IN RE: THE INVESTIGATION OF SHARON HOLMES (2026)

ORDER

¶1 The Council on Judicial Complaints (“the Council”) initiated this matter by delivering a report to this Court concerning the Council's investigation of Tulsa County District Judge Sharon Holmes. The report contained Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and its recommendation that the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary be invoked for removal proceedings pursuant to 20 O.S. § 1659. (“the Report”).

¶2 The Council plays an important role in protecting and preserving the integrity of the Oklahoma Judiciary. The Council is “an agency in the Executive Department” that independently investigates and evaluates complaints of judicial misconduct. 20 O.S.2011, §§ 1651 and 1652; Rule 3 of the Rules Governing Complaints on Judicial Misconduct, 5 O.S. Ch.1, App. 4A (“the Rules”). While this Court utilizes the investigation of the Council on Judicial Complaints pursuant to Rule 3, the Council's Report is not binding on the Court. Matter of Disciplinary Proc. Concerning Coleman, 2019 OK 77, ¶ 6, 454 P.3d 1280, 1282. This Court is vested with authority to decide whether the judicial misconduct detailed in the report by the Council warrants proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary. Haworth v. Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division, 1975 OK JUD 1, ¶ 6, 684 P.2d 1217, 1218; 20 O.S.2011, § 1659.

¶3 The Rules vest the Chief Justice with responsibility to determine “appropriate action ․ to remedy the problem” and reserves to the Court the power to impose “appropriate discipline.” Rule 4(c) and (d), 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4A. After considering the findings, “the Court may then choose to impose any combination of appropriate discipline to include a private reprimand, mandatory education paid for by the judge ․, mandatory mentorship, suspension with or without pay, public reprimand, or censure.” Rule 4(d), 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4A. “Even though this Court may begin its review of non-removal misconduct under its exclusive jurisdiction, the Chief Justice or the Court can later file a petition for removal in exercise of the authority conferred by Article 7-A, § 4 of the Constitution, if the Chief Justice or the Court deems such action necessary.” Coleman, ¶ 7, 454 P.3d at 1283.

¶4 According to the Report, in June 2025, the Council initiated complaint No. COC-25-147 by a majority vote after learning of a news report that Judge Holmes engaged in an ex parte meeting with a criminal defendant and then declined to recuse from the case. While investigating the matter, the Council became aware of additional allegations of ex parte communications; undignified demeanor; failure to disqualify; and a lack of fairness and impartiality related to a specialty treatment docket, the Arise Program.  ¹ The Council voted to expand the scope of the investigation to include these additional allegations.

¶5 In October 2025, the Council received a second complaint, No. COC-25-256, which set forth many of the same allegations already under investigation in No. COC-25-147. The Council issued subpoenas duces tecum, interviewed nearly twenty witnesses, and received testimony from Judge Holmes regarding the allegations. The Council found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Holmes's conduct was “replete with ex parte communications, undignified demeanor, failures to disqualify when required by the law, multiple violations of due process, and systemic failure(s) to uphold and apply the law or fairly and impartially perform her duties in violation of Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9, and 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”  ² In addition, the Council found that Judge Holmes lacked credibility and candor in both her testimony and written responses before the Council in violation of Rule 2.16 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and concluded that her lack of neutrality with the Arise Program, her poor courtroom demeanor, and engaging in ex parte communications constituted “oppression in office” under Article VII-A, § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

¶6 The Chief Justice forwarded the Report to the Supreme Court, which voted for the Chief Justice to handle the matter with corrective action. The Chief Justice sent the Report to Judge Holmes, offered her an opportunity to submit any additional response, and requested she appear with counsel for an interview. The Chief Justice conducted Judge Holmes's interview and presented his recommendation of discipline to the Supreme Court.

¶7 “Whether discipline should be imposed should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the Rule(s) and should depend on factors such as the seriousness of the violation, the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous violations of the Rules, and the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial system or others.” Scope of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch.1, App. 4.

¶8 “An independent, fair, and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice.” Preamble of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. Judges must “respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.” Id. Judges are required to “maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.” Id. These are not aspirational ideals; they are essential obligations of judicial office.

¶9 We adopt the Council's findings and conclusions and find that Judge Holmes violated Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11, and 2.16 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. We do not find that Judge Holmes's conduct constitutes “oppression in office,” warranting removal.

EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

¶10 Judge Holmes's most serious violations stem from her engagement in ex parte communications and her failure to disclose the substance of those communications. The Report identifies two instances in which Judge Holmes engaged in ex parte communications--one with a criminal defendant and one with jurors. According to the Report, while in open court, the criminal defendant asked to speak with Judge Holmes about a personal matter. Judge Holmes informed the criminal defendant that she could not speak with him about his case, but “that she would speak to him privately as long as it was alright with his attorney.”  ³ No objection was made by the defendant's attorney or the State. Judge Holmes proceeded into the hallway with the criminal defendant wherein they held a private conversation. Thereafter, the Tulsa County District Attorney sought Judge Holmes's recusal in the case, which Judge Holmes declined, stating the State did not lodge an objection to the private conversation and the conversation “did not have anything to do with this case, at all.”  ⁴

¶11 The Report highlights another instance in which Judge Holmes spoke to jurors privately for approximately five to ten minutes. Upon her return to the bench, defense counsel asked Judge Holmes whether she would reveal what she discussed with the jurors to which she replied no. The State sought Judge Holmes's recusal, which she initially declined but stated the following day she would recuse “in the interest of efficiency to allow the case to move forward quickly.”  ⁵

¶12 Judge Holmes argued to the Council that her communications with the criminal defendant and jurors did not go to the substance of the case. And in her interview with the Chief Justice, Judge Holmes acknowledged that this type of behavior was not appropriate.

