STATE OF OKLAHOMA OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. JAMES ALBERT CONRADY (2025)

¶1 James Albert Conrady (Conrady or Respondent) has repeatedly practiced law without the requisite diligence, failed to communicate with clients, neglected to hold unearned fees in trust, and accepted fees he did not earn. This resulted in material harm to several of Respondent's clients. We have already disciplined Respondent once and conclude he should not continue practicing law in this state. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has disbarred Respondent, and we now do the same.

¶2 In response to grievances from multiple clients, the Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar or Complainant) brought a formal complaint against Respondent under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S.2021 Ch. 1, App. 1-A.  ¹ The Bar sought emergency interim suspension of Respondent's license to practice law, which was granted July 30, 2025.  ² Following a trial, the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) determined Conrady had committed professional misconduct, including numerous violations of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC).  ³ The PRT recommended Conrady be disbarred for his actions and ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.  ⁴

¶3 During the pendency of this formal disciplinary proceeding, Complainant initiated a summary reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against Respondent under RGDP Rule 7.7, which provides an independent basis for disbarment.  ⁵ We resolve both proceedings with this opinion.  ⁶

¶4 This Court is responsible for regulating the practice of law in Oklahoma.  ⁷ This responsibility comes with the power both to establish rules of professional conduct and to discipline those practitioners who violate them.  ⁸ These powers are exclusive to this Court and, as such, our review in disciplinary proceedings is de novo, or without deference to either the stipulations of the parties or the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the PRT.  ⁹ To impose discipline under Rule 6, we must find clear and convincing evidence of misconduct.  ¹⁰ “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”  ¹¹ Based on our review of the record, we find that such evidence exists to disbar Respondent pursuant to Rule 6. We also find that Complainant has established that Respondent should be disbarred pursuant to Rule 7.

I. RULE 6 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

A. Count I: Representation of Jason Clark

¶5 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Jason Clark (Clark). Clark's professional relationship with Respondent began approximately ten years ago when Clark retained Respondent to prepare operating agreements for his oil and gas business, Gator, LLC.  ¹² Clark, along with several partners (the Gator plaintiffs), operated Gator until internal disputes led the Gator plaintiffs to file a lawsuit against Clark in Logan County.  ¹³ In response, Clark again turned to Respondent for legal representation.  ¹⁴

¶6 Respondent filed an answer to the lawsuit and an affirmative defense that the operating agreement mandated mediation and arbitration before initiating litigation.  ¹⁵ On August 30, 2022, the trial court ordered the case to mediation.  ¹⁶ Despite having relied on the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) clause in his initial filing, Respondent subsequently resisted efforts by opposing counsel to proceed with mediation.  ¹⁷

¶7 On December 2, 2022, the trial court granted a temporary injunction to prevent Clark from exercising control over Gator, LLC and again ordered the parties to mediation.  ¹⁸ On Clark's behalf, Respondent appealed this order arguing in part that the Gator plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not pursued ADR.  ¹⁹ This is perplexing considering Respondent's refusal to take part in ADR. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court's order, noting that Clark “failed to even present an argument.”  ²⁰ According to Clark's testimony, Respondent never explained the rationale behind the appeal or any related motions and failed to communicate about scheduling mediation.  ²¹ Instead, Respondent repeatedly assured Clark that the matter would ultimately be resolved in federal court.  ²²

¶8 Although Respondent did not communicate with Clark, he did contact opposing counsel, to whom he stated in writing that he would not participate in mediation or arbitration related to the Logan County case.  ²³ Nevertheless, arbitration proceeded without the presence of either Clark or Respondent.  ²⁴ The arbitrator ultimately awarded nearly $340,000.00 to the Gator plaintiffs.  ²⁵ Clark testified that he was unaware of both the arbitration hearing and the award until informed by a third party.  ²⁶ When confronted, Respondent filed an appeal challenging the trial court's confirmation of the arbitration award.  ²⁷ Clark then hired new counsel in the appeal of the order confirming arbitration who dismissed the appeal.  ²⁸ Throughout, Respondent continued to reassure Clark that the federal court would provide recourse.  ²⁹

