STATE v. OLAYO DEONATE (2026)

Defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of failure to perform the duties of a driver causing property damage, ORS 811.700(1)(a), (d). Defendant raises two assignments of error: (1) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of ORS 811.700(1)(a), (d); and (2) that the trial court erred when it imposed probation conditions in the judgment that were not announced on the record at sentencing. We agree that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not reasonably investigate the crash and that he did not take reasonable steps to notify the city of the property damage. Because our holding on the first assignment of error requires reversal, we do not reach defendant's second assignment of error. Accordingly, we reverse.

This court reviews the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994). “Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a particular inference is a legal question for the court to decide. Reasonable inferences are permissible; speculation and guesswork are not.” State v. Derry, 200 Or App 587, 591, 116 P3d 248 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An inference is reasonable if “there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the proven facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant crashed the vehicle he was driving into a tree and traffic sign, which resulted in damage to the tree and sign and totaled his car. A bystander saw defendant's crashed vehicle and pulled over to call emergency services and render assistance. The bystander tried to talk to defendant but was unable to communicate because defendant does not speak English. Defendant called a friend to take him to the hospital. Defendant's friend arrived at the same time as the ambulance, and defendant got in his friend's truck to go to the hospital. Police arrived after defendant left the scene and found defendant's keys in the car, which included a keychain with defendant's first name on it. Later that day, after defendant had been discharged from the hospital, he returned to the crash scene to find that his car was no longer there. He called the police nonemergency line and reported the crash. When the police responded, defendant arranged for one of his friends to translate for him and told police that he had been in a single-car crash and left the scene to go to the hospital. Defendant told the police the make, model, and license plate number of his car.

Four days after the crash, a police officer and interpreter interviewed defendant. Defendant fully complied with the police investigation, and told the officers that he was in a crash and that he hit a tree.

Defendant was subsequently charged with failure to perform the duties of a driver causing property damage pursuant to ORS 811.700. As discussed below, that statute requires that a driver involved in a collision must stop their vehicle and “reasonably investigate what the driver's vehicle struck,” ORS 811.700(1)(a), and, if the collision damages roadside property or fixtures, to “[t]ake reasonable steps to notify the owner or person in charge of the property” of the collision and other information, ORS 811.700(1)(d)(A).

At trial, after the state's case-in-chief, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. He argued the state did not prove defendant “was acting unreasonably in the actions that he took.” Defendant pointed out that he had to stop because his car was inoperable, that he left his keys, including his house key, with the car when he went to the hospital, and that he called the police after he was discharged from the hospital and that those were all reasonable actions. The court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and ultimately the court convicted him.

Defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he did not immediately stop and reasonably investigate the scene of the crash or that he did not take reasonable steps to notify the property owner—in this case, the city.¹ Defendant points out that “ORS 811.700(1)(d)(A) imposes no duty that a person immediately notify the owner of the damaged property.” Defendant contends that it was reasonable for him to call police the same day as the crash, after he was released from the hospital. Additionally, defendant states that there is no evidence showing the exact time that he called the nonemergency police line and to infer that it took him until 8:00 p.m., when officers responded, would be speculative. Defendant argues that he necessarily stopped because his vehicle was totaled in the crash and that the evidence shows that he reasonably investigated because in statements to the police he told them he hit a tree. Defendant argues that all of these steps were reasonable within the meaning of the statute.

The state argues that there was sufficient evidence to create a factual question for the jury as to whether defendant took “reasonable steps” to investigate and report the crash. According to the state, defendant seeks to establish a rule that “evidence becomes legally insufficient because defendant ultimately did contact police, without regard to other inferences that could be drawn from defendant's delay in contacting police and apparent decision to contact them only when it became necessary to retrieve his car.”

ORS 811.700(1)(a) requires a driver “who knows or has reason to believe that the driver's vehicle was involved in a collision” to “immediately stop the driver's vehicle at the scene of the collision or as close to the scene of the collision as possible and reasonably investigate what the driver's vehicle struck.” On this record, there is insufficient evidence that defendant failed to stop or that his investigation was unreasonable. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, shows that defendant necessarily stopped his vehicle immediately because it was totaled when it hit the tree. The evidence also shows that defendant's investigation was reasonable, as he was later able to describe to law enforcement officers what had happened; the state has not identified any information that he should have, but failed to, collect during his investigation.