¶13 The Report also highlights that Judge Holmes directly received communications from incarcerated defendants and their families, which Judge Holmes did not share with the parties. In connection, Judge Holmes's staff noted that Judge Holmes “reads every email sent by family members.”  ⁶ When asked about these communications during her interview with the Chief Justice, Judge Holmes stated she now places every communication received in the parties’ court file.

¶14 Rule 2.9 prohibits a judge from initiating, permitting, or considering ex parte communications concerning a pending or impending matter subject to few exceptions.  ⁷ Even if an ex parte communication is permitted, Rule 2.9(A)(b) requires the judge to promptly notify all other parties of the substance of the communication and provide the parties an opportunity to respond. Rule 2.6 requires a judge to “accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.” Rule 2.6(A), Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. Rule 1.2 requires a judge to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Rule 1.2, Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. The test for appearance of impropriety is “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, or fitness to serve as a judge.” Rule 1.2, comment 5, Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4.

¶15 Judge Holmes's engagement in ex parte communications and her refusal to disclose the substance of those communications was in violation of Rules 2.6 and 2.9. Moreover, her conduct created the appearance of impropriety, undermining the public's confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

¶16 Although Judge Holmes acted alone in her conduct, her actions reflect upon the entirety of the judiciary. The Code's prohibition against ex parte communications is a cornerstone of our judicial system as they serve as a safeguard to an impartial judiciary. The prohibition exists to ensure that judges remain neutral arbiters in both appearance and fact. Conduct that creates a perception of unequal access, preferential treatment, or private influence undermines confidence in the judiciary.

¶17 We find Judge Holmes's engagement in ex parte communications, whether substantively harmless or not, created an appearance of impropriety and jeopardized public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.

DISQUALIFICATION

¶18 Rule 2.11 requires a judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Rule 2.11, Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. In addition to Judge Holmes's failure to disqualify herself from the matters in which she engaged in ex parte communications, Judge Holmes also failed to disqualify herself from matters in which attorneys who previously represented her appeared before her. Her failure to disqualify herself from those matters caused her impartiality to be questioned in violation of Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

UPHOLD AND APPLY THE LAW

¶19 Rule 2.2 requires a judge to “uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.” Rule 2.2, Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. The Report identifies three instances in which Judge Holmes ignored the sentencing limitations in 22 O.S. § 991a(C),  ⁸ which identifies categories of defendants who are excluded from consideration for suspended sentences with or without probation in lieu of incarceration. In three instances, the State filed memoranda advising Judge Holmes that certain defendants did not statutorily qualify for the Arise Program. Nonetheless, Judge Holmes disregarded the law and allowed defendants to plea into the Arise Program.

¶20 The Report also notes that one of the instances could have been cured by Judge Holmes making findings on the record that there were substantial and compelling reasons to deviate from sentencing requirements after considering the nature of the crime, history, and character of the defendant and his or her chances of successful rehabilitation under the Justice Safety Valve Act, 22 O.S. § 985.1. But Judge Holmes failed to make such findings and testified that she did not know she was required to do so. Judge Holmes's failure to consult and follow the statutory sentencing stricture illustrated a lack of good faith to apply and uphold the law in violation of Rule 2.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

DIGNIFIED BEHAVIOR

¶21 Rule 2.8 requires a judge to be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Rule 2.8, Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. The Report highlights an instance in which an assistant public defender attempted to organize photographs for admission and explained how the defense would offer objections in a manner that Judge Holmes had previously accepted. When the defense objected as previously outlined, Judge Holmes “became palpably annoyed and lashed out at the assistant public defender.”  ⁹ Judge Holmes then ordered the assistant public defender to the hallway to speak outside the presence of the jury. According to witnesses in the hallway, Judge Holmes yelled at the assistant public defender and was observed as “very hostile and very nasty.”  ¹⁰

¶22 According to the Report, this was not the first instance in which Judge Holmes became visibly annoyed and yelled at attorneys and defendants appearing before her. The Report highlights a specific instance in which Judge Holmes left the bench and approached an agitated defendant with her fists raised as if she was going to fight him.  ¹¹

¶23 The Report concludes that Judge Holmes has demonstrated a pattern of undignified behavior, exhibiting her lack of impulse control and proper temperament. During her interview with the Chief Justice, Judge Holmes acknowledged that her behavior was inappropriate and undignified.

¶24 Judicial temperament is among the most important qualities for any individual serving as a judge. A lack of appropriate judicial temperament undermines the dignity of judicial office and diminishes public confidence in the impartial administration of justice. Judge Holmes's behavior in these instances was undignified, and her conduct displayed a serious lack of temperament required of a judge, in violation of Rule 2.8, Code of Judicial Conduct.

HONESTY WITH DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES

¶25 Rule 2.16 requires judges to cooperate and be candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies. Rule 2.16, Code of Judicial Conduct 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4. The Council determined Judge Holmes failed to be candid and honest with the Council during the investigation. Judge Holmes's testimony was contradicted by evidence collected by the Council, resulting in the questioning of her honesty. Comment 1 to Rule 2.16 states “[c]ooperation with investigations and proceedings of judicial and lawyer discipline agencies, ․ instills confidence in judges’ commitment to the integrity of the judicial system and the protection of the public.” Because Judge Holmes's honesty was questioned, her ability to maintain confidence in any of her actions was compromised.

