The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Magdi Sourour, Appellant. (2026)

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of forcible touching (Penal Law § 130.52) and sexual abuse in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.55). Defendant was sentenced (Lisa M. Petrocelli, J.) to two terms of probation, to run concurrently, which included, among other things, home confinement and employment conditions. On appeal, defendant contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the aforementioned conditions of probation should be removed because they are not reasonably related to his rehabilitation.

At trial, the complainant testified that she met defendant, a physician, at his office for a job interview. She spoke with defendant in his office for about 90 minutes, during which time defendant asked her about her medical history and informed her that a physical examination was required as part of the interview process. The complainant told defendant, among other things, that she thought that she had scoliosis. Defendant stated that he could examine her for scoliosis; they went into an examination room and defendant told the complainant to undress. She voluntarily took off her blouse, kept on her sports bra, and unzipped her pants, after which defendant told her to lie down on the exam table. Defendant locked the door, sat on a stool behind her and "trac[ed]" her back. After putting oil on his hands, defendant asked the complainant to lie on her stomach and told her to remove her bra, which she refused to do. Defendant then turned off the lights, explaining that the complainant could relax, and massaged her back and shoulders with the oil. While massaging her lower back, defendant slipped his hands through her pants, touched her buttocks and "finger[ed]" her vagina. The complainant thereupon jumped off of the exam table and defendant, who was immediately in front of her, tried to kiss her. At the conclusion of the People's case, defendant rested without presenting any evidence.

Upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), while according great deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we are satisfied that the verdict convicting defendant of forcible touching and sexual abuse in the third degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-646 [2006]).

A court is authorized to impose conditions of probation which "the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so" (Penal Law § 65.10 [1]). When imposing a sentence of probation, the court may require the defendant to comply with "any other reasonable condition as the court shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the incarceration of the defendant" (Penal Law § 65.10 [5]; see People v Hannah, 65 AD3d 1378, 1379 [2009]; People v Wagner, 9 Misc 3d 131[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51597[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]). Moreover, Penal Law § 65.10 (2) (l) provides that a defendant shall "[s]atisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation" (see People v Hale, 93 NY2d 454, 461 [1999]; see also People v Hakes, 32 NY3d 624, 629 [2018]; see e.g. People v Letterlough, 86 NY2d 259, 263-265 [1995]).

Under the circumstances presented, we find that the home confinement and employment conditions of probation were reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life (Penal Law § 65.10 [1]) and were reasonably related to his rehabilitation (see Penal Law § 65.10 [2] [l]). With respect to defendant's challenge to the home confinement condition of probation, the relatively short 30-day time period thereof can be used to insure that defendant will avoid situations in which he could forcibly touch or sexually abuse someone and, therefore, lead a law-abiding life during the early portion of his probation. We note that even though "the legislature plainly intended to authorize conditions that are rehabilitative in nature, . . . many . . . may have incidental punitive and deterrent effects" (Hakes, 32 NY3d at 629 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Letterlough, 86 NY2d at 264-265).

With respect to defendant's challenge to the employment condition of probation, we find, contrary to defendant's arguments, that this condition does not totally prohibit him from practicing medicine, as it solely requires him to get the approval of probation, or the court, prior to any type of employment. The condition has nothing to do with defendant's license to practice medicine and clearly does not usurp the authority of the Office of Professional Medical Conduct to regulate medical licenses. Restrictions on employment are obviously beneficial to the rehabilitative goals of probation as "[o]ffenders should be kept from persons and places which might serve to trigger their sex offending conduct—at least until they have learned how to deal with these 'triggers' during the course of sex offender treatment" (People v Kenneth B., 2003 NY Slip Op 51147[U], *20-21 [County Ct, Dutchess County 2003]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

DRISCOLL, P.J., WALSH and VAZQUEZ-DOLES, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: August 20, 2026