EMMANUEL GARCIA TENORIO v. OREGON CORRECTIONS ENTERPRISES (2026)

Plaintiff, an adult in custody (AIC) at an Oregon correctional institution, appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his claims for breach of contract and financial abuse of a vulnerable person under the Vulnerable Persons Act (VPA), ORS 124.100 to 124.140.¹ The trial court granted defendant Oregon Department of Corrections’ (ODOC) motion to dismiss both claims after concluding that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery of economic damages under Article I, section 41(3), of the Oregon Constitution. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, argues that the trial court erred. ODOC responds that the trial court “may have erred” in concluding that plaintiff's claims were barred by the Oregon Constitution but argues that we should affirm on the alternative bases that ODOC was entitled to sovereign immunity from plaintiff's breach of contract claim and that plaintiff's complaint failed to establish that he is a “vulnerable person” for purposes of the VPA.

We conclude that the trial court erred in granting ODOC's motion to dismiss based on Article I, section 41(3) because the court did not first address whether plaintiff had adequately pleaded an entitlement to economic damages under the alleged contract. We further conclude that ODOC was not entitled to sovereign immunity on the breach of contract claim. Thus, we reverse the trial court's ruling as to plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings. With respect to plaintiff's VPA claim, we conclude that plaintiff did not establish that he is a “vulnerable person” and affirm the trial court's dismissal of that claim on that alternative basis.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 for errors of law. Strizver v. Wilsey, 210 Or App 33, 35, 150 P3d 10 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 474 (2007). Under ORCP 21 A(1)(h), a trial court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim. “[W]e assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of plaintiffs.” Tomlinson v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, 362 Or 431, 434, 412 P3d 133 (2018).

We state the facts based on the allegations in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff worked in a call center for a company that contracted with ODOC for telemarketing services provided by AICs. After working for several months, plaintiff notified the manager of the call center that he was immediately terminating his employment, and the manager asked plaintiff to stay for two weeks. Plaintiff told the manager that he had not been paid compensation that he had earned over the previous months working in the call center and agreed to stay if the manager promised to pay plaintiff all of the compensation that he was owed. The manager agreed to those terms. Plaintiff worked in the call center for two more weeks but did not receive the compensation that he had been owed for previous work.

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a complaint against ODOC and others, alleging, as relevant here, that ODOC had breached its contract with plaintiff and committed financial abuse of a vulnerable person under the VPA. As to the VPA claim, plaintiff alleged, without providing additional facts, that he was “a financially incapable person within the meaning of ORS 125.005(3).” See ORS 125.005(3) (defining financially incapable as “a condition in which a person is unable to manage financial resources” for reasons such as “mental illness, mental retardation, physical illness or disability,” chronic intoxication, and confinement). Plaintiff requested $480 in economic damages and $9,519 in noneconomic damages. See ORS 31.705(2) (defining economic damages as “objectively verifiable monetary losses” such as loss of income, and “noneconomic damages” as “subjective, nonmonetary losses,” including pain, mental suffering, and emotional distress); ORS 30.650 (noneconomic damages “may not be awarded to an adult in custody in an action against a public body” unless the adult in custody has also suffered economic damages).

ODOC filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims under ORCP 21 A(1)(h) for “failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim.” ODOC argued that plaintiff “has alleged economic damages to which he is not legally entitled” under Article I, section 41(3), of the Oregon Constitution. See Or Const, Art I, § 41(3) (providing, in part, that “no [AIC] has a legally enforceable right to a job or to otherwise participate in work, * * * or to compensation for work or labor performed while an [AIC]”). ODOC argued that “because all * * * of plaintiff's claims depend on allegations of economic damages” in the form of lost compensation, the complaint should be dismissed.

Alternatively, ODOC argued that under ORS 30.320, plaintiff was barred from bringing a breach of contract claim against ODOC and that plaintiff's VPA claim failed to sufficiently allege that he is “vulnerable” as defined by the relevant statutes. See ORS 30.320 (providing in part that “no suit or action may be maintained against any county or the State of Oregon upon a contract relating to the care and maintenance of an adult in custody or patient of any county or state institution”); see Clardy v. Gangitano, 334 Or App 213, 222-23, 556 P3d 642, rev den, 373 Or 154 (2024) (on AIC's VPA claim, the undisputed facts demonstrated as a matter of law that plaintiff was not a “vulnerable person” as defined by the relevant statutes).