OPPRESSION IN OFFICE

¶26 The Council accuses Judge Holmes of “oppression in office,” asserting she should be removed from office. Okla. Const. art., VII-A, § 1(b). Specifically, the Council asserts Judge Holmes's conduct, including her “lack of neutrality relative to the Arise Program and her demeanor, constitut[ed] oppression in office.”  ¹²

¶27 A judge is guilty of “oppression in office” when that judge intentionally commits acts which he or she knows, or should know, are obviously and seriously wrong and amount to an excessive use of judicial authority. State v. Colclaizer, 2002 OK JUD 1, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d 138, 141-42. “The relevant inquiry is whether the judge formed a specific intent to commit acts with the requisite knowledge that they were obviously and seriously wrong under the circumstances and amounted to excessive use of judicial authority ․” Id. at 142. When evaluating a judge's conduct for “oppression in office,” a reasonably prudent judge standard is applied. Id., n. 3.

¶28 In Colclaizer, the Appellate Division of the Court on the Judiciary of Oklahoma held that Judge Colclaizer's conduct rose to the level of “oppression in office,” warranting his removal. Judge Colclaizer's conduct included the following: threatening a locksmith with contempt for failing to surrender a key to the court clerk's office; improperly directing a warrantless arrest without bond when no charges were filed; disregarding statutory sentencing requirements by imposing a life sentence on a first-time drug offender based on unsworn testimony and ex parte communications; issuing a written order with no case number; and directing law enforcement to assist a father in taking physical custody of his children from their mother based upon ex parte communications. Id., ¶ 21, 106 P.3d at 143.

¶29 In determining whether Judge Colclaizer's conduct rose to the level of “oppression in office,” the court considered several factors: the availability of appeal, the nature of the judge's conduct, the extent of the court's jurisdiction, the motive of the judge, the egregiousness of the error, and the frequency of the offending conduct. Id. ¶ 20. Applying those factors, the court concluded Judge Colclaizer “intentionally committed acts which he should have known were obviously and seriously wrong and amounted to an excessive use of judicial authority.” Id. ¶ 21.

¶30 In each instance, Judge Colclaizer intentionally acted beyond the bounds of his position by circumventing proper procedure and disregarding the law--conduct that falls outside judicial discretion assigned to the district court. Notably, Judge Colclaizer committed more than legal errors, he utilized his position to reach an outcome either for personal gain or for one party over another--clear examples of excessive use of judicial authority that warranted removal.

¶31 The question before us is whether Judge Holmes's conduct was tantamount to excessive use of judicial authority.

¶32 Judge Holmes unquestionably erred by suspending the sentences of certain criminal defendants who were statutorily ineligible for probation or participation in the Arise Program. In doing so, Judge Holmes failed to follow mandatory sentencing strictures and should have known the sentences she imposed were contrary to law and required findings of why the defendant should receive an exception. Nevertheless, she did so in the course of exercising her judicial discretion while performing a function assigned to the district court--sentencing criminal defendants. And although she abused her discretion, the suspended sentences remained subject to judicial review through an Application to Revoke Suspended Sentence, which the State filed with respect to several defendants after they violated probation requirements. Thus, we cannot conclude that her sentencing constituted conduct that went beyond legal error and abuse of discretion, unlike the conduct in Colclaizer.

¶33 Likewise, Judge Holmes's improper temperament and engagement in ex parte communications reflected serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such conduct undermined the integrity of judicial proceedings and public confidence in the judiciary. Her conduct calls into question whether she possesses the very minimum attributes required of a judge and warrants meaningful discipline to preserve public confidence in the judiciary.  ¹³ But the evidence of Judge Holmes's improper judicial temperament and evidence of ex parte communications--while serious--do not establish that her conduct constituted an excessive use of judicial authority.

CONCLUSION

¶34 Removal from the bench is the most severe sanction to be imposed and should be reserved for the most egregious conduct. Oklahoma's Constitution expressly lists “oppression in office” as one of six causes for removal of a judge by the Court on the Judiciary. Okla. Const. Art. VII-A, § 1(b).  ¹⁴

¶35 Today, we distinguish “oppression in office” from legal error, isolated mistakes in judgment, and conduct subject to appellate correction. And although Judge Holmes's conduct presents us with cumulative violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, when considered collectively, we do not find her repeated violations rise to the level of “oppression in office.”

¶36 We find Judge Holmes's conduct indefensible--her conduct reflects a serious lack of impulse control, lapses in judgment, and a failure to appreciate and respect the boundaries imposed upon her by the Code of Judicial Conduct, warranting discipline from this Court. Her conduct presents both commissions of legal error and abuses of discretion, compounded by their repetitive occurrences for which we must impose discipline.

¶37 Like disciplinary proceedings pertaining to attorneys, “[t]he purposes of discipline are the protection of the public, ․ and the deterrence of similar misconduct.” State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Beasley, 2006 OK 49, ¶ 34, 142 P.3d 410, 417. The Rules “are promulgated to preserve the integrity and public trust of the Judicial Branch of Government,” not to punish the offending judge. Preface to the Rules, 5 O.S. Ch. 1, App. 4A. To deter similar behavior in the future from Judge Holmes and reinforce the standards expected of all judges, we hereby Reprimand Judge Holmes and direct that this Reprimand be made public through the publication of this order.

DISTRICT JUDGE SHARON HOLMES PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE ON THIS 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026.

¶1 I concur with the Court's order publicly reprimanding District Judge Sharon Holmes. I write separately to clarify the scope of the Court's authority to decide whether reported judicial misconduct warrants proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary.

