KEVIN STITT v. GENTNER DRUMMOND (2025)

¶1 Since 1986, when legislation authorizing creation of a Governor's Cabinet was passed, Oklahoma Governors have from time to time asked agency heads to serve as Cabinet Secretaries. Oklahoma law generally prohibits individuals from holding more than one State office at the same time, unless a statutory exception applies. 51 O.S. § 6. This case is not about the accretion of powers within agencies and the Cabinet; the Legislature has clearly articulated the policy that the Governor may appoint agency heads to his Cabinet. It is not about the separation of powers; this complaint concerns only appointments made by, and within, the Executive branch. The only question presented is whether Title 74, Section 10.3 allows an agency head to also serve as a Cabinet Secretary.  ¹ We hold that it does. Any other interpretation would render Section 10.3 superfluous. An agency head may concurrently serve as a Cabinet Secretary without violating Oklahoma's prohibition against holding dual office.

I. Background

¶2 Governor Stitt asked several agency heads to serve in his Cabinet. Subsequent to those appointments, a state senator requested an Attorney General's Opinion, essentially asking whether a person may simultaneously hold multiple State offices. In response, Attorney General Drummond issued AG Opinion 2024-5, which found that Cabinet Secretaries are not exempt from Oklahoma's prohibition against holding dual office and, therefore, cannot simultaneously serve as agency heads without violating Title 51, Section 6. This Opinion has the force and effect of law until overturned by a court of competent jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 2003 OK 29, ¶ 16, 66 P.3d 432, 441 (“Public officers have the duty to follow Attorney General opinions until they are judicially relieved of compliance.”).

¶3 Governor Stitt filed a petition for declaratory relief in Oklahoma County District Court. After a hearing, the district court ruled in favor of the Attorney General, finding that Cabinet Secretaries are subject to Oklahoma's prohibition against holding dual office. The court concluded that the expanded authority granted to Cabinet Secretaries in 2021 under Senate Bill 913, particularly the power to veto administrative rules, qualifies as an exercise of sovereign power, thereby making Secretaries officers under Oklahoma law. As a result, the court determined that agency heads who also serve as Cabinet Secretaries are holding two offices simultaneously, in violation of Title 51, Section 6. The district court rejected the argument that Title 74, Section 10.3 creates an exception, reasoning that the statute does not expressly override the prohibition against holding dual office and cannot be read to do so by implication. Governor Stitt appealed.  ² We retained the case on its merits. The Court held oral argument on June 17, 2025.

II. Standard of Review

¶4 Legal questions involving statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review. Bailey v. State ex rel. Bd. of Tests for Alcohol & Drug Influence, 2022 OK 50, ¶ 21, 510 P.3d 845, 852. On de novo review, an appellate court has plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to determine whether the trial tribunal erred in its legal rulings. Snow v. Town of Calumet, 2022 OK 63, ¶ 5, 512 P.3d 369, 372 (citing State ex rel. Protective Health Servs. State Dep't of Health v. Vaughn, 2009 OK 61, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 1058, 1064).

III. Discussion

A. Cabinet Secretaries Are Officers Under Oklahoma Law

¶5 The Court employs a three-part test for determining whether a State position is an office: (1) was the specific position created or authorized by law; (2) does the law impose certain definite duties upon the position holder; and (3) do the duties imposed “involve the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power.” Okla. City v. Century Indem. Co., 1936 OK 589, ¶ 21, 62 P.2d 94, 97. We are concerned here with the third factor.

¶6 Title 74, Section 10.3(B) sets out the primary duties of a Cabinet Secretary:

1.Advise the Governor of any policy changes or problems within the area they represent;

2.Advise the entities represented of any policy changes or problems as directed by the Governor; and

3.Coordinate information gathering for the Legislature as requested.

74 O.S. § 10.3(B). Thus, Cabinet Secretaries were primarily intended to serve as advisors and coordinators, roles that lacked the independent authority or sovereign power necessary to classify the position as an officer under the Century Indemnity Company framework. However, those roles have always been flexible. In 2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 913, granting Cabinet Secretaries the unilateral ability to approve or veto administrative rules proposed by the State agencies under their purview. 74 O.S. § 303(A)(6). In addition, Executive Orders by several Governors, past and present, have given Cabinet Secretaries authority to oversee agency operations, including rulemaking, hiring, grant applications, or expenditures.  ³ For example, the Office of the Attorney General agreed in 1996 that the Governor could issue an Executive Order authorizing Cabinet Secretaries to administer a state hiring freeze. AG Opinion 1995-12, ¶ 38. And the Office of the Attorney General previously recognized that individual Cabinet Secretaries had been given authority to exercise sovereign power under various circumstances. OK AG Opinion 2005-28, ¶ 7; OK AG Opinion 2000-54, ¶ 14. Taken together these grants of authority have transformed those historically advisory roles into positions which exercise some sovereign power.

B. 74 O.S. § 10.3 Is Not Affected By Oklahoma's Prohibition Against Holding Dual Office

¶7 We have established that Cabinet Secretaries are officers. The Attorney General argues that this status prevents an agency head from serving in the Governor's Cabinet, because a person cannot hold two state offices. Title 51, Section 6 provides: “Except as may be otherwise provided, no person holding an office under the laws of the state ․ shall, during the person's term of office, hold any other office ․ under the laws of the state.” 51 O.S., § 6. Although Section 6 enumerates thirty exceptions allowing a person to hold more than one state office, its plain language clearly contemplates that additional exceptions may exist in other statutes, and there are numerous examples of such exceptions found throughout our statutes.  ⁴ For that matter, the Legislature could add more exceptions to the list in Section 6, remove exceptions currently listed, or even revoke the entire section.

