SOLAGES v. NATIONAL GRID (2019)

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant's motion to dismiss the action is denied.

In this small claims action seeking $4,990.61 for an “overcharge,” plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court granting defendant's motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the Public Service Commission has primary jurisdiction to resolve what defendant describes as a billing dispute.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether “substantial justice has ․ been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law” (CCA 1807; see CCA 1804; Ross v. Friedman, 269 A.D.2d 584, 707 N.Y.S.2d 114 [2000]; Williams v. Roper, 269 A.D.2d 125, 703 N.Y.S.2d 77 [2000]).

“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. The doctrine is intended to coordinate the relationship between courts and administrative agencies so that the agency's views on factual and technical issues, as well as the scope and meaning of the statute administered by the agency, are made available where the matter before the court is within the agency's specialized field” (2 NY Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 328; see also Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 436 N.E.2d 461 [1982]). The doctrine comes into play “whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body” (2 NY Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 328). “There is no fixed formula governing the application of the doctrine to the facts of a particular case. Rather, the court must determine in each case whether the reasons for the doctrine are present and whether the purposes of the doctrine will be served by its application” (Heller v. Coca-Cola Co., 230 A.D.2d 768, 769, 646 N.Y.S.2d 524 [1996]).

We find that, based on the papers submitted to the Civil Court, it cannot be said that it has been established that the resolution of plaintiff's claims would require “the special competence of an administrative body” (2 NY Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 328). Plaintiff does not seem to challenge, for example, the reasonableness of defendant's rates or raise any other issue requiring the expertise of the Public Service Commission (cf. Lamparter v. Long Is. Light. Co., 90 A.D.2d 496, 496, 454 N.Y.S.2d 751 [1982]; Guglielmo v. Long Is. Light. Co., 83 A.D.2d 481, 484, 445 N.Y.S.2d 177 [1981]; Filler v. Consolidated Edison, 39 Misc. 3d 128(A), 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 50423(U), 2013 WL 1234935 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2013] ). Instead, plaintiff's claim appears to be merely a dispute over what amount of money he has paid to defendant, in which case “no coordination between the court action and any administrative agency proceeding is necessary, as there is no risk of inconsistent dispositions” (Amoamah v. Fried, 48 Misc. 3d 64, 65, 15 N.Y.S.3d 540 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2015] ). Consequently, we find that, on this record, the court's dismissal of plaintiff's action failed to render substantial justice between the parties (see CCA 1807).

However, if, at trial, it appears that plaintiff is not simply seeking money in this action, but is, instead, seeking injunctive relief or a declaration that he does not owe money to defendant, we note that such relief is not available in this forum (see CCA 1801 [a small claims action is a cause of action “for money only”] ). Moreover, if plaintiff raises issues at trial which require the expertise of the Public Service Commission or would risk inconsistent dispositions between that agency and the courts, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would apply to his claims.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant's motion to dismiss the action is denied.

WESTON, J.P., ALIOTTA and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.