STATE OF OREGON v. DAVID JOHN DANIELS (2026)

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered following a jury trial, for unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV) and felony unlawful possession of methamphetamine. Defendant raises three assignments of error. We reverse and remand for a new trial based on defendant's second assignment of error, because the trial court proceeded with the second day of trial in defendant's absence, and the record does not support a finding that defendant waived his right to be present for trial. We address defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the UUV conviction because it would provide him with more complete relief and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Finally, because it is likely to arise again on remand, we address defendant's challenge to the trial court's jury instructions concerning the mental state that applies to the “substantial quantity” element of felony possession of methamphetamine and conclude that in defendant's case the trial court will be required to instruct the jury that the “substantial quantity” element requires a knowing mental state.

RIGHT TO BE PRESENT FOR TRIAL

In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it proceeded with the second day of trial in his absence and absent evidence supporting a finding that he waived his right to be present at trial. We review whether a defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his right to be present at trial for legal error. State v. Peltier, 318 Or App 267, 272, 508 P3d 567, rev den, 370 Or 197 (2022).

The underlying facts are undisputed. Defendant was present for the first day of trial. The following morning, defendant came to the courthouse. He was in or near the courtroom for at least an hour, went outside to smoke a cigarette, and was seen walking down the street, away from the courthouse, before the second day of trial began. The record contains no evidence suggesting that any attempts to contact him were made that morning. The trial court found that defendant's absence was voluntary and that the trial could proceed in his absence.

To knowingly waive the right to be present at trial, “a defendant must at least understand that trial will proceed without the defendant, and the risks and consequences associated with that absence.” Id. at 280. The state concedes that the record does not reflect that defendant had that understanding, and that therefore the record lacks evidence that defendant knowingly waived his right to be present for the second day of trial. We agree, accept the concession, and reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR UUV

Because it could result in greater relief, we briefly address defendant's third assignment of error, which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his UUV conviction. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to show that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the owner did not consent to the use of the vehicle. Defendant points to the fact that he had the keys to the vehicle and that the ignition was not damaged in a manner that would have clearly indicated to defendant that the vehicle, which he had purchased from a third party, was stolen.

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by examining the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). If inferences from circumstantial evidence are necessary to prove an element, it is a question of law what reasonable inferences may be made. State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460, 467, 83 P3d 379 (2004). Reasonable inferences are allowed, but “speculation and guesswork are not.” Id.

In light of that standard, we conclude that there were facts in the record from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendant disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the vehicle was stolen. When he was arrested, defendant explained that he purchased the truck by paying $1,000 as a “down payment” to a man he knew as “Pops” at a bar. He stated that he agreed to make monthly payments, but that he did not have a way to contact Pops in order to make further payments and that he did not know Pops's full name. And, defendant did not have any paperwork associated with the vehicle. The vehicle's license plates were found concealed under the passenger-side seat, and items that were associated with defendant were also found in the truck, including under the seats. Apart from defendant's account of how he came to purchase the truck, there were facts from which a jury could infer that defendant was at least aware that the license plates, which would have easily revealed that the truck was stolen, were deliberately concealed inside the vehicle. Those circumstances distinguish this case from State v. Smith, 338 Or App 206, 213-14, 566 P3d 14 (2025), in which we held that the defendant's potentially untruthful account of how he came into possession of the vehicle, standing alone, did not allow for a nonspeculative inference that the defendant had reason to believe that the vehicle was stolen.

The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

MENTAL STATE FOR QUANTITY ELEMENT OF POSSESSION

Because it may arise again on remand, we address defendant's challenge to the trial court's jury instructions on the mental state that applies to the quantity of methamphetamine defendant possessed. After he was transported to jail, officers searched defendant's jacket and found 12.2 grams of methamphetamine in a plastic baggie deep inside the lining of his jacket. The state alleged in the indictment that defendant “did unlawfully and knowingly possess ten grams or more” of methamphetamine, which elevated the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. ORS 475.894(2)(c) (B) (providing that it is a Class C felony to “knowingly or intentionally” possess a “substantial quantity” of methamphetamine); ORS 475.900(3)(b)(D) (defining a “substantial quantity” as “[t]en grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine”).

Defendant argued before the trial court that the culpable mental state for the substantial quantity element is knowledge based on the structure of the statute, the indictment, and State v. Simonov, 358 Or 531, 368 P3d 11 (2016). The trial court ultimately concluded that the drug quantity had an attendant mental state of criminal negligence and instructed the jury that it would have to find that defendant was negligent as to the quantity of methamphetamine that he possessed.

The question of which culpable mental state applies to the “substantial quantity” element of the felony offense of unlawful possession of methamphetamine “ultimately is a matter of legislative intent.” Simonov, 358 Or at 546. We discern that intent “us[ing] the same methodology as for any other statutory construction issue. That is, we analyze the text, context, and any helpful legislative history * * *.” State v. Propp, 345 Or App 376, 390, 583 P3d 344 (2025), rev den, 375 Or 202 (2026) (citation omitted); see generally State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (describing methodology).

