STATE OF OKLAHOMA OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. LEDGER WAYNE NEWMAN (2026)

¶1 Ledger Wade Newman (Newman or Respondent) is suspended from practicing law for one year for multiple instances of professional misconduct.  ¹ Newman was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) after colliding with another vehicle. Since it was Newman's second DUI, he was charged with, and ultimately pleaded nolo contendere to, felony DUI. Newman's decision to leave the scene of the collision to consume more alcohol and smoke marijuana before inevitable questioning by law enforcement demonstrates a lack of respect for the legal process and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Newman stipulated that his conduct reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, constitutes professional misconduct, and warrants the imposition of discipline.

¶2 In addition to the felony DUI offense, Newman repeatedly practiced law without the requisite diligence, failed to communicate with clients, accepted substantial fees for work he did not carry through to conclusion, and neglected to safeguard client property. This resulted in material harm to Respondent's clients, several of whom filed grievances with the Oklahoma Bar Association. Newman's actions also drew the attention of a district judge, who contacted the Bar to express concern about Newman's “failure to appear for court” and for his clients, who “do not know what services he is failing to perform on their behalf.”  ² Consistent with our July 2025 consolidation order, we resolve both SCBD No. 7903 and SCBD No. 7914 with this opinion.  ³

¶3 The Oklahoma Supreme Court is responsible for regulating the practice of law in Oklahoma.  ⁴ This responsibility comes with the power to establish rules of professional conduct and to discipline those practitioners who violate them.  ⁵ These powers are exclusive to this Court.  ⁶ Our review in disciplinary proceedings is de novo and without deference to either the stipulations of the parties or the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT).  ⁷ The purpose of the Supreme Court's licensing and disciplinary authority is not to punish offenders but to safeguard the interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession.  ⁸

¶4 Based on our de novo review of the record, we order Respondent suspended from the practice of law for one year pursuant to both RGDP Rule 6 and Rule 7.

I. RULE 7 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

¶5 A lawyer who has pleaded no contest pursuant to a deferred sentence plea agreement for a crime which demonstrates unfitness to practice law is subject to professional discipline.  ⁹ Based on the circumstance of this case, Respondent's felony DUI offense demonstrates unfitness to practice law and warrants discipline.

A. Factual Background

¶6 On September 21, 2024, Respondent failed to slow and stop at a stoplight and collided with another vehicle in Hochatown, Oklahoma. Respondent admitted that he had consumed alcohol prior to the collision.  ¹⁰ The collision resulted in property damages in excess of $30,000.00 and caused bodily harm to passengers in the vehicle Respondent struck.  ¹¹

¶7 After the accident, Respondent swiftly left the scene after a brief exchange of information with the other driver.  ¹² He entered Abendigo's restaurant and quickly consumed multiple shots of tequila and a beer. Respondent then exited the restaurant and “took a few hits” from a prepackaged marijuana joint.  ¹³ He was then approached by Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper Jaydon Pingleton. Based on his training and experience, Pingleton concluded that Respondent was inebriated when Pingleton began his interaction with Respondent, which could not have resulted from Newman's post-collision consumption of intoxicating substances.  ¹⁴ Respondent refused a field sobriety test (allegedly because of a cyst removed from his foot eight or nine months earlier),  ¹⁵ refused to take a breathalyzer test, blamed the accident on the sun being in his eyes, and downplayed the incident, stating he barely clipped the other car and that no injuries were reported at the scene.  ¹⁶

¶ 8 Respondent was arrested and charged with criminal offenses including Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Drugs, 47 O.S. § 11-902(A). A news report regarding Respondent's arrest appeared on the front page of the McCurtain Gazette.  ¹⁷ The State subsequently filed an amended information charging Respondent with felony DUI because Respondent had previously been convicted of aggravated misdemeanor DUI in 2016 while in college. Respondent pleaded no contest to the felony DUI, and the district court imposed a two-year deferred sentence concluding April 10, 2027.  ¹⁸

¶9 On May 12, 2025, Complainant Oklahoma Bar Association (the Bar) initiated this Rule 7 proceeding.  ¹⁹ On June 30, 2025, this Court entered an order of immediate interim suspension “suspending [Respondent] from the practice of law pending further order from this Court.”  ²⁰ We referred this matter “to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal to hold a hearing to make a recommendation on whether final discipline should be imposed and if so, a recommendation of the final discipline to be imposed.”  ²¹