¶8 It is well within the Legislature's power to pass a law authorizing a person holding one office to assume the duties of another office without mentioning Section 6 at all. The Governor contends that Title 74, Section 10.3 authorizes agency heads to serve concurrently as Cabinet Secretaries. We agree. Section 10.3 does not merely create an exception to Section 6. It is, instead, a complete and freestanding exercise of Legislative authority granting the Governor the power of appointment over his Cabinet, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

¶9 Section 10.3 provides, in relevant part:

A cabinet Secretary may be appointed as a position funded by the Office of the Governor from funds available to that office, or appointed as a cabinet Secretary from among the agency heads within the cabinet area.

․

The cabinet Secretaries shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor, however, the appointment or removal of a cabinet Secretary who is also an agency head shall not otherwise affect the status of the other duties of the agency head.

74 O.S. §§ 10.3(B), (C). “When a statute's text is clear and unambiguous, courts are obligated to give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to rules of construction.” Bailey v. State of Okla. ex rel. Serv. Okla., 2025 OK 34, ¶ 14, 572 P.3d 1026, 1031. The plain language of Section 10.3 expressly contemplates that an agency head may also serve as a Cabinet Secretary. There is nothing ambiguous about this. A statute does not become ambiguous over time; language does not become ambiguous because lawyers may propose differing interpretations of it; we will not create an ambiguity where none exists. Read together, Title 51, Section 6 and Title 74, Section 10.3 complement, not contradict, one another.

C. The Attorney General's Interpretation Renders 74 O.S. § 10.3 Superfluous

¶10 Despite the plain language of Title 74, Section 10.3, the Attorney General asserts that the statute cannot survive the statutory bar against holding dual office. Instead, the Attorney General contends: (1) because the Governor may still appoint non-officer agency heads as Cabinet Secretaries, Section 10.3 is not superfluous; (2) because Section 10.3 was last amended prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 913, the Legislature could not have anticipated that Cabinet Secretaries would later be classified as officers; and (3) the Legislature has the authority to expressly exempt Cabinet Secretaries from Oklahoma's prohibition against holding dual office if it so chooses.

1. Agency Heads are Officers Absent Statutory Authority to the Contrary

¶11 The Attorney General asserts that the Governor may still appoint non-officer agency heads as Cabinet Secretaries, thus avoiding any conflict. However, the Attorney General fails to cite any statutory basis for distinguishing between officer and non-officer agency heads, nor does the Attorney General identify any statutory provision that prohibits agency heads from qualifying as officers. In the absence of such authority, no basis exists to exclude agency heads from classification as officers, leaving only the conclusion that they must be considered as such. And as a practical matter, neither party has offered this Court any example of a current agency head who does not have duties which qualify that position as an officer.

2. The Plain Statutory Text Controls Over Speculative Legislative Intent

¶12 The Attorney General asserts that, because Section 10.3 was last amended prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 913, the Legislature could not have anticipated that Cabinet Secretaries would later be classified as officers.  ⁵ As a result, the Attorney General argues that Title 74, Section 10.3 does not provide statutory authorization for an agency head--who is already an officer--to simultaneously serve as Cabinet Secretary, now that Cabinet Secretaries also qualify as officers. This argument fails under well-established statutory interpretation principles, which require courts to look to the text itself rather than speculate on legislative inaction.

¶13 It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that, if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2008 OK 21, ¶ 16, 184 P.3d 518, 525; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012). “A statute must be read to make every part operative and to avoid making parts of it superfluous or useless.” Raymond v. Taylor, 2017 OK 80, ¶ 16, 412 P.3d 1141, 1146 (citing Moran v. City of Del City, 2003 OK 57, ¶ 8, 77 P.3d 588, 591).

¶14 The Attorney General's interpretation of Title 51, Section 6 would nullify the relevant language in Title 74, Section 10.3, as it would preclude any circumstance in which that language could be given effect. Because all Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads qualify as officers, the Attorney General's reading of Section 6 would make it impossible for any agency head to concurrently serve as a Cabinet Secretary--directly contradicting the express language of Section 10.3. Accordingly, we reject the Attorney General's interpretation, as it would render the language in Section 10.3 meaningless and without effect. And, as a practical matter, that interpretation is not supported by facts. For decades, Governors have expanded the duties of individual Cabinet Secretaries by Executive Order, functionally making them officers. Not only could the Legislature have anticipated this, it should have done so, particularly since the Legislature had the benefit of Attorney General Opinions approving this practice. See OK AG Opinions 2005-28, 2000-54.

3. Existing Law Governs

¶15 The Attorney General asserts that the Legislature has the authority to expressly exempt Cabinet Secretaries from Oklahoma's prohibition against holding dual office if it so chooses. We agree. The question before the Court is not whether the Legislature could create this exemption in the future, but if it already has. We find that it has.

¶16 If the Legislature wishes to change the unambiguous meaning of Section 10.3, it may do so through legislative action. The Legislature retains full authority to amend, repeal, or enact new legislation addressing the issue, including through overriding a gubernatorial veto under Article VI, Section 11 of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, absent such legislation, Title 74, Section 10.3 must be given full effect as written.

