IN RE: K. A. C. (2026)

In this consolidated juvenile delinquency proceeding, youth came under the juvenile court's jurisdiction for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute unauthorized use of a vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle. ORS 164.135; ORS 819.300. On appeal, youth challenges the juvenile court's denial of his motion to dismiss the delinquency petition on the grounds that Washington County was an improper venue, because it is not the county where the alleged acts occurred, where youth actually lives, or—according to youth's reading of the applicable statutes—where jurisdiction had previously been established. The state argues that venue is proper in Washington County because youth was under that county's jurisdiction. Youth also raises a separate due process argument, but that argument is unpreserved. We agree with the state, conclude that the trial court did not err in denying youth's motion, and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This proceeding arises out of one of two instances of youth being in possession of a stolen vehicle over the span of one week in June 2023. The first instance occurred in Multnomah County. The second instance occurred a few days later in Washington County.

The Washington County Sheriff's Office referred the second incident to the Washington County Juvenile Department, which filed a petition for jurisdiction for that incident the next day. On October 11, 2023, after a hearing on the petition, the Washington County Juvenile Court determined that youth was within its jurisdiction and committed him into the legal custody of the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) with a recommendation for placement at a youth correctional facility. Youth was subsequently placed at a facility in Marion County.

The next month, the Washington County Juvenile Department filed a second petition with the Washington County Juvenile Court, this time based on the first incident.¹ Youth filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the second petition based on improper venue, contending that venue was proper where the act had occurred (Multnomah County) or where youth was living (Marion County), but not in Washington County. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that venue was proper in Washington County because youth “resided” there, under the meaning of ORS 419A.004(29) and ORS 419C.013, due to being under the court's jurisdiction in that county following the first delinquency petition.

A jurisdictional hearing was held, and the Washington County Juvenile Court again determined that youth was under its jurisdiction and committed youth to OYA's legal custody with continued placement in the Marion County facility. Youth appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, youth assigns error to the denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the petition based on improper venue. We review determinations that venue is proper for errors of law, limiting ourselves to the record as it was developed at the time of the ruling. State v. Paul, 345 Or App 348, 362, 583 P3d 1045 (2025), rev den, 375 Or 496 (2026) (describing the standard for venue rulings in criminal cases involving adults).²

In a delinquency proceeding, venue is proper in either “the county where the youth resides or the county in which the alleged act was committed.” ORS 419C.013. Here, it is undisputed that the alleged act was not committed in Washington County. Accordingly, for venue to be proper in Washington County, youth must have “resided” in that county within the meaning of ORS 419C.013. The place where a youth “resides” is “the place where the child, ward, youth or adjudicated youth is actually living or the jurisdiction in which wardship or jurisdiction has been established.” ORS 419A.004(29). Because it is also undisputed that youth did not “actually liv[e]” in Washington County, the question is whether the jurisdiction established on the first petition served to establish that he resided there under the meaning of the statute.

Youth makes two primary arguments for why venue was improper in Washington County: (1) due process required dismissal due to improper forum shopping, and (2) the context of this case requires a narrower definition of the term “resides” than the definition provided in ORS 419A.004(29).

We first address youth's argument that the decision implicated his due process rights. We understand youth to be making two due process arguments: (1) due process favors a narrower construction of the statutory definition of “resides,” and (2) due process required dismissal due to improper forum shopping. The first argument is properly before us as a consideration applied during our statutory construction analysis, which we conduct later in this opinion. Bonner v. American Golf Corp. of California, 372 Or 814, 844, 558 P3d 812 (2024) (explaining that “when a statute is capable of more than one plausible interpretation, the court will avoid an interpretation that raises a constitutional problem”). However, we conclude that youth's second argument is unpreserved because it was not raised with the requisite level of specificity to allow the state or the court to respond. State v. Skotland, 372 Or 319, 327, 549 P3d 534 (2024) (holding that a party must “explain its objection clearly enough for the opposing party, and the trial court, to understand the issue and either avoid an error, or correct an error if one has occurred”). Youth does not request plain error review. See State v. Ardizzone, 270 Or App 666, 673, 349 P3d 597, rev den, 358 Or 145 (2015) (“We ordinarily will not proceed to the question of plain error unless an appellant has explicitly asked us to do so.”).

Turning to youth's statutory argument, he argues that, under ORS 419A.004(29), “resides” means where a youth actually lives or where jurisdiction has previously been established as to the specific case at issue; in his view, it does not mean that a youth resides in any county that has previously exercised jurisdiction over youth. Accordingly, because, youth asserts, he was only under Washington County's jurisdiction in a previous proceeding, youth believes venue was improper for the current proceeding. Youth argues that the legislature's inclusion of the definite article “the” in ORS 419C.013 in reference to “the county where the youth resides” indicates that it intended there to be only one county where a youth could reside, a position that youth argues is supported by the statutory context. Under his reading, youth argues that Marion County—where youth actually lives—was the only proper venue in the context of this proceeding.