¶10 Trial before the PRT was held over three days in October 2025. Following the trial, the PRT found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated RGDP Rules 6 and 7. The PRT recommended that this Court suspend Respondent from the practice of law for one year and place Respondent on two years of supervised probation at the conclusion of his suspension.  ²²

B. Analysis

¶11 In a summary disciplinary proceeding based on a lawyer pleading nolo contendere pursuant to a deferred sentence plea agreement, two basic issues are addressed: (1) does the crime that the lawyer pleaded to demonstrate the lawyer's unfitness to practice law, and if so, (2) what is the appropriate discipline to be imposed.  ²³ “Every criminal conviction does not facially demonstrate the lawyer's unfitness to practice law.”  ²⁴ Some do. Some don't.  ²⁵

¶12 This Court's prior cases have determined that a conviction for felony DUI does not automatically demonstrate unfitness to practice law.  ²⁶ Instead, we determine whether the circumstances surrounding the DUI offense warrant discipline.  ²⁷ Our decisions in this area are guided by Rule 8.4 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC), 5 O.S.2021 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, which “defines professional misconduct to include a criminal act reflecting adversely on a lawyer's ‘honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.’ ”²⁸ Criminal offenses that indicate a “lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice” warrant discipline.  ²⁹ These include “[o]ffenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice.”  ³⁰ Additionally, a “pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation” and can constitute professional misconduct.  ³¹

¶13 Thus, a pattern of alcohol-related offenses can constitute professional misconduct,  ³² and even a single misdemeanor DUI --absent any harm to a client--can warrant discipline when it places the physical safety of others at risk.  ³³ Similarly, DUI offenses that encompass dishonesty, untrustworthiness, or an interference with the administration of justice warrant discipline.

¶14 In recent cases, we have consistently imposed discipline in cases involving DUI nolo contendere pleas or convictions, but the severity of discipline has varied based on the facts of each proceeding. For example:

• In State ex rel. OBA v. Gies, the attorney received a six-month suspension after pleading no contest to misdemeanor DUI and felony child endangerment.  34

• In State ex rel. OBA v. Bethea, this Court suspended the attorney whose DUI-induced collision injured six people, including three children, for one year from the date of his interim suspension, with credit for “time served” during the interim suspension.  35

• In State ex rel. OBA v. McCoy, an attorney serving as an associate district judge pleaded guilty to actual physical control of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in 2021.  36 In response to mitigating evidence, the Court dismissed the first Rule 7 proceeding.  37 Five months after the Court declined discipline, the respondent pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DUI in Colorado.  38 The Court imposed a two-year suspension.  39

• In State ex rel. OBA v. Littlefield, the Court suspended the attorney for one year from the date of the Court's interim suspension order after the attorney pleaded guilty to felony DUI, his second DUI felony and fourth DUI conviction.  40

• In State ex rel. OBA v. Easley, the Court imposed a two-year deferred suspension on an attorney with five previous alcohol-related convictions.  41 Subsequently, Easley resigned his bar membership after being charged with his sixth alcohol-related offense.  42

• In 2017, this Court issued public reprimands in three Rule 7 proceedings involving attorneys who were convicted of or pleaded guilty to DUI: State ex rel. OBA v. Hunt, 2017 OK 28, ¶ 10, 394 P.3d 216, 219; State ex rel. OBA v. McMillen, 2017 OK 26, ¶¶ 2--3, 10, 393 P.3d 219, 220--21, 222; and State ex rel. OBA v. Shahan, 2017 OK 10, ¶ 2, 390 P.3d 254, 255. In each case, the attorney had committed another alcohol-related offense.

¶15 The circumstances surrounding Newman's DUI offense demonstrate unfitness to practice law and warrant discipline. Even though not binding on this Court, Respondent has stipulated that his unlawful conduct reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer and was contrary to the prescribed standards of conduct.  ⁴³ He also stipulated that his actions constitute professional misconduct in violation of ORPC Rules 8.4(b) and RGDP Rule 1.3.  ⁴⁴

¶16 The evidence in this case supports and confirms these stipulations. First, and perhaps most concerning, is the fact that Respondent chose to leave the scene of the vehicle collision with little delay to consume more alcohol and smoke marijuana. Though the record is devoid of evidence that Newman's decision to leave and consume intoxicating substances was part of an elaborate scheme to avoid a DUI charge, his actions reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. As an attorney, Newman should have known that a post-collision interaction with law enforcement was imminent. Newman admits to having consumed alcohol prior to the accident, and whether Newman could lawfully operate the vehicle was contingent upon the quantum of alcohol in his bloodstream at the time of the accident. Newman should have appreciated that leaving the scene to consume alcohol and marijuana would prejudice the State's investigation of the accident and Newman's DUI offense. Newman's actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice, which is professional misconduct. It also reflects poorly on his judgment, trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law.

