SAVE STAFFORD ROAD v. Portland General Electric Company, Respondent Cross-Petitioner. (2026)

In this land use case, petitioner Save Stafford Road petitions for review of a final opinion and order of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), in which LUBA affirmed in part and remanded in part a Clackamas County Hearings Officer's decision that, subject to certain conditions, approved respondent Portland General Electric's (PGE's) request for a conditional use permit to replace existing utility poles and power lines with upgraded poles, lines, and related infrastructure, including the addition of transmission lines, within a 5.9 mile corridor along Stafford Road in Clackamas County. Petitioner raises three assignments of error, asserting that LUBA erred in three ways when it rejected petitioner's assignments of error regarding the county's conclusion that PGE's proposed transmission line project would not substantially impair the use of surrounding properties for residential uses in the Stafford Road area pursuant to Clackamas County Zoning and Development Ordinance (ZDO) 1203.03(D). In a cross-petition, PGE challenges the portion of LUBA's order that remanded the county's decision for further findings on ZDO 1203.03(E). We conclude that LUBA did not err in the ways asserted by the parties and affirm on the petition and cross-petition.

We review LUBA's order to determine if it is “unlawful in substance.” ORS 197.850(9)(a). “A LUBA order is unlawful in substance if it represented a mistaken interpretation of the applicable law.” Nicita v. City of Oregon City, 317 Or App 709, 716, 507 P3d 804, rev. den., 370 Or 404 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “LUBA must defer to a local governing body's permissible interpretation of its local land use legislation,” but it need not defer to “the interpretations of hearings officers or other subordinate local officials.” Gould v. Deschutes County, 322 Or App 340, 350, 520 P3d 433 (2022); see also Siporen v. City of Medford, 349 Or 247, 261, 243 P3d 776 (2010) (“A LUBA decision is unlawful in substance (in at least one way) if, in contravention of the standard of review set out at ORS 197.829(1), LUBA substitutes its own interpretation of a local government's land use regulations for a plausible interpretation of those regulations offered by the local government.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

BACKGROUND

We take the pertinent background facts from LUBA's final opinion and order and from undisputed evidence in the record; we provide additional background information as necessary when we address the cross-petition. In July 2025, as part of a larger project, the Tonquin Rosemont-Wilsonville Line Replacement Project, PGE applied for a conditional use permit for a high voltage transmission line in a 5.9 mile corridor along Stafford Road. The existing utility corridor along Stafford Road was established in the late 1940s, and PGE is upgrading poles to allow both distribution and transmission lines. The project will include replacing the existing power poles with taller poles and increased line capacity. Approximately two-thirds of the existing poles will be converted from wood to steel, and one-third will remain wood. The project will also include the removal of some existing trees.

The project area includes lands that are zoned Rural Residential Farm Forest 5-Acre (RRFF-5) and Exclusive Farm Use (EFU).¹ Electric transmission lines are a conditional use in the RRFF-5 zone. ZDO Table 316-1. Primary uses in the surrounding area are generally rural residential, farming, and forestry uses. The corridor contains improvements such as dwellings, places of worship, schools, and agricultural businesses.² Petitioner Save Stafford Road consists of property owners in the Stafford Road area.

Section 1203 of the ZDO provides “standards, criteria, and procedures under which a conditional use may be approved.” ZDO 1203.01. ZDO 1203.03 provides general approval criteria and states, in relevant part:

“D. The proposed use will not alter the character of the surrounding area in a manner that substantially limits, impairs, or precludes the use of surrounding properties for the primary uses allowed in the zoning district(s) in which surrounding properties are located.”