¶2 The Oklahoma Constitution plainly states that:

(a) The jurisdiction of the Trial Division of the Court may be invoked by a petition, filed either by the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice thereof; by the Governor; by the Attorney General; or by the Executive Secretary of the Oklahoma Bar Association when directed so to do by a vote of a majority of all members of its Executive Council.

Okla. Cons. art. VII-A, § 4(a).

¶3 In Haworth v. Court on the Judiciary, Trial Div., 1975 OK JUD 1, 684 P.2d 1217, the Court on the Judiciary addressed the interplay between Article VII-A, Section 4(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution and 20 O.S.2021, § 1659.  ¹ While holding § 1659 unconstitutional insofar as it mandated the officers and entities to file a petition to invoke the jurisdiction of the Trial Division, the Court on the Judiciary clarified that Section 4(a) intentionally limits who may invoke the Trial Division's jurisdiction to six specified entities. Because this constitutional list is exhaustive, the Legislature has no authority to enlarge the group or restrict its discretionary power. Id. ¶ 7, 684 P.2d at 1218. Consequently, the Court on the Judiciary unequivocally affirmed that this Court holds the authority to decide whether reported judicial misconduct merits formal removal proceedings.

¶4 The Oklahoma Attorney General later issued an opinion supporting that the constitutional authority granted to these six officers or entities is discretionary. Question Submitted by: Rob Rabon, Council on Jud. Complaints, 2000 OK AG 20. There, the Board of Governors of the Oklahoma Bar Association declined to review a judicial complaint forwarded by the Council on Judicial Complaints (“Council”). Relying on Haworth, the Attorney General concluded:

The Board of Governors is authorized to exercise its discretion in determining whether to file a Petition. As noted above, however, the exercise of discretion by governmental officials in such instances implies the knowledge, prudence and discernment which would enable the official to judge critically which is the correct course of action․ Accordingly, we conclude that the Board of Governors, in exercising its discretion in deciding whether or not to file a Petition with the Court of the Judiciary, must accept the documents forwarded by the Council on Judicial Complaints, then examine each complaint and its record and the Council's findings, before making a decision on the merits of each case.

Id. ¶¶ 13-14.

¶5 This Court has also consistently operated under these teachings of Haworth, retaining discretion to determine whether removal proceedings should be initiated--a principle recently reaffirmed in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Concerning Coleman, 2019 OK 77, 454 P.3d 1280(finding that the alleged misconduct did not warrant a petition for removal and instead publicly admonishing and reprimanding the judge).  ²

¶6 We have held that this Court and the other officers and entities designated in Article VII-A, Section 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution have discretionary authority to decide whether the judicial misconduct described in the Council's report warrants proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary. See Coleman, 2019 OK 77, ¶ 7, 454 P.3d at 1286. That discretion follows from the Council's limited role. The Council may make recommendations, but it “may not adjudicate any matter nor impose any sanction.” Mattingly v. Court on the Judiciary, Trial Div., 2000 OK JUD 1, ¶ 17, 8 P.3d 943, 949. Nor may it “invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary [or] substitute its own discretion for that of the officers charged with that duty by the constitution.” Id. ¶ 9, 8 P.3d at 947. Were we to adopt every removal recommendation without any independent review, we would cede our adjudicative authority to the Council and convert an advisory body into the ultimate tribunal.

¶7 We therefore begin by asking whether the Council's allegations, taken as true, warrant the judge's removal or compulsory retirement. Id. ¶¶ 7, 19, 8 P.3d at 947, 950. In this case, the Court determined that the allegations against Judge Holmes did not justify removal. That decision did not conclude the matter; instead, it engaged this Court's exclusive jurisdiction to discipline judicial misconduct that falls short of removal or compulsory retirement. Id. ¶ 19, 8 P.3d at 950. Exercising exclusive jurisdiction over non-removal discipline is vital because interpreting the Court on the Judiciary's powers to include mere discipline “would both grant the Court on the Judiciary powers not given by [the Constitution] and deprive the Supreme Court of its responsibility to exercise ‘superintendent control’ and ‘administrative authority’ over the courts of this state mandated by [the Constitution].” Id. ¶ 16, 8 P.3d at 949.

¶8 With today's decision, we continue to exercise the authority the Oklahoma Constitution grants us, and the Court on the Judiciary reaffirmed, to decide whether judicial misconduct reported by the Council warrants proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary. Grounded in that precedent, our decision protects both the independence of the judiciary and this Court's duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

¶1 I dissent from the majority's order that publicly reprimands District Judge Sharon Holmes based upon this Court's determination that her “conduct presents us with cumulative violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct” the majority characterizes as “indefensible” and as “reflect[ing] a failure to appreciate and respect the boundaries imposed upon her.” Majority's Order ¶¶ 35--36. Both that determination and the majority's further “find[ing] [that] her repeated violations” of the Code of Judicial Conduct “do not ․ rise to the level of ‘oppression in office,’ ” id. ¶ 35, demonstrate that this Court is usurping a role that Article VII-A, Section 2(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution specifically reserves for a different court, i.e., the Court on the Judiciary:

§ 2. Creation of Court on the Judiciary -- Trial and Appellate Divisions -- Jurisdiction -- Membership

(a) There is created a Court on the Judiciary, hereinafter referred to as the Court, divided into a Trial Division and an Appellate Division. The Court is vested, subject to the provisions of this Article, with sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine causes arising thereunder.

