PEOPLE v. GORDON (2018)

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of disobeying a traffic control signal by failing to stop at a steady red light (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 [d] [1] ).

Defendant's contention regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review since defendant's attorney did not move for a trial order of dismissal in the Justice Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v. Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491–492 [2008]; People v. Daniels, 111 AD3d 847 [2013] ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983] ) and indulging in all reasonable inferences in the People's favor (see People v. Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 437 [1985] ), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's guilt of disobeying a traffic control signal by failing to stop at a steady red light (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 [d] [1] ). Defendant's conviction was supported by a police officer's testimony that he had observed the traffic light, which controlled the westbound traffic on Popham Road, turn red, and had seen a vehicle, which was being driven by defendant, before it had reached the stop line and crosswalk located in front of the light, and then watched the vehicle as it passed a steady red light. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348–349 [2007] ), while according great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v. Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987] ), we find that the verdict convicting defendant of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111 (d) (1) was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643–646 [2006] ).

Defendant further contends that a new trial is required because the Justice Court prevented her from establishing material issues of fact regarding approximate distances between the traffic signal, the stop line, and the police officer's observation location. This contention, however, is unpreserved for appellate review, as defendant failed to object in the Justice Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v. Lyons, 81 NY2d 753, 754 [1992]; People v. West, 56 NY2d 662, 663 [1982]; People v. Francisco, 44 AD3d 870 [2007] ). Nevertheless, it is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion over the nature and extent of cross-examination (see People v. Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 [1969] ), and can limit the scope of cross-examination when questions are irrelevant or only marginally relevant, or concern collateral issues (see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 [1986]; People v. Francisco, 44 AD3d at 870). The “Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish” (Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 US 15, 20 [1985]; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US at 679; People v. Burns, 6 NY3d 793, 795 [2006] ). Here, defense counsel's questions regarding distances were only marginally relevant. In any event, upon a review of the record, we find that error, if any, was harmless, inasmuch as the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted but for the error (see People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241–242 [1975] ). We further find that defendant's Brady contention (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963] ) lacks merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

MARANO, P.J., GARGUILO and BRANDS, JJ., concur.