¶17 Second, Respondent's DUI offense arises from a vehicle collision causing personal injuries and property damage.  ⁴⁵ The fact Respondent caused personal injury to others while illegally driving a vehicle supports the imposition of discipline.⁴⁶

¶18 Third, this is not Newman's first DUI offense. In 2016, Newman was convicted of misdemeanor aggravated DUI and sentenced to one year deferred in Cleveland County.  ⁴⁷ While in the past we have given less weight in disciplinary proceedings to remote-in-time offenses, it is notable that Newman's offenses were close enough in time to result in a felony charge.

¶19 We have little difficulty concluding that Respondent's DUI offense demonstrates unfitness to practice law and warrants discipline. What constitutes appropriate discipline for Respondent is more challenging because the facts of this case do not substantially align with the facts in our previous decisions. Respondent has already served an interim suspension of approximately 10 months, but we do not decide this Rule 7 case in isolation. The Bar also initiated a Rule 6 proceeding which includes evidence of professional misconduct in addition to Respondent's criminal offense. We must consider his client-related misconduct to determine proper discipline for Respondent.

II. RULE 6 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

¶20 In response to grievances from multiple clients and a district judge's letter expressing concern about failures to appear in court and perform client services, the Bar brought a formal complaint against Respondent under RGDP Rule 6. Following a trial, the PRT determined Newman had committed professional misconduct, including numerous violations of the ORPC.

¶21 To impose discipline under Rule 6, we must find clear and convincing evidence of misconduct.  ⁴⁸ “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”  ⁴⁹

A. Count I: Representation of B.F.  50

¶22 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of B.F. Respondent was retained to obtain pardons and to see those records and information relating to B.F.’s criminal convictions expunged and sealed from public view. B.F. paid Respondent a $7,750.00 retainer. After long delays and numerous (and often unanswered) client inquiries, Respondent successfully obtained pardons and expungements on B.F.’s behalf. Despite this, information relating to B.F.’s criminal convictions remained available online, leaving the matter undertaken for the client unresolved.  ⁵¹

¶23 Pursuant to ORPC Rule 1.3, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”  ⁵² ORPC Rule 1.4 in pertinent part requires a lawyer to: “(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information ․” ORPC Rule 1.5 prohibits a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting unreasonable fees. As relevant here, ORPC Rule 8.4(a) reads: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ․ violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct ․”

¶24 Over the course of his representation of B.F., Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client; failed to communicate and respond to the client's requests for information; and accepted substantial fees for work he did not carry through to conclusion. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5.

¶25 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5.  ⁵³ This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

B. Count II: Representation of Shelly Downing

¶26 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Shelly Downing (Downing). Downing retained Respondent for several legal matters relating to Downing's business for which Downing paid Respondent $785.00. In particular, Respondent was retained to safekeep a thumb drive containing Downing's “master business plan” and asked to draft a cease-and-desist letter. Respondent failed to complete the letter. Frustrated and anxious, Downing requested that Respondent return the thumb drive. Downing's property was never returned.  ⁵⁴ After Downing filed a Bar grievance, Respondent eventually refunded the $500.00 she paid to draft the cease-and-desist letter.

¶27 While there is conflicting evidence about the whereabouts of Downing's thumb drive, there is clear and convincing evidence that, over the course of his representation of Downing, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client; failed to communicate and respond to the client's requests for information; and accepted a fee for holding property that can no longer be located. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.15.

¶28 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.15. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

C. Count III: Representation of Paula Jenkins

¶29 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Paula Jenkins (Jenkins). Respondent was retained to represent Jenkins in a McCurtain County estate matter. Jenkins paid Respondent a $10,000.00 retainer, $7,500.00 of which he eventually paid himself with approval from the probate court. Respondent prepared a petition for probate and sought to have Jenkins named personal representative to facilitate the disposal of estate assets. Thereafter, family members filed an objection challenging the validity of the will and contesting Jenkins’ appointment. Respondent failed to file a response until requested by the court and failed to communicate with Jenkins about the case. After an adverse ruling against Jenkins, Respondent failed to perform further work on the matter and ceased communications.  ⁵⁵ After Jenkins filed a Bar grievance, Respondent refunded $2,500.00 of the $10,000.00 retainer, which Respondent unilaterally determined was unearned.

