WILKINSON v. FARMERS HOLDING COMPANIES (2026)

Lucas Wilkinson appeals a judgment for Farmers Holding Companies d/b/a Capital Sand Inc. on its motion for summary judgment. This Court affirms the circuit court's judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Wilkinson worked as a wet plant foreman at Capital Sand until his employment was terminated in January 2022. In April 2022, Wilkinson sent a certified letter to “Farmer Holding Co.,”¹ requesting a service letter under section 290.140.² He did not receive a response. In December 2022, Wilkinson sued Farmers, alleging Farmers violated section 290.140 when it did not respond to his request.³ Without filing an answer alleging affirmative defenses to Wilkinson's lawsuit, Farmers moved for summary judgment. In its motion, Farmers asserted it was entitled to summary judgment on Wilkinson's claim for violation of section 290.140 because Wilkinson did not send a service letter request to or sue his actual employer. Farmers alleged Wilkinson's actual employer was “Capital Sand Proppants, LLC,” the legal entity from which Wilkinson received his W-2s.

The circuit court sustained Farmers’ motion and entered a judgment in Farmers’ favor. Wilkinson timely appealed. This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020). “In reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this Court applies the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Summary judgment is proper if the moving party establishes there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Rule 74.04(c)(6). “The record below is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.” Green, 606 S.W.3d at 116.

Analysis

Wilkinson raises a single point of error in his opening brief, asserting the circuit court erred by granting Farmers the extreme and drastic remedy of summary judgment because numerous genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute.⁴ This Court rejects the proposition summary judgment is an extreme and drastic remedy. See ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. banc 1993) (discussing the history of Rule 74.04, noting summary judgment historically had been regarded as an “extreme and drastic remedy” and rejecting “slightest doubt” as the proper standard for denial of summary judgment under Rule 74.04 due to a “genuine issue” of material fact (internal quotation omitted)). In ITT, this Court held: “To the extent that trial and appellate courts are of the impression that the ‘slightest doubt’ standard defeats summary judgment when any doubt exists, no matter how unreasonable, the standard [h]as been misapplied and is now abandoned.” Id. at 378. This Court now repeats what it established in ITT. Rule 74.04 sets out the requirements for summary judgment, and summary judgment is not an extreme or drastic remedy. To the extent this Court's opinions or opinions of the court of appeals hold or suggest summary judgment is an extreme or drastic remedy, those cases should no longer be followed.⁵

As to Wilkinson's argument genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute precluding summary judgment, the record reflects Wilkinson failed to file a proper response to Farmers’ summary judgment motion. Rule 74.04(c)(2) requires a summary judgment response “set forth each statement of fact in its original paragraph number and immediately thereunder admit or deny each of movant's factual statements” and requires “the response ․ support each denial with specific references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Wilkinson did not comply with either requirement. He filed a document titled “Answer and Counter Affidavit” and set out newly numbered paragraphs referencing multiple of Farmers’ individual statements of fact (without restating those facts as required by Rule 74.04(c)(2)) and admitted and denied them in bulk. He included no specific references to supporting materials in his purported denials of each of Farmers’ alleged material facts.⁶

Rule 74.04(c)(2) explicitly states: “A denial may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleading[,]” but Wilkinson's bulk denials did just that. Rule 74.04(c)(2) itself sets out the legal consequence for failing to follow it: “A response that does not comply with this Rule 74.04(c)(2) with respect to any numbered paragraph in movant's statement is an admission of the truth of that numbered paragraph.” “Facts not properly supported under Rule 74.04(c)(2) or (c)(4) are deemed admitted.” Green, 606 S.W.3d at 116 (internal quotation omitted). Because Wilkinson's response did not comply with Rule 74.04(c)(2), his response admitted the truth of each of Farmers’ statements of material fact.

Rule 74.04(c)(2) also provides a response may “set forth additional material facts that remain in dispute, which shall be presented in consecutively numbered paragraphs and supported in the manner prescribed by Rule 74.04(c)(1).” Wilkinson's response sets forth no additional material facts that remained in dispute. In addition to his bulk admissions and denials, in certain paragraphs in his response, Wilkinson made bare allegations, such as: “That the service letter was sent and received by the Defendant[,]” but this allegation is not in the form prescribed by Rule 74.04(c)(2) and has no reference to supporting materials in the record, as required by Rules 74.04(c)(1) and (2). Accordingly, Wilkinson fails to establish any genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute such that summary judgment should not have been granted.⁷

Perhaps recognizing the deficiencies in the single point in his opening brief, Wilkinson filed a reply brief raising a new point relied on and what he acknowledges is a new argument asserting summary judgment was precluded as a matter of law because Farmers failed to comply with Rule 55.08 in that Farmers did not file an answer asserting, as an affirmative defense, Wilkinson's noncompliance with section 290.140.⁸ Wilkinson spent almost all of his oral argument asserting this Court should decide his appeal based on his new point.

