PEOPLE v. MENDEZ (2018)

Judgment of conviction (Carol R. Feinman, J.), rendered July 2, 2017, affirmed.

The accusatory instrument was not jurisdictionally defective. It charged all the elements of criminal trespass in the second degree (see Penal Law § 140.15[1] ). The instrument recited that defendant was observed "on the roof landing" of a specified New York City Housing Authority building, which is "a dwelling where people reside," in a location beyond posted "No Trespassing" signs; and that in response to police questioning, defendant stated "I am not a tenant" and "I am not an invited guest". These allegations, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000] ), were sufficient for pleading purposes to establish that defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling (see People v Barnes, 26 NY3d 986, 989 [2015]; People v Richardson, 49 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51579[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1111 [2016] ).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Per Curiam.