After a public hearing, the hearings officer approved with conditions PGE's application for conditional use approval for utility poles in the RRFF-5 zone and improvements in the EFU zone outside of the right-of-way. The hearings officer issued a written decision which contained an analysis of whether PGE's proposed project met the criteria of ZDO 1203.03(D). The hearings officer considered potential impacts to the character of the area that had been raised by the parties: increased fire risk and arcing, adverse health effects from electromagnetic field (EMF) exposure, property values, farming impacts, increased noise, tree removal, wildlife and natural resources, and views and aesthetics. In the conclusion regarding the ZDO 1203.03(D) criteria, the hearings officer stated, in part:

“The applicant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with all of the applicable approval criteria, including that the use will not ‘substantially limit, impair, or preclude the use of surrounding properties for primary uses.’ ZDO 1203.03(D). However, this does not require the applicant to ‘prove a negative.’ As the applicant put it * * *, they are only required to address likely/foreseeable impacts, as well [as] nonspeculative impacts raised by others, to show that it is more likely than not that those potential impacts will not result in the standard at issue being violated. The hearings officer finds, based on the preponderance of evidence in the record, that in this case the applicant sustained its burden of proof that the application complies with ZDO 1203.03(D). Although the evidence regarding some issues is conflicting[,] the hearings officer finds that the applicant's evidence is the most persuasive, based on the discussion in this Final Order.

“* * * * *

“The hearings officer finds that the proposed use will alter (make different) the visual and aesthetic character (the attributes and features that make up and distinguish, the surrounding area; SW Stafford Road and properties abutting the project corridor). As stated in the nonconforming use decision, the visual simulations in the record ‘[c]learly demonstrate that the project will have significant visual impacts in comparison to the existing lines. The added height, larger-diameter poles, and additional wires combine to create a far more industrial aesthetic than the current power lines, an aesthetic that is inconsistent with the current visual identity of the area.’ * * * The proposed tree removal will also change the visual character of the area, increasing views of the powerlines and creating more open views for persons traveling on SW Stafford Road as well as for the owners and residents of some properties.

“However, unlike the standard at issue in the nonconforming use decision, which prohibits any greater adverse impact to the neighborhood, alteration of the character of the area alone is not sufficient to deny this project. In order to approve this conditional use application the hearings officer must find that the alteration to the character of the area, individually and collectively, will not considerably (significantly, or greatly) limit (bound, restrain, or confine), impair (diminish in function, ability, or quality : weaken or make worse), or preclude (make impossible) the use of surrounding properties, ZDO 1203.03(D).[3] The hearings officer finds that this standard is met based on the discussion below.

“The visual and aesthetic impacts of the project will not substantially limit, impair, or preclude the use of surrounding properties. Although the area may look different after the project is completed, surrounding properties can continue to be used for residences, farms, and other permitted uses. Transmission lines exist in relative harmony with these uses throughout the region.”

(Emphases and brackets in original; citations omitted.)

Petitioner appealed to LUBA, challenging only the conditional use approval for improvements in the RRFF-5 zone. Petitioner argued to LUBA that (1) the hearings officer misconstrued ZDO 1203.03(D) in concluding that the proposed project would not substantially visually impair the use and enjoyment of residential uses in the Stafford Road Area, (2) the hearings officer misconstrued ZDO 1203.03(D) in concluding that PGE had met its burden of proof demonstrating compliance with ZDO 1203.03(D) on the basis that surrounding properties could continue to be used for residential use, and (3) the hearings officer's finding that the proposed project would not substantially visually impair the use and enjoyment of the residential uses in the Stafford Road Area was inadequate and contradictory. LUBA considered those arguments together and rejected them.

LUBA explained that

“[t]he central issue is whether the proposed electrical transmission line development along Stafford Road would alter the character of the area in a way that would substantially limit or impair residential uses on surrounding RRFF-5 properties. Detached single-family dwellings are the primary residential use allowed in the RRFF-5-zoned property. ZDO Table 316-1. The primary impacts from the transmission line that opponents argued would substantially limit or impair residential uses include visual and aesthetic changes. [Petitioner] argues that the use of rural residential property includes the scenic character of the surrounding area. [Petitioner] argues that the visual impact of the transmission line changes and impairs the surrounding residential uses because the changes create an industrial aesthetic that is out of character with the surrounding area.”