The trial court granted ODOC's motion to dismiss after concluding that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery of economic damages under the Oregon Constitution. In light of that conclusion, the trial court did not address ODOC's arguments that it was entitled to sovereign immunity on the breach of contract claim or that plaintiff failed to establish that he was a “vulnerable person.”

Plaintiff challenges the trial court's ruling on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the Oregon Constitution barred his claims. Plaintiff also argues that ODOC is not entitled to sovereign immunity and that his VPA claim sufficiently established that he is a “vulnerable person.” ODOC argues that in light of Huskey v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, 373 Or 270, 564 P3d 142 (2025), which was issued after the trial court made its ruling, the trial court's ruling “may have been in error.” In Huskey, the plaintiff, an AIC, brought a breach of contract claim against ODOC, seeking economic damages based on lost future wages and employment opportunities. 373 Or at 272-73. ODOC moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(h), arguing that Article I, section 41(3) “rendered plaintiff unable to plead economic damages because he had no right to employment.” Id. at 273. The Supreme Court determined that it need not decide the constitutional issues because the case presented “a straight-forward question of pleading damages,” and held that where the plaintiff alleged economic damages in the form of future lost employment income, the plaintiff was not required to plead an “enforceable right” to that future employment to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim brought under ORCP 21 A(1)(h). Id. at 272, 274.

Here, ODOC notes that the trial court's ruling “does not reflect whether it first considered the sub-constitutional question of whether plaintiff had adequately pleaded an entitlement to economic damages under the alleged contract, apart from any potential entitlement under the constitution.” That silence, in ODOC's view, is “in tension with the Supreme Court's holding in Huskey, which expressly considered first the ‘sub-constitutional’ question of what suffices to plead a loss of future income, which ultimately made resolving the parties’ constitutional arguments unnecessary.”

We agree with ODOC that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims under the Oregon Constitution without first addressing whether plaintiff had sufficiently stated a breach of contract claim.² See Huskey, 373 Or at 275 (“[G]enerally, to state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, plead facts with sufficient particularity as to allege the existence of a contract, its relevant terms, and a breach by [the] defendant that resulted in damage to [the] plaintiff.”).

ODOC argues, however, that we should affirm the trial court's ruling on the alternative bases that plaintiff's contract claim is barred by sovereign immunity and that he failed to establish that he is a “vulnerable person” with respect to his VPA claim.³ See Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 514-18, 783 P2d 506 (1989) (the state is immune from suit except as it consents by general law, and ODOC, as an instrumentality of the state, “is immune from suit to the same extent the state as such is immune”).

Beginning with ODOC's sovereign immunity argument, ODOC argues that ORS 30.320, which waives the state's sovereign immunity from particular contract claims, includes an exception for claims relating to the care and maintenance of an AIC in a state institution, and that plaintiff's claim falls within that exception. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that

“A suit or action may be maintained against any county and against the State of Oregon by and through and in the name of the appropriate state agency upon a contract made by the county in its corporate character, or made by such agency and within the scope of its authority; provided, however, that no suit or action may be maintained against any county or the State of Oregon upon a contract relating to the care and maintenance of an adult in custody or patient of any county or state institution.”

ORS 30.320 (emphasis added).

ODOC argues that the exception set out in ORS 30.320 for contracts “relating to the care and maintenance of an adult in custody” applies to plaintiff's claim, and thus ODOC is entitled to sovereign immunity from plaintiff's claim. Whether plaintiff's contract claim “relat[es] to the care and maintenance of an adult in custody” is a question of statutory construction, which we review for legal error. State v. Craig, 337 Or App 38, 44, 563 P3d 389 (2024). In resolving issues of statutory construction, we “seek[ ] to give effect to the intent of the legislature as demonstrated by the text, context, and any helpful legislative history.” Id.