Conclusion

¶17 Under Oklahoma law, no individual may hold more than one State office unless an exception applies. While Cabinet Secretaries now qualify as officers due to expanded statutory authority, Title 74, Section 10.3 expressly provides that agency heads may serve concurrently as Cabinet Secretaries. This statutory language must be given effect. We read the plain language of Section 10.3 in conjunction with the prohibition against holding dual office in Title 51, Section 6, giving effect to each. This preserves the coherence of the statutory scheme and avoids rendering Section 10.3 superfluous. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order and remand with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with this Opinion.

DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

¶1 In the present case, the Attorney General was requested by a member of the Legislature to render his opinion on a question of law, as is his statutory duty. 74 O.S. § 18b(A)(18). With the exception of an Attorney General's opinion that an act of the Legislature is unconstitutional, an Attorney General's opinion is usually binding upon the state officials whom it affects, and public officers have the duty to follow Attorney General opinions until they are judicially relieved of compliance. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 of Okla. Cty. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Ed., 2024 OK 39, ¶ 23, 565 P.3d 23, 32. It was a request for such a judicial review that brings this matter before us.

¶2 I write separately to note that the trial judge and more than one member of our Court read the law one way, while the majority read the law another. In other words, like many legal issues that come before this Court, this was an unanswered question with principled points in favor of each position. I commend counsel for both sides for the clarity and precision of their competing arguments.

J. KEVIN STITT, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Oklahoma, and BLAYNE ARTHUR, in her capacity [sic] as Secretary of Agriculture and Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry, Plaintiffs/Appellants,

and

SHELLEY ZUMWALT, in her capacity [sic] as Secretary of Tourism, Wildlife, and Heritage and as Executive Director of the Tourism and Recreation Department, and DR. DEBORAHSHROPSHIRE, M.D., in her capacity [sic] as Secretary of Human Services and as Director of the Department of Human Services, Plaintiffs,

v.

GENTNER DRUMMOND, in his capacity as Attorney General of Oklahoma, Defendant/Appellee 1.

I do not understand how the majority concludes that the language of 74 O.S.2021, § 10.3(B) and (C) unambiguously creates an exemption for all state agency heads serving as Cabinet Secretaries from 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding. See Majority Op. ¶ 9. When viewed in light of section 10.3’s history, the plain meaning of its text, and the litany of state officials--i.e., the Attorney General, the district judge, 94 state representatives, 41 state senators, and myself--who have reached an opposite conclusion, it should be readily apparent to the majority and anyone else looking at the issue in this case that either an ambiguity exists or section 10.3 unambiguously does not create an exemption. I cannot read the statute the way the majority does. The Attorney General's opinion preventing the Governor from appointing agency heads to serve as Cabinet Members in light of recent developments in the law was well-reasoned. The district judge's declaratory judgment in favor of the Attorney General and against the Governor reached the right result. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority's reversal of the district judge's summary judgment.

* * *

¶2 Since 1910, Oklahoma law has contained a general prohibition that forbids public officers from “hold[ing] any other office or be[ing] the deputy of any officer holding any other office.”  ² O.S.1910, § 4274; O.S.1921, § 130; O.S.1931, § 3424; 51 O.S.1941, § 6 (omitting the second “other”); 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A) (same). The wording of this prohibition against dual office holding invites the question: What constitutes an “office”? Before statehood, the Supreme Court of the Oklahoma Territory established that “a public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public.” Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 8, 41 P. 635, 636 (quoting Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 1, at 1--2 (1890)). In the case of City of Oklahoma City v. Century Indemnity Co., 1936 OK 589, 62 P.2d 94, this Court distilled that declaration into three elements:

[T]he chief elements of a public office are: (a) The specific position must be created or authorized by law; (b) there must be certain definite duties imposed by law on the incumbent; and (c) they must involve the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power ․

Id. ¶ 21, 62 P.2d at 97. “[A] position which has these three elements is presumably an ‘office,’ while one which lacks any of them is a mere ‘employment.’ ” Id. (quoting Winsor v. Hunt, 243 P. 407, 413 (Ariz. 1926)). The third element is the most important feature distinguishing an office from employment because “the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.” Guthrie Daily Leader, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 10, 41 P. at 636 (quoting Mechem, supra, § 4, at 5). This requires “that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.” Id. (quoting Mechem, supra, § 4, at 5). From this definition of “office,” we learn that one person should not be vested with two types of sovereign power. The principle behind the prohibition against dual office holding is predicated upon both the separation of powers, see, e.g., Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1, and the belief that the public will be best served if its public officers are able to devote their full time and attention to one office.

¶3 There are exceptions to this general rule, which the preliminary language of the statute even acknowledges: “Except as may be otherwise provided, no person holding an office ․” 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A) (emphasis added). The remainder of subsection A even contains over thirty exceptions itself. See id. § 6(A)(1)--(30). But none of those exceptions in subsection A covers an agency head who also serves as a Cabinet Secretary. That's why the Governor and the majority of this Court point to another statutory provision in a different title of the Oklahoma Statutes--i.e., section 10.3 of the Executive Branch Reform Act of 1986 contained in Title 74, which concerns “State Government.” As I've already stated, I don't believe that section 10.3 contains an exception to the general prohibition against dual office holding.