LUBA noted that the argument being made was “almost identical to an argument that [LUBA] rejected in” a prior decision. LUBA pointed to two prior decisions regarding a proposed solar power generation facility and conditional use application where neighbors in the adjoining RRFF-5-zoned area opposed the facility: York v. Clackamas County, 79 Or LUBA 278 (2019) (York I), and York v. Clackamas County, 81 Or LUBA 20 (2020) (York II).

In York I, LUBA stated that

“ZDO 1203.03(D) does not prohibit alteration of the character of the surrounding area, only alterations ‘in a manner that substantially limits, impairs, or precludes the use of surrounding properties for the primary use[.]’ As ZDO 1203.03(D) is structured, if the hearings officer concludes that the proposed use does not substantially limit, impair or preclude the primary uses of the surrounding area, there is no need to address whether it has ‘altered the character’ of the surrounding area in some other manner. For example, we understand [the] petitioners to argue that even if the proposed facility does not substantially limit, impair, or preclude the primary residential uses in the RRFF-5-zoned area to the north, the proposed facility nonetheless fails to comply with ZDO 1203.03(D) if it alters the ‘rural’ character of the area. However, altering the rural character of the surrounding area would not run afoul of ZDO 1203.03(D) unless that alteration also ‘substantially limits, impairs or precludes’ the primary uses in the area. The hearings officer did not err in focusing on that predicate inquiry.”

79 Or LUBA at 288 (emphasis in original; second brackets added).

In York II, which involved the same project as York I, the petitioners argued “that the visual impact of the solar facility substantially impair[ed] the surrounding residential uses because a solar facility is out of character with the surrounding area.” York II, 81 Or LUBA at 25. LUBA stated that that argument “misrepresent[ed] the appropriate inquiry” and referred back to its decision in York I, above. Id. LUBA ultimately rejected the revived argument; it concluded that “the hearings officer correctly limited the focus of residential use to actual residential use of the property.” Id. It further explained that “[d]etached single-family dwellings are the primary residential use allowed in the RRFF-5 zone. ZDO Table 316-1. We agree with the county that use and occupancy of the dwelling structure is the primary use.” Id. Thus, according to LUBA in York II, “the hearings officer did not misinterpret the scope of the primary residential use in applying ZDO 1203.03(D).” Id.

Turning back to the Stafford Road project, LUBA relied on its explanations and conclusions in the York decisions to conclude that “[s]imilarly here, [petitioner] emphasizes that the conditional use will alter the visual character and identity of the Stafford Road area, but [petitioner] has not explained how the transmission line will substantially impair the use of the surrounding properties for the primary residential uses.” LUBA agreed with PGE that petitioner had “not identified any remandable error” regarding the hearings officer's determination that ZDO 1203.03(D) was satisfied. LUBA rejected petitioner's three assignments of error regarding ZDO 1203.03(D).

PETITIONER'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On review, petitioner asserts in its first assignment of error that LUBA mischaracterized petitioner's argument and misapplied the York decisions. That is, according to petitioner, LUBA treated petitioner as asserting that any visual impact constitutes substantial impairment and then relied on the York decisions to reject the mischaracterized argument that petitioner did not make. Petitioner asserts that its argument to LUBA was focused on whether the alteration to the character of the area would substantially limit, impair or preclude the primary use, and that the hearings officer's conclusion that it would not cannot be reconciled with the findings made in support of allowing the conditional use. In response, PGE disagrees that LUBA mischaracterized petitioner's argument and argues that LUBA understood petitioner's arguments and correctly dismissed them.

We do not agree with petitioner that LUBA mischaracterized its argument. As recounted above, LUBA stated that the “central issue is whether the proposed electrical transmission line development along Stafford Road would alter the character of the area in a way that would substantially limit or impair residential uses on surrounding RRFF-5 properties.” (Emphasis added.) It explained that petitioner “argues that the hearings officer misconstrued ZDO 1203.03(D) in concluding that the transmission line changes would not substantially visually impair the use and enjoyment of residential uses.” Therefore, it is clear that LUBA understood petitioner to be making an argument that the transmission lines would alter the character of the area and that altered character would result in a visual impairment to the residential uses in the RRFF-5 zone.