¶30 Over the course of his representation of Jenkins, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client; failed to communicate with the client about the case; and collected a fee unapproved by the court. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5.

¶31 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

D. Count IV: Matters Before District Judge Emily Maxwell

¶32 Seventeenth Judicial District ⁵⁶ Judge Emily Maxwell notified the Bar that Respondent, for whom Judge Maxwell had previously made accommodation, had stopped appearing altogether and was neglecting multiple legal matters in her district. Judge Maxwell brought several matters to the Bar's attention.

1. Representation of Aquanita Carter

¶33 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Aquanita Carter (Carter). Carter retained Respondent to represent her in a personal injury matter against the McCurtain County Sheriff's Office. Respondent filed a petition on Carter's behalf but thereafter performed no work and did not adequately communicate with his client. Defense counsel served discovery on Respondent, but it went unanswered. Following a series of email exchanges, defense counsel filed a motion to compel. Respondent did not respond to the motion to compel and failed to appear at the hearing on the motion. The court granted defense counsel's motion, but Respondent failed to comply with it. Eventually, Respondent was sanctioned, costs and fees were assessed, and his client's case was dismissed without prejudice. After the commencement of the Bar investigation, Respondent paid Carter's daughter $6,000.00, which Respondent determined was reflective of actual damages.

¶34 Over the course of his representation of Carter, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client and failed to communicate with the client about the case. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

¶35 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

2. Representation of Jonathan Flores-Vargas

¶36 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Jonathan Flores-Vargas (Flores-Vargas). Respondent was retained by Flores-Vargas to petition for his appointment as special administrator of his father's estate. Respondent secured Flores-Vargas’ appointment but thereafter failed to perform any additional legal work or communicate with his client. Because of Respondent's failure to communicate with his client and appear in court, Flores-Vargas was removed as special administrator. Flores-Vargas’ removal led to an eventual loss of ownership of two restaurants that had been successfully owned and operated by Flores-Vargas’ father.

¶37 Over the course of his representation of Flores-Vargas, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client and failed to communicate with the client about the case. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

¶38 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

3. Representation of Delmar Vaughn

¶39 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Delmar Vaughn (Vaughn). Vaughn retained Respondent to represent him in a divorce and paid Respondent a $3,000.00 retainer. Respondent accepted the retainer but failed to perform any work on the matter. After Respondent failed to return Vaughn's calls, Vaughn filed a petition in small claims court and obtained a default judgment against Respondent in the amount of $3,000.00.

¶40 Although the representation was short-lived, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client and failed to communicate with the client about the case. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

¶41 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).  ⁵⁷

III. RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT

A. Failure to Cooperate & Actions Contrary to Prescribed Standards

¶42 RGDP Rule 5.2 specifies that “[t]he failure of a lawyer to answer [a grievance] within twenty (20) days after service of the grievance (or recital of facts or allegations), or such further time as may be granted by the [Bar's] General Counsel, shall be grounds for discipline.” RGDP 1.3 provides: “The commission by any lawyer of any act contrary to prescribed standards of conduct, whether in the course of his professional capacity, or otherwise, which act would reasonably be found to bring discredit upon the legal profession, shall be grounds for disciplinary action, whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, or a crime at all.” During the joint hearing in SCBD No. 7903 (cons. w/ 7914), Respondent agreed “that he failed to timely respond to [OBA] grievances.”  ⁵⁸ Respondent likewise conceded he violated RGDP 1.3.  ⁵⁹ However, Respondent's failure to comply with RGDP Rules 5.2 and 1.3 are not a determinative factor in the discipline we impose in this proceeding.

B. Conduct During the Trial Proceedings

¶43 Respondent's failure to respond to the grievances and refusal to cooperate with the Bar's investigation notwithstanding, Respondent's testimony before the PRT included an acknowledgement that he did wrong, should have known better, and that there was no defense to his conduct. He also testified that he is embarrassed and has experienced shame on account of these proceedings. Respondent apologized to his family, friends, and peers, and to the Bar, the courts, and public.

¶44 We acknowledge and appreciate Respondent's decision to apologize and to admit his failures. Not every attorney facing disciplinary charges chooses to take responsibility or express regret for their actions. While Respondent's contrition does not exempt him from discipline, we have taken Respondent's remorse into account when considering appropriate discipline in this case.