¶9 In June 2023, Respondent filed a federal lawsuit against the Gator plaintiffs on Clark's behalf asserting RICO and ERISA claims.  ³⁰ Respondent failed to serve the defendants within the 90-day period required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, prompting the court to issue a show cause order.  ³¹ Respondent did not respond, and the case was eventually dismissed without prejudice.  ³² Clark was not notified of the dismissal.  ³³

¶10 Respondent refiled the federal action in December 2023.  ³⁴ All defendants eventually moved to dismiss, with several also filing motions for sanctions under Rule 11.  ³⁵ Respondent failed to notify Clark of these developments.  ³⁶ A hearing on the motions to dismiss was scheduled for April 2024 at which Respondent failed to appear.  ³⁷ Respondent did not inform Clark of the hearing.  ³⁸ Respondent later submitted untimely responses to the motions.  ³⁹

¶11 An evidentiary hearing was set for May 2024 to address Respondent's failure to appear in April.  ⁴⁰ Respondent arrived fifteen minutes late to the hearing.  ⁴¹ The court took the matter under advisement and, in June 2024, the federal court dismissed Clark's amended complaint, finding that Respondent “delayed and disrupted this litigation and that he has acted in bad faith, wantonly[,] or for oppressive reasons.”  ⁴² In a contemporaneously filed order, the federal court characterized Respondent's conduct as a “dereliction of duties.”  ⁴³ In its June 2024 orders, the federal court granted various sanctions and attorney fee awards to the Clark defendants based on Respondent's repeated failures to respond and appear.  ⁴⁴

¶12 Pursuant to ORPC Rule 1.3, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” ORPC Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;

(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

Over the course of his representation of Clark, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client; failed to reasonably consult with the client about his unorthodox strategy; and failed to communicate and respond to the client's requests for information. This demonstrates Respondent's failure to comply with ORPC Rules 1.3 and 1.4.

¶13 According to ORPC Rule 3.1, “A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” The evidence shows Respondent “failed to respond to defense motions, failed to comply with [c]ourt [o]rders[,] and failed to appear for hearings.”  ⁴⁵ Ultimately, Respondent's services resulted in sanctions being imposed upon him by a federal court, which found not only that Respondent acted in bad faith but also that “[a] reasonable attorney would not have brought the federal claims as alleged.”  ⁴⁶ It is apparent Respondent failed to comply with ORPC 3.1.  ⁴⁷

¶14 In the course of Respondent's representation of Jason Clark, there is clear and convincing evidence Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 3.1. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

B. Count III: Representation of Donett Brooks

¶15 Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Donett Brooks (Brooks). Following the death of her husband, Brooks retained Conrady to assist with multiple legal matters, including the probate of her late husband's estate, the revision of her own will and trust, preparation of business tax returns, and the transfer of stock, among other issues.  ⁴⁸ Respondent agreed to handle all these matters, and Brooks paid him a $12,000.00 retainer.  ⁴⁹

¶16 Although Respondent occasionally contacted Brooks with pertinent questions, none of the matters advanced in any meaningful way.  ⁵⁰ For example, while Respondent entered an appearance in the probate proceeding for which he had been retained, he did not do any further work in that matter.  ⁵¹ Respondent also failed to revise Brooks’ estate planning documents, prepare tax returns, or facilitate the transfer of stock as agreed.  ⁵² When asked about his lack of progress, Brooks testified Respondent offered no substantive explanation, stating only that “he was just busy.”  ⁵³

¶17 In addition to his inaction, Respondent returned only a portion of the original documents Brooks had provided to him.  ⁵⁴ According to Brooks’ testimony, this has caused significant difficulties, as she “cannot get anything done without the originals.”  ⁵⁵ Respondent also deposited Brooks’ retainer fee check into his operating account and did not return unearned fees.  ⁵⁶ Eventually, after Conrady ceased all communication, Brooks filed a grievance with the Bar.  ⁵⁷

¶18 The evidence of Respondent's misconduct is clear and convincing. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness as required by ORPC Rule 1.3. In violation of ORPC Rule 1.4, he failed to communicate with the client and respond to reasonable requests for information. Respondent accepted substantial fees for work he did not perform in contravention of ORPC Rule 1.5. Respondent also commingled Brooks’ retainer with personal or operating funds and failed to issue any refund in violation of ORPC Rule 1.15.