Although LUBA stated that petitioner's argument is “almost identical” to an argument that LUBA rejected in York II, we observe that it is similar, but not identical. The York II petitioners opposed the proposed solar generation facility, asserting that the visual impact of the facility would substantially impair the surrounding residential uses because the facility was out of character for the surrounding area. 81 Or LUBA at 25. LUBA concluded that the correct focus of the residential use was on the actual use of the property for residential purposes—that the “use and occupancy of the dwelling structure is the primary use.” Id. Petitioner's argument here is similar in that petitioner is focused on the altered character of the area visually impairing the use and enjoyment of residential uses. In both situations, the petitioners are asserting, essentially, that there will be a visual impairment in connection with the change in the character of the area from the proposed conditional use. However, here petitioner is asserting, although not in a very specific way, that the enjoyment and use of the homes would be impaired visually by the changes whereas the York II petitioners appeared to be focused more on the character of the neighborhood changing rather than an impairment of the use of the residences.

LUBA correctly interpreted ZDO 1203.03(D) in York I when it explained that “ZDO 1203.03(D) does not prohibit alteration of the character of the surrounding area, only alterations ‘in a manner that substantially limits, impairs, or precludes the use of surrounding properties for the primary use,’ ” and also when it stated that “altering the rural character of the surrounding area would not run afoul of ZDO 1203.03(D) unless that alteration also ‘substantially limits, impairs or precludes’ the primary uses in the area.” 79 Or LUBA at 288 (emphasis in original). We therefore do not view LUBA's reliance on the York decisions to be problematic, and having also determined that LUBA did not mischaracterize petitioner's argument, we reject petitioner's first assignment of error.⁴

PETITIONER'S SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In its second assignment of error, petitioner asserts that LUBA misconstrued ZDO 1203.03(D) by applying a “continued use” standard instead of the required “substantial impairment” standard. In petitioner's view, the ordinance protects the use and enjoyment of surrounding properties, not merely their continued existence.⁵ Petitioner contends that LUBA conflated a use being impaired with a use being precluded and asserts that a use need not be rendered impossible to be substantially impaired. In response, PGE argues that a review of LUBA's final order and the hearings officer's decision show that LUBA and the hearings officer understood the difference between the terms “preclude” and “impair” and correctly interpreted and applied ZDO 1203.03(D).

We agree with PGE. LUBA correctly articulated the standard contained in ZDO 1203.03(D), and there is no indication in its final opinion and order that it misunderstood or conflated the parts of that standard. LUBA also noted that the hearings officer had begun its ZDO 1203.03(D) analysis by setting out dictionary definitions of the words in the ordinance because the ordinance itself did not define them. Those words included “substantial,” “limit,” “impair,” and “preclude.” There was an acknowledgement, then, from both decisionmakers that those words had different meanings.

In addition, LUBA stated that the “hearings officer found that the visual and aesthetic impacts of the project would not substantially impair the residential uses within the Stafford Road Area and, therefore, PGE had sustained its burden of demonstrating compliance with ZDO 1203.03(D).” LUBA then went on to quote portions of the hearings officer's findings in which it considered the impact of the change in the existing visual character of the area. For example, drivers on the road currently see a mix of trees and open areas; after trees are removed, the amount of open areas will increase. The hearings officer found that the impact of that change would be subjective “depending on the viewer's preference for forested or open rural views.” Another example included in LUBA's decision is that the project will affect views from abutting homes and properties because taller, wider poles and additional wires will increase the visual impact; however, the views will not be completely obscured and “the new poles and wires will consume a relatively small portion of the larger viewing shed.” The hearings officer also found that the existing poles and wires already impact views in the area and that the new wires will be elevated above the 25-foot building height, “which will limit their impact on views from residences, as the wires will be above the elevation of second floor windows.”