Beginning with the text of the statute, the legislature did not define “care” or “maintenance.” When words are not statutorily defined, we usually presume them to have their ordinary meaning, and we generally “use sources contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute.” Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 282, 295-96, 296 n 7, 337 P3d 768 (2014). The relevant text was enacted in 1959 and provided that “no suit or action may be maintained against any county or the State of Oregon upon a contract relating to the care and maintenance of an inmate or patient of any county or state institution.” ORS 30.320 (1959), amended by Or Laws 1969, ch 429, § 4; Or Laws 1993, ch 289, § 1; Or Laws 2019, ch 213, § 3.

The relevant contemporaneous definition of “care” is “[c]harge, oversight, or management, implying responsibility for safety; as under a doctor's care.” Webster's Second New Int'l Dictionary 405 (unabridged ed 1952) (emphasis in original). The relevant contemporaneous definition of “maintenance” is “support, sustenance, defense, livelihood, etc.” Id. at 1484. Those definitions suggest that the legislature intended for the exception to apply to contracts related to the state's provision of care for inmates and patients residing in state institutions, such as providing safe facilities, health care, and food.

Turning to the context of those terms, when the exception was added to the statute in 1959, the phrase “care and maintenance” was used in statutes that governed processes relating to the care of residents in state mental institutions. See, e.g., former ORS 427.260 (1959), repealed by Or Laws 1979, ch 683, § 37 (referring to the cost of “care and maintenance” of residents of state institutions for the mentally ill). Additionally, the term “inmate” was used in those statutes to refer to residents in state mental institutions. See, e.g., former ORS 427.120 (1959), repealed by Or Laws 1979, ch 683, § 37 (providing that the superintendent of a state mental institution “may require that a reexamination of any inmate be made by at least two physicians”). That context supports the interpretation that the legislature intended “care and maintenance” to mean providing necessary support such as safe facilities, health care, and food to individuals residing in state institutions.

The legislative history of ORS 30.320 further supports that interpretation. The original draft of Senate Bill (SB) 450 (1959), which amended ORS 30.320 to expand the waiver of the state's sovereign immunity against contract claims, did not include the exception. At a hearing on the bill, Senator Lewis asked if the bill “would apply if a parent signs a contract for care of a child in a mental institution.” Minutes, Senate Judiciary Committee, April 3, 1959, 2. A proponent of the bill, Hugh Barzee, an attorney representing the Association of General Contractors, replied that he “did not think that an agreement for the care of an individual in an institution would be a contract in the same sense as used in [the statute].” Id. At a subsequent hearing, Senator Lewis introduced an amendment that included the exception for contracts “relating to the care and maintenance of an inmate or patient of any county or state institution,” explaining that the amendment “would avoid any possibility of suit on contract for failure to give care to a patient in an institution[.]” Minutes, Senate Judiciary Committee, April 13, 1959, 1. The amendment was adopted unanimously. Id.4

Thus, based on the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 30.320, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for the exception—that no suit could be brought “upon a contract relating to the care and maintenance of an adult in custody”—to apply to contracts governing an AIC's employment. That is, an AIC's employment contract does not relate to the “care and maintenance” of the AIC as those terms were understood by the legislature.

ODOC resists that conclusion by arguing that under the Oregon Constitution all AICs are required to participate in work programming and the purposes of that requirement include developing “motivation, work capabilities and cooperation”; assisting AICs in “successfully re-enter[ing] society with practical skills and a viable work ethic”; and “achiev[ing] savings in government operations” by benefitting from the work of AICs within “taxpayer-supported institutions.” Or Const, Art I, § 41(2); Or Const, Art I, § 41(1); Or Const, Art I, § 41(5). ODOC also points out that any compensation earned by AICs, with limited exceptions, can only be used for limited purposes, including “reimbursement for * * * costs of the [AIC's] rehabilitation, housing, health care, and living costs[.]” Or Const, Art I, § 41(8). Thus, in ODOC's view, in light of those constitutional provisions, plaintiff's contract to participate in work programming was a contract related to his “care and maintenance”; that is, to the institution's charge, oversight and management of plaintiff, and to the expense of supporting plaintiff in his sustenance and livelihood.