¶4 We must first look at the text of 74 O.S.2021, § 10.3. Our inquiry into the meaning of a statute “begins with the text of the statute and--absent unresolvable ambiguity--ends with the text.” Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 45, 427 P.3d 1052, 1070. Rules of construction are only applied to ascertain the meaning of a statute when its language is ambiguous or conflicting. Stricklen v. Multiple Injury Tr. Fund, 2024 OK 1, ¶ 14, 542 P.3d 858, 866. Language in a statute is only considered ambiguous “when it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. In ascertaining meaning, we “determine the ordinary meaning of the words that the Legislature chose in the provisions of law at issue” and “look ․ also at the text of related provisions in the same statute or legislative act, in a manner that achieves full force and effect for each provision.” Hall, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 45, 427 P.3d at 1070--71 (citing Broadway Clinic v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 OK 29, ¶ 15, 139 P.3d 873, 877; Twin Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Forest Park, 2005 OK 71, ¶ 6, 123 P.3d 5, 6--7; Cox v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs., 2004 OK 17, ¶ 19, 87 P.3d 607, 615; City of Midwest City v. Harris, 1977 OK 7, ¶ 6, 561 P.2d 1357, 1358; Rath v. LaFon, 1967 OK 52, ¶ 4, 431 P.2d 312, 314). The text of section 10.3 is set forth below:

§ 10.3. Cabinet system to be created

A. Within forty-five (45) days of assuming office, each Governor may create a cabinet system for the executive branch of state government. The cabinet system may be an organizational framework created by executive order which includes all executive agencies, boards, commissions, or institutions and their assignments to specific cabinet areas. The cabinet system shall consist of no more than fifteen cabinet areas and each cabinet area shall consist of executive agencies, boards, commissions, or institutions with similar programmatic or administrative objectives. One cabinet area shall consist of the Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs, its institutions and other executive agencies, boards, commissions, and institutions which are related to veterans. The Governor's cabinet shall be in effect until the Legislature supersedes each specific cabinet area or department by providing by law for specific cabinet areas or departments, or removes by law the authority of the Governor to create a cabinet area. At any time during the Governor's term of office, the cabinet may be modified at the sole discretion of the Governor subject to Senate confirmation as provided by subsection B of this section.

B. The Governor shall appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Secretary to head each cabinet area. The Secretary appointee for the cabinet area consisting of the Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs and other related veterans entities shall be an honorably discharged veteran and be eligible to receive benefits from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. A cabinet secretary may be appointed as a position funded by the Office of the Governor from funds available to that office, or appointed as a cabinet Secretary from among the agency heads within the cabinet area. The cabinet Secretaries shall:

1. Advise the Governor of any policy changes or problems within the area they represent;

2. Advise the entities represented of any policy changes or problems as directed by the Governor; and

3. Coordinate information gathering for the Legislature as requested.

C. The cabinet Secretaries shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor, however, the appointment or removal of a cabinet Secretary who is also an agency head shall not otherwise affect the status of the other duties of the agency head. Whenever a Secretary position becomes vacant, the Governor shall appoint a successor within thirty (30) calendar days pursuant to the provisions of Subsection B of this section. If the Legislature is not in session at the time of appointment it shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate upon convening of the next regular session of the Legislature.

74 O.S.2021, § 10.3 (emphasis added). The Governor and the majority home in on the bolded sentences. See Majority Op. ¶ 9 (only quoting those two sentences in isolation); ROA, Pet'rs’ Mot. Partial Summ. J. 1--2, 6 (same). Let's look at what those provisions actually say in context. Subsection B has four sentences covering four topics: (1) the first sentence establishes the appointment process for Cabinet Secretaries; (2) the second sentence sets forth specific qualifications that must be met by the Cabinet Secretary over veterans affairs--a position that must be included in every Governor's cabinet per subsection A; (3) going out of order, the fourth sentence lays out some general administrative duties for Cabinet Secretaries, i.e., advising and information gathering; and, (4) finally, the third sentence--upon which the majority and the Governor rely--discusses how the salary of a Cabinet Secretary will be funded, either through funds available to the Office of the Governor or, if the Cabinet Secretary also happens to be an agency head, through funds available to that agency. Besides that third sentence of subsection B, no other provision within the Executive Branch Reform Act of 1986 or other applicable law provides for the funding of the position of Cabinet Secretary. Looking at subsection C, there are three sentences covering three topics: (1) the first sentence provides that Cabinet Secretaries are at-will employees of the Governor; (2) the first sentence also specifies that a Governor's removal of a Cabinet Secretary who happens to be an agency head--and for that matter, his or her appointment too--does not impact their status as an agency head or the duties they must carry out as an agency head; and (3) the second and third sentences establish the process for filling a vacancy in the position of Cabinet Secretary due to removal, death, resignation, impeachment, etc.--including what must be done to obtain “the advice and consent of the Senate” in the event the Legislature is not in session when the Governor appoints a replacement. Although the third sentence of subsection B and the first sentence of subsection C acknowledge the possibility of one person serving as both agency head and Cabinet Secretary, they do not discuss any exception to 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding. That is, those sentences do not explicitly say that an agency head can always serve as a Cabinet Secretary regardless of 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding. The majority is attempting to graft an implicit exception into those sentences. But an exception is not what those sentences are about. Furthermore, the majority's attempt to insert an implicit exception into those sentences should not be seen as creating an ambiguity--particularly when our jurisprudence has repeatedly acknowledged a “cardinal rule of statutory construction” that “courts should not read into a statute exceptions not made by the Legislature. It has been well said that ‘seeking hidden meaning at variance with the language use is a perilous undertaking which is quite as apt to lead to an amendment of law by judicial construction as it is to arrive at the actual thought in the legislative mind.’ ” Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 1966 OK 155, ¶ 14, 422 P.2d 840, 843--44 (quoting City of Bristow ex rel. Hedges v. Groom, 1944 OK 223, ¶ 11, 141 P.2d 936, 940; 25 Ruling Case Law Statutes § 217, at 961, 963 (William M. McKinney et al. eds., 1929)); accord Antini v. Antini, 2019 OK 20, ¶ 12, 440 P.3d 57, 60; Hall, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 54 & n.118, 427 P.3d at 1075 & n.118; Martin ex rel. S.M. v. Phillips, 2018 OK 56, ¶ 9 & n.18, 422 P.3d 143, 147 & n.18; Oglesby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1992 OK 61, ¶ 13 & n.33, 832 P.2d 834, 842 & n.33; Rice v. Rice, 1988 OK 83, ¶ 9, 762 P.2d 925, 927; Udall v. Udall, 1980 OK 99, ¶ 11, 613 P.2d 742, 745. The majority doesn't even suggest an exception to 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding is implicit, but rather that it's plainly stated. See Majority Op. ¶ 9.

