148 2018 LLC v. Ogan Williams, Appellant, Alain Palmer, Tenant, "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," Undertenants. (2026)

ORDERED that the final judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this holdover proceeding commenced in August 2023, Ogan Williams (respondent) asserted in his answer that he was not a tenant and had never been petitioner's tenant. At a nonjury trial, petitioner's president testified that petitioner purchased the premises in June 2018, and that he met respondent at the closing, at which time respondent showed him a copy of his lease agreement with Uri McPhill, one of the former owners of the premises. Petitioner presented, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, a deed to the premises dated June 27, 2018 that was "RECORDED OR FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CITY REGISTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK" on July 23, 2018, listing three individuals, including Uri McPhill and McPhill's former wife, as grantors and petitioner as grantee; a lease agreement executed by respondent and Uri McPhill, effective from March 1, 2018 to March 1, 2020; and a copy of a 90-day notice with proof of service upon respondent. Respondent disputed petitioner's ownership of the premises, and presented a deed to the premises from 2017, which he claimed was given to him by Uri McPhill. He admitted that, while he had attempted to record this deed, the deed was never officially recorded, and that he had executed the lease agreement with Uri McPhill which petitioner had presented to the court. However, he alleged that he had executed the lease agreement with Uri McPhill because he could not find the deed at that time, and that he used this lease agreement in order to present a defense in a prior summary proceeding commenced by Uri McPhill's former wife.

Following the trial, the Civil Court (Clifton A. Nembhard, J.) awarded petitioner possession, finding that petitioner's claim of title was superior to respondent's claim of title, because petitioner's deed had been recorded. Notably, in a decision after trial, the court held that respondent "is judicially estopped from taking the position there is no landlord tenant relationship between the petitioner and himself," because "he testified that he successfully used the lease in [two prior cases] to show that he had an unexpired lease with McPhill." The court also stated that respondent's "contention that McPhill gave him the lease only because he could not find his deed rings hollow as nothing prevented McPhill from providing him with a replacement deed."

On appeal from the final judgment entered on October 8, 2024, respondent argues that the Civil Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the title dispute between the parties and that his deed "was recorded prior to any purported claim by [petitioner]." He also argues that there was never any landlord-tenant relationship between himself and petitioner, acknowledging the "lease executed between the Respondent-Appellant and a prior owner of the property," but arguing that it was not a basis for this proceeding because it expired in 2020. Finally, he argues that the Civil Court improperly denied his requests for a jury trial and for an adjournment to retain counsel.

It is well settled that "a question of title can properly be raised as a defense to a summary proceeding even though title to the premises cannot ultimately be determined as an affirmative claim in the context of a summary proceeding" (City of New York v Akbar's Self Help, Inc., 25 Misc 3d 129[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52112[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; see RPAPL 743; CCA 905; Nissequogue Boat Club v State of New York, 14 AD3d 542 [2005]; Yacoob v Persaud, 34 Misc 3d 150[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50249[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Muzio v Rogers, 20 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51763[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]). Consequently, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of respondent's claim that he was the owner of the premises "for purposes of determining the right to present possession at issue in this proceeding" (Chopra v Prusik, 9 Misc 3d 42, 44 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]). While respondent presented a deed to the premises, which predated petitioner's deed, respondent admitted at trial that his deed was never properly recorded and that he entered into a lease as a tenant for the subject property subsequent to the purported deed. Assuming without deciding that respondent's deed is authentic, we agree with the Civil Court's determination that respondent's claim of title was inferior to petitioner's claim of title (see Real Property Law § 291; Williams v Ross, 277 AD2d 776, 777 [2000]). Respondent's claim, made for the first time on appeal, that his deed was recorded prior to petitioner's deed, explicitly contradicts his trial testimony.

While respondent contends that the final judgment should be reversed because he did not have a landlord-tenant relationship with petitioner, as relevant here, "a successor-in-interest to real property takes the premises subject to the conditions as to the tenancy . . . that his predecessor in title has established" (Tehan v Peters Print. Co., 71 AD2d 101, 104 [1979]; see Bank of NY, Albany v Hirschfeld, 37 NY2d 501 [1975]; Peak Dev., LLC v Construction Exch., 100 AD3d 1394 [2012]), and respondent admits that he signed the March 2018 lease with Uri McPhill. To the extent that respondent implied in the Civil Court that the 2018 lease was not authentic, the Civil Court correctly rejected that claim and properly held that, in any event, respondent is judicially estopped from disputing the leases's validity because he successfully defended two prior summary proceedings by submitting the lease to the Civil Court (see generally Moran Enters., Inc. v Hurst, 160 AD3d 638 [2018])—a determination that he does not challenge on this appeal. To the extent he implies on appeal that the 2018 lease was valid but that petitioner cannot evict him because the lease expired in 2020, we note that a successor-in-interest to a lease to which he is subject may commence a holdover proceeding, as petitioner did here, upon service of the proper notice and the expiration of the notice period (see Real Property Law § 226-c; see also generally Real Property Law § 228; 4720 Ave., Inc. v House, 81 Misc 3d 139[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51459[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023] [regarding the termination of a tenancy at will and a tenancy by sufferance]). Here, service of a 90-day notice was appropriate, since respondent had occupied the premises for more than two years (see Real Property Law § 226-c [2] [d]).

Upon a review of the record, we find that the Civil Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion when it denied respondent's request for an adjournment, given that the trial occurred 14 months after the proceeding was commenced, and respondent failed to provide any documentation that his alleged medical condition prevented him from retaining an attorney for the entire 14-month period (see generally Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Chaudhury, 188 AD3d 1126, 1127 [2020]; Terio v Terio, 190 AD2d 665, 665-666 [1993]; Boltz v Ascolesi, 16 Misc 3d 133[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51499[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Further, respondent waived any right to a jury trial, as he did not demand a jury trial in his answer (see RPAPL 745; Glass v Thompson, 51 AD2d 69, 73 [1976]).

Respondent's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. In view of the foregoing, we find no basis to disturb the final judgment.

Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed.

BUGGS, J.P., MUNDY and LIN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: September 18, 2026