This Court's appellate rules preclude new issues from being raised in a reply brief. Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A) requires the appellant's initial brief to identify each “trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges[.]” “Assignments of error set forth for the first time in the reply brief do not present issues for appellate review.” Swafford v. Treasurer of Mo., 659 S.W.3d 580, 585 n.7 (Mo. banc 2023) (internal quotation omitted). Under Rule 84.13(a), “allegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal[.]”

Attempting to avoid these rules, Wilkinson asserts this Court is free to consider his argument raised for the first time in his reply brief because, in conducting its de novo review, this Court sits as the circuit court and reviews the case anew. According to Wilkinson, because Rule 74.04(c)(6) permits a circuit court to enter summary judgment only “[i]f the motion, the response, the reply and the sur-reply show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” this Court may and should consider, in its de novo review, whether the circuit court incorrectly concluded Farmers had the right to judgment as a matter of law. Wilkinson misunderstands de novo review. “[T]his Court reviews the circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo. But this standard of review does not alter that appellants always bear the burden of establishing error whatever the standard of review.” City of De Soto v. Parson, 625 S.W.3d 412, 416 n.3 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal citation omitted); see also Apperson v. Kaminsky, 727 S.W.3d 422, 426 & n.3 (Mo. banc 2026) (noting issues of law are reviewed de novo but an “appellant always bears the burden of showing error and a right to relief”).

In conducting de novo review, this Court reviews arguments properly presented to the circuit court, properly preserved for review, and properly raised on appeal. A contrary rule would require this Court to become an advocate for Wilkinson by raising sua sponte arguments he did not raise in the circuit court or on appeal and to which Farmers had no opportunity to respond.⁹ This would far exceed this Court's role as a reviewing court. See Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20, 29 (Mo. banc 2013) (“An appellate court's role is to review specifically challenged trial court rulings, not to sift through the record to detect possibly valid arguments.”); see also Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region v. Knodell, 685 S.W.3d 377, 386 (Mo. banc 2024) (“It is not this Court's role to make an appellant's argument. This ensures the opposing party has proper notice and opportunity to respond and brief the argument.” (internal quotation omitted)).

It follows Wilkinson failed to properly preserve the argument he raises for the first time in his reply brief. As a result, there is no argument for this Court to review as to whether the circuit court erred in determining Farmers was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 74.04 because Farmers had to file affirmative defenses under Rule 55.08 challenging Wilkinson's noncompliance with section 290.140 and did not do so.

Conclusion

The circuit court did not err in entering summary judgment for Farmers. This Court affirms the circuit court's judgment.

SEPARATE OPINION

If I were to reach the merits of this appeal, I would concur with the principal opinion. I feel compelled to write separately because the record in this case shows the court of appeals ordered Lucas Wilkinson to file an amended brief in response to Farmers Holding Companies’ motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of compliance with Rule 84.04. In other words, despite having the opportunity to correct his briefing deficiencies, Wilkinson failed to do so at the court of appeals and in this Court. Wilkinson's single point relied on provides:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING RESPONDENT-EMPLOYER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THIS REMEDY IS EXTREME AND DRASTIC AS SUPREME COURT RULE 74.04 REQUIRES DEFENDANT TO FILE ITS MOTION WITH SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS AND PLAINTIFF TO FILE HIS RESPONSE AND DENIAL AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT WITH FACTS TO COUNTER; AS THERE ARE NUMEROUS ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE PRIMARILY THAT THE SERVICE LETTER SENT TO THE PROPER EMPLOYER, THAT PLAINTIFF SIGNED THE SERVICE LETTER AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO REPLY TO THE SERVICE LETTER (DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LAW) THESE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE ARE DETERMINATIVE BY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNSSES [sic] WHICH CAN ONLY BE ASCERTAINED AND DETERMINED BY A JURY AND NOT A TRIAL JUDGE REVIEWING THE COLD AFFIDAVIT OF EACH PARTY AND, THEREFORE, THIS AND OTHER DISPUTED FACTS AND AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO REPLY TO THE SERVICE LETTER RESULTED IN DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF WHICH CLEARLY PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Wilkinson's point fails to follow the template set forth in Rule 84.04(d), which specifies:

The point shall be in substantially the following form. The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error].

“The point relied on is a central, indispensable element of an appellate brief because it defines a specific issue for this Court's review.” City of Harrisonville v. Mo. Dep't of Nat. Res., 681 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Mo. banc 2023). “A deficient point relied on requires the respondent and appellate court to search the remainder of the brief to discern the appellant's assertion and, beyond causing a waste of resources, risks the appellant's argument being understood or framed in an unintended manner.” Id. at 181 (internal quotation omitted). Wilkinson's single point relied on violates Rule 84.04(d) in multiple respects and, therefore, preserves nothing for review. See Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022) (stating a point relied on that does not comply with Rule 84.04(d) preserves nothing for appellate review).

