General Star Indemnity Company, Plaintiff, v. PLLC (2026)

Plaintiff General Star Indemnity Company ("General Star") sues for a judicial declaration that it is not obliged to defend or indemnify defendant Bucher Law PLLC ("Bucher Law") in a lawsuit filed by Valve Corporation ("Valve") in the Superior Court of Washington ("Valve Action"). In the underlying action, Valve accused Bucher Law of engaging in a scheme to enrich itself by extorting settlements, tortiously interfering with Valve's customer contracts, and abusing the legal process.

Bucher Law joined issue through an answer alleging five counterclaims that seek relief for General Star's allegedly improper denial of a defense in the Valve Action (see NYSCEF Doc No. 13 ["Answer"]).

Fact discovery is substantially complete, and General Star now moves for summary judgment on its complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1 ["Complaint"]) and for the dismissal of Bucher Law's counterclaims. Bucher Law opposes the motion and cross-moves for a favorable declaration of coverage.

BACKGROUND

A. General Star, Bucher Law and Valve

General Star is a Delaware insurance corporation having its principal place of business in Connecticut, and Bucher Law is a domestic law firm with its principal office in Albany, New York.

Valve is a Washington corporation that operates an online platform known as "Steam," through which video game developers sell and distribute games, and Steam users can purchase, download and play those games (see NYSCEF Doc No. 81 ["R-SOMF"], ¶¶ 1-2).

Steam users agree to the Steam Subscriber Agreement ("SSA"), which includes dispute resolution provisions (see id., ¶ 3). The process begins with informal efforts to resolve the dispute:

[The subscriber] and Valve agree to make reasonable, good faith efforts to informally resolve any dispute before initiating arbitration. A party who intends to seek arbitration must first send the other a written notice that describes the nature and basis of the claim or dispute and sets forth the relief sought. If [the subscriber] and Valve do not reach an agreement to resolve that claim or dispute within thirty (30) calendar days after the notice is received, [the subscriber] or Valve may commence an arbitration (id., ¶ 5).

Where informal efforts do not result in a resolution, the subscriber and Valve "agree to resolve all disputes and claims . . . in individual binding arbitration" (id., ¶ 4 [capitalization omitted] [emphasis added]), and the "SSA prohibits Steam users from bringing or participating in a class, collective, or representative arbitration" (id., ¶ 8).

Additionally, where the subscriber seeks $10,000 or less, Valve will (i) promptly reimburse the arbitration filing fee and the subscriber's share of the arbitral costs, and (ii) waive recovery of its own attorney's fees and costs, unless the subscriber's claims were determined to be frivolous or filed for harassment (see id., ¶ 7).

"Bucher Law represents thousands of individual Steam users seeking resolution in arbitration of disputes relating to Valve's alleged anticompetitive practices under federal antitrust and state consumer protection laws" (id., ¶ 9). Bucher Law represents each user "on a contingency fee basis," meaning that the law firm "only recovers a portion of the gross amount recovered by the individual user, if any, together with any fee awards against Valve" (id., ¶ 10).

"In recognition of the unique circumstances of these claims, Bucher Law sought and obtained insurance coverage for the risks involved" (id., ¶ 11).

General Star "issued a Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy to Bucher Law" that "was in effect at the relevant time and provided primary insurance coverage" (id., ¶ 15; see NYSCEF Doc No. 2 ["Policy"]). Bucher Law also obtained a policy from Hudson Insurance Company that "was in effect at the relevant time and also provided primary insurance coverage" (R-SOMF, ¶ 16).

B. The Policy

Under the Policy, General Star "shall pay . . . all sums in excess of the Deductible which the Insured becomes legally obligated to pay as Damages for Claims first made against the Insured during the Policy Period" (Policy at 3).

"Claim" is defined as "a written demand for monetary damages, including the service of Suit or institution of arbitration proceedings, by reason of a Wrongful Act" (id. at 8), and a "Wrongful Act means any actual or alleged act, error, omission, or Personal Injury arising out of Professional Services rendered by an Insured for others" (id. at 9).

