PEOPLE v. DAI MA (2019)

ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 165.45 [1]) and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.05 [1]). After the felony count was dismissed, defendant, while represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree. Thereafter, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, and based upon the recommendation contained in defendant's presentence report, the court imposed a split sentence of 60 days' incarceration combined with three years' probation. On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence was excessive and, given his lack of a prior criminal record, should be reduced in the interest of justice to a sentence solely of 60 days' incarceration, which he has already served.

As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement will not be heard to complain that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive (see People v Galvez, 72 AD3d 838 [2010]; People v Ubiles, 59 AD3d 572 [2009]; People v Oneyeukwu, 56 Misc 3d 140[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51100[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; People v Rosario, 47 Misc 3d 141[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50622[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015] ). Under the circumstances presented, we find no basis to deviate from that rule. The sentence imposed did not constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion or a failure to observe sentencing principles, and defendant has not demonstrated the existence of mitigating or extraordinary circumstances warranting a modification of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302 [1981]; People v Vega, 73 AD3d 1218 [2010]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]; People v Oneyeukwu, 56 Misc 3d 140[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51100[U]).

Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

SIEGAL, J.P., PESCE and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.