PEOPLE v. BROOKS (2019)

Order (Tamiko A. Amaker, J.), dated August 4, 2017, reversed, on the law, the accusatory instrument reinstated, and the matter remanded to Criminal Court for further proceedings.

On July 5, 2017, defendant sent a text message to his ex-girlfriend that read “I am going to hurt you, I want you to die, I have a mixture of bleach and hair dye that I am going to use on you.” Later that day, after the victim saw defendant outside of a Manhattan subway station, defendant was arrested and police recovered from him a bottle containing bleach and water. At arraignment, Criminal Court, in New York County, issued a temporary order of protection directing, inter alia, that defendant “stay away” from the victim. Defendant signed the order of protection, which was personally served on him in court.

Approximately one week later, on July 14, 2017, defendant approached and spoke to the victim inside a Kings County subway station, in violation of the order of protection. As a result, defendant was arrested in New York County and charged herein with second-degree criminal contempt. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the New York County Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged criminal conduct occurred in Kings County. Criminal Court granted the motion and dismissed the accusatory instrument. The People appeal and we now reverse.

CPL 20.40(2)(c) confers jurisdiction in a county where the offending conduct “had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon such county.” In this case, when defendant violated the order of protection in Kings County, his conduct had a “particular effect” on the New York County Court that issued the edict because Courts rely upon the full force and effect of their orders of protection to protect not only the named complainant but the well being of the community as a whole. Therefore, defendant's conduct in King's County had a “particular effect” in New York County by producing “a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare” (CPL 20.10[4]; see Matter of Taub v. Altman, 3 N.Y.3d 30, 36-37, 781 N.Y.S.2d 492, 814 N.E.2d 799 [2004]; People v. Fludd, 44 A.D.3d 408, 409, 843 N.Y.S.2d 249 [2007], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 765, 854 N.Y.S.2d 327, 883 N.E.2d 1262 [2008]; People v. Latour, 11 AD3d 819, 783 N.Y.S.2d 429 [2004], lv denied 4 N.Y.3d 800, 795 N.Y.S.2d 175, 828 N.E.2d 91 [2005]; People v. Sandy, 236 A.D.2d 104, 114-115, 666 N.Y.S.2d 565 [1997], lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 977, 672 N.Y.S.2d 856, 695 N.E.2d 725 [1998]; People v. Ortega, 152 Misc. 2d 84, 575 N.Y.S.2d 247 [Crim. Ct., N.Y. County 1991] ). Manifestly, “it would not be in keeping with the purpose of a temporary order of protection, to protect the victims of family offenses pending trial, if the court did not have jurisdiction over violations of the order of protection that allegedly occurred in other counties” (People v. Nakouzi, 31 Misc. 3d 1213[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 50665[U], *3, 2011 WL 1459214 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2011] ).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Per Curiam.