Before turning to ORS 475.894, which defines the offense at issue, we note that we are guided by the statutory provisions contained in ORS 161.115(1) and (2), setting out two analytical paths for determining what mental state applies to an element of an offense:

“(1) If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.

“(2) * * * [I]f a statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence.”

Thus, our analytical path “differ[s] depending on whether a criminal statute contains an explicit mental state, governed by ORS 161.115(1), or not, governed by ORS 161.115(2).” State v. Prophet, 318 Or App 330, 335, 507 P3d 735, rev den, 370 Or 472 (2022); Simonov, 358 Or at 538 (ORS 161.115(1) applies when the statute defining an offense contains a mental state but does not specify the element to which it applies, and if the statute does not prescribe a culpable mental state for all or some of the material elements of the offense, culpability is nonetheless required pursuant to ORS 161.115(2)).¹

Here, the operative statute specifies a culpable mental state for unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The crime of unlawful possession of methamphetamine is defined in ORS 475.894(1): “It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess methamphetamine” subject to exceptions not applicable here. (Emphasis added.) Paragraph (2)(a) of the statute classifies that offense as a “drug enforcement misdemeanor.” Paragraphs (2)(b) and (c) set out specific conditions under which that offense constitutes a misdemeanor or a felony, respectively. As relevant here, under ORS 475.894(2)(c), possession of methamphetamine is a Class C felony if “[t]he person possesses a substantial quantity under ORS 475.900(3)(b),” which, in turn, is defined as “[t]en grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine,” ORS 475.900(3)(b)(D).²

Furthermore, in the context of felony unlawful possession of methamphetamine, the parties do not dispute that the “substantial quantity” element is a material element and that the state must therefore prove that defendant “act[ed] with a culpable mental state” with respect to that element. ORS 161.095(2); ORS 161.105; Prophet, 318 Or App at 336 (all elements of an offense are material other than statute of limitations, jurisdiction, and venue). Based on the manner in which defendant was charged, the issue before us involves determining whether that culpable mental state is knowledge or criminal negligence.³

As relevant here, the statute that defines the offense of felony possession of methamphetamine contains an explicit applicable mental state—knowingly. “For statutes that contain an explicit mental state, that mental state applies to each nonprocedural element of the crime unless the text, context, and legislative history indicate that the legislature intended otherwise.” Prophet, 318 Or App at 347 (citing ORS 161.115(1)).

The structure of ORS 475.894 couples the prohibited conduct with additional elements that define whether the conduct is a violation, a misdemeanor, or a felony. The text of the statute thus does not demonstrate a clear legislative intent that different mental states would apply to those different elements contained in paragraphs of the same statute. Moreover, the mental state of “knowingly” may apply to the substantial quantity element, regardless of whether it is a conduct or a circumstance element. See Simonov, 358 Or at 539-40 (conduct and circumstance elements may take a knowing mental state). And the parties have not presented us with any legislative history that would suggest a different legislative intent.

We therefore conclude that ORS 161.115(1) operates to apply the “knowing[ ]” mental state contained in ORS 475.900(1) to the “substantial quantity” element of the offense of felony possession of methamphetamine as set out in ORS 475.894(2)(c)(B).

Seeking a different result, the state argues that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that it must find that defendant was at least criminally negligent as to the quantity of the offense because the separation of the “substantial quantity” element into a paragraph of ORS 475.900 that does not specify a mental state puts this case on par with State v. Shedrick, 370 Or 255, 518 P3d 559 (2022).

Shedrick does not aid the state here. That case involved ORS 164.055, a statute defining first-degree theft, which did not itself specify a culpable mental state. Instead, ORS 164.055 incorporated by reference the definition of theft, and its culpable mental state, contained in an entirely separate statute: ORS 164.015. Shedrick, 370 Or at 259. By contrast, here the “substantial quantity” element is contained within the same statute as the knowingly mental state. The fact that it is identified by a separate paragraph of the statute does not provide any reason to deviate from the straightforward rule in ORS 161.115(1).

Moreover, in Shedrick, neither party argued for the applicability of ORS 161.115(1); they “appear[ed] to assume that ORS 161.115(2) applie[d].” Id. at 270 n 2. Given that argument, the Supreme Court held only that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of first-degree theft without including any culpable mental state as to the “value of the property” element. Id. at 270.

In this case, however, defendant argues that ORS 161.115(1) applies; a position which we agree is correct. Under that statute, we can therefore readily ascertain that the appropriate mental state for the “substantial quantity” element is the one established in the statute, to wit, “knowingly.”

Ultimately, we reject the state's reading of the statute, which would have us treat ORS 475.900(1) and ORS 475.900(2) as disconnected from one another. The statute defining the offense contains a mental state that may reasonably be applied to the material elements contained in that same statute. And the text of ORS 161.115—which refers to “the statute defining the offense”—does not suggest that we should parse “the statute” into its subparts in this type of circumstance, as the state suggests.

