The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Antonio Jose De Oliveira, Appellant. (2026)

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Following a nonjury trial, the City Court (Lyndon D. Williams, J.; op 80 Misc 3d 1227[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51114[U]) convicted defendant of forcible touching (Penal Law § 130.52) and sexual abuse in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.55), and, on March 11, 2024, sentenced defendant to six years' probation on the forcible touching charge and one year's probation on the sexual abuse in the third degree charge to run concurrently with the six-year period. The uncontroverted evidence indicated that, when defendant saw the complainant, a female employee at a restaurant which defendant frequented, enter a bathroom at the restaurant, he knocked on the door and, when she opened it, he entered the bathroom, grabbed the complainant's face with both of his hands and tried to kiss her on her lips. The complainant placed her hands on her lips and moved her head away from defendant to prevent him from kissing her. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient as it did not show with any degree of certainty that he forcibly touched, or subjected the complainant to sexual contact with, a sexual or intimate part of the complainant's body; that the City Court erred when it allowed the complainant to testify about a prior time when defendant had tried to kiss her; and that the sentences imposed were unduly harsh and excessive.

Defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is preserved for appellate review as he moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People's case on the same grounds he now raises on appeal and renewed that motion at the close of the trial (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). Consequently, we must determine whether there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational person could have found that the elements of the charged offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]; see also People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]).

Pursuant to Penal Law § 130.52 (1), a person is guilty of forcible touching "when such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose . . . forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor's sexual desire." Under Penal Law § 130.52, "forcible touching includes squeezing, grabbing or pinching." Penal Law § 130.55 provides that, with an exception not applicable here, "[a] person is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent." "Sexual contact" is defined broadly as "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party" (Penal Law § 130.00 [3]).

The City Court found that the evidence presented at trial established that defendant intentionally and forcibly grabbed the complainant's face, without her consent, for the purpose of trying to kiss her for his own sexual gratification. Thus, "[g]iven the nature and circumstances of the encounter," the court determined that complainant's face was an intimate body part and that defendant forcibly touched it and subjected her to sexual contact, without her consent, while trying to kiss her (People v De Oliveira, 2023 NY Slip Op 51114[U], at *3). The City Court is correct that a person's face can be considered an intimate body part, especially in the context of a kiss (see People v Sumpter, 190 Misc 2d 115 [App Term, 1st Dept 2001]; People v Lewis, 25 Misc 3d 1206[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51983[U] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2009]; People v Miller, 19 Misc 3d 457 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2008]). Consequently, we find that the evidence presented by the People was legally sufficient to prove that defendant was guilty of forcible touching and sexual abuse in the third degree.

Evidence of a defendant's prior "bad act" is admissible, notwithstanding potential prejudice to the defendant, where it is offered for some purpose other than to show the defendant's criminal disposition and can "logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case" (People v Denson, 26 NY3d 179, 185 [2015], quoting People v Cass, 18 NY3d 553, 559 [2012]; see People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-243 [1987]; People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]). Here, we find that it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the City Court to have allowed testimony pertaining to defendant's prior attempt to kiss the complainant, as the court correctly found that such testimony was relevant to proving defendant's intent and motive, and completed the narrative (see People v Dorm, 12 NY3d 16, 19 [2009]; Alvino, 71 NY2d at 241-243; People v Bernard, 224 AD2d 192 [1996]).

Contrary to defendant's final contention, the sentences imposed were not unduly harsh or severe (see People v George, 237 AD3d 971 [2025]; People v Trent, 236 AD3d 1068 [2025]; People v Krasnyanskiy, 86 Misc 3d 135[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51168[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2025]; see generally CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; People v Brisman, 43 NY3d 322 [2025]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

WALSH, J.P., CONWAY and VAZQUEZ-DOLES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: August 20, 2026