The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terrance Edwards, Appellant. (2025)

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a new trial.

An accusatory instrument was filed on October 27, 2021 charging defendant with, among other things, menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]). The case was then adjourned to November 18, 2021, on which date the People were not ready for trial and the case was adjourned to December 21, 2021. On December 21, the People submitted a certificate of compliance (COC) and a statement of readiness (SOR), along with a CPL 30.30 (5-a) certification. The pertinent part of the COC stated that, pursuant to CPL 245.20 (1) (e), the People had provided defendant with "Any and all statements, written or recorded or summarized in any writing or recording, made by persons who have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or any potential defense thereto, including all police reports, notes of police and other investigators, and law enforcement agencies have been provided in the attached discovery package."

In court on December 21, 2021, defense counsel argued that the COC was improper because the People had failed to turn over witness interview audio recordings relating to an internal affairs bureau (IAB) investigation of the arresting officer conducted by Sergeant Lukas. The District Court instructed defense counsel to submit his motion by January 4, 2022, the People were to submit any opposition by January 18, 2022, and any reply was due by February 7, 2022. The case was adjourned to February 7. Defendant failed to submit a motion by February 7 and the case was adjourned to February 15, 2022. Thereafter, the People submitted a supplemental COC and SOR, with a CPL 30.30 (5-a) certification, dated March 4, 2022, which stated that, on February 28, 2022, the People had provided the defense with "Recordings of conversations related to Sgt Lukas IAB investigation," and that "These recordings are related to an open and ongoing Suffolk County Police Department IAB investigation pertaining to the arresting officer in this case . . . The IAB investigator, Sgt Stephen Lukas, has not reached a conclusion nor written a final case report in connection with his investigation. The investigation was launched after the defendant . . . alleged that . . . [the arresting officer] falsified a statement [defendant] made to law enforcement during his arrest in connection with this case." Specifically, the People provided the defense with audio recordings of defendant, two civilian witnesses, and the arresting officer.

The case next appeared on the calendar on March 23, 2022, on which date it was noted that defendant had filed a motion on March 22, 2022. Defendant's motion sought to, among other things, strike the December 2021 COC as improper and the SOR as illusory, and to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds. The People opposed the motion, to which defendant replied. By order dated June 8, 2022, the District Court (Alonzo G. Jacobs, J.), insofar as is relevant to this appeal, denied the branches of defendant's motion seeking to strike the December 21 COC and SOR, and to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds. The court found that the People were only chargeable with the 55 days from the commencement of the action on October 27, 2021 to when the People filed the COC and SOR on December 21. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of menacing in the second degree, and sentence was imposed.

On appeal, defendant contends, among other things, that the December 21 COC and SOR should have been stricken; that the accusatory instrument should have been dismissed on statutory speedy trial grounds since more than 90 days of delay were chargeable to the People; that the evidence was legally insufficient; that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and that the District Court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror.

The COC and SOR

As of January 2020, absent an individualized finding of special circumstances, the filing of a proper COC is a prerequisite to the People being ready for trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 (see CPL 30.30 [5]; 245.20, 245.50 [3]; People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 [2023]; People v Guzman, 75 Misc 3d 132[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50445[U], *5 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]).

In Bay, the Court of Appeals held that "the key question in determining if a proper COC has been filed is whether the prosecution has 'exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery' " (Bay, 41 NY3d at 211, quoting CPL 245.50 [1]; see also CPL 245.20 [2]). The Court noted that "the discovery provisions empower—and indeed, require—the trial court to facilitate compliance on the record with these new discovery obligations" (Bay, 41 NY3d at 212-213). If a defendant brings "a CPL 30.30 [statutory speedy trial] motion to dismiss on the ground that the People failed to exercise due diligence and therefore improperly filed a COC, the People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure . . . . If the prosecution fails to make such a showing, the COC should be deemed improper, the readiness statement stricken as illusory, and—so long as the time chargeable to the People exceeds the applicable CPL 30.30 period—the case dismissed" (id. at 213 [citations omitted]).

Defendant contends on appeal that the December 21, 2021 COC was improper and the attendant SOR illusory because the People failed to provide discovery pursuant to CPL 245.20 (1). It is uncontroverted that, at the time the People submitted their COC and SOR, they had not provided defendant with the aforementioned audio recordings made by Sergeant Lukas. The People state that Lukas first informed them of his IAB investigation on December 6, 2021, and that Lukas "made no indication at that time as to the status of the investigation, nor the creation of underlying materials relating to the investigation. The People, meanwhile, regularly monitored an internal District Attorney office IAB log to ascertain whether the IAB bureau had sent material or a final case report stemming from the investigation to the District Attorney's office. These checks of the oft updated IAB log yielded no signs of new IAB material." The recordings were ultimately provided to the defense on February 28, 2022.

Police investigations typically result in some type of paperwork or other material being created. Having been informed of the ongoing investigation on December 6, 2021, instead of contacting Sergeant Lukas directly before filing the COC eleven business days later on December 21, 2021, the People admit that they filed the COC without making any efforts, other than monitoring the IAB log, to find out what, if any, materials had been created with respect to the investigation. The People's statement that they "regularly monitored" the IAB log which is "oft updated," without more, is insufficient to show what specific efforts they made and whether those efforts were reasonable. Thus, the People's response to defendant's motion failed to establish their due diligence or good faith. When the IAB log failed to provide any information, the People ultimately decided, on February 28, 2022, to contact Lukas directly about the investigation, after which Lukas sent them the audio recordings which the People then provided to the defense. In view of the foregoing, the December 2021 COC was improper and the attendant SOR illusory.