Petitioner points to one sentence in the hearings officer's decision for its proposition that LUBA considered only whether the uses could continue, rather than whether the changes would substantially impair the uses: “Although the area may look different after the project is completed, surrounding properties can continue to be used for residences, farms, and other permitted uses.” In context, that sentence was preceded with a sentence that states, “The visual and aesthetic impacts of the project will not substantially limit, impair, or preclude the use of surrounding properties.” Although we acknowledge that the sentence petitioner relies on does not expressly address each part of the standard, when it is read in the context of the entire LUBA decision, there is no indication that LUBA misconstrued the standard in ZDO 1203.03(D), conflated its terms, or misapplied it in the manner petitioner contends when it accepted the hearings officer's conclusion. Therefore, we reject petitioner's second assignment of error.

PETITIONER'S THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In its third assignment of error, petitioner contends that LUBA improperly shifted the burden of proof to petitioner to demonstrate that the proposed transmission line would substantially impair the use and enjoyment of surrounding residential properties under ZDO 1203.03(D). In response, PGE first asserts that petitioner did not preserve this issue, but that if we conclude that it is preserved, we should affirm on the merits because both the hearings officer and LUBA correctly placed the burden of proof to show compliance with all applicable approval criteria on PGE, not petitioner.

As an initial matter, we reject PGE's contention that petitioner failed to preserve this issue. Rather, because this alleged error appeared for the first time in LUBA's final opinion and order, petitioner would have had no way of anticipating that it was an issue to be preserved. Under the circumstances, preservation is excused. See Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 220, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (“In some circumstances, the preservation requirement gives way entirely, as when a party has no practical ability to raise an issue.”).

Turning to the merits, petitioner points to the concluding statement by LUBA for its assertion that LUBA improperly shifted the burden of proof to petitioners:

“[H]ere, [petitioner] emphasizes that the conditional use will alter the visual character and identity of the Stafford Road area, but [petitioner] has not explained how the transmission line will substantially impair the use of the surrounding properties for the primary residential uses. Accordingly, we agree with PGE that [petitioner] has not identified any remandable error regarding the hearings officer's conclusion that ZDO 1203.03(D) is satisfied.”

Petitioner argues that in its appeal to LUBA, it had argued that the hearings officer's findings and conclusions were inadequate, and that LUBA's concluding statement not only failed to address the inadequacy argument, it also effectively shifted the burden to petitioner to explain how the proposed transmission line would substantially impair the use of surrounding residential uses. We do not understand LUBA's final order and opinion to shift the burden as petitioner contends.

LUBA begins by stating that “[c]onditional use criterion ZDO 1203.03(D) requires PGE to demonstrate the following,” and then it quotes the ordinance. (Emphasis added.) After providing some background information, LUBA then turned to a recitation of a portion of the hearings officer's findings. It stated, “The hearings officer found that the visual and aesthetic impacts of the project would not substantially impair the residential uses within the Stafford Road Area and, therefore, PGE had sustained its burden of demonstrating compliance with ZDO 1203.03(D).” (Emphasis added.)

Although LUBA did fault petitioner for a lack of explanation as to how the altered visual character of the area would substantially impair the use of the surrounding properties for the primary residential uses, we understand LUBA's statement as a comment on the lack of a fleshed out theory on appeal before LUBA rather than a failure to provide evidentiary proof. In other words, no one was disputing the fact that, if the conditional use was approved, the project would have an impact on the visual character of the area. However, petitioner had not connected the dots between that change and a substantial impairment of the use of the surrounding properties for a primary use, such as a detached single-family dwelling.

In sum, the hearings officer was clear that the burden was on PGE to demonstrate that it met the criterion in ZDO 1203.03(D), and the hearings officer considered and weighed the evidence and determined that PGE had met its burden. LUBA, in turn, articulated the correct standard and, in essence, adopted the hearings officer's findings; it concluded that the hearings officer was correct in his conclusion that the conditions of ZDO 1203.03(D) were satisfied. LUBA did not improperly shift the burden, and we reject petitioner's third assignment of error.