Okla. Const. art. VII-A, § 2(a) (emphasis added). Insofar as the report and recommendation from the Council on Judicial Complaints contains a finding of potential oppression in office that constitutionally “shall be” cause for removal, Okla. Const. art. VII-A, § 1(b), the complaint gives rise to a cause that the Court on the Judiciary--not the Oklahoma Supreme Court--has “sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine.” For that reason, I believe we are constitutionally required to refer this matter to the Court on the judiciary in keeping with the Council's recommendation.

¶2 The majority ignores the applicable statutory law. In 1974, the Legislature enacted a law creating the Council on Judicial Complaints, codified in title 20, sections 1651 through 1661 of the Oklahoma Statutes. See Act of May 23, 1974, ch. 251, §§ 1--11, 1974 Okla. Sess. Laws 515, 515--17. Therein, the Legislature declared the public policy of the State:

SECTION 1. Public policy

It hereby is declared to be the public policy of the State of Oklahoma to afford a means whereby complaints by any person concerning the conduct of persons occupying positions in the judicial department of government and subject to the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary may be efficiently and impartially investigated; to provide an agency which can determine whether such complaints should be made the subject of action before the Court on the Judiciary, or should be dismissed; to provide means for procuring necessary information to enable such agency to perform its functions, including the power to issue and enforce subpoenas to testify and to produce tangible evidentiary materials; to provide for the designation of complaining authorities in those cases which should be prosecuted before the Court on the Judiciary; to better the administration of justice in this state through the means enumerated in this act.

Id. § 1, 1974 Okla. Sess. Laws at 515 (emphasis added) (codified at 20 O.S.Supp.1974, § 1651) (amended 1997 to give the Council authority to recommend reprimands and admonitions). In keeping with that public policy, the Legislature created the Council on Judicial Complaints consisting of three members, id. § 3, 1974 Okla. Sess. Laws at 515 (codified at 20 O.S.Supp.1974, § 1653) (amended 1975 to specify the number of members necessary for a quorum), whose “purpose is to serve as a grand jury in investigating complaints against judicial officers and to determine whether or not the Attorney General should proceed on a complaint before the Court on the Judiciary.” Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints, 46 Okla. B.J. 550, 550 (Mar. 22, 1975). Although that purpose is not explicitly stated in the law, it is implicitly confirmed in various provisions of the law, such as a provision that “[a]ll proceedings under this section shall be held in secrecy to the same extent as proceedings before a grand jury,” § 8, 1974 Okla. Sess. Laws at 516 (codified at 20 O.S.Supp.1974, § 1658) (amended 1997 to give the Council authority to issue reprimands and admonitions with the Chief Justice's approval), and a provision that treats the Council's findings like an indictment that “shall [be] promptly file[d] [in] a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the Trial Division of the Court on the Judiciary in accordance with Section 4(a) of Article 7-A of the Constitution of Oklahoma” by the filing entity or officer listed in that specific constitutional provision, § 9, 1974 Okla. Sess. Laws at 516 (codified at 20 O.S.Supp.1974, § 1659) (amended 1998 to list not just the Attorney General, but all of the filing entities and officers appearing in Article VII-A, Section 4 of the State Constitution). It is the mandate in the amended version of this last provision that the majority ignores:

§ 1659 -- Filing of Petition Invoking Jurisdiction of Court on the Judiciary

In the event the Council on Judicial Complaints finds that the complaint should be made the subject of proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary, it shall forward all papers concerning the same, together with its findings, to either the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice thereof, the Governor, the Attorney General, the Executive Secretary of the Oklahoma Bar Association, or the House of Representatives, who shall promptly file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the trial division of the Court on the Judiciary in accordance with subsection (a) Section 4 of Article 7-A of the Constitution of Oklahoma ․

20 O.S.2026, § 1659 (emphasis added). The legislative intent in this provision is clear and hearkens back to the language in the public policy provision. See id. § 1651(2) (“[t]o provide an agency which can determine whether such complaints should: a. be made the subject of action before the Court on the Judiciary for the purpose of removal, reprimand or admonition, or b. be dismissed”). Statutorily speaking, it is the Council--not this Court--who has the authority to determine whether a judicial complaint should go to Court on the Judiciary.

¶3 No doubt, the majority would invoke Haworth v. Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division, 1975 OK JUD 1, 684 P.2d 1217, in protest against strict application of the terms of 20 O.S.2026, § 1659. See Majority's Order ¶ 2 (citing Haworth for the proposition that “this Court is vested with authority to decide whether the judicial misconduct detailed in the report by the Council warrants proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary”). Decided just one year after the Legislature enacted the law creating the Council on Judicial Complaints, the Appellate Division of the Court on the Judiciary held in Haworth “that § 1659, supra, is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a mandatory duty upon the Attorney General to file a Petition invoking the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary when directed to do so by the Council on Judicial Complaints.” 1975 OK JUD 1, ¶ 7, 684 P.2d at 1218--19. It based this holding upon an observation that Article VII-A, Section 4(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution “provides that jurisdiction of the Trial Division may be invoked by a Petition filed by either of six different officers or bodies,” which it found “gives discretionary authority to the named officers or bodies, including the Attorney General, to invoke the authority of the Court on the Judiciary.” Id. ¶ 6, 684 P.2d at 1218.

¶4 I believe, however, that the majority's reliance upon Haworth is misplaced for two reasons.

