The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Seanpaul Reyes, Respondent. (2026)

ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified, on the law, by providing that so much thereof as granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with trespass on the ground that it was facially insufficient is vacated and that branch of defendant's motion is denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with trespass and for all further proceedings thereon.

Defendant was charged in a single accusatory instrument with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), criminal trespass in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.10 [a]), and trespass (Penal Law § 140.05) at the 75th police precinct in Brooklyn. The factual portion of the accusatory instrument alleged:

"The deponent[, a police officer,] states, that deponent was performing deponent's official duties in that deponent was working inside of the 075 command and the deponent observed the defendant video recording within the police station and the deponent asked the defendant to stop video recording with the defendant's cellphone, tripod, microphone, and a smartwatch and defendant continued to video record and refused to comply and then the deponent asked the defendant to leave the police station whereupon defendant stated in sum and substance, I have a right to be inside and you can't keep me out and then the deponent escorted the defendant out of the police station while the defendant prevented the doors from closing and upon the defendant exiting the police station the deponent told the defendant if the defendant reenters the police station the defendant would be arrested for trespassing and subsequently the defendant reentered the police station and started to video record and the deponent arrested the defendant.

The deponent further states that the deponent is the custodian of the above-described dwelling and defendant did not have permission or authority to enter or remain therein."

The People timely filed a certificate of compliance (COC) with discovery and a statement of readiness (SOR) for trial, which included a CPL 30.30 (5-a) certification of the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument. Thereafter, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument on several grounds including, as relevant here, that each count is facially insufficient. By order dated January 30, "2023" [2024], the Criminal Court (Germaine Auguste, J.), found, insofar as relevant, that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient as to each count and dismissed the accusatory instrument. The People appeal, arguing that the counts of governmental administration in the second degree and trespass were not facially insufficient.¹

The accusatory instrument here must be evaluated under the standards that govern the sufficiency of an information (see People v Hatton, 26 NY3d 364, 368 [2015]). To be sufficient, an information must allege "facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges" (CPL 100.15 [3]; see CPL 100.40 [1] [a]), the factual allegations in the information or in any supporting depositions which may accompany it must "provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged" (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]), and the information or any supporting depositions must contain "[n]on-hearsay allegations" which "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; see People v Slade, 37 NY3d 127, 136 [2021]). The law does not require that the accusatory instrument contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge (see People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004]), and "reasonable inferences" should be drawn "from all the facts set forth in the accusatory instrument" (People v Drelich, 32 NY3d 1032, 1033 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Insofar as relevant here, a person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree when he or she "intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act" (former Penal Law § 195.05, now Penal Law § 195.05 [1], eff April 20, 2024). While the factual allegations of an accusatory instrument "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading," they must still "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense" and be "adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575). Here, we find that the accusatory instrument failed to allege "facts of an evidentiary character" (CPL 100.15 [3]) supporting or tending to support the charge of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree or demonstrating "reasonable cause" (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]) to believe that defendant had committed that offense (see People v Tucker, 32 Misc 3d 135[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51467[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]). Consequently, the Criminal Court properly dismissed that count.

"A person is guilty of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises" (Penal Law § 140.05). "A person who, regardless of his intent, enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person" (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]). Here, giving the allegations of the accusatory instrument "a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (Casey, 95 NY2d at 360), they support the reasonable inference that the officer's order that defendant cease recording, excluding him from the precinct when he refused to comply, and directing him not to reenter the precinct or else he would be arrested for trespass was lawful. The accusatory instrument sufficiently alleged a trespass by providing that defendant then reentered the precinct and resumed recording (see People v Jones, 44 Misc 3d 127[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50967[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; People v Reape, 22 Misc 3d 615 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2008]; cf. People v Pennisi,61 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51731[U] [Crim Ct, Queens County 2018]). Consequently, the Criminal Court erred in dismissing the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with trespass as facially insufficient.

Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that so much thereof as granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with trespass on the ground that it was facially insufficient is vacated and that branch of defendant's motion is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the count of the accusatory instrument charging defendant with trespass and for all further proceedings thereon.

OTTLEY, J.P., TOUSSAINT and MUNDY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Jennifer Chan

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: February 27, 2026

FOOTNOTES

1.   The People do not challenge the dismissal of the count of criminal trespass in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.10 [a]).