¶19 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.15. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

C. Count IV: Representation of Geoffrey Arce

¶20 Geoffrey Arce (Arce), the owner of a powersports business in Norman, retained Respondent to initiate a federal lawsuit to recover damages connected to a state court case.  ⁵⁸ Arce paid Respondent $5,952.00 for representation in both the federal matter and another proceeding.  ⁵⁹ Respondent filed a complaint on Arce's behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.  ⁶⁰ However, as occurred in Respondent's representation of Clark, the defendants were never served, and the case was ultimately dismissed.  ⁶¹ Respondent did not notify Arce of the dismissal.  ⁶²

¶21 While the federal case was pending, Arce also retained Respondent to represent him in a separate replevin action filed in Cleveland County District Court.  ⁶³ Respondent entered an appearance but failed to take any further action.  ⁶⁴ A default judgment was entered against Arce in the amount of $17,742.72.  ⁶⁵ When Arce inquired about the judgment, Respondent assured him he would figure out what was going on and follow up.  ⁶⁶ No further communication was received.  ⁶⁷

¶22 Respondent received an initial retainer from Arce in the amount of $2,500.00.  ⁶⁸ This retainer was deposited directly into Respondent's operating account rather than his IOLTA Account.  ⁶⁹

¶23 There is clear and convincing evidence Conrady engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Arce. In violation of ORPC Rule 1.3, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness allowing cases he filed to be dismissed and default judgment to be entered against the client. He failed to communicate with his client and to respond to reasonable requests for information as mandated by ORPC Rule 1.4. Respondent accepted more than $5,000.00 in fees for work that he largely did not perform. This constitutes an unreasonable fee under ORPC Rule 1.5. Contrary to ORPC Rule 1.15, Respondent deposited Arce's initial retainer directly into his operating account rather that depositing it into his IOLTA account for safekeeping until the fee was earned.

¶24 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.15. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

D. Count V: Representation of Navarro and Boggs

¶25 Jodie Navarro and her brother, Micah Boggs, retained Respondent to assist with the probate of their late father's estate, believing their stepmother had improperly filed the probate action in the wrong county.  ⁷⁰ They paid Respondent a total of $3,000.00 for his representation.  ⁷¹ Respondent successfully obtained a dismissal of the stepmother's probate petition based on improper venue.  ⁷² But it was a transitory triumph. Despite assuring Navarro and Boggs by email that he was “finishing up on” pleadings for a new probate action in the correct county--and urging them “not [to] to give up on [him]”--Respondent never filed the probate proceedings.  ⁷³

¶26 After a significant delay, Respondent advised Boggs that he needed more money before he could file the case in Canadian County.  ⁷⁴ Boggs subsequently received an email stating that there was still $1,000.00 left from the original retainer.  ⁷⁵ However, Conrady never filed the Canadian County probate action.  ⁷⁶ Neither did Conrady refund the $1,000.00 unused retainer or ensure it was preserved in trust in his IOLTA account.  ⁷⁷ Repeated attempts to reach Respondent were unsuccessful, so a grievance was filed with the Bar.  ⁷⁸

¶27 We find clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed professional misconduct. Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in initiating a Canadian County probate action as required by ORPC Rule 1.3. In contravention of ORPC Rule 1.4, Respondent ceased communication with the clients. Despite reporting there was a $1,000.00 credit remaining from the clients’ retainer, Conrady performed no additional work. Nor did he refund the unused retainer. Thus, the fee charged by Respondent was unreasonable in violation of ORPC Rule 1.5. Finally, Respondent did not deposit the clients’ retainer in his IOLTA account until such time as it was earned as required by ORPC Rule 1.15.  ⁷⁹

¶28 We conclude Respondent violated ORPC Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.15. This constitutes professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).

E. Count II: Representation of Margaret Lowery

¶29 The Bar has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in professional misconduct during his representation of Margaret Lowery (Lowery).  ⁸⁰ We conclude Lowery's testimony is not credible. Thus, the Bar has not met its evidentiary burden.