Our conclusion that ORS 161.115(1) applies to this statute is consistent with other cases in which we have concluded that the minimum culpable mental state is criminal negligence even though the corresponding statutes contain a mental state—ORS 162.315, defining the offense of resisting arrest, in Prophet, 318 Or App at 333, and ORS 164.365, defining the offense of first-degree criminal mischief, in State v. Vaught-Cantwell, 353 Or App 239, 240, __ P3d __ (2026). In Prophet, we explained that the rule set out in ORS 161.115(1) directs the application of the explicitly stated mental state “to each nonprocedural element of the crime unless the text, context, and legislative history indicate that the legislature intended otherwise.” 318 Or App at 347. We observed that the definition of “resists” for the purposes of the offense of resisting arrest contains a means—the use of violence or physical force—and an end—the substantial risk of physical injury—and that the statutory text was ambiguous as to whether the legislature intended the mental state of intentionally to apply to both components of the definition. Id. at 348. We then turned to the legislative history of the resisting arrest statute, which resolved the ambiguity: We determined that the legislature meant for intentionally to apply to the conduct rather than the result of the conduct, that is, the intentional mental state did not apply to the creation of a risk of injury, but to conduct that prevents a person from making an arrest. Id. at 349-50 (concluding that the material element of creating a substantial risk of injury necessarily requires a mental state, and that “evidence of legislative intent affirmatively rebuts the presumption that ‘intentionally’ should be that mental state”); accord State v. Wear, 351 Or App 714, 724-26, ___ P3d ___(2026) (the legislative history of the resisting arrest statute indicates that “creates a substantial risk of physical injury” is a result element that takes a mental state of criminal negligence). Here, the statute defining the unlawful possession of methamphetamine does not produce an ambiguity similar to that created by the complex definition of “resists” in the resisting arrest statute, and the parties do not argue that anything in the legislative history affirmatively rebuts that reading of statutory text.⁴

Consideration of the legislative intent guided us to a similar conclusion in Vaught-Cantwell. We first determined that both the statute and the legislative history were ambiguous as to whether the amount-of-damage element—a material element of first-degree criminal mischief—was a result or a circumstance element and rejected the defendant's argument that separate, but related statutory provisions suggested that the reckless mental state applies to that element. 353 Or App at 243-44. We concluded that, regardless of that ambiguity, the statute evinced a legislative intent for the default minimum mental state of criminal negligence to apply to the amount-of-damage element. Id. Given the parties’ arguments, we did not consider the applicability of ORS 161.115(1) to the first-degree criminal mischief statute, nor was there occasion to consider whether the mental state contained in the statute—”with intent to damage property”—could be reasonably applied to the amount-of-damage element. See Simonov, 358 Or at 539-40 (the minimum culpable mental state for both conduct and circumstance elements is criminal negligence, however, in contrast to circumstance elements, result elements may take an intentional mental state).

As we have previously explained, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the basis that the second day of trial was held in defendant's absence, and there was no evidence in the record that defendant waived his right to be present at trial. In any subsequent jury trial, the trial court should instruct the jury that the substantial-quantity element of felony possession of methamphetamine takes a knowing mental state.

Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Much of our case law concerning the minimum culpable mental state for elements of various offenses has developed along the second analytical path, that is, addressing statutes defining offenses that do not contain any culpable mental state. E.g., Propp, 345 Or App at 394-405 (considering whether the victim's age is part of the conduct element for sexual offenses—using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct, second- and third-degree sexual abuse, and luring a minor—none of which contained a mental state).

2.   ORS 475.894 provides, in full:“(1) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess methamphetamine unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by ORS 475.005 to 475.285 and 475.752 to 475.980.“(2)(a) Unlawful possession of methamphetamine is a drug enforcement misdemeanor punishable as described in ORS 475.896.“(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, unlawful possession of methamphetamine is a Class A misdemeanor if the person possesses two grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.“(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, unlawful possession of methamphetamine is a Class C felony if:“(A) The possession is a commercial drug offense under ORS 475.900(1) (b); or“(B) The person possesses a substantial quantity under ORS 475.900(3) (b).”

3.   Defendant was not charged with intentionally possessing any quantity of methamphetamine, and we express no opinion on what jury instructions would be correct for a charge of intentional possession.

4.   The parties have not pointed us to any pertinent legislative history, and we have not independently sought such legislative history, as it is unnecessary for us to do so in light of the text of ORS 475.894 and its context. ORS 174.020(3) (“A court may limit its consideration of legislative history to the information that the parties provide to the court.”); see also Baldwin v. Seida, 297 Or App 67, 76, 441 P3d 720, rev den, 365 Or 769 (2019) (“We need not exercise our discretion to seek legislative history, particularly when unnecessary.”).

HELLMAN, J.