PARRISH III v. CORPORATION COUNSEL CITY OF NEW YORK (2018)

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In August of 2015, plaintiff commenced this action seeking $7,500 for loss of time from work and $12,500 for loss of the use of his property, plus interest from March 5, 2014, based on defendant's allegedly wrongful seizure of his vehicle. The dates of occurrence as listed on the complaint are March 5, 2014 to July 24, 2014. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no timely notice of claim had been filed and, in the alternative, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. In opposition, plaintiff contended, among other things, that he had filed a notice of claim on December 30, 2013. By order entered May 5, 2016, defendant's motion was granted.

General Municipal Law § 50–e requires that a plaintiff asserting a tort claim against a municipality serve a notice of claim upon the municipality within 90 days after the claim arises, as a condition precedent to bringing an action against the municipality (see Campbell v. City of New York, 4 NY3d 200 [2005]; O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353 [1981]), a period which may, in certain circumstances, be extended, but not beyond the applicable period of limitations (see General Municipal Law § 50–e [5]; see also Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950 [1982]; Iglesias v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 118 AD3d 785 [2014] ). General Municipal Law § 50–i establishes a statute of limitations of one year and 90 days for tort actions against municipalities (see Campbell v. City of New York, 4 NY3d 200; Matter of Billman v. Port Jervis School Dist., 84 AD3d 1367 [2011] ). It is undisputed that no notice of claim was filed within 90 days of the dates of the occurrence as listed on the complaint, and that plaintiff never obtained leave of court to file a late notice of claim or filed a notice of claim within one year and 90 days from the dates set forth in the complaint. As a notice of claim is a condition precedent to filing a tort action against a municipality, the action was properly dismissed.

We note that, to the extent that plaintiff is arguing that the instant action is based on incidents in 2013 and February 2014, defendant's motion was properly granted on defendant's alternative ground that the action is barred by the statute of limitations (see General Municipal Law § 50-i).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

PESCE, P.J., WESTON and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.