PEOPLE v. FLOYD (2019)

Judgments of conviction (Bruna L. DiBiase, J.), rendered October 3, 2014, affirmed.

In view of defendant's knowing waiver of her right to prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement (see People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument under docket number 2014NY071951 was jurisdictionally valid, since the factual allegations provide reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 265.01[2]). The instrument recited that defendant held a knife with a four inch blade that she used to “stab[ ] outwardly” against a window, while repeatedly yelling “I'm going to kill him.” These allegations were sufficient for pleading purposes to establish that defendant possessed a “dangerous knife” within the contemplation of Penal Law § 265.01(2), i.e., “an instrument of offensive or defensive combat” (Matter of Jamie D., 59 NY2d 589, 592 [1983][internal citation omitted]; see People v. Edward, 51 Misc 3d 36 [App Term, 1st Dept 2016], affd sub nom People v. McCain, 30 NY3d 1121 [2018]).

With respect to the conviction under docket number 2014NY066757, we are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant's assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 US 738 [1967]) and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues that could be raised on the appeal from that judgment. Counsel's application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Per Curiam.