¶5 Had the Legislature wanted to include an explicit exception, it knows how to do so. As already mentioned, the statute containing the prohibition against dual office holding contains more than thirty exceptions of its own, as demonstrated in this excerpt of just five such exceptions:

§ 6. Officers and deputies not to hold other offices--Exemptions

A. Except as may be otherwise provided, no person holding an office under the laws of the state and no deputy of any officer so holding any office shall, during the person's term of office, hold any other office or be the deputy of any officer holding any office, under the laws of the state. The provisions of this section shall not apply to:

1. Notaries public;

2. Members of the State Textbook Committee;

3. County free fair board members;

․

25. Any person who is an assistant district attorney serving as a municipal judge or prosecutor; [and]

․

28. Any member of the state Legislature or any state officer who serves on the board of trustees of the Oklahoma School for the Visual and Performing Arts ․

51 O.S.2021, § 6(A). Those exceptions have, for the most part, been added one at a time over the years since 1929. See, e.g., Act of July 12, 1929, ch. 255, § 1, 1929 Okla. Sess. Laws 363, 363 (codified at O.S.1931 § 3424) (creating the exception for notaries public). Moreover, the Legislature has included explicit exceptions to section 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding in numerous other statutes over the years. For example, section 98.4 of title 25 of the Oklahoma Statutes has provided since its enactment in 1994 that the “honorary position” of “State Poet Laureate shall not be prohibited because of said appointed position from: 1. Running for and being elected to any office in the State or a political subdivision of the state,” 25 O.S.2021, § 98.4; of course, it is doubtful the honorary position would have resulted in the exercise of sovereign state power to qualify as an “office” for purposes of the dual office holding prohibition. More on point, section 288.4 of the Oklahoma Energy Education and Marketing Act was amended in 1999 to specify that “[m]embers serving on the [Oklahoma Energy Resources] Board shall be eligible to serve on any other state board or commission if such member is otherwise qualified to hold such appointed office, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6 of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” Act of June 4, 1999, ch. 317, § 4, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1392, 1398 (codified at 52 O.S.Supp.1999, § 288.4(J)) (emphasis added). Section 1094 of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision has provided since its enactment in 2000 that “members of the [Oklahoma State] Council [for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision] shall not be subject to the dual office holding prohibitions set forth in Section 6 of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” 22 O.S.2024, § 1094(A) (emphasis added). Section 640.1(E) of the Oklahoma Partnership for School Readiness Act has similarly provided since its enactment in 2003 that “[m]embers of the [ ] Board shall be exempt from the dual-office-holding provisions of Section 6 of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” 10 O.S.2024, § 640.1(E) (emphasis added). Section 4005(D) of the OSU Veterinary Medicine Authority Act has provided since its enactment in 2023 that “[e]ach member of the Authority shall possess dual office holding exemption privileges and shall be exempt from any statutory dual office holding prohibitions.” 2 O.S.2023, § 4005(D) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 903 of the Oklahoma Workforce Transformation Act has provided since its enactment in 2023 that “[m]embers serving on the [Oklahoma Workforce] Commission shall be eligible to serve on any other state board or commission if such member is otherwise qualified to hold such appointed office, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6 of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” 40 O.S.2023, § 903(G) (emphasis added). Also in 2023, the Legislature amended section 27-104 of the Oklahoma Municipal Code to specify that “[a] municipal judge in a court not of record is not an ‘officer’ of the municipality pursuant to paragraph 6 of Section 1-102 of this title and shall not be considered a state officer for the purposes of Section 6 of Title 51 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” Act of May 22, 2023, ch. 274, § 1, 2023 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 849, 849 (codified at 11 O.S.2023, § 27 104(A)) (emphasis added). These last six examples clearly demonstrate the Legislature's ability to make an explicit exception when they so desire. The absence of similar language in section 10.3 of Title 74 would seem to belie the Governor's arguments and the majority's conclusion that section 10.3 contains an unambiguous exception to the dual-office-holding prohibition.

¶6 The lack of an explicit exception to 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding makes even more sense when we examine the history behind section 10.3.