We are not persuaded by ODOC's argument. The goal in interpreting ORS 30.320 is to determine the legislature's intent at the time it enacted the statute through examining the text, context, and legislative history of the statute. As discussed above, the legislature enacted the relevant text referring to contracts relating to “care and maintenance” in 1959. The constitutional provisions that ODOC discusses were not adopted until 1994, and thus they do not provide relevant context with respect to determining the legislature's intent in using the terms “care” and “maintenance.” Moreover, in our view, the constitutional provisions that ODOC cites do not relate to “care and maintenance” as the legislature understood those terms in 1959, which we have explained cover basic needs such as safe facilities, health care, and food. Rather, those constitutional provisions relate to more modern societal interests in incarceration such as rehabilitation and governmental cost savings. Therefore, those later-enacted constitutional amendments do not lead us to a different interpretation of the meaning of ORS 30.320.

Because plaintiff's contract does not relate to the “care and maintenance” of AICs, the exception in ORS 30.320 does not apply to his claim against ODOC. Thus, we reject ODOC's argument that we should affirm the trial court's grant of ODOC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim on the alternative basis that ODOC has sovereign immunity against the claim.

Turning to plaintiff's abuse of a vulnerable person claim, as noted, the trial court dismissed that claim after concluding that, based on the Oregon Constitution, plaintiff was not entitled to economic damages. As discussed above, we conclude that that ruling was error. ODOC argues, and we agree, that we should affirm on the alternative basis that plaintiff failed to establish that he is a “vulnerable person” under the VPA.

We review whether a plaintiff is a financially vulnerable person under ORS 124.100 for legal error. Clardy, 334 Or App at 222-23. Under the VPA, a “vulnerable person” who has been injured by financial abuse may seek economic and noneconomic damages from the abuser. ORS 124.100(2). A “vulnerable person” is (1) an elderly person; (2) a financially incapable person; (3) an incapacitated person; or (4) certain disabled persons. ORS 124.100(1)(e). Here, in making his VPA claim, plaintiff asserted that he is a “financially incapable” person, which means a person who is “unable to manage financial resources of the person effectively” for reasons such as mental illness, physical disability, chronic substance use, and confinement. ORS 125.005(3); ORS 124.100(1)(b) (“ ‘Financially incapable’ has the meaning given that term in ORS 125.005.”). “Manage financial resources” means “those actions necessary to obtain, administer and dispose of real and personal property, intangible property, business property, benefits and income.” ORS 125.005(3).

Here, the only fact that plaintiff alleged in his complaint that plausibly related to being financially incapable is that he is an AIC. Although plaintiff concedes that his status as an AIC alone does not establish that he is financially incapable, he argues that he “is readily able to prove his financial vulnerability at the proper time.” Our review of a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(h), however, “is based solely on the allegations in the complaint.” Beck v. City of Portland, 202 Or App 360, 364, 122 P3d 131 (2005). Accepting as true all factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint and viewing those allegations and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff did not establish that he is a “vulnerable person.” Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's VPA claim on that basis.

Reversed in part; affirmed in part; and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff's complaint also included claims for conversion and deceit. Defendant notes, and plaintiff concedes, that plaintiff does not challenge on appeal the trial court's dismissal of those claims; thus, we do not address them.

2.   Accordingly, we do not address the merits of whether Article I, section 41(3), in light of Article I, section 34(2) (prohibiting involuntary servitude), could be construed to deny AICs a right to compensation for work performed.

3.   In advancing its alternative arguments, ODOC cites the “right for the wrong reason” doctrine. See Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659, 20 P3d 180 (2001) (describing the “right for the wrong reason” doctrine). However, that doctrine applies only to issues raised for the first time on appeal, not to issues—like the ones presented here—that were raised before the trial court. See Sherertz v. Brownstein Rask, 314 Or App 331, 341-42, 498 P3d 850 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 338 (2022) (when an argument was made before the trial court and is made again on appeal, Outdoor Media does not apply and we will normally resolve the issue, unless a remand is necessary for factual findings, exercise of discretion, or the like).

4.   The legislature subsequently amended ORS 30.320 in 2019 with the enactment of House Bill (HB) 3146 (2019), which comprehensively replaced the term “inmate” with “adult in custody” throughout the ORS. Or Laws 2019, ch 213, § 3.

HELLMAN, J.