Section VI of the Policy contains the two exclusions at issue in this case. The first sub-paragraph of Exclusion B provides that General Star has no duty to indemnify or defend in connection with any Claim "based upon or arising out of any Dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, knowingly wrongful, willful, malicious or intentional act, error, omission, offense or Personal Injury" (id., § VI [B] [1]). Under this exclusion, Bucher Law was obliged to reimburse General Star "for all Claims Expenses incurred if [Bucher Law's] acts, errors, omissions, offenses or Personal Injury are found to be a conduct stated in this exclusion" (id., VI [B]).

Under Exclusion V, General Star has no obligation to indemnity or defend in connection with any Claim "based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in any way involving any actual or alleged gain of any personal profit or advantage to which [Bucher Law] is not legally entitled" (id., VI [V]).

C. The Valve Action

"In accordance with Valve's SSA, Bucher Law initiated the dispute resolution process by sending a letter on behalf of its clients relating to Valve's alleged anticompetitive practices and proposing settlement terms pursuant to the informal dispute resolution process" (R-SOMF, ¶ 17). Valve responded that the notice "lacked important customer identifying information, was not particularized to individual customers, and 'was not sent in good faith' " (id., ¶ 18 [citation omitted]). Bucher Law then sent "Valve individual e-mails on behalf of each [client]" (id., ¶ 19).

Following expiration of the thirty-day period for informal dispute resolution, "Bucher Law filed . . . claims individually in arbitration," and it "successfully arbitrated and obtained recovery from Valve on behalf of one or more of its Steam clients" (id., ¶¶ 20-21).

On October 20, 2023, Valve commenced an action in the Superior Court of Washington, alleging claims for tortious interference with contract and abuse of process (see NYSCEF Doc No. 3 ["Valve Complaint"]). Valve alleged that Bucher Law, together with other entities, attempted to "weaponize the terms of Valve's dispute resolution agreement with Steam users to line their own pockets. Bucher Law . . . abused the legal process and interfered with Valve's relationships with its customers" (Valve Complaint, ¶ 1).

The Valve Complaint explained that "Bucher's scheme targeted Valve and Steam users . . . because the arbitration clause in the SSA is 'favorable' to Steam users in that Valve agrees to pay the fees and costs associated with arbitration" (id., ¶ 29). "[T]here is no money set aside [in Bucher Law's business model] to evaluate whether any Steam user actually has a valid dispute with Valve"; Bucher Law "instead focuses on building technical infrastructure, gathering clients, and then filing cases" (id., ¶ 37; see also id., ¶¶ 30-36 & Ex. B [litigation funding presentation]).

Bucher Law moved for the pre-answer dismissal of the Valve Action under Washington's Uniform Public Expression Protection Act ("UPEPA") (see R-SOMF, ¶ 28), and the case ultimately was dismissed on appeal (see id., ¶ 29; NYSCEF Doc No. 63). The Washington Court of Appeals held that the conduct for which Bucher Law was sued was privileged under UPEPA (see Valve Corp. v Bucher Law PLLC, 34 Wash App 2d 727, 571 P3d 312 [Wash Ct App 2025], review denied 579 P3d 792 [Wash 2025]).

D. General Star's Denial of Coverage

Bucher Law notified General Star of the Valve Action on October 24, 2023 (see R-SOMF, ¶ 35). General Star assigned Sonia Dhaliwal, Senior Claim Executive, to handle the claim (see id., ¶ 36).

By email dated October 28, 2023, Bucher Law informed General Star that it "intend[ed] to retain Andrew Escobar of Seyfarth [Shaw LLP]" (id., ¶ 54). On November 2, 2023, General Star advised Bucher Law that it had "retained Jeff Downer of Lee Smart" (id., ¶ 55).

After some confusion regarding representation, General Star confirmed on November 2, 2023 that Bucher Law was aware of the retention of Attorney Downer, a coverage determination was forthcoming and "General Star will be defending under a reservation of rights which will be issued under separate cover" (id., ¶ 59 [emphasis omitted]; see NYSCEF Doc No. 65 at 35-36; see also R-SOMF, ¶¶ 62-72 [General Star ultimately allowing Bucher Law to keep its counsel of choice while the insurer "complete(s) its coverage review" (citation omitted)]).