¶30 The Bar alleges that Lowery, a self-employed attorney, “retained Respondent [in March 2024] to seek emergency injunctive relief on her behalf in federal court related to her bar licensure proceedings in the State of Illinois.”  ⁸¹ The Bar's Brief-in-chief is even more vague: “[Lowery] retained Respondent in March of 2024 to represent her in a personal matter.”  ⁸² According to the Bar, Lowery paid Respondent $10,000.00 to file a declaratory judgment action or TRO.  ⁸³ The Bar critiques: “Respondent never filed the declaratory judgment action or TRO.”  ⁸⁴ While you would never know from the Bar's Brief-in-chief or Complaint, there may be a cogent reason Respondent did not file the federal lawsuit. It appears Lowery wanted Respondent to file a lawsuit in federal court either to enjoin the Illinois Supreme Court or to declare it to be a RICO organization.  ⁸⁵ When Mr. Conrady did not initiate the federal lawsuit, Lowery filed her grievance.

¶31 Lowery herself has been subject to attorney discipline proceedings. In 2023, this Court imposed reciprocal discipline on Lowery after the Illinois Supreme Court suspended her from practicing law for thirty days.  ⁸⁶ Notably, one of the bases for the Illinois Supreme Court's discipline was that Lowery made knowingly false statements in a disciplinary proceeding.  ⁸⁷

¶32 In Lowery's testimony to the PRT, she made statements that undermine her credibility. For instance, the Bar's counsel asked Lowery whether there was a “sense of urgency about the filing” of a declaratory judgment action.  ⁸⁸ Lowery testified:

Well, we had an upcoming hearing that we were afraid I would be defaulted in, and I had gotten very, very ill from sepsis with kidney stones. In fact, that's what occurred, and he [Respondent] was supposed to file the action, and I ended up being defaulted.  89

Later, when she was testifying about the date of text messages she sent to Respondent, Lowery stated, “I'm going to guess this was around May 1. I mean, I had sepsis during this time period, so I don't want to misstate anything to anybody, but that would be my best.”  ⁹⁰

¶33 Lowery's testimony that she was “very, very ill from sepsis” and that she was “defaulted” is dubious. On May 2, 2024, the Hearing Board of the Illinois Registration and Disciplinary Commission (IRDC) conducted an evidentiary hearing upon allegations that Lowery had engaged in professional misconduct.  ⁹¹ Lowery, appearing pro se, filed repeated motions requesting that the hearing be continued.  ⁹² To support one of her motions to continue the proceedings, Lowery submitted an affidavit from Dr. Patrick VanSchoyck stating that Lowery had emergency surgery on April 26 with a diagnosis of sepsis.  ⁹³ However, according to the Hearing Board's Report and Recommendation, Lowery “emailed photographs of herself to Counsel for the Administrator [of the IRDC] at 9:21 a.m. on April 26, 2024, which depict[ed Lowery] standing, smiling, and extending her middle fingers while in a hospital gown.”  ⁹⁴ The IRDC Hearing Board concluded that “Respondent's physical appearance and her ability to correspond with Counsel for the Administrator at a time when she purportedly was in septic shock and about to undergo emergency surgery undermine the reliability of Respondent's and Dr. VanSchoyck's sworn affidavits.”  ⁹⁵

¶34 The Hearing Board of the IRDC eventually denied Lowery's request for a continuance but allowed her to participate remotely.  ⁹⁶ Lowery did not appear, and the hearing proceeded in her absence. Contrary to Lowery's testimony at the PRT, she was not “defaulted.”  ⁹⁷

¶35 Eventually, the Hearing Board of the IRDC found clear and convincing evidence that Lowery “knowingly and recklessly made a false statement of fact to the [Illinois] Supreme Court” that an Illinois judge “threatened to harm her, which falsely impugned his integrity and which constituted dishonest conduct.”  ⁹⁸ The Hearing Board also found clear and convincing evidence that Lowery “knowingly or recklessly made false statements of fact concerning the qualifications or integrity of the Illinois Supreme Court” and two other judges.  ⁹⁹ In December 2024, the Hearing Board recommended that Lowery be disbarred.  ¹⁰⁰ On appeal, the IRDC's Review Board affirmed.  ¹⁰¹

¶36 To be clear, we draw no conclusions regarding the validity of the professional misconduct violations against Lowery. However, we find it concerning that in its submissions to this Court the Bar made no attempt to demonstrate Lowery's credibility as a witness in this case. Neither the Bar's Complaint nor its Brief-in-chief mentioned Lowery's previous discipline, which was based in part on dishonesty in professional misconduct proceedings. Nor, for that matter, does it appear that the Bar advised the PRT that aspects of Lowery's testimony to the PRT had been found to lack credibility a few months earlier by a sister tribunal in Illinois. The PRT made no specific finding with respect to Lowery's credibility.