PGE'S CROSS-PETITION

We turn to PGE's cross-petition for judicial review, in which it raises one assignment of error. In petitioner's fourth assignment of error before LUBA, petitioner asserted that the hearings officer's finding that the proposed project would not conflict with the Goals and Policies for Rural Scenic Roads failed to demonstrate that the proposed project complies with Policies 5.I.1 and 5.I.2 of the county's comprehensive plan. LUBA agreed with petitioner and remanded for further findings on ZDO 1203.03(E). PGE contends that LUBA erred in remanding and asks us to reverse that portion of LUBA's decision.

We begin with a brief description of the proceedings below and the relevant policies and ordinance. It is undisputed that the northernmost 2.7 mile segment of the proposed project along Stafford Road is designated as a rural scenic road. ZDO 1203.03(E) requires the county to find that “[t]he proposed use is consistent with the applicable goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan.”⁶ The Rural Scenic Roads Policies in the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan provide, in relevant part,

“5.I.1 Implement a County Scenic Road System that is safe and attractive for all users.

“5.I.2 Promote the protection of recreation values, scenic features and an open, uncluttered character along designated scenic roads.

“Developments adjacent to scenic roads shall be designed with sensitivity to natural conditions and:

“5.I.2.1 Scenic roads shall have strict access control on new developments.

“5.I.2.2 Scenic roads should have shoulders wide enough for pedestrians or bicycles, or a separated path where feasible and when funding is available.

“5.I.2.3 Turnouts shall be provided where appropriate for viewpoints or recreational needs.

“5.I.2.4 Design review of developments adjacent to scenic roads shall require visual characteristics and signing appropriate to the setting.

“5.I.2.5 Buildings shall be set back a sufficient distance from the right-of-way to permit a landscaped or natural buffer zone.

“5.I.2.6 Parking area adjacent to scenic roads shall be separated from the right-of-way by a landscaped buffer.

“5.I.2.7 Any frontage roads adjacent to scenic roads shall be separated by a vegetative buffer where feasible.

“5.I.2.8 Underground placement of utility service lines shall be required unless prohibited by the utility service provider.”

LUBA explained that “[f]indings must address and respond to specific issues relevant to compliance with applicable approval standards that were raised in the proceedings below. Norvell v. Portland Area LGBC, 43 Or App 849, 852-53, 604 P2d 896 (1979)” and that, “[g]enerally, findings must (1) address the applicable standards, (2) set out the facts relied upon, and (3) explain how those facts lead to the conclusion that the standards are met, Heiller v. Josephine County, 23 Or LUBA 551, 556 (1992).”

In its final opinion and order, LUBA quoted the entirety of the hearings officer's specific findings regarding Policy 5.I and scenic roads:

“ ‘The section of SW Stafford Road between the City of Lake Oswego and SW Mountain Road is designated a “scenic road” (Policy 5.I.3). As discussed above, this project will alter the character of the surrounding area to some extent. However, the comprehensive plan does not prohibit transmission lines along scenic roads. If the [County Board of Commissioners] had intended to impose such a prohibition it would have said so by using the terms “prohibit” or “shall not” as it did in other sections of the comprehensive plan [listing examples]. The determination that transmission lines are not prohibited on scenic roads is supported by the fact that there are existing 115kV transmission lines on scenic roads in the County; the section of S. Redland Road that are similar to the lines proposed with his application (Exhibit 2 at 65 and 67) and on the scenic road section of SW Stafford Road between the Rosemont substation and SW Boreland Road (applicant testimony). Eight other scenic roads include lower voltage transmission lines. Therefore, the hearings officer cannot find that transmission lines conflict with the goals and policies for scenic roads.’

“ ‘Scenic road policies 5.I.2.1-5.I.2.3 relate to the design of and access to scenic roads and are inapplicable to this development which will not alter SW Stafford Road or require additional roadway access.’

“ ‘Design review is not required for institutional uses in the RRFF-5 zone (ZDO 1102.01). Therefore, policy 5.I.2.4 is inapplicable.’

“ ‘Policy 5.I.2.5 is inapplicable as no buildings are proposed.’