Although this Court prefers to reach the merits of an appeal, Wilkinson's noncompliance with Rule 84.04(d) is not a mere technicality.¹ The point relied on fails to identify the legal reasons for Wilkinson's claim of reversible error and explain why those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error. Instead, the point asserts material facts remain in dispute regarding whether Wilkinson signed the service letter request or sent the request to his employer. If Wilkinson believed a genuine issue remained as to either of those alleged material facts or any others, he was required to set out which material facts remain in dispute and the legal reasons why a genuine issue as to those material facts precluded summary judgment. Any attempt to discern a specific argument from Wilkinson's noncompliant point would require this Court to “abandon[ ] the role of neutral arbiter and, instead, assume[ ] an improper ‘advocacy role’ on [Wilkinson's] behalf.” City of Harrisonville, 681 S.W.3d at 181.

Wilkinson's brief violates Rule 84.04 in other respects as well. Immediately after his point relied on, Wilkinson cited Rule 74.04 and six cases, which ignores Rule 84.04(d)(5)’s requirement that each point shall be followed by “a list of cases, not to exceed four, and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that party principally relies.” Furthermore, Rule 84.04(a)(1) requires an appellant's brief to contain “[a] detailed table of contents, with page references, and a table of cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes, and other authorities cited, with reference to the pages of the brief where they are cited[.]” Wilkinson's brief set forth a table of authorities; however, he failed to provide the page numbers where he cited to Rule 74.04 and the cases in his brief. Wilkinson also did not arrange the cases alphabetically.

“Rule 84.04's requirements are mandatory.” Lexow, 643 S.W.3d at 505 (internal quotation omitted). In Lexow, this Court found the appellant's substantial noncompliance with Rule 84.04 preserved nothing for appellate review and dismissed the appeal. Id. at 509-10. In my view, Wilkinson's appeal should be dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Respondent has also referred to the entity to which Wilkinson sent the letter as “Farmers Holding Co.” This discrepancy has no bearing on this Court's analysis.

2.   All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, and all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2024). Section 290.140.1 sets out requirements for how and when a discharged employee may request a service letter from a former employer. As relevant here, the service letter request must be in writing and sent by certified mail to the superintendent, manager, or registered agent of the corporation that employed the employee. The former employer has 45 days from receipt of the request to issue a service letter complying with the statutory requirements. Under section 290.140.2, if the former employer fails to comply with section 290.140.1, the former employer may be liable for nominal damages, compensatory damages, or punitive damages.

3.   Wilkinson also alleged disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Farmers removed the case to federal court. The federal district court dismissed Wilkinson's ADA claim and remanded the case to state court for disposition of the remaining claim for violation of section 290.140.

4.   Wilkinson did not file a substitute appellant's brief in this Court as permitted by Rule 83.08(b). As a result, he stands on his amended appellant's brief originally filed in the court of appeals.

5.   See, e.g., Clark v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, 666 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. App. 2023); Boone Cnty. v. Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund, 26 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Mo. App. 2000).

6.   For example, in a newly numbered paragraph 4, Wilkinson responded: “That Plaintiff denies paragraphs 12, 14 (unsigned), 16 and 17.” This improper bulk denial contains no reference to any supporting materials in the record. Demonstrating one of the problems with newly numbered paragraphs, Wilkinson failed to admit or deny two of Farmers’ statements of uncontroverted material facts; Wilkinson simply did not respond to those two paragraphs.

7.   This is not to say the circuit court had to enter summary judgment in Farmers’ favor based on Wilkinson's improper summary judgment response. Rule 74.04(c)(6) makes clear this is not the case when it provides a circuit court “shall enter summary judgment” when “the motion, the response, the reply and the sur-reply show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]” (Emphasis added). Wilkinson, however, raised no such error despite including the words “as a matter of law” in his opening brief point asserting only that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute with respect to his request for a service letter.

8.   Rule 55.08 provides: “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth all applicable affirmative defenses and avoidances[.]” Although not raised by Wilkinson, Rule 55.01 provides: “There shall be a petition and an answer[.] ․ A defense consisting of an affirmative avoidance to any matter alleged in a preceding pleading must be pleaded.” Because this issue was not properly raised or preserved for appellate review, this Court declines to address what effect failure to comply with Rules 55.01 and 55.08 may have on a motion for summary judgment.

9.   Rule 84.13(c) permits this Court in its discretion to consider plain errors affecting substantial rights even if not raised or preserved when this Court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted from the plain error. Plain error review is discretionary and “rarely granted in civil cases.” Bridegan v. Turntine, 689 S.W.3d 481, 485 n.6 (Mo. banc 2023) (internal quotation omitted). Wilkinson does not request plain error review and has not alleged or proven manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.

1.   “Abstract statements of law, standing alone, do not comply with this rule.” Rule 84.04(d)(4).

Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

Powell, C.J., Ransom, Wilson, Broniec, and Russell, JJ., concur; Fischer, J., filed separate opinion.