¶37 The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is “not to punish a lawyer, but to inquire into and to gauge the lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, with a view to protecting the interest of the public, of the courts[,] and of the legal profession.”  ¹⁰² The Bar would do well to consider this in the fulfillment of its prosecutorial role. Presenting evidence from witnesses lacking credibility is of no assistance to the disciplinary process, especially when witnesses are presented without any attempt to address known credibility issues.

¶38 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Lowery's testimony is not credible. Each allegation of professional misconduct arising from Respondent's representation of Lowery relies, at least in part, on Lowery's testimony. The Bar, therefore, has not produced clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in his representation of Lowery.

II. RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT

A. Respondent's Failure to Cooperate

¶39 Clark filed his grievance against Respondent April 17, 2024. The next month, the Bar sent a letter to Respondent directing him to respond to Clark's grievance within twenty days. Respondent did not respond. In July, the Bar sent a second letter, via certified mail, return receipt requested, directing Respondent to respond in five days. Once again, no response was received. A third letter directing Respondent to submit a response to Clark's grievance and to submit certain IOLTA bank account records, also went out in July. Respondent did not respond to the third letter.  ¹⁰³ The Bar thereafter subpoenaed the requested bank records.  ¹⁰⁴

¶40 Brooks filed her grievance against Respondent September 11, 2024. Five days later, the Bar sent a letter to Respondent advising him that Brooks had filed a grievance and directing Respondent to respond to the grievance within twenty days. No response was received. About six weeks later, the Bar sent a second letter, via certified mail, return receipt requested, directing Respondent to respond in five days. It, too, went ignored.  ¹⁰⁵

¶41 Arce filed his grievance against Respondent December 12, 2024. The day after Christmas, the Bar sent a letter to Respondent advising him that Arce had filed a grievance and directing Respondent to respond to the grievance within twenty days. Respondent did not respond. A second letter, sent via certified mail, return receipt requested, went out in late January. Respondent did not respond.  ¹⁰⁶

¶42 Navarro and Boggs filed their grievance against Respondent February 3, 2025. Just over a week later, the Bar sent a letter to Respondent advising him of the grievance and directing Respondent to respond to the grievance within twenty days. This letter, not unlike the other letters advising him of the grievances filed against him and directing him to respond, went unanswered.  ¹⁰⁷

¶43 Respondent's conduct is subject to discipline under RGDP Rule 5.2, which specifies that “[t]he failure of a lawyer to answer [a grievance] within twenty (20) days after service of the grievance (or recital of facts or allegations), or such further time as may be granted by the [Bar's] General Counsel, shall be grounds for discipline.” However, Respondent's failure to comply with RGDP Rule 5.2 is not a determinative factor in the discipline we impose in this proceeding.

B. Respondent's Conduct During the Trial Proceedings

¶44 Respondent's failure to respond to the grievances and refusal to cooperate with the Bar's investigation notwithstanding, Respondent made a closing statement at the April 21, 2025 hearing in which he “apologized to the Bar”; “acknowledged he failed to properly communicate and respond to clients”; and noted his “shameful conduct.”  ¹⁰⁸ Complainant admits this. “Respondent did appear at the disciplinary hearing ․ [where] Respondent appeared contrite and offered no excuses for his conduct. In closing, he stated that he appreciated the courtesy extended to him by the PRT and apologized to the [Bar].”  ¹⁰⁹ He further “agreed to continue to work with the OBA” to locate and return files, including at least one client's “original documents.”  ¹¹⁰ As of June 2025, Respondent has followed through on this commitment.  ¹¹¹

¶45 We acknowledge and appreciate Respondent's decision to apologize and admit his failure to adequately communicate with his clients. Not every attorney facing disciplinary charges chooses to take responsibility or express regret for their actions. We have taken Respondent's contrition into account when considering appropriate discipline in this case.