“ ‘Policy 5.I.2.6 is inapplicable as no parking areas are proposed.’

“ ‘Policy 5.I.2.7 is inapplicable as no frontage roads are proposed.’

“ ‘As noted above, this project does not involve placement of “utility service lines.” Therefore, Policy 5.I.2.8 is inapplicable.’ ”

(Emphases in original; brackets added.)

LUBA also noted that the hearings officer's list of comprehensive plan policies at the outset of its ZDO 1203.03(E) analysis did not include Policies 5.I.1 and 5.I.2; the list did include the policies at subsections 5.I.2.1 through 5.I.2.8, but without the first sentence that articulates the overarching policy of 5.I.2. As reflected in the findings above, the hearings officer found that the design policies at subsections 5.I.2.1 through 5.I.2.8 are not applicable; however, the hearings officer did not address the overarching policy language in 5.I.2 and did not make any findings on 5.I.1.

Petitioner argued to LUBA that those findings were inadequate to support a conclusion that the development was consistent with Rural Scenic Road Policies 5.I.1 and 5.I.2. PGE argued, in part, that the scenic road policies are not approval criteria, and that a criterion that requires the county find “consistency” with the comprehensive plan—here ZDO 1203.03(E)—requires assessing the development within the context of the comprehensive plan as an overarching guide. LUBA stated that it had “acknowledged that such a consistency inquiry typically requires balancing competing applicable policies,” and cited Yamhill Creek Solar, LLC v. Yamhill County, 78 Or LUBA 245, 251 (2018), aff'd, 295 Or App 669, 433 P3d 802 (2019), and Waker Associates, Inc. v. Clackamas County, 111 Or App 189, 194, 826 P2d 20 (1992), in support of that proposition.

LUBA ultimately agreed with petitioner that the hearings officer's analysis was inadequate, stating, “We do not agree with PGE that, taken as a whole, the decision demonstrates that the hearings officer balanced the applicable comprehensive plan policies to conclude that the impacts on the scenery along Stafford Road within the designated scenic road area are counterbalanced by the advancement of other comprehensive plan goals and policies.” LUBA agreed with petitioner “that the findings do not address whether the decision is consistent with the overarching policy language in Policies 5.I.1 and 5.I.2, and remand is warranted for further findings on ZDO 1203.03(E).”

On judicial review, PGE argues that LUBA misconstrued and misapplied its review function as contained in ORS 197.835(11)(b). That statutory provision states,

“Whenever the findings are defective because of failure to recite adequate facts or legal conclusions or failure to adequately identify the standards or their relation to the facts, but the parties identify relevant evidence in the record which clearly supports the decision or a part of the decision, the board shall affirm the decision or the part of the decision supported by the record and remand the remainder to the local government, with direction indicating appropriate remedial action.”

PGE relies, in part, on the hearings officer's general finding that “the proposed development is, on balance, consistent with the applicable goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan,” and PGE argues that that finding, coupled with the hearings officer's other findings throughout the decision, was adequate and supported by relevant evidence in the record.

PGE does not deny that the hearings officer's final order does not quote Policies 5.I.1 and 5.I.2 or specifically address them. PGE asserts that “LUBA appears to have faulted the Hearings Officer for essentially a scrivener's error—namely, not including * * * the two sentences that make up Sections 5.I.1 and 5.I.2.” In our view, PGE's characterization of the omission of the subject policy language minimizes of what occurred here. Black's Law Dictionary equates “scrivener's error” with “clerical error,” which it defines as “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence and not from judicial reasoning or determination; esp. a drafter's or typist's technical error that can be rectified without serious doubt about the correct reading.” (12th ed. 2024). The hearings officer explicitly listed the comprehensive plan provisions that were at issue but omitted 5.I.1 and 5.I.2., and when analyzing the rural scenic roads policies there was no mention of 5.I.1 and 5.I.2 or the language contained therein. PGE asks us to assume based on the contents of the final order as a whole that the hearings officer considered those policies as part of the required balancing exercise and to conclude that LUBA erred in not concluding the same.