¶5 First of all, the Court on the Judiciary's interpretations of constitutional and statutory provisions are not binding on this Court, although they might be considered persuasive. Cf. Okla. Const. art. VII, § 4 (granting the Court of Criminal Appeals “exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases”); Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 19 & n.19, 353 P.3d 532, 540 & n.19 (observing that “the Oklahoma Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction to provide appellate review of a judgment on a criminal cause of action upon creation of the Criminal Court of Appeals” in 1908 (citing In re Op. of the Judges, 1909 OK 277, ¶ 5, 105 P. 325, 326); Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Okla. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 2011 OK 68, ¶ 22 n.27, 267 P.3d 838, 847 n.27 (“Holdings in cases released by the Court of Criminal Appeals are not binding upon this Court although the rules announced therein may be considered persuasive.” (citing One Chi. Coin's Play Boy Marble Bd., No. 19771 v. State ex rel. Adams, 1949 OK 251, ¶ 9, 212 P.2d 129, 131)). This principle is particularly important where the Court on the Judiciary's opinion is not persuasive or well-reasoned.

¶6 That brings me to my second point, which is that Haworth is not well reasoned and should therefore be disregarded by this Court. The Court on the Judiciary relies exclusively upon the word “may” in Article VII-A, Section 4(a) of the State Constitution:

§ 4. Invoking jurisdiction by petition -- Hearing

(a) The jurisdiction of the Trial Division of the Court may be invoked by a petition, filed either by the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice thereof; by the Governor, by the Attorney General; or by the Executive Secretary of the Oklahoma Bar Association when directed so to do by a vote of a majority of all members of its Executive Council; or by Resolution of the House of Delegates or by Resolution of the House of Representatives of the State of Oklahoma․

Okla. Const. art. VII-A, § 4(a) (emphasis added). I would suggest that use of the word “may” in this constitutional provision wasn't intended to give discretionary authority to the six officers and entities listed therein. If that were the intent, the word “may” would be attached to the verb “file.” Rather, the word “may” is attached to the verb “invoke”--an action that is accomplished by an inanimate petition that cannot exercise discretion. This seemingly indicates a different purpose for the word “may.” In ascertaining “the intent ․ in the use of the word ‘may,’ ” this Court has previously “observe[d] that, as a general rule, the word ‘may’ is an auxiliary verb expressing permission, competency, or ability.” Ass'n of Classroom Teachers of Okla. City, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89 of Okla. Cnty., 1975 OK 118, ¶ 31, 540 P.2d 1171, 1176 (citing United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914)); accord May, Black's Law Dictionary 1131 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Furthermore, this Court has occasionally interpreted the word “may” as not indicating the power to exercise discretion. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of City of Tulsa v. Morley, 1934 OK 302, ¶ 0, 34 P.2d 258, 259 (Syllabus by the Court, #8); Bartlesville Water Co. v. Brann, 1933 OK 629, ¶ 10, 27 P.2d 345, 347. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the word “may” necessitates the granting of discretionary powers. As used in Article VII A, Section 4(a), I read the word “may” as a substitute for the word “can” to express an ability to invoke the Court on the Judiciary's jurisdiction. That ability can be exercised numerous ways, e.g., (1) through a petition filed by the Supreme Court, (2) through a petition filed by the Chief Justice, (3) through a petition filed by the Governor, (4) through a petition filed by the Attorney General, etc. By enabling several options, Article VII-A, Section 4(a) essentially gives the Legislature options for how the Court on the Judiciary's jurisdiction may/can be invoked.

¶7 Haworth’s interpretation of Article VII-A, Section 4(a) is undermined by the history of that provision. The constitutional amendment that added Article VII-A was the first of three significant steps towards judicial reform that the Legislature and the People of Oklahoma undertook in the wake of a bribery scandal involving three Oklahoma Supreme Court Justices that came to light in December of 1964.  ¹ Insofar as three Supreme Court justices seemingly necessitated the need for an independent Court on the Judiciary to oversee judicial discipline, it would make no sense for the Legislature and the People to list “the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice thereof” among the officers and entities authorized to commence such disciplinary proceedings and also give them discretion not to file such a disciplinary case against one of their own.

¶8 Furthermore, my interpretation of Article VII-A, Section 4(a) is reinforced by subsequent amendments to 20 O.S.Supp.1974, § 1659. If the purpose was to define the different ways a case can be commenced, then the Legislature was presumably free to legislate specifics surrounding the filing of petitions that invoke the Court on the Judiciary's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Legislature created the Council on Judicial Complaints, specified that it must forward all papers concerning the [complaint], together with its findings, to the Attorney General” alone, and further specified that the Attorney General would have no discretion in deciding whether to file a petition with the Court on the Judiciary insofar as he or she “shall promptly file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the Trial Division of the Court on the Judiciary.” 20 O.S.Supp.1974, § 1659. That is the specific language that Haworth found unconstitutional. After Haworth, the Legislature has never amended section 1659 to grant discretion in filing the petition that invokes the Court on the Judiciary's jurisdiction, but the Legislature has nevertheless amended section 1659 twice for other reasons. Twenty-three years after Haworth, in 1998, the Legislature amended section 1659 to authorize four other officers and entities listed in Article VII-A, Section 4(a)--i.e., the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, the Governor, and the Board of Governors (f/k/a the Executive Council prior to September 24, 1966) of the Oklahoma Bar Association--to receive the Council's papers and findings and to file the jurisdiction-invoking petitions. Act of June 8, 1998, ch. 368, § 8, 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws 1645, 1648. One year after that, in 1999, the Legislature amended section 1659 again to add the last entity listed in Article VII-A, Section 4(a)--i.e., the House of Representatives. Act of June 10, 1999, ch. 423, § 7, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 2064, 2067. With regards to the unconstitutional “shall” language in section 1659, the Legislature appears to have doubled down by purposefully not changing that auxiliary verb from “shall” to “may.” But the addition of the other recipients begs the question of whether the amendments would affect and even change Haworth’s analysis of section 1659’s constitutionality. Because the Legislature has added officers and entities in a piecemeal fashion over the years, it demonstrates the actual import of “may be invoked” in Article VII-A, Section 4(a) as an authorization of several possible officers and entities from which the Legislature could choose one, five, or all. It was never intended to grant discretion to those officers and entities--not in 1974, not in 1998, and not now.