Regarding the investigation requirement, we do not agree with the state's argument that

“even if the damage to the tree and road sign were relatively easy to discover, the jury could nonetheless still find that defendant's conduct—calling a friend to remove him from the scene without contacting police or waiting for first responders—was not a reasonable investigation of the damage he caused.”

The record shows that defendant's friend arrived at the same time as the ambulance, and defendant opted to go to the hospital with someone that he knew after a severe crash. To the extent that the state contends that a reasonable investigation might have required defendant to stay at the scene and contact the police rather than promptly going to the hospital, we reject that argument under these circumstances because, in our view, there is no evidence that defendant acted unreasonably in prioritizing his medical treatment after being in a car crash. The evidence is similarly insufficient that defendant's observation of what his vehicle struck was lacking.

As for the notification requirement, if the only damage is to property legally upon or adjacent to a highway, the driver must “[t]ake reasonable steps to notify the owner or person in charge of the property of the collision.” ORS 811.700(1)(d)(A). ORS 811.700(1)(d)(A) does not require a driver to immediately notify the property owner at the scene. State v. Pruitt, 115 Or App 587, 590, 839 P2d 735 (1992) (“[D]efendant's argument is that, unlike some other statutes relating to a driver's duties at the scene of a crash, ORS 811.700(1)(c) does not require a driver in defendant's position to stop immediately and communicate information and to remain at the scene. That is accurate [.]”).² In contrast, ORS 811.705(1)(b) requires that in crashes that result in injury or death to a person the driver must “remain at the scene of the collision until the driver has fulfilled all of the requirements under [ORS 811.705(1)].” The express requirement to remain at the scene in ORS 811.705 shows that, had the legislature intended for a driver in a crash that only causes property damage to remain at the scene, it would have written that requirement into the statute. However, ORS 811.700(1)(d)(A) does not contain a similar provision, and we will not read one into the statute. See Speck Restaurant v. OLCC, 24 Or App 337, 339, 545 P2d 601 (1976) (“The statute is plain and unambiguous. We are not at liberty to read into it what it does not contain, nor to remove from it what it does.”).

Here, the evidence does not support a determination that the steps defendant took to notify the city were not reasonable. The record shows that defendant suffered injuries, including a hematoma, as a result of hitting his head in the crash. Under these circumstances, we disagree with the state's premise that the factfinder could find that it was not reasonable for defendant to seek medical attention before notifying the city of the property damage. The state did not present any evidence that defendant delayed beyond what was necessary to get medical attention. Nor did it present evidence that there was any delay between defendant's release and his call to the nonemergency police line to report the crash.

We recognize that reasonableness is typically a jury question. State v. Porter, 95 Or App 373, 374, 768 P2d 940, rev. den., 308 Or 33 (1989). However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that when assessing reasonable conduct, and actions are “at the outer margins of debatable conduct[,] a court is obliged to say ‘that the conduct does or does not meet the standard.’ ” Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 12, 734 P2d 1326 (1987) (quoting Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 608, 469 P2d 783 (1970)). “The cases that fall beyond the outer margins are few and far between and should be identified ad hoc.” Najjar v. Safeway, Inc., 203 Or App 486, 492, 125 P3d 807 (2005). Defendant's conduct in this case falls “at the outer margins of debatable conduct” and the evidence on this record is that defendant actually notified the property owner the same day after he received medical attention. Conversely, there is no evidence to show that defendant failed to take reasonable steps to notify the property owner.

The record does not support a reasonable inference that defendant failed to reasonably inspect the damage caused by the crash or reasonably notify the city of that damage. Thus, we reverse.

Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant and the state agree that, for the purposes of this statute, when the city is the property owner, calling the police to notify them suffices to provide notice to the city of the property damage.

2.   In Pruitt, we analyzed a previous version of ORS 811.700 in effect in 1992. ORS 811.700 (1992), amended by Or. Laws 2017, ch. 75, § 1. That statute contained the same “reasonable steps” element at issue in this case.

EGAN, J.