IV. MITIGATION EVIDENCE

¶45 This Court takes note of the mitigating evidence presented to the PRT including Respondent's past seizures,  ⁶⁰ ongoing health issues, and alcoholism, as well as an office move and Respondent's status as a relatively new attorney.  ⁶¹ We also acknowledge Respondent's subsequent efforts at monetary remediation including reimbursing clients’ unearned retainers and compensating the family of a client for actual damages sought in a dismissed lawsuit, as discussed above.

¶46 Respondent's successful completion of a 30-day inpatient course of treatment in the fall of 2024, his decision to seek out a therapist, his willingness to contract with a Lawyers Helping Lawyers sponsor, and his testimony that he has maintained sobriety since the vehicle collision are taken into consideration with the discipline we impose. When the PRT inquired as to whether he was an addict, Newman “responded that he had an addictive personality and can abuse substances.”  ⁶² While we credit Newman for the steps he has taken, the evidence leaves lingering questions about his plan to maintain his sobriety in the future. The record shows that Newman does not attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, ceased therapy in the fall of 2025, and relies upon his 97-year-old grandmother as his primary support system.  ⁶³ Newman's therapist testified that even though “her therapy had nothing to do with [his] sobriety, if [he] is not attending AA meetings, he is getting no help with his addiction issues.”  ⁶⁴ We encourage Respondent to put sufficient safeguards in place to assist him with maintaining sobriety, and we offer a reminder “that substance abuse of any kind is incompatible with the practice of law.”  ⁶⁵

¶47 The mitigating factors in this case do not excuse the underlying misconduct nor eliminate the need for discipline.  ⁶⁶

V. DISCIPLINE

¶48 Based on the foregoing, we conclude Respondent has committed professional misconduct as that term is defined in ORPC Rule 8.4(a). Even when a respondent agrees with the Bar's assertion that they violated their ethical obligations to their clients, stipulate to nearly every allegation in the Bar's complaint, and invite discipline upon themselves,  ⁶⁷ we retain our prerogative to determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed in RGDP Rule 6 proceedings.  ⁶⁸ That same prerogative is unaffected in RGDP Rule 7 disciplinary proceedings.  ⁶⁹

¶49 “We consider discipline using both the Rule 7 convictions and our Rule 6 conclusions.”  ⁷⁰ In this case, the “totality” of Respondent's conduct warrants the imposition of additional discipline.  ⁷¹ Newman has repeatedly practiced law without the requisite effort and skill our profession demands. This resulted in material harm to several of Respondent's clients and drew the attention of a district judge before whom he practiced. Respondent also failed to respond to client grievances and the Bar's investigative inquiries in a timely fashion. Such conduct has repeatedly been held to warrant the imposition of discipline.  ⁷²

¶50 “Although we utilize prior decisions as a gauge for imposing attorney discipline, the particular facts and circumstances of each case dictate its resolution.”  ⁷³ The circumstances of Respondent's case--including the three dissimilar disciplinary recommendations ⁷⁴ --do not neatly map onto previous disciplinary matters. But because this case raises analogous ethical concerns to those analyzed in State ex rel. OBA v. Sheridan,  ⁷⁵ State ex rel. OBA v. Willis,  ⁷⁶ State ex rel. OBA v. Lance,  ⁷⁷ and DUI-related proceedings analyzed in section I, we consider these decisions in determining the commensurate level of discipline:

• In Sheridan, this Court suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months and ordered respondent to participate in the Bar's management assistance program.  78 The attorney's primary fault was neglect of client matters and a general lack of diligence.  79

• In Willis, this Court disbarred the attorney because of a pattern of misconduct stemming from criminal offenses and unresponsiveness to clients, this Court, the PRT, and the Bar, among others.  80

• In Lance this Court disbarred the attorney for civil and criminal actions and their consequences to the attorney's clients and the profession. “Respondent's misconduct combined substance abuse, violence, dishonesty, disregard for court orders, disregard for legal process, and disregard for the Bar's requirements.”  81

¶51 Having considered these cases, reviewed the disciplinary recommendations in the record, and taken account of Respondent's criminal conviction and professional misconduct, including his interference with the administration of justice, we find suspension of one year is warranted and appropriate in this case. In contrast with Sheridan, which imposed a six-month suspension for a pattern of client-related professional misconduct, Respondent has also pleaded no contest to a felony DUI charge which demonstrated unfitness to practice law. This heightens the need for discipline in this case. Respondent's criminal and professional misconduct, however, do not rise to the level demonstrated in Willis and Lance, which resulted in disbarment. We also conclude that proper discipline in this case is categorically different than our past decisions stemming from alcohol-related offenses since Respondent was simultaneously engaged in professional misconduct that was injurious to his clients. For these reasons, we determine a one-year suspension is proper discipline.