In a letter dated November 17, 2023, General Star disclaimed coverage based on Exclusions B and V of the Policy:

[T]he [P]olicy excludes coverage for any Claim based upon or arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, knowingly wrongful, willful, malicious or intentional act, error, omission, offense or Personal Injury. The [P]olicy also excludes coverage for any Claim based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in any way involving any actual or alleged gain of any personal profit or advantage to which the Insured is not legally entitled. In the complaint, Valve alleges that Bucher Law engaged in knowingly wrongful, willful, malicious, or intentional acts by tortiously interfering with Valve's customer contracts and by abusing the legal process for the improper purpose of financially benefitting Bucher Law. Consequently, Valve's complaint is excluded from coverage, and General Star will neither provide Bucher Law with a defense nor indemnify Bucher Law for any liability, loss, cost, or expense incurred in connection with the complaint (NYSCEF Doc No. 56 at 5-6; see R-SOMF, ¶¶ 82-83).¹

E. This Litigation

Also on November 17, 2023, General Star commenced this action for a declaration that the Valve Action is excluded from coverage under Exclusions B and V (see Complaint, ¶ 1 & Wherefore clause). Bucher Law joined issue through an Answer alleging five counterclaims: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) recovery of counsel fees; (4) bad faith (Washington law); and (5) bad faith (New York law) (see Answer, ¶¶ 15-74).

Fact discovery is substantially complete, and each side now moves for summary judgment on the coverage issue.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

To obtain summary judgment, the movant must establish its position " 'sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment' " in its favor (Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067 [1979], quoting CPLR 3212 [b]). The proponent must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). If the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opponent to demonstrate the existence of disputed material facts or a legal defense (see id.).

"Under New York law, an insurance policy is a contract which, like any other contract[,] must be construed to effectuate the parties' intent as expressed by their words and purposes" Alfin, Inc. v Pacific Ins. Co., 735 F Supp 115, 118 [SD NY 1990] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "In interpreting an insurance policy, the policy should be read as a whole" (MDW Enters. v CNA Ins. Co., 4 AD3d 338, 341 [2d Dept 2004] [citation omitted]).

"If the words of the [policy] are unambiguous, establishing only one meaning when read in the context of the entire policy, then a New York court must enforce the plain meaning of the words and refrain from making or varying 'the contract of insurance to accomplish its notions of abstract justice or moral obligation' " (American Home Products Corp. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F Supp 1485, 1492 [SD NY 1983], affd as mod 748 F2d 760 [2d Cir 1984], quoting Breed v Insurance Co. of N. Am., 46 NY2d 351, 355 [1978]).

Where the policy is ambiguous, such that its language is "susceptible of two reasonable interpretations" (State of New York v Home Indem. Co., 66 NY2d 669, 671 [1985]), any "ambiguity will be construed in favor of the insured, and exceptions to coverage will be narrowly read" (JBGR LLC v Chicago Tit. Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 1213[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50089[U], *3 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2013], affd 128 AD3d 900 [2d Dept 2015]).

An insurer's "duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify," and the insurer "will be called upon to provide a defense whenever the allegations of the complaint suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage" (Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co. v Henderson, 179 AD3d 1193, 1193 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 35 NY3d 915 [2020]). "If the complaint's allegations bring the claim 'even potentially within the embrace of the policy, the insurer must defend its insured, no matter how groundless, false or baseless the suit may be' " (Guzy v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 146 AD3d 1143, 1144 [3d Dept 2017], quoting Village of Brewster v Virginia Sur. Co., Inc., 70 AD3d 1239, 1241 [3d Dept 2010]).

The "duty to defend is determined solely by comparing the allegations on the face of the underlying complaint[ ] to the terms of the policy" (Federal Ins. Co. v Weinstein, 2019 WL 1407455, *3, 2019 US Dist LEXIS 53165, *8 [SD NY, Mar. 28, 2019, No. 18 Civ 2526 (PAC)]; see General Star Indem. Co. v Driven Sports, Inc., 80 F Supp 3d 442, 450 [ED NY 2015]). "The nature of claims asserted in a complaint is to be determined based upon the facts alleged and not the conclusions which the pleader draws therefrom or upon the characterization applied to a claim by a party" (J. Lucarelli & Sons, Inc. v Mtn. Val. Indem. Co., 64 AD3d 856, 858 [3d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

"To avoid its duty to defend, an insurer must show, 'as a matter of law[,] that there is no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held to be obligated to indemnify the insured under any provision of the insurance policy' " (Henderson, 179 AD3d at 1193-1194, quoting Servidone Constr. Corp. v Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 64 NY2d 419, 424 [1985]; see Frontier Insulation Contrs. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 91 NY2d 169, 175 [1997]).