¶7 When the State of Oklahoma drafted its Constitution in 1906, its founders sought to avoid placing too much power in any one person--just as they did when they passed the 1910 statute prohibiting dual office holding. With respect to the executive branch, the Constitution provides that “[t]he Executive authority of the state shall be vested in a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor and Inspector, Attorney General, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Commissioner of Labor, Commissioner of Insurance and other officers provided by law and this Constitution, each of whom ․ shall perform such duties as may be designated in this Constitution or prescribed by law.” Okla. Const. art. VI, § 1(A). Each of these executive officers “[wa]s given certain specified powers and charged with certain specified duties, and while each must operate within the general comprehensive sphere of the executive department, with the Governor as Chief Executive, yet each is endowed with a limited independence and held directly responsible to the electorate”--except for the Secretary of State, see Okla. Const. art. VI, § 1(B)--“for the discharge of its specified duties.” Bynam v. Strain, 1923 OK 596, ¶ 17, 218 P. 883, 886. Perhaps Justice Fletcher Riley captures the founders’ distrust for centralized power best in his concurring opinion from Wentz v. Thomas, 1932 OK 636, 15 P.2d 65:

Thus it is plain that the Constitution of Oklahoma vested the executive authority, not as by the Federal Constitution in one official, but in twelve separately named officials and with provision for future legislative vestment of executive authority in “other officers provided by law and this Constitution,” “each of whom * * * shall perform such duties as may be designated in this Constitution or prescribed by law,” thus evidencing specific instruction, except as otherwise provided for, that these officers were not to perform duties under the direction of the Chief Executive, but to do their duty as outlined in the Constitution and laws․

The Governor has no constitutional power to appoint (except to fill vacancies) or remove any of the other executive officers named in the Constitution (except Bank Commissioner, section 1, art. 14, Const.) They are elective by, and responsible to, the sovereignty for the faithful discharge of their duties. The Governor is not responsible to the sovereignty for their faithful performance of the duty of any of them, except that upon their commission of impeachable offenses he should recommend their impeachment to the Legislature. They can be removed from office only in the manner provided by the people in their Constitution.

Thus it is obvious that the Hamiltonian idea of a centralized form of government by a concentration of all executive authority in one office was not the public policy adopted by the people and expressed in Constitution of Oklahoma. To the contrary, the Constitution of this state embraced the political idea of a plural executive department--one consisting of many executive officers who would obey the law rather than policy of a man who might happen to occupy the position of Governor.

¶ 123--125, 15 P.2d at 84 (Riley, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added). With this background in mind, it's not surprising to learn that for eighty years Oklahoma's executive branch did not include a Cabinet of secretaries or ministers under the Governor.

¶8 The Oklahoma Constitution remains silent on the permissibility of creating a Cabinet; it would only prohibit the divestiture of powers and duties from constitutionally created executive officers and the reassignment of those powers and duties to Cabinet Secretaries serving and answerable to the Governor. Consequently, the Legislature was at liberty to statutorily create an executive Cabinet, which it did by enacting the Executive Branch Reform Act of 1986, ch. 207, 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws 645, codified at 74 O.S.Supp.1986 §§ 10.1 through 10.3. Section 10.1 gave the Act its title, and section 10.2 spelled out the Legislature's intent “to organize the various departments, agencies, boards, commissions and other entities of the executive branch of state government into a cabinet system of government in order to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of state government.” 74 O.S.Supp.1986, §§ 10.1, 10.2. Section 10.3 set out the parameters for the Cabinet the Legislature envisioned, as discussed supra in my analysis of section 10.3’s plain language. Over the years, section 10.3 has been modified here and there, but the only amendments to subsections B and C concerned specifications related to the required Cabinet area covering veteran-related issues. The last amendment to section 10.3 came in 2013, which will be important in our timeline as we assess the historical context of the language in section 10.3(B) and (C).

¶9 From 1986 to 2021, most Cabinet Secretaries only exercised the powers and duties spelled out in section 10.3(B), which--as we've already discussed supra--involved general administrative duties such as “advis[ing]” and “coordinat[ing] information.” § 10.3(B). Even the majority recognizes that Cabinet Secretaries’ powers were limited “to serv[ing] as advisors and coordinators, roles that lacked the independent authority or sovereign power necessary to classify the position as an officer under the Century Indemnity Company framework.” Majority Op. ¶ 6; accord Question Submitted by the Hon. Guy Davis, Okla. H.R., 1988 OK AG 3, ¶ 5, 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 5, 6 (“The terms ‘advise’ and ‘authority’ are so antithetical by their very nature that extended discussion of the differences is hardly warranted. Suffice it to say that the purely advisory role for cabinet secretaries contemplated by the Legislature creates no independent substantive role in the actual management of the agencies placed in a particular cabinet area.”). Because they weren't exercising sovereign power, they would never run afoul of the prohibition against dual office holding by virtue of both holding a public office and being a Cabinet Secretary. Even when section 10.3 was last amended back in 2013, most Cabinet Secretaries serving the Governor were not considered “state officers.”  ³ Thus, there was little to no need for the Legislature to include in subsection B or C an exception to the prohibition against dual office holding. If there was no need for an exception, why read that language as an exception-particularly when it can be read as primarily settling (1) the source of funding for a Cabinet Secretary's salary and (2) the effect of a Cabinet Secretary's firing on other positions held by that person, even though it incidentally acknowledges the possibility of one person serving as both agency head and Cabinet Secretary? It seems nonsensical to point to such language, which has been part of section 10.3 ever since 1986, as an unambiguous exception to the prohibition against dual office holding.