¶52 We hope the discipline imposed in this case deters Respondent and reminds other members of the Bar of our predecessors’ wise words: “A lawyer's license is a certificate of professional fitness to deal with the public as a legal practitioner. Public confidence in every approved legal practitioner is essential to the proper functioning of the profession.”  ⁸² Moreover, “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened by conditions. A fair private and professional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is essential at the moment of admission; but it is equally essential afterwards. Whenever the condition is broken, the privilege is lost.”  ⁸³ Where a lawyer's conduct discredits the profession in the eyes of the public, the lawyer “has breached his obligation to uphold, with strict fidelity, the high standards imposed upon the bar.”  ⁸⁴ This important reminder notwithstanding, this Court's primary responsibility in disciplinary proceedings is not to punish individual offenders but to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.  ⁸⁵ Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we believe today's pronouncement accomplishes that.

* * *

¶53 Respondent Ledger Wade Newman is suspended from the practice of law for one year and, pursuant to RGDP Rule 6.16, ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $6,907.06 within 90 days of the effective date of this opinion.

ORDER OF IMMEDIATE INTERIM SUSPENSION LIFTED; RESPONDENT SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ONE YEAR, EFFECTIVE THE DAY THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL

“I would impose a two year and one day suspension.”

FOOTNOTES

1.   On June 30, 2025, this Court issued an order immediately interim suspending Newman during the pendency of this disciplinary proceeding. Order of Immediate Interim Suspension, State ex rel. OBA v. Newman, SCBD No. 7903 (Okla. June 30, 2025); Order Nunc Pro Tunc Correcting Interim Suspension Order of June 30, 2025, Newman, SCBD No. 7903 (Okla. July 3, 2025); see also Rule 7.3, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S.2021 Ch. 1, App. 1-A. We now lift the interim order to impose final discipline.

2.   Compl't’s Ex. 11 at *1, Letter from Judge Emily Maxwell to the Oklahoma Bar Association (Aug. 21, 2024).

3.   State ex rel. OBA v. Newman, Consolidation Order, SCBD No. 7903 (cons. w/ 7914) (Okla. July 3, 2025); see also State ex rel. OBA v. Knight, 2014 OK 71, ¶ 19, 330 P.3d 1216, 1221 (“[T]his Court may combine [a] Rule 6 action with another RGDP action.”).

4.   5 O.S. § 13; RGDP Rule 1.1.

5.   Id.; State ex rel. OBA v. Kruger, 2018 OK 53, ¶ 2, 421 P.3d 306, 309.

6.   Id.

7.   State ex rel. OBA v. Boone, 2016 OK 13, ¶¶ 2--3, 367 P.3d 509, 511.

8.   State ex rel. OBA v. Friesen, 2016 OK 109, ¶ 8, 384 P.3d 1129, 1133.

9.   RGDP Rule 7.1.

10.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2.

11.   Id.

12.   Tr. of Ledger Wade Newman Hearing (Tr.) at 173:12--174:5 (Day 1--Oct. 9, 2025).

13.   Respondent has a medical marijuana card. Tr. at 393:23--395:12 (Day 2--Oct. 10, 2025).

14.   Tr. at 156:4--161:21 (Day 1--Oct. 9, 2025).

15.   Tr. at 376:13--23 (Day 2--Oct. 10, 2025).

16.   Report of the Trial Panel at *10.

17.   Compl't’s Ex. 33 at *1, Attorney Faces Felony Count After an Accident, McCurtain Gazette, Sept. 26, 2024.

18.   Count 2: Leaving Scene of Accident Involving Damage and Count 3: Carrying Firearm while Under the Influence were dismissed with costs pursuant to a plea agreement.

19.   The Bar filed certified copies of the Information, Probable Cause Affidavit, Supplemental Information for After Former Conviction, Amended Information, Amended Supplemental Information for After Former Conviction, and Deferment from State v. Ledger Newman, Case No. CF-2024-155 (McCurtain Cty. D. Ct.).

20.   Order of Immediate Interim Suspension, Newman, SCBD No. 7903; see also Order Nunc Pro Tunc Correcting Interim Suspension Order of June 30, 2025, Newman, SCBD No. 7903.

