LANDSCAPING WITH GRACE INC v. RICKERT (2018)

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the action.

Plaintiff commenced this commercial claims action to recover the principal sum of $5,000 for landscaping services it had rendered. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff's witness testified that defendant's son-in-law, Al Mansour, had agreed to have plaintiff provide landscaping services at defendant's premises. Plaintiff's witness also testified that defendant's son-in-law assured the witness that he was going to get a power of attorney from his mother-in-law. Plaintiff presented an estimate that it had prepared for Al Mansour that was made out to “Al Rickert” totaling $7,000, which described the services plaintiff was hired to perform. Plaintiff's witness further testified that, while he was performing the services, defendant was at the door of the premises “pointing to trees.” Following the trial, the District Court awarded judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $5,000.

Appellate review of a commercial claims judgment is limited to determining whether “substantial justice has ․ been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law” (UDCA 1807-A [a]; see UDCA 1804-A; Ross v. Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v. Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000] ). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v. State of New York, 184 AD2d 564, 564 [1992]; Kincade v. Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991] ). This deference applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Commercial Claims Part of the court, given the limited standard of review (see Williams v. Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

Upon a review of the record, we find that plaintiff failed to prove that it had any agreement, written or otherwise, with defendant, or that defendant's son-in-law, with whom plaintiff dealt, had authority to act as defendant's agent. Indeed, it appears from the written estimate that plaintiff was looking to “Al Rickert” for payment, not defendant. Under the totality of the circumstances presented, it cannot be inferred that there existed an implied contract by defendant to pay for the reasonable value of the services rendered (see Berlinger v. Lisi, 288 AD2d 523 [2001] ).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the action.

RUDERMAN, J.P., TOLBERT and BRANDS, JJ., concur.