¶10 Arguably, it wasn't until 2021--when Cabinet Secretaries were granted new powers to unilaterally approve or veto proposed rules from State agencies under their purview, see Act of Apr. 12, 2021, ch. 11, § 8, 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 30, 40 (codified at 75 O.S.2021, § 303(A)(6))--that all Cabinet Secretaries began exercising independent sovereign power that would render them “state officers” under our Century Indemnity test.  ⁴ Thus, it wasn't until 2021 that all Cabinet Secretaries who also served as agency heads would have been deemed to hold two public “offices” in violation of 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding. By extension, it wasn't until 2021 that the language in section 10.3(B) and (C) would need to be cast or read as an exception to 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding. But why would we read such language--drafted in 1986--as fixing a problem that wouldn't be manifest until thirty-five years later? We shouldn't.

¶11 Everything came to a head in 2024, after Senator Mary Boren asked the Attorney General for an opinion regarding whether the same individual could simultaneously serve as the Cabinet Secretary of Transportation, as the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Department of Transportation, and as the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority. The Attorney General rendered his opinion on February 28, 2024, from which the Governor and several of his Cabinet Secretaries immediately sought relief by filing the underlying action in district court on March 7, 2024. In the meantime, the House resurrected Senate Bill No. 1196 (“SB 1196”) from the previous legislative session and introduced a floor substitute that would fix the dual office holding violation created in 2021. SB 1196, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2024) (Floor Substitute), available at https:// www.oklegislature.gov/cf_pdf/2023-24%20FLOOR%20AMENDMENTS/House/ SB1196%20FA1%20ECHOLSJO-LRB.PDF. SB 1196 sailed through the legislative process within 7 days. It passed the House by a vote of 94 yeas, 1 nay, and 6 excused; and it passed the Senate by a vote of 41 yeas, 0 nays, and 7 excused. See All House Votes on SB 1196, Okla. State Leg., https://www.oklegislature.gov/cf/2023-24%20SUPPORT%20DOCUMENTS/votes/House/SB1196_VOTES.HTM (last visited Oct. 15, 2025); All Senate Votes on SB 1196, Okla. State Leg., https://www.oklegislature.gov/cf/2023-24%20SUPPORT%20DOCUMENTS/votes/ Senate/SB1196_VOTES.HTM (last visited Oct. 15, 2025). SB 1196 was enrolled to the Governor, but he vetoed it on March 12, 2024, the day after receiving it. Veto of SB 1196, Okla. Sec'y of State, Enrolled Legislation, https://www.sos.ok.gov/ documents/legislation/59th/2024/2R/SB/1196.pdf. The Governor had filed suit just 5 days earlier. He took the position in his veto that “Enrolled Senate Bill 1196 is duplicative and unnecessary” because “Oklahoma law already provides for them [i.e., Cabinet Secretaries] to simultaneously serve as agency heads ․ in 74 O.S. § 10.3. While I appreciate the floor amendment author's well-meaning attempt to ensure that a great public servant is spared from potential ripple effects of an Attorney General Opinion, the Secretary of Agriculture and all other cabinet Secretaries who also serve as agency heads can maintain their posts pursuant to the law as it already is. I trust a court of law will soon resolve this issue ․” Id. Although the majority acknowledges the existence of SB 1196, they attempt to hide the Governor's involvement in its demise by stating simply that “Senate Bill 1196 did not pass, leaving the existing statutes unchanged.” Majority Op. ¶ 3 n.2 (emphasis added). They then assert that “[w]hether Senate Bill 1196 supported one interpretation over another is irrelevant.” Id. I find it highly relevant insofar as it demonstrates that 135 state legislators either read the law or, at least, acknowledged the possibility that it could be read the same way I read it. That makes 135 state legislators, the Attorney General, the district judge, and myself who read 74 O.S.2021, § 10.3 differently than the majority and the Governor.

¶12 The majority's suggestion that my interpretation renders the language of section 10.3(B) and (C) superfluous is doubtful. I would give that language the meaning it always has had.

¶13 For all these reasons, I dissent. I would affirm the district court's summary judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 10.3 provides, in relevant part:A cabinet Secretary may be appointed as a position funded by the Office of the Governor from funds available to that office, or appointed as a cabinet Secretary from among the agency heads within the cabinet area.․The cabinet Secretaries shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor, however, the appointment or removal of a cabinet Secretary who is also an agency head shall not otherwise affect the status of the other duties of the agency head.

2.   During litigation, the Oklahoma Legislature considered Senate Bill 1196, which could have clarified whether the Legislature intended agency heads to be able to serve on the Governor's Cabinet. However, Senate Bill 1196 did not pass, leaving the existing statutes unchanged. Whether Senate Bill 1196 supported one interpretation over another is irrelevant. Legislative inaction is equivalent to legislative silence, which is never probative of legislative intent. Allen v. State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Okla. Unif. Ret. Sys. for Justs. & Judges, 1988 OK 99, ¶ 11, 769 P.2d 1302, 1306.

3.   See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 2023-8, OAC 1:2023-8 (Sept. 13, 2023); Exec. Order No. 2023-4, OAC 1:2023-4 (Feb. 28, 2023); Exec. Order No. 2019-14, OAC 1:2019-14 (April 16, 2019); Exec. Order No. 2019-40, OAC 1:2019-40 (Sept. 23, 2021).

4.   See, e.g., 74 O.S.Supp.2023, § 5207(B)(1); 25 O.S. § 98.4; 2 O.S.Supp.2023, § 4005(D); 74 O.S. § 1207(B); 10 O.S.Supp.2024, § 640.1(E); 70 O.S. § 1210.401(D); 22 O.S.Supp.2024, § 1094(A); 40 O.S.Supp.2023, § 903(G); 52 O.S. § 288.4(J); 70 O.S. § 4663(A).