21.   Id.

22.   Report of the Trial Panel at *10, *12.

23.   See State ex rel. OBA v. Cooley, 2013 OK 42, ¶ 2, 304 P.3d 453, 454.

24.   Id. ¶ 12, 304 P.3d at 456; cf. State ex rel. OBA v. Burns, 2006 OK 75, ¶ 33, 145 P.3d 1088, 1095 (holding that substance abuse is incompatible with fitness of an individual to practice law).

25.   See id.; see also ORPC 8.4, cmt. 2 (“Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication․ Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.”).

26.   Cooley, 2013 OK 42, ¶ 13, 304 P.3d at 456; see also State ex rel. OBA v. Bethea, 2024 OK 33, ¶ 21, 549 P.3d 1230, 1238; State ex rel. OBA v. Armstrong, 1990 OK 9, ¶ 8, 791 P.2d 815, 818. Though Armstrong and Cooley indicate that a felony DUI does not facially demonstrate unfitness to practice law, we have also noted that “[e]ntering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony charge has routinely been viewed by this Court as satisfactory evidence of professional misconduct.” State ex rel. OBA v. Gies, 2025 OK 59, ¶ 9, 578 P.3d 1195, 1199 (quoting State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, 2012 OK 29, ¶ 8, 275 P.3d 133, 136).

27.   Cooley, 2013 OK 42, ¶ 13, 304 P.3d at 456.

28.   Bethea, 2024 OK 33, ¶ 21, 549 P.3d 1230, 1238 (quoting ORPC Rule 8.4(b)).

29.   ORPC Rule 8.4, cmt. 2.

30.   Id.

31.   Id.

32.   State ex rel. OBA v. Littlefield, 2023 OK 53, ¶¶ 8--9, 529 P.3d 185, 188; Rule 8.4, cmt. 2.

33.   Gies, 2025 OK 59, ¶ 10, 578 P.3d at 1199.

34.   2025 OK 59, ¶ 16, 578 P.3d at 1201

35.   2024 OK 33, ¶¶ 0, 26, 549 P.3d at 1231, 1239.

36.   2023 OK 79, ¶¶ 2--3, 531 P.3d 1276, 1277.

37.   Id. ¶ 3, 531 P.3d at 1277.

38.   Id. ¶ 4, 531 P.3d at 1277.

39.   Id. ¶ 19, 531 P.3d at 1280.

40.   2023 OK 53, ¶ 14, 529 P.3d at 189.

41.   2019 OK 81, ¶ 3, 455 P.3d 903, 904.

42.   State ex rel. OBA v. Elsey, 2023 OK 115, 539 P.3d 710.

43.   Newman, Joint Stipulations ¶¶ 68, 69, SCBD No. 7903 (cons. w/ 7914) (Okla. Sep. 29, 2025).

44.   Id.

45.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2.

46.   See Bethea, 2024 OK 33, 549 P.3d 1230.

47.   State v. Newman, Case No. CM-2016-970 (Cleveland Cty. D. Ct.); see also Compl't’s Ex. 33 at *2.

48.   RGDP Rule 6.12(c). RGDP Rule 7.7 requires no such finding.

49.   State ex rel. OBA v. Clark, 2023 OK 27, ¶ 10, 527 P.3d 708, 712.

51.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2.

52.   ORPC Rule 1.3 cmts. 3 & 4 ([3] “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination․ [D]elay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness․ [4] Unless the relationship is terminated ․ a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client.”).

53.   Although the Bar contends that Respondent also failed to comply with ORPC Rule 3.2 (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”), the Bar has not produced clear and convincing evidence of a violation of that rule during Respondent's representation of B.F.

54.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2--3; see also Compl't’s Ex. 7 at *6--7.

55.   Report of the Trial Panel at *4.

56.   The Seventeenth Judicial District consists of Pushmataha, McCurtain, and Choctaw Counties. 20 O.S. § 92.18.

57.   Curiously, the Bar's Brief-in-Chief does not address Respondent's representation of Nicole Hamill. The PRT found that after Respondent completed some work in a probate case Respondent asked for a $5,950.00 retainer. Respondent then preformed no work after filing a proof of publication. The PRT also found that Hamill obtained a judgment against respondent for $5,950.00, which was later satisfied. Since the Bar did not brief this issue, we do not rely on the Respondent's representation of Hamill as a basis for discipline.

58.   Resp't’s Br. at 10; see also Joint Stipulations at 3--5, where Respondent admits he failed to timely respond to OBA grievances.