As we stated in Waker, a case in which the county plan's agricultural goals were being considered in conjunction with a proposed conditional use golf course in an EFU zone,

“[a]lthough the effect on and consistency of a proposed use with each of the goals must be considered, the weight to be given a goal and the magnitude of the effects that particular proposed uses will have on the values that the different goals protect will inevitably vary from case to case.”

111 Or App at 194. We acknowledged that “[s]ome of the goals may be totally irrelevant to some proposed conditional uses,” and that it was “equally apparent that some proposed conditional uses will have more profound effects on some goals than on others and that some proposed uses will have greater effects on the goals generally than will other proposed uses.” Id. We concluded that “none of the goals may be disregarded ab initio” and that “a balancing process that takes account of relative impacts of particular uses on particular goals and of the logical relevancy of particular goals to particular uses is a decisional necessity.” Id. Although Waker is not directly on point, the concept is applicable here. Because the hearings officer's final order does not reflect that it considered Sections 5.I.1 and 5.I.2, we are unable to conclude that the hearings officer considered all of the comprehensive plan policies regarding rural scenic roads. Therefore, LUBA did not err in remanding for further fact finding. We reject PGE's cross petition.

On petition, affirmed; on cross-petition, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Only the conditional use approval for improvements in the RRFF-5 zone is before us on review; therefore, we do not provide details regarding the EFU portion of the project.

2.   “Uses permitted in each rural residential and future urban residential zoning district are listed in Table 316-1, Permitted Uses in the Rural Residential and Future Urban Residential Zoning Districts. Uses not listed are prohibited.” ZDO 316.03(A). Primary uses for RRFF-5-zoned districts include bus shelters; conservation areas for water, soil, forest, or wildlife habitat resources; detached single-family dwellings; manufactured dwellings; prefabricated structures; single room occupancies; various farm uses; fish or wildlife management programs; forest practices; places of worship; government-owned recreational uses; government-owned golf courses; roads; short-term rental in a dwelling unit or guest house permitted by this table; and specified utility facilities. ZDO Table 316-1.

3.   The hearings officer noted that the ZDO does not define the majority of the terms used in ZDO 1203.03(D) and relied on dictionary definitions of the terms.

4.   We disagree with LUBA's interpretation of one aspect of ZDO 1203.03(D) as it interpreted that ordinance in York I. In that case, LUBA stated that as that ordinance “is structured, if the hearings officer concludes that the proposed use does not substantially limit, impair or preclude the primary uses of the surrounding area, there is no need to address whether it has ‘alter[ed] the character’ of the surrounding area in some other manner.” 79 Or LUBA at 288 (brackets in original). That is an incorrect statement of the law. The first part of ZDO 1203.03(D) states, “The proposed use will not alter the character of the surrounding area in a manner that substantially limits * * *.” The ordinance plainly states that the consideration begins with an assessment of whether the proposed use will not alter the character of the surrounding area; by its plain terms, the hearings officer must assess whether the character is altered or not. Nonetheless, that misstatement does not affect the analysis in this case, because, although LUBA cited York I, LUBA did not make the same error when it affirmed the hearings officer's application of the ordinance here. As we discuss, LUBA correctly understood petitioner's argument and the standard to be applied—whether the proposed use would “alter the character of the surrounding area in a manner that substantially limits, impairs, or precludes the use of surrounding properties for the primary uses allowed” in the RRFF-5 zone. ZDO 1203.03(D).

5.   We observe that ZDO 1203.03(D) does not contain the word “enjoyment.” Despite the absence of that word in the ordinance, petitioner refers to “use and enjoyment” multiple times in connection with ZDO 1203.03(D). When conducting a statutory analysis, we are “not to insert what has been omitted.” ORS 174.010.

6.   The hearings officer's final order began its analysis of ZDO 1203.03(E) by listing the Clackamas County Comprehensive Plan provisions that were referenced in the application or testimony. We do not recount them all, and include only the provisions that were challenged or associated with the challenge in petitioner's appeal to LUBA.

SHORR, P. J.