C. Respondent's Prior Discipline

¶46 This is not Conrady's first disciplinary proceeding.  ¹¹² On April 3, 2012, this Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law for two years and one day “for shooting up the home of his ex-girlfriend's boyfriend.”  ¹¹³ Although Respondent was reinstated to membership in the Oklahoma Bar in 2017,  ¹¹⁴ we take notice of the prior discipline imposed on Respondent, which the Bar, under RGDP Rule 6.2, relies upon to “enhance discipline” here.  ¹¹⁵

III. RULE 7 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

¶47 During the pendency of the Rule 6 proceeding (SCBD No. 7863) against Respondent, Complainant initiated a summary reciprocal disciplinary proceeding pursuant to RGDP Rule 7.7 (SCBD No. 7940). Rule 7.7(b) requires the Bar notify the Chief Justice “[w]hen a lawyer is the subject of a final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding ․ in any other jurisdiction.” On July 28, 2025, Complainant informed the Chief Justice that Respondent's name had been stricken from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's attorney admission roster after he “entered an appearance while suspended from practicing law in th[at] court” and “failed to respond to multiple orders and communications ․ regarding noncompliance with th[at] court's rules.”  ¹¹⁶

¶48 Per RGDP Rule 7.7(b), this Court ordered Conrady to show cause in writing by August 22 why a final order of discipline should not be made. In the interest of explaining his conduct or by way of mitigating the discipline which may be imposed upon him, the show cause order informed Respondent he was permitted to submit a brief and any evidence, including transcripts of evidence taken during disciplinary proceedings in another jurisdiction, tending to mitigate the severity of discipline by September 5, 2025.  ¹¹⁷ Respondent failed to respond.

¶49 The same show cause order advised Complainant it was permitted to submit a brief and any evidence supporting a recommendation of discipline on or before September 22, 2025. Complainant filed a brief requesting that Respondent be disbarred.  ¹¹⁸ Complainant advises that Respondent failed to notify the Bar of the Tenth Circuit's discipline in violation of RGDP Rule 7.7(a).  ¹¹⁹ Second, Complainant contends that the Tenth Circuit's order disbarring Respondent is prima facie evidence of Respondent's professional misconduct.  ¹²⁰

A. Respondent's Failure to Self-Report

¶50 RGDP Rule 7.7(a) requires “a lawyer licensed in Oklahoma to notify the [Bar's] General Counsel whenever discipline for lawyer misconduct has been imposed upon him/her in another jurisdiction, within twenty (20) days of the final order of discipline, and failure to report shall itself be grounds for discipline.” An order of disbarment by the Tenth Circuit triggers the reporting requirement under Rule 7.7(a).  ¹²¹ There is no evidence Respondent reported his Tenth Circuit disbarment to Complainant.

B. The Tenth Circuit's Prima Facie Evidence Against Respondent

¶51 Pursuant to ORPC Rule 3.4(c), “[a] lawyer shall not ․ knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists ․” ORPC Rule 5.5 likewise prohibits a lawyer from “practic[ing] law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction ․” RGDP Rule 7.7(c) states, “Certified copies of [another jurisdiction's disciplinary] documents shall constitute the charge and shall be prima facie evidence the lawyer committed the acts therein described.”

¶52 Here, a certified copy of the Tenth Circuit's order disbarring Respondent confirms Respondent “failed to respond to multiple orders and communications from the court regarding noncompliance with the court's rules” and “knowingly disobeyed” Tenth Circuit rules by “enter[ing] an appearance while suspended from practicing” in that jurisdiction.  ¹²² This constitutes prima facie evidence Respondent committed professional misconduct pursuant to ORPC Rule 8.4(a).  ¹²³ Thus, Respondent is subject to discipline under RGDP Rule 7.7.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶53 Based on the foregoing, we conclude Respondent has committed professional misconduct as that term is defined in ORPC Rule 8.4(a). Even when allegations are deemed admitted pursuant to RGDP Rule 6.4, we retain our prerogative to determine the appropriate discipline to be imposed in RGDP Rule 6 proceedings.  ¹²⁴ That same prerogative is unaffected in RGDP Rule 7.7 reciprocal disciplinary proceedings.  ¹²⁵

¶54 “[T]he totality of Respondent's conduct warrants disbarment” pursuant to both RGDP Rule 6 and Rule 7.  ¹²⁶ “The possibility of [Respondent] continuing to practice law in our State poses too great a danger to its courts and to its people.”  ¹²⁷

¶55 Respondent James Albert Conrady is therefore disbarred and, pursuant to RGDP Rule 6.16, ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $4,833.99 within ninety days of the effective date of this opinion.