59.   Resp't’s Br. at 17.

60.   Respondent had two seizures in September 2023 and March 2024, respectively. The first seizure was the result of Xanax withdrawal and strobe lights. Report of the Trial Panel at *7. Respondent testified that the first seizure prevented him from servicing his clients for approximately two months. Id. The second seizure was related from benzodiazepine withdrawal, according to Respondent. Id.

61.   Respondent was licensed to practice law on October 26, 2020. At least two of the grievances giving rise to the Rule 6 proceedings stemmed from attorney-client relationships beginning in the summer of 2021, or less than a year after Respondent was licensed to practice law.

62.   Report of the Trial Panel at *7; see also Burns, 2006 OK 75, ¶ 33, 145 P.3d at 1095 (“We have consistently expressed our strong belief that substance abuse is incompatible with the fitness of an individual to practice law.”).

63.   Report of the Trial Panel at *8--9.

64.   Id. at *8.

65.   Burns, 2006 OK 75, ¶ 32, 145 P.3d at 1095 (citation modified).

66.   Report of the Trial Panel at *11--12 (discounting much of Respondent's mitigating evidence).

67.   See generally Resp't’s Br.

68.   5 O.S. § 13; RGDP Rule 1.1. Kruger, 2018 OK 53, ¶ 2, 421 P.3d at 309.

69.   Cooley, 2013 OK 42, ¶ 4, 304 P.3d at 454.

70.   State ex rel. OBA v. Lance, 2023 OK 98, ¶ 47, 540 P.3d 458, 472.

71.   State ex rel. OBA v. Mortenson, 2023 OK 32, ¶ 0, 527 P.3d 724, 728.

72.   State ex rel. OBA v. Spadafora, 1998 OK 28, ¶¶ 34--35, 40, 957 P.2d 114, 119--20; State ex rel. OBA v. Sheridan, 2003 OK 80, ¶¶ 31--32 & 47, 84 P.3d 710, 717 & 719; State ex rel. OBA v. McCoy, 2010 OK 67, ¶ 33, 240 P.3d 675, 686; State ex rel. OBA v. Bradley, 2014 OK 78, ¶¶ 19, 25--27 & 29, 338 P.3d 629, 636 & 638--39.

73.   State ex rel. OBA v. Drummond, 2017 OK 24, ¶ 28, 393 P.3d 207, 217.

74.   In this matter, the PRT recommended Respondent's license “be suspended for a period of one (1) year, with such suspension beginning the date of any Supreme Court Order.” The PRT also recommended “that at the end of the suspension period, Respondent be placed on supervised probation with a mentor, approved by the OBA, for a period of two (2) years,” with stipulations and costs. See Report of the Trial Panel at *12.By contrast, the Bar “recommends that Respondent be suspended for two years, retroactive to the date of his immediate interim suspension and be ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.” Compl't’s Br.-in-chief at 22.Finally, Respondent invites this Court to “impose a six (6) month suspension, applied retroactively, considering he was interim suspended on the 30th day of June, 2025. Respondent agrees with the recommendation of having a mentor advise him during any probationary period, and [he] would abide by any probationary requirements this Court would impose.” Resp't’s Br. at 17.

75.   2003 OK 80, 84 P.3d 710(suspending lawyer from the practice of law for six months and ordering him to participate in the Bar's management assistance program).

76.   2022 OK 15, 504 P.3d 1141(disbarring lawyer on account of cumulative misconduct and actions which inflicted significant embarrassment upon the profession).

77.   2023 OK 98, 540 P.3d 458(disbarring lawyer for civil and criminal actions and their consequences to his clients and the profession).

78.   Sheridan, 2003 OK 80, ¶ 47, 84 P.3d at 119.

79.   Id. ¶ 44, 84 P.3d at 119.

80.   2022 OK 15, ¶ 26, 504 P.3d at 1152.

81.   Lance, 2023 OK 98, ¶ 47, 540 P.3d at 473.

82.   State ex rel. OBA v. Livshee, 1994 OK 12, ¶ 13, 870 P.2d 770, 775.

83.   Burns, 2006 OK 75, ¶ 30, 145 P.3d at 1094.

84.   Livshee, 1994 OK 12, ¶ 13, 870 P.2d at 775.

85.   Friesen, 2016 OK 109, ¶ 8, 384 P.3d at 1133.

JETT, J:

CONCUR: ROWE, C.J., KUEHN, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, GURICH, KANE and JETT, JJ. DISSENT: COMBS and DARBY, JJ.;