5.   Title 74, Section 10.3 had been last amended on April 8, 2013, while the relevant portion of Senate Bill 913 was codified on September 1, 2021.

2.   Prior to 1910, the same provision appearing in the territorial statutes of Oklahoma forbade several specified officers from appointing certain other officers as a deputy:(3838) § 19. No territorial officer can appoint as his deputy any other territorial or any district officer, nor can a Territorial Treasurer appoint as his deputy any county treasurer, judge of the probate court, ragister [sic] of deeds, sheriff, or county commissioner, nor can either the clerk of the district court, the register of deeds or sheriff appoint as his deputy either of the others or their deputies.O.S.1890, § 3838; O.S.1893, § 3472. In the state statutes published in 1909, the term “State” was substituted for “territorial” and the phrase “county court” was substituted for “probate court.” O.S.1909, § 4805. When the Legislature authorized the compilation, annotation, and revision of the statutes in 1910, the Code Commissioners revised this provision to “[s]implif[y]” it “by making language general, instead of attempting to enumerate the different classes of officers.” O.S.1910, § 4274 (History); see also Reviser's Note in O.S.1910, May 1, 1911 (following the Foreword and the Certificates of Authentication at the beginning of Volume I and explaining that the Code Commissioners “prepared a history of the various sections, indicating the statute when adopted and their source in Oklahoma, as well as a note briefly setting forth the nature of the revision work in relation to each section”). The Code Commissioners’ revisions were thereafter adopted wholesale by the Legislature in the Act Adopting Revised Laws of Oklahoma, ch. 39, § 1, 1911 Okla. Sess. Laws 70, 70--71.

3.   As best as I can ascertain, only one Cabinet Secretary was ever deemed to exercise sovereign power such that his or her position as Cabinet Secretary would be classified as a public “office.” In 2000, the Attorney General issued an opinion finding that the Secretary of Commerce on Governor Keating's Cabinet exercised sovereign power and, “therefore, would be an officer of the State of Oklahoma.” Question Submitted by the Hon. Angela Z. Monson, State Sen., Dist. 48, 2000 OK AG 54, ¶ 14, 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 275, 280. But that determination was not made for purposes of enforcing the prohibition against dual office holding contained in 51 O.S.Supp.1999, § 6(A). Rather, the determination was made for purposes of enforcing the prohibition in 74 O.S.1991, § 2.2(B) against appointment of a rejected nominee to a Cabinet position on an acting or interim basis. See 2000 OK AG 54, ¶ 14, 30 Op. Att'y Gen. at 279. The Governor has never presented any evidence to the district court demonstrating that any Secretary of Commerce also served in another public office in violation of 51 O.S.2021, § 6(A)’s prohibition against dual office holding.The majority insinuates that the Attorney General has twice found that a particular Cabinet Secretary was exercising sovereign power, insofar as the majority cites two Attorney General opinions. See Majority Op. ¶ 6. The citation to the 2005 Attorney General opinion, however, is nothing more than a recitation of the previous findings from the 2000 Attorney General opinion. It's not a separate incident where the Attorney General found that another Cabinet Secretary was exercising sovereign power. In fact, it was quite the opposite. The Attorney General specifically found in 2005 that the Cabinet Secretary of Finance and Revenue had “no specific statutory duties ․ [and] no duties which involve the exercise of sovereign power,” such that “the position of Secretary of Finance and Revenue is not an office, [and] there [wa]s no dual office holding violation in holding both that position and a state office, such as State Treasurer.” Question Submitted by the Hon. Gus Blackwell, State Rep., Dist. 61, 2005 OK AG 28, ¶ 8, 35 Op. Att'y Gen 141, 144. The very fact that the Attorney General was looking for a dual office holding violation would seem to cut against the majority's citation in favor of their holding.

4.   The majority points to various executive orders dating back to 2019. See Majority Op. ¶ 6. The Governor's district court briefing even mentioned an executive order from 2015. Either way, the executive orders being relied upon post-dated the last amendment to section 10.3 in 2013. Thus, the exercise of sovereign power by Cabinet Secretaries was not widespread in 1986--when the Legislature drafted the language in section 10.3(B) and (C) to which the majority and the Governor point as creating an exception--or in 2013--when the Legislature last amended any part of section 10.3.The majority's citation of a 1996 Attorney General opinion as proof that Cabinet Secretaries were allowed to exercise sovereign power is inapposite. That opinion dealt with whether the Governor could delegate his power to implement a state hiring freeze to other executive agents, including Cabinet Secretaries, to administer the approval or denial of requests for exceptions to the hiring freeze. See Question Submitted by the Hon. Cal Hobson, State Sen., Dist. 16, 1995 OK AG 12, ¶ 39, 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 30. When it's couched in those terms, it isn't readily apparent whether any Cabinet Secretary tasked with “administer[ing] the freeze by approving or denying requests for exceptions to the hiring freeze” would have been exercising sovereign power himself or coordinating information for the Governor to make the decision. Thus, reliance upon that Attorney General opinion as proof that Cabinet Secretaries were allowed to exercise sovereign power seems dubious, at best.

KUEHN, V.C.J.:

CONCUR: ROWE, C.J., KUEHN, V.C.J., and GURICH, DARBY, KANE (by separate opinion) and JETT, JJ., and PRINCE, S.J. DISSENT: COMBS (by separate opinion) J., and WISEMAN, S.J. DISQUALIFIED: WINCHESTER, J. RECUSED: EDMONDSON, J.