* * *

¶56 No sooner than five (5) years after the effective date of this opinion, Respondent may petition this Court for reinstatement to the practice of law through the procedures set forth in RGDP Rule 11.

RESPONDENT IS DISBARRED AND ORDERED TO PAY COSTS

FOOTNOTES

1.   State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, SCBD No. 7863 (Okla. March 19, 2025).

2.   Order of Immediate Interim Suspension, State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, SCBD No. 7863 (Okla. July 30, 2025).

3.   Report of the Trial Panel at *11.

4.   Id. at *13.

5.   State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, SCBD No. 7940 (Okla. July 28, 2025).

6.   See State ex rel. OBA v. Knight, 2014 OK 71, ¶ 19, 330 P.3d 1216, 1221 (“[T]his Court may combine [a] Rule 6 action with another RGDP action.”).

7.   5 O.S. § 13; RGDP Rule 1.1.

8.   Id.; State ex rel. OBA v. Kruger, 2018 OK 53, ¶ 2, 421 P.3d 306, 309.

9.   State ex rel. OBA v. Boone, 2016 OK 13, ¶¶ 2--3, 367 P.3d 509, 511.

10.   RGDP Rule 6.12(c). RGDP Rule 7.7 requires no such finding.

11.   State ex rel. OBA v. Clark, 2023 OK 27, ¶ 10, 527 P.3d 708, 712.

12.   Report of the Trial Panel at *1.

13.   Id.; see also Gator, LLC v. Clark, No. CJ-2022-117 (Logan Cnty. D. Ct.).

14.   Report of Trial Panel at **1--2.

15.   Id.

16.   Minute Order, Gator, LLC v. Clark, No. CJ-2022-117 (Logan Cnty. D. Ct. Aug. 30, 2022).

17.   Report of the Trial Panel at *11.

18.   Journal Entry Granting TRO in Part, Gator, LLC v. Clark, CJ-2022-117 (Logan Ctny. D. Ct. Dec. 2, 2022). On December 2, 2022, the trial court also entered a minute order staying the proceeding pending mediation and arbitration. Minute Order, Gator, LLC v. Clark, CJ-2022-117 (Logan Cnty. D. Ct. Dec. 2, 2022.)

19.   Gator, LLC v. Clark, No. 120,962, slip op. at **6--9 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 8, 2023).

20.   Id. at *7.

21.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2.

22.   Id.

23.   Compl't’s Ex. 1, vol. 3 at *54.

24.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2.

25.   Order Granting Appl. and Mot. for Order Confirm. Arb. Award, Gator, LLC v. Clark, No. CJ-2022-117 (Logan Cnty. D. Ct. Feb. 2, 2024).

26.   Report of the Trial Panel at *2.

27.   Id.

28.   Order Sheet, Gator, LLC v. Clark, No. 122,025 (Okla. Sept. 30, 2024).

29.   Report of the Trial Panel at *3.

30.   Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-521 (W.D. Okla. June 13, 2023).

31.   Order, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-521 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 2023).

32.   J. of Dismissal, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-521 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 10, 2023).

33.   Report of the Trial Panel at *3.

34.   Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 15, 2023).