¶9 Consequently, this Court should do its own analysis of section 1659’s constitutionality that takes into account the various meanings of the word “may” and the historical context of Article VII-A, Section 4(a) and should follow the dictates of section 1659 that require it to file a petition with the Court on the Judiciary when the Council recommends removal.

¶10 The majority relies upon the Rules Governing Complaints on Judicial Misconduct as authority that “vest[s] the Chief Justice with responsibility to determine ‘appropriate action ․ to remedy the problem’ and [that] reserves to the [Oklahoma Supreme] Court the power to impose ‘appropriate discipline’ ” in this case. Majority's Order ¶ 3 (quoting Rule 4(c)--(d), R. Governing Compls. on Jud. Misconduct, 5 O.S.2026, ch. 1, app. 4-A). But those rules only govern matters where the Council of Judicial Complaints does not recommend removal from office or compulsory retirement, as clearly demonstrated both in the Preface to the Rules and in Rule 3. When those rules were initially adopted in 2006, this Court was seeking “to ensure that uniform rules [we]re promulgated ․ to protect and preserve the integrity, detachment and neutrality of judicial decision-making” for the “investigat[ion] and administ[ration] [of] judicial discipline for misconduct that does not warrant removal from office or compulsory retirement.” Order, SCAD No. 2006-36 (Okla. Mar. 30, 2006) (emphasis added). To that end, this Court noted in the initial Preface to the Rules Governing Complaints on Judicial Misconduct:

Preface

The Supreme Court adopts Rules Governing Complaints on Judicial Misconduct under its exclusive supervisory and administrative power over the inferior courts as provided under Article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution. Historically, the Chief Justice has administered forms of discipline short of removal from office. These rules are promulgated to preserve the integrity and public trust of the Judicial Branch of Government. The following procedure provides a uniform process to investigate and administer judicial discipline for misconduct that does not warrant removal from office or compulsory retirement.

Preface, In re R. Governing Compls. on Jud. Misconduct, SCAD No. 2006-36, 2006 OK 82, ¶ 1 (filed Oct. 27, 2006) (second emphasis added) (codified at 5 O.S.Supp.2007, ch. 1, app. 4-A) (amended 2023 to remove the second sentence). The only authority this Court has for issuing these rules was its supervisory and administrative power over the Chief Justice in his or her historical role that oversaw the administration of judicial discipline when the Council had not recommended removal or compulsory retirement. That's further borne out in Rule 3:

Rule 3. Council on Judicial Complaints

To ensure independent investigation of the complaint, the Council on Judicial Complaints is authorized to receive complaints regarding a judge as defined in 20 O.S.2001, § 1404.

If after an investigation, the Council on Judicial Complaints finds evidence of misconduct that does not warrant removal from office or compulsory retirement, they may refer the matter to the Chief Justice for review.

Rule 3, In re R. Governing Compls. on Jud. Misconduct, SCAD No. 2006-36, 2006 OK 82, ¶¶ 6--7 (filed Oct. 27, 2006) (emphasis added) (codified at 5 O.S.Supp.2007, ch. 1, app. 4-A) (amended 2023). Although Rule 3 was extensively amended in 2023 to give the Council more flexibility in deciding whether to refer a matter to the Chief Justice, Rule 3 was never amended to confer power upon the Chief Justice or this Court to handle matters or administer discipline when the Council finds evidence of misconduct that does warrant removal from office or compulsory retirement. See In re Amends. to R. Governing Compls. on Jud. Misconduct, SCAD No. 2023-59, 2023 OK 73. Thus, the Chief Justice's power under Rule 4(c) to “determine[ ] that appropriate action has been taken to remedy the problem” and this Court's power under Rule 4(d) to “choose and impose appropriate discipline” are only activated if and when the Council “finds evidence of misconduct that does not warrant removal from office or compulsory retirement.” Rules 3, 4(c)--(d), In re R. Governing Compls. on Jud. Misconduct, SCAD No. 2006-36, 2006 OK 82, ¶ 7 (filed Oct. 27, 2006) (emphasis added) (codified at 5 O.S.Supp.2007, ch. 1, app. 4-A) (amended 2023). Again, although Rule 4 was extensively amended in 2023, none of the amendments to Rule 4 conferred new powers upon the Chief Justice or this Court to remedy problems or impose discipline in matters where the Council finds evidence of misconduct that does warrant removal from office or compulsory retirement. See In re Amends. to R. Governing Compls. on Jud. Misconduct, SCAD No. 2023-59, 2023 OK 73. Insofar as the Council has found evidence of misconduct that would warrant Judge Holmes's removal from office, the majority's reliance upon these Rules Governing Complaints on Judicial Misconduct is misplaced.

¶11 This brings us full circle, back to the mandate in 20 O.S.2026, § 1659 that governs matters where the Council “finds that the complaint should be made the subject of proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary” because of misconduct that warrants removal from office, and back to Article VII-A, Section 2(a)’s language that gives the Court on the Judiciary “sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine causes” where the misconduct arguably warrants removal from office.