DISCUSSION

A. Coverage

General Star raises two grounds for the denial of coverage: (1) the Valve Complaint alleges "exclusively intentional conduct that is excluded from coverage, namely, tortious interference with contract and abuse of process"; and (2) "Valve alleges that Bucher Law gained a profit or advantage to which [it] was not legally entitled" (NYSCEF Doc No. 57 ["MOL"] at 1; see Complaint, ¶ 1).

The Court begins with Exclusion B (1), which relieves General Star of any obligation to defend or indemnify in connection with a Claim "based upon or arising out of any Dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, knowingly wrongful, willful, malicious or intentional act, error, omission, offense or Personal Injury" (Policy, § VI [B] [1]).

This language is consistent with New York's "strong public policy against insuring a party from its intentional and/or fraudulent acts, practices, or conduct" (Silverman Neu, LLP v Admiral Ins. Co., 933 F Supp 2d 463, 475 [ED NY 2013]; see also Town of Massena v Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 435, 445 [2002]). Where the underlying complaint alleges only intentional conduct, the insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify (see Tartaglia v Home Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 396, 398 [2d Dept 1997]). "[I]t is the nature of the underlying acts, not the theory of liability, that governs" (Sweet Home Cent. School Dist. of Amherst & Tonawanda v Aetna Commercial Ins. Co., 263 AD2d 949, 949 [4th Dept 1999]).

General Star maintains that Valve's complaint against Bucher Law alleged exclusively intentional conduct. Specifically, General Star argues that, under Washington law, claims for tortious interference with contract and abuse of process both require proof of intentional conduct (see MOL at 10, citing Centurion Properties III, LLC v Chicago Tit. Ins. Co., 186 Wash 2d 58, 81, 375 P3d 651, 662 [2016] ["Tortious interference with a contract requires intentional conduct"]; Koch v Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 108 Wash App 500, 506, 31 P3d 698, 701 [Wash Ct App 2001]; Mason v Mason, 19 Wash App 2d 803, 835, 497 P3d 431, 449 [Wash Ct App 2021] ["an attorney can be liable for abuse of process where the attorney was alleged to have intentionally employed legal process for an inappropriate and extrinsic end"]; Hough v Stockbridge, 2013 WL 1748450, *3, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 58290, *9 [WD Wash Apr. 23, 2013, No. 12-cv-5661-RBL] ["(A) defendant could not be found liable of abuse of process without intentionally causing harm to a particular person, which is of course the definition of malice"]).

The first cause of action alleged by Valve in the underlying action was tortious interference with contract. Valve alleged "valid contractual relationships and business expectancies in relation to the customers of its Steam platform, all of whom necessarily agreed to" an SSA that "contains a dispute resolution clause requiring a good-faith attempt at informal dispute resolution and individualized arbitration" (Valve Complaint, ¶¶ 91-92). Valve further alleged that Bucher Law "knew of the [SSA] and its terms," and "intentionally induced and/or caused Steam users to breach their respective [SSAs] with Valve" by engaging in prohibited collective/representative arbitration (id., ¶¶ 93-94; see also id., ¶¶ 55, 81), and that Bucher Law did so "for an improper purpose or by improper means" (id., ¶ 95).

The claim for abuse of process alleges that Bucher Law "brought collective/ representative arbitration claims against Valve in contravention of the terms of the [SSA's] dispute resolution clause" for the improper "purpose" of "forc[ing] Valve to enter into early and collective settlement negotiations" that would financially benefit Bucher Law (id., ¶¶ 98-99).

And in the factual allegations common to the claims, Valve further alleged that: Bucher Law "targeted" Valve "precisely because" of the SSA's "favorable" arbitration clause (id., ¶¶ 29, 40 & Ex. B); Bucher Law "intentional[ly]" failed to "meaningfully evaluate" its clients' claims (id., ¶ 48); and "all" of Bucher Law's actions, "including filing of over 1,000 arbitrations," were done for "the main purpose of extorting Valve" (id., ¶ 80).

Having compared the factual allegations of the underlying complaint to the plain language of Exclusion B (1), the Court agrees with General Star that Valve's claims against Bucher Law for tortious interference with contract and abuse of process alleged intentional conduct falling squarely within the exclusion (see Tartaglia, 240 AD2d at 397-398 ["where the only theory of liability requires proof of intentional wrongdoing encompassed by the exclusion, the insurance carrier has no duty to indemnify and is therefore relieved of the obligation to defend"]).

