PEOPLE v. PATINO (2025)

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress evidence on the ground that the stop of defendant's vehicle was illegal is denied, the accusatory instruments are reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant's motion and for all further proceedings.

By separate accusatory instruments dated May 5, 2022, defendant was charged with, respectively, driving while intoxicated per se (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]), common-law driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), failing to use a designated lane (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 [c]), driving on the shoulder (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1131), and operating a motor vehicle with an obstructed view (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [30]). A combined Ingle/Dunaway/Huntley hearing was held at which a police officer testified that, prior to his encounter with defendant, he observed defendant's vehicle straddle the fog line for approximately five seconds, traveling about 50 yards, before jerking back into the travel lane, with no obstruction of the roadway that would have explained the vehicle's movements. Following the hearing, the Justice Court (Steven Tekulsky, J.) issued an order dated May 17, 2023, finding that “there was no probable cause to stop the Defendant's vehicle, and any and all evidence recovered as a result thereof must be suppressed. The Charges are hereby dismissed.” The court did not reach the remaining branches of defendant's motion. On appeal, the People argue that the encounter between the officer and defendant was not a traffic stop and, even if it was, defendant's crossing of the fog line provided a lawful basis for the stop.

We need not decide whether, under the particular circumstances presented here, a traffic stop occurred, as, in any event, the officer had a lawful basis for a stop. A traffic stop is a seizure and is permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution “where law enforcement has ‘probable cause that a driver has committed’ a traffic violation” (People v. Nektalov, 42 N.Y.3d 363, 367, 221 N.Y.S.3d 19, 246 N.E.3d 390 [2024], quoting People v. Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d 427, 430, 132 N.Y.S.3d 90, 156 N.E.3d 812 [2020]; see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 [1996]). “Probable cause, in turn, ‘does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed’ ” (People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015], quoting People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 [1985]; see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 [1996]). In addition, “ ‘an automobile stop is lawful so long as it is demonstrated that a traffic violation occurred, and it is not necessary that [the] defendant be charged with the specific violation established at a probable cause hearing’ ” (People v. Matos, 60 Misc.3d 130[A], 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994[U], *2, 2018 WL 3191016 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2018], quoting People v. Gramajo, 49 Misc.3d 131[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 51435[U], *2, 2015 WL 5775796 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2015]; see People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 [2001]; People v. Weishaupt, 118 A.D.3d 1100, 1102, 987 N.Y.S.2d 493 [2014]; People v. Ross, 106 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 964 N.Y.S.2d 740 [2013]). “All that is required is that [the officer] have had a reasonable cause to believe that [the] defendant had violated [the] Vehicle and Traffic Law” (People v. Newcomb, 58 Misc.3d 153[A], 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 50145[U], *2, 2018 WL 735619 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Hilker, 133 A.D.2d 986, 988, 521 N.Y.S.2d 136 [1987]; People v. Gingras, 22 Misc.3d 22, 23, 871 N.Y.S.2d 812 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2008]). Here, the evidence established that the officer had a reasonable belief that defendant had failed to remain in the travel lane in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (a) (see People v. Rufus, ––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 06384, *3 [2024]; Matter of Schoonmaker v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 33 N.Y.3d 926, 928, 99 N.Y.S.3d 760, 123 N.E.3d 244 [2019]; People v. Eron, 119 A.D.3d 1358, 1359, 989 N.Y.S.2d 559 [2014]; People v. Tandle, 71 A.D.3d 1176, 1177-1178, 898 N.Y.S.2d 597 [2010]; People v. Parris, 26 A.D.3d 393, 394, 809 N.Y.S.2d 176 [2006]; see also People v. Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d at 433 n. 4, 132 N.Y.S.3d 90, 156 N.E.3d 812; cf. People v. Davis, 58 A.D.3d 896, 898, 870 N.Y.S.2d 602 [2009]).

Accordingly, the order is reversed, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress evidence on the ground that the stop of defendant's vehicle was illegal is denied, the accusatory instruments are reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a determination of the remaining branches of defendant's motion and for all further proceedings.

GARGUILO, P.J., WALSH and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.