In response, the state argues that the text and context of the statute support the juvenile court's construction. The state contends that ORS 419A.004(29) and ORS 419C.013, read together, indicate that the youth can “reside” in either the place where youth actually lives or where jurisdiction exists as the result of a previous adjudication. The state asserts that the existence of two potential residence options within the statute itself demonstrates that a youth can have multiple qualifying residences. While the state agrees that use of the definite article “the” often signifies a narrowing intent in reference to something specific, it contends that in this instance “the” refers to whichever qualifying county it has been determined youth resides within as defined by ORS 419A.004(29). The state also asserts that youth failed to establish that commencing a delinquency proceeding in a county where jurisdiction over a youth has been established violates due process principles.

Youth's arguments fail under a plain reading of the applicable statutes because a youth “resides” in a county where jurisdiction exists. We come to that conclusion by applying our usual mode of statutory interpretation, considering the text, context, and any helpful legislative history of the disputed statute to discern the legislature's intent. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).

We begin with the text of the applicable statutes. We have explained that “if possible, we should avoid interpreting statutory enactments in a way that makes parts of them superfluous or redundant.” State v. Giron-Cortez, 372 Or 729, 738, 557 P3d 505 (2024). Therefore, we assume that the legislature intentionally included each aspect of the statutes and that each statement serves a purpose. ORS 419C.013 governs where venue is proper in a juvenile proceeding:

“(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a juvenile proceeding based on allegations of jurisdiction under ORS 419C.005 shall commence in either the county where the youth resides or the county in which the alleged act was committed.”

ORS 419A.004 provides the guiding definitions for the juvenile code, including ORS 419C.013, and defines “resides” as follows, “unless context requires otherwise”:

“(29) Resides’ or ‘residence,’ when used in reference to the residence of a child, ward, youth or adjudicated youth, means the place where the child, ward, youth or adjudicated youth is actually living or the jurisdiction in which wardship or jurisdiction has been established.”

“Adjudicated youth” means

“a person who has been found within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under ORS 419C.005 for an act committed when the person was under 18 years of age.”

ORS 419A.004(1). A juvenile court that establishes jurisdiction over an adjudicated youth pursuant to ORS 419C.005 maintains jurisdiction until, among other conditions:

“(a) The court dismisses a petition filed under this chapter or waives the case under ORS 419C.340. If jurisdiction is based on a previous adjudication, then dismissal or waiver of a later case does not terminate jurisdiction under the previous case unless the court so orders.”

ORS 419C.005(4)(a) (emphasis added).

On their face, the statutes read together indicate that a youth may “reside” where they actually live or in a county where “jurisdiction has been established,” and jurisdiction may be “based on a previous adjudication.” Therefore, the Washington County Juvenile Court was an appropriate venue for the subsequent proceeding because it had continuing jurisdiction as a result of the previous adjudication. As we will explain, that conclusion is supported by the purpose of the delinquency code.

We read the statutory provisions at issue in this case within the context of the juvenile delinquency code, as well as the rest of the juvenile code. See Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 54, 430 P3d 1021 (2018) (examining the juvenile code provision at issue in the context of the rest of the juvenile code); Brown v. SAIF, 361 Or 241, 254-55, 391 P3d 773 (2017) (explaining that statutory context includes the entire statutory scheme).

The purpose of the juvenile delinquency system is to “provide a continuum of services that emphasize prevention of further criminal activity by the use of early and certain sanctions, reformation and rehabilitation programs[,] and swift and decisive intervention in delinquent behavior.” ORS 419C.001(1); see, e.g., State v. B. Y., 371 Or 364, 383, 537 P3d 517 (2023) (reasoning that juvenile courts should base their decisions on “the specific circumstances and rehabilitative needs of the youth in each case”). A reading of the statutes that allows for venue in a delinquency proceeding to be based on existing jurisdiction aligns with that goal because it allows a single jurisdiction to quickly intervene and manage an effective rehabilitation effort in instances where a youth has committed multiple acts that are subject to delinquency proceedings, rather than try to coordinate those efforts across multiple jurisdictions.

In this case, context supports a plain reading of the statutes, that a youth resides in the county where they “actually live” or “where jurisdiction has been established.” And venue is proper “where the youth resides or the county in which the alleged act was committed.” ORS 419C.013. Therefore, venue in this case would have been proper where youth actually lives (Marion County), where the alleged act was committed (Multnomah County), or—as occurred—where delinquency jurisdiction had been established and continued (Washington County).

Because Washington County had delinquency jurisdiction over youth, we conclude that youth “resided” there within the meaning of ORS 419A.004(29) and that the juvenile court correctly determined that it was a proper venue under ORS 419C.013. In our view, that determination did not impede youth's right to due process. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in denying youth's motion to dismiss based on improper venue.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The original petition alleged that the first instance occurred in either Lane County, where the vehicle was found, or Washington County. But the petition was amended twice, eventually alleging that the act occurred in Multnomah County.

2.   Because each party cites State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Smith, 126 Or App 646, 651, 870 P2d 240 (1994), we note that the holding of that case was that a venue challenge must be made pretrial and that venue need not subsequently be proved during the proceeding.

EGAN, P. J.