In this connection, the Court rejects Bucher Law's argument that Valve's references to "failures" (see e.g. Valve Complaint, ¶¶ 46, 48) could reflect negligent or accidental conduct falling outside the scope of Exclusion B (see NYSCEF Doc No. 76 ["Opp Mem"] at 10). As General Star observes, the underlying complaint plainly alleges that Bucher Law's "failures" to investigate and evaluate client claims were part of a deliberate scheme to extort settlements through abusive legal tactics, rather than accidental or negligent oversights by a busy law firm (see e.g. Valve Complaint, ¶¶ 48-50 [alleged "explicit and intentional failure to meaningfully evaluate the legal merits or the factual underpinnings of their clients' claims," focusing instead on "return on investment"]; see also id., ¶¶ 37, 42-46, 55-56, 69, 80-85, 94, 98).

The principal focus of Bucher Law's opposition and cross motion is the final sentence of Exclusion B: "The Insured shall reimburse the Company for all Claims Expenses incurred if the Insured's acts, errors, omissions, offenses or Personal Injury are found to be a conduct stated in this exclusion." Bucher Law characterizes this sentence as a "final adjudication clause," and maintains that it requires a finding of malfeasance before coverage can be denied (Opp Mem at 5). "The only reasonable interpretation is that where an insured is alleged to have intentionally harmed a claimant, the insurer will advance defense costs. 'If' the insured is 'found' to have intentionally harmed, the insured is required to reimburse the carrier for the advanced defense costs. Without an obligation to advance defense costs, the right to reimbursement is hollow, rendering the provision a nonsensical dead appendage" (id. at 6).

The Court is unpersuaded by Bucher Law's reading of Exclusion B and its mischaracterization of the reimbursement obligation as a "final adjudication clause," a term that does not appear anywhere in the Policy. Under Exclusion B:

The Company has no obligation [to indemnify or] to provide a defense, in connection with any Claim: . . .

B. based upon or arising out of any:

1. Dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, knowingly wrongful, willful, malicious or intentional act, error, omission, offense or Personal Injury;

[omitted text of exclusions 2, 3 and 4]

The Insured shall reimburse the Company for all Claims Expenses incurred if the Insured's acts, errors, omissions, offenses or Personal Injury are found to be a conduct stated in this exclusion.

Read as a whole, this language is susceptible to only one reasonable construction: that General Star has no obligation to provide a defense in connection with claims arising out of "intentional act[s]," and Bucher Law must reimburse General Star for the defense of acts ultimately "found" to be intentional.

Thus, the final sentence of Exclusion B is not a condition or limitation on General Star's right to disclaim coverage for intentional acts; it is a stand-alone provision requiring the insured to reimburse General Star for any "Claims Expenses," including defense costs made under a reservation of rights,² where the applicability of Exclusion B is confirmed in litigation. Nor is the reimbursement provision a "nonsensical dead appendage," as claimed by Bucher Law (Opp Mem at 6); the reimbursement clause strengthens the intentional-acts exclusion by allowing the insurer to claw-back defense costs paid for excluded claims under a reservation of rights.³

The distinction between a reimbursement provision adopted for the benefit of the insurer and a "final adjudication clause" adopted for the benefit of an insured is well-illustrated by Bucher Law's own cited cases. For instance, the principal case it relies on, Soni v Pryor (139 AD3d 841 [2d Dept 2016]), involved an exclusion for "criminal, fraudulent or dishonest act if any final adjudication establishes that such criminal, fraudulent or dishonest act occurred' " (id. at 843). Unlike the freestanding reimbursement provision here, the "final adjudication" requirement in Soni was a condition precedent embedded into the operative language of the exclusion (see also CUMIS Specialty Ins. Co., Inc. v Kaufman, 2022 WL 4534459, *1, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 176535, *2 [SD NY Sep. 28, 2022, No. 21cv11107 (DLC)] [exclusion available "only if a final adjudication establishes . . ."]).