¶12 Because I believe we are constitutionally and statutorily required to file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the Trial Division of the Court on the Judiciary, I dissent.

¶1 I agree that removal from office is not warranted but I dissent to the public reprimand. In my view, a period of suspension without pay would even better serve our dual aims of deterrence and promoting public confidence in the judiciary.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Arise Program is a 24-month outpatient substance abuse treatment program for high-risk males in the criminal justice system in Tulsa, focusing on recovery, counseling, and life skills development. ActionSteps Counseling, Inc., “The Arise Program,” at https://actionstepscounseling.org/arise (last accessed July 20, 2026).

2.   Council on Judicial Complaints’ Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for Removal, 3.

3.   Id., 8.

4.   Id., 9.

5.   Id., 18.

6.   Id., 40.

7.   Rule 2.9 provides that an ex parte communication may be permitted for “scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes.” Rule 2.9(A)(1), Code of Judicial Conduct.

8.   “When sentencing a person convicted of a crime, the court shall first consider a program of restitution for the victim, as well as imposition of a fine or incarceration of the offender. The provisions of paragraph 1 of subsection A of this section shall not apply to defendants being sentenced for:Beginning January 1, 1993, a defendant being sentenced for a second or subsequent felony conviction for violation of Section 11-902 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes, except as otherwise provided in this subsection.• A third or subsequent conviction of a violent crime enumerated in Section 571 of Title 57 of the Oklahoma Statutes;• A fourth or subsequent conviction for any other felony crime; orIn the case of a person being sentenced for a second or subsequent felony conviction for violation of Section 11-902 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the court may sentence the person pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of subsection A of this section if the court orders the person to submit to electronically monitored home detention administered and supervised by the Department of Corrections pursuant to subparagraph e of paragraph 7 of subsection A of this section. Provided, the court may waive these prohibitions upon written application of the district attorney. Both the application and the waiver shall be made part of the record of the case.” 22 O.S. § 991a(C).

9.   Council on Judicial Complaints’ Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for Removal, 42.

10.   Id., 27.

11.   Id., 29.

12.   Id., 3.

13.   The people of Tulsa County elected Judge Holmes to her position--and she is currently running unopposed for another four-year term.

14.   “Cause for removal from office shall be” Gross neglect of duty; corruption in office; habitual drunkenness; commission while in office of any offense involving moral turpitude; gross partiality in office; oppression in office; or other grounds as may be specified hereafter by the legislature.” Okla. Const. Art. VII-A, § 1(b).

1.   Title 20 of the Oklahoma Statute, § 1659 states:In the event the Council on Judicial Complaints finds that the complaint should be made the subject of proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary, it shall forward all papers concerning the same, together with its findings, to either the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice thereof, the Governor, the Attorney General, the Executive Secretary of the Oklahoma Bar Association, or the House of Representatives, who shall promptly file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the trial division of the Court on the Judiciary in accordance with subsection (a) Section 4 of Article 7-A of the Constitution of Oklahoma; provided, however, filing by the Executive Secretary of the Oklahoma Bar Association shall be at the direction of the majority of the members of Executive Council or by resolution of the House of Delegates of the Oklahoma Bar Association. Thereafter, the matter shall proceed in accordance with the applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and rules of the said Court on the Judiciary.The dissent relies on this provision to conclude that the Court has no discretion in deciding whether removal proceedings are appropriate. But § 1659 itself contemplates discretion: the Executive Secretary of the Oklahoma Bar Association may file a petition only at the direction of a majority of the Executive Council or by resolution of the House of Delegates.

2.   After additional allegations of misconduct on the part of the District Judge Kendra Coleman, the Court filed a petition to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial division of the Court on the Judiciary. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Concerning Coleman, 2019 OK 77, 474 P.3d 354.

1.   See Ref. No. 152, State Question No. 431, §§ 1--7, 1967 Okla. Sess. Laws 732, 732--735 (adopted at election May 3, 1966) (ratifying the constitutional amendment that created the Court on the Judiciary in new Article VII-A of the Oklahoma Constitution); Ref. No. 163, State Question No. 447, §§ 1--7, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 834, 834--37 (adopted at election July 11, 1967) (ratifying the constitutional amendment that created the Judicial Nominating Commission in new Article VII-B of the Oklahoma Constitution); Ref. No. 164, State Question No. 448, §§ 1--15, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 829, 829--34 (adopted at election July 11, 1967) (ratifying constitutional amendments to existing Article VII of the Oklahoma Constitution that, among other things, provided for non-partisan elections of Supreme Court justices).For a fuller discussion of the Supreme Court's bribery scandal, see generally Johnson v. Johnson, 1967 OK 16, 424 P.2d 414; Okla. Co. v. O'Neil, 1967 OK 105, 431 P.2d 445; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Grimes, 1967 OK 178, 436 P.3d 40; Marshall v. Amos, 1968 OK 86, 442 P.2d 500; and William A. Berry & James Edwin Alexander, Justice for Sale: The Shocking Scandal of the Oklahoma Supreme Court (1996).

CONCUR: Rowe, C.J., Winchester, J., (by separate writing), Edmondson, and Gurich, JJ., and Reif, S.J.; CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART: Rowland, S.J., (by separate writing); DISSENT: Combs, J., (by separate writing), Kane and Jett, JJ. Kane, J., with whom Jett, J. joins, dissenting: “I would forward the allegations to the trial division of the Court on the Judiciary to proceed with a trial to prove or disprove the concerns expressed in the complaint.” RECUSED: Kuehn, V.C.J., and Darby, J.