Statutory Speedy Trial

The People had 90 days from the filing of the accusatory instrument on October 27, 2021, to announce their readiness for trial since the most serious offense charged was a class A misdemeanor (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 356 [1980]). Defendant contends on appeal that 124 days of delay are chargeable to the People for the time period of October 27, 2021 (when the accusatory instrument was filed) to February 28, 2022 (when defendant received the audio recordings). The People acknowledge, and do not dispute, the District Court's finding that 55 days of delay were chargeable to the People for the period of October 27 to December 21, 2021 (when a motion schedule was set after defense counsel made an oral motion to dismiss). For the first time on appeal, the People argue that all time post December 21 was excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (a) as time attendant to motion practice. Defendant replies that the People's CPL 30.30 (4) (a) argument is unpreserved for appellate review since it was not raised in the District Court, and that the holding of People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470, 474 [1998]) precludes this court from addressing that argument.

We note that this court has previously determined that review of legal questions as to the chargeability of speedy trial time that are clear on record is not precluded by LaFontaine regardless of whether the issue was addressed by the motion court (see People v Pagan, 82 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023]). The Court of Appeals stated in People v Garrett (23 NY3d 878, 885 n 2 [2014]) that LaFontaine does not prevent the review of all aspects of a single multipronged issue simply because the lower court neglected to mention one of those prongs (see generally People v Butler, 41 NY3d 186, 199 [2023]), and this analysis has been applied to the calculation of speedy trial time (see People v Mena, 29 AD3d 349, 350 [2006]; People v Salgado, 27 AD3d 71, 72 [2006]; People v Jacob, 83 Misc 3d 134[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51182[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]; Pagan, 82 Misc 3d 1; People v Larkins, 62 Misc 3d 147[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50218[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

The time from December 21, 2021 to the February 7, 2022 adjourned date, when all motion practice was to be completed, was excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (a) as time attendant to motion practice. Consequently, we find that fewer than 90 days of delay were chargeable to the People up until February 28 and, thus, the District Court properly denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

Legal Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

Some of the arguments defendant makes in support of his contention that the evidence is legally insufficient are unpreserved for appellate review since he failed to raise these specific arguments at trial (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10 [1995]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As for those arguments properly preserved for appellate review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), and indulging in all reasonable inferences in the People's favor (see People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 437 [1985]), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14). Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), while according great deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we find that the verdict convicting defendant of menacing in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-646 [2006]).

For-Cause Challenge to a Prospective Juror

"Prospective jurors who make statements that cast serious doubt on their ability to render an impartial verdict, and who have given less-than-unequivocal assurances of impartiality, must be excused" for cause (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 363 [2001]; see People v Harris, 19 NY3d 679, 685 [2012]; People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]). While CPL 270.20 (1) (b) "does not require any particular expurgatory oath or talismanic words, [prospective] jurors must clearly express that any prior experiences or opinions that reveal the potential for bias will not prevent them from reaching an impartial verdict" (Arnold, 96 NY2d at 362 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The juror must provide unequivocal and unambiguous assurance that he or she can set the bias aside and reach a fair and impartial verdict (see Harris, 19 NY3d at 685; People v Johnson, 17 NY3d 752, 753 [2011]; People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 613-614, 616 [2000]).

When defense counsel asked a prospective juror whether she thought that an innocent defendant should testify at trial, she stated "I think so. I'm trying to evaluate that question. So, I'm not sure." Counsel then asked the prospective juror if she would think negatively about a defendant who did not testify, to which the juror replied "I think I would actually." The District Court asked the prospective juror "are you staunch in your opinion that if a person doesn't testify in their own defense . . . they must be guilty or they must be hiding something, or do you think your mind can be changed after you hear the facts of this case." The prospective juror replied, "I think that I can, but it is a question that I'm rattling in my head." The court then stated "You said you think you can," and the prospective juror stated "I think I can. But I'm saying that, you know, something that just perked the brain to keep going."

The foregoing statements made by the prospective juror showed her potential bias against any defendant who chooses not to testify at trial, which casts serious doubt on her ability to render an impartial verdict. Following questioning by the District Court, the prospective juror failed to state that her bias would not influence her verdict or that she could render an impartial verdict based on the evidence presented. A prospective "juror's use of the word 'think' might not in every case render his or her statements inadequate" (People v Blyden, 55 NY2d 73, 79 [1982]). However, in the context of the prospective juror's responses in the case at bar, while evaluating the entirety of her responses (see Johnson, 94 NY2d at 615-616; People v Torpey, 63 NY2d 361, 369 [1984]; Blyden, 55 NY2d at 78; People v Wilson, 7 AD3d 549, 550 [2004]), we conclude that her responses were equivocal and uncertain (see Torpey, 63 NY2d at 369; Blyden, 55 NY2d at 79; People v Laverpool, 185 AD3d 431, 431 [2020]).

In view of the foregoing, we find that the District Court's denial of defendant's for-cause challenge to this prospective juror constituted reversible error, as defendant subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge to that juror and had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges before jury selection was complete (see CPL 270.20 [2]; People v Nicholas, 98 NY2d 749, 752 [2002]; Chambers, 97 NY2d at 419; People v Lynch, 95 NY2d 243, 251-252 [2000]; Wilson, 7 AD3d at 550 [2004]).

We pass on no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a new trial.

GARGUILO, P.J., WALSH and CONWAY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Paul Kenny

Chief Clerk

Decision Date: July 29, 2025