The Court therefore concludes that General Star properly disclaimed coverage under Section VI (B) (1) of the Policy, entitling it to the requested declaration of non-coverage and the dismissal of Bucher Law's first counterclaim, alleging breach of the Policy.⁴

B. Remaining Counterclaims

Unjust enrichment. Bucher Law's second counterclaim alleges unjust enrichment, but the claim fails because the parties' relationship is governed by the Policy, a binding and enforceable contract of insurance (see Goldman v Metropolitan Life Ins Co., 5 NY3d 561, 572 [2005]; see also Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 388 [1987]). Contrary to Bucher Law's contention, the Policy is not "illusory" (Opp Mem at 22) "because [it] provided some benefit to the insured and the exclusion [relied on by General Star] does not negate all possible coverage" (Lend Lease [US] Constr. LMB Inc. v Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 136 AD3d 52, 60 [1st Dept 2015], affd 28 NY3d 675 [2017]; see Associated Community Bancorp, Inc. v St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 118 AD3d 608, 608 [1st Dept 2014]).⁵

Attorney's fees and costs. The third counterclaim, seeking recovery of counsel fees and costs under the authority of Mighty Midgets v Centennial Ins. Co. (47 NY2d 12 [1979]), must be dismissed because Bucher Law has not "prevail[ed] on the merits" (U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v City Club Hotel, LLC, 3 NY3d 592, 597 [2004]; see Kramarik v Travelers, 25 AD3d 960, 963 [3d Dept 2006]).

Bad-faith denial of coverage. The fourth and fifth counterclaims allege bad-faith denial of coverage under Washington and New York law, respectively. The claim under Washington law fails because the Policy is governed by New York law, which is the principal location of Bucher Law and the insured risk (see Zurich Ins. Co. v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 84 NY2d 309, 317 [1994]; Maryland Cas. Co. v Cont. Cas. Co., 332 F3d 145, 152 [2d Cir 2003]). And New York law does not recognize an independent cause of action for "bad faith claims handling" (Orient Overseas Assoc. v Xl Ins. Am., Inc., 132 AD3d 574, 577 [1st Dept 2015]; see New York Univ. v Cont. Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308, 319-320 [1995]). And even if such a claim were available, General Star "did not breach any duty to defend or to indemnify [Bucher Law]" (Cochrane v American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 471 F Supp 3d 1140, 1153 [WD Wash 2020]).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,⁶ it is

ORDERED that General Star's motion for summary judgment is granted and Bucher Law's cross motion for summary judgment is denied in accordance with the foregoing; and it is further

ADJUDGED and DECLARED that plaintiff General Star Indemnity Company has no duty to defend or indemnify Bucher Law in connection with the Valve Action; and finally, it is

ORDERED that Bucher Law's counterclaims are dismissed.

This constitutes the Decision, Order & Judgment of the Court, the original of which is being uploaded to NYSCEF for entry by the Albany County Clerk. Upon such entry, counsel for General Star shall promptly serve notice of entry on all parties entitled thereto.

Dated: January 16, 2026

Albany, New York

RICHARD M. PLATKIN

A.J.S.C.

Papers Considered:

NYSCEF Doc Nos. 1-3, 13, 19, 45-58, 61-78, 81-83.

FOOTNOTES

1.   General Star subsequently denied Bucher Law's request for reconsideration (see R-SOMF, ¶¶ 96-99).

2.   "It is common practice for insurance companies to defend an insured in a lawsuit under a reservation of rights. Proceeding under a reservation of rights, in and of itself, is not a concession of coverage" (General Star Natl. Ins. Co. v MDLV LLC (2022 WL 17987304, *3 [SD Fla 2022] (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]).

3.   Given the early dismissal of the Valve Complaint under UPEPA, no finding was made that would trigger the reimbursement obligation.

4.   In view of the Court's conclusion that General Star was entitled to disclaim coverage under Exclusion B (1), the Court need not reach the issue of Exclusion V.

5.   General Star's general awareness that Bucher Law was pursuing mass arbitration claims against Valve (see Opp Mem at 22) does not and cannot expand coverage beyond that provided for in the language of the Policy (see Holman v Transamerica Ins. Co., 183 AD2d 589, 591 [1st Dept 1992], affd 81 NY2d 1026 [1993]; Reinhart v Terra Nova Ins. Co., 124 AD2d 795, 796 [2d Dept 1986]).

6.   The parties' remaining arguments and requests for relief have been considered and found to be either without merit or unnecessary to entertain in view of the disposition reached herein.

Richard M. Platkin, J.