DHARAMDAS v. RAMPERSAUD (2024)

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

On March 10, 2020, plaintiff commenced this action to recover $25,000 for damage caused to property, failure to return monies, and failure to provide repairs. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that the parties had agreed to the price of $38,000 for defendant to renovate plaintiff's apartment. Plaintiff stated that she had paid defendant $22,000 in cash before he abandoned the project, which necessitated plaintiff paying another party an additional $22,500 to finish the renovations. Defendant disputed, among other things, the amount paid to him, submitting a receipt for $12,000. Following the trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $6,500, representing the difference between the total amount it found that plaintiff had paid for the renovations and the amount initially agreed upon with defendant.

Generally, “the decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence, especially when the findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses” (Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 544-545 [1990]; see Leya, LLC v Kodicek, 73 Misc 3d 133[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51013[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

Here, the testimony of plaintiff and her witnesses differed markedly from that of defendant regarding the apartment renovation, including as to what was paid to defendant. Ultimately, the Civil Court's determination appeared to rest largely upon its finding that the testimony of plaintiff and her witnesses was more credible than that of defendant. These credibility determinations were not inconsistent with a fair interpretation of the evidence and should be given substantial deference. Consequently, we find no basis to disturb the judgment.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and HOM, JJ., concur.