35.   Compl't’s Ex. 1, vol. 4 at **44--161.

36.   Report of the Trial Panel at *3.

37.   Order to Show Cause, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. April 2, 2024).

38.   Report of the Trial Panel at **3--4.

39.   Order [Doc. 42], Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. April 10, 2024).

40.   Order [Doc. 43], Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. April 10, 2024).

41.   Minute Sheet of Proceedings at *4, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. May 2, 2024).

42.   Order [Doc. 57] at *17, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. June 12, 2024).

43.   Order [Doc. 58] at *19, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. June 12, 2024).

44.   Order [Doc. 57] & Order [Doc. 58], Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. June 12, 2024).

45.   Report of the Trial Panel at *12.

46.   Order [Doc. 58] at *17, Clark v. Stockton, No. CIV-23-1147 (W.D. Okla. June 12, 2024).

47.   Before the PRT, Clark testified that he paid Respondent roughly $40,000.00 in fees. (Tr. of James Conrady Disciplinary Hearing (Tr.) at 108:18 (April 21, 2025).) Based on Clark's testimony, the PRT found that Clark “received nothing of value for his money” from Conrady's representation. (Report of the Trial Panel at *12.) While the PRT held that Respondent violated ORPC Rule 1.5, the Bar does not argue that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 in his representation of Clark in its Br.-in-chief. (Id.; see also Compl't’s Br.-in-chief.) Thus, we do not consider this unbriefed argument.Conversely, in its Br.-in-chief, the Bar claims Respondent violated Rule 1.15; however, the PRT did not find that Respondent violated Rule 1.15 in his representation of Clark. (See generally Report of the Trial Panel.) We cannot determine by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.15 in his representation of Clark.

48.   Report of the Trial Panel at **5--6.

49.   Id. at *6; see also Tr. at 147:13.

50.   Report of the Trial Panel at *6.

51.   Tr. at 149:20--150:3; see also Docket Sheet, In re Estate of Charles H. Holmes, Deceased, No. PB-2013-56 (McClain Cnty. D. Ct.).

52.   Report of the Trial Panel at *6.

53.   Id.

54.   Id.

55.   Id.

56.   Id.; see also Tr. at 153:19--21.

57.   Report of the Trial Panel at *6.

58.   Id. at *7.

59.   Compl't’s Ex. 8F at *5; see also Tr. at 192:3.

60.   Arce v. Dep't of Wildlife, No. 5:23-CV-722 (W.D. Okla.).

61.   Report of the Trial Panel at *7.

62.   Id.

63.   Id.; see also Vidana v. Amphib. Powersports LLP, No. CJ-2023-1212 (Cleveland Cnty. D. Ct.).

64.   Report of the Trial Panel at *7.

65.   Id.; see also Journal Entry of J., CJ-2023-1212 (Cleveland Ctny. D. Ct. Aug. 6, 2024).

66.   Tr. at 189:2--11.

67.   Id. at 189:23--190:1.

68.   Id. at 191:8--11; see also Compl't’s Ex. 4G at *13.

69.   Compl't’s Ex. 8F at *5; see also Tr. at 235:25--236:10.

70.   Report of the Trial Panel at *7.

71.   Id.

72.   Id.

73.   Id. at **7--8; see also Compl't’s Ex. 1, vol. 8, Tab 5(A) at *9.

74.   Tr. at 202:3--6.

75.   Report of the Trial Panel at *7; see also Tr. at 202:21--203:19; Compl't’s Ex. 5A at *9.

76.   Report of the Trial Panel at *8.

77.   Id. at **8--9.

78.   Tr. at 205:1--23.

79.   Id. Rule 1.15.

80.   RGDP Rule 6.4 provides: “In the event the respondent fails to answer, the charges shall be deemed admitted, except that evidence shall be submitted for the purpose of determining the discipline to be imposed.” Accord Compl't’s Mot. to Deem Allegations Admitted, State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, SCBD No. 7863 (Okla. March 19, 2025). However, “Even when allegations are deemed admitted, we will impose discipline only upon finding that clear and convincing evidence was presented demonstrating the misconduct. Clark, 2023 OK 27, ¶ 10, 527 P.3d at 712; State ex rel. OBA v. Seratt, 2003 OK 22, ¶¶ 44 & 48, 66 P.3d 390, 397 & 398 (declining to impose discipline for violations alleged in one of the complaint's counts--despite a prior finding that, under RGDP Rule 6.4, the allegations of the complaint were deemed admitted).

81.   Compl't’s Verified Compl. and Appl. for an Order of Emerg. Interim Suspension at *7.

82.   Compl't’s Br.-in-chief at **16--17.

83.   Id. at *17.

84.   Id.

85.   Compl't’s Ex. 2 at *1.

86.   State ex rel. OBA v. Lowery, 2023 OK 54, ¶ 16, 531 P.3d 99, 103.

87.   Id. ¶ 33, 531 P.3d at 106.

88.   Tr. at 127:15.

89.   Id. at 127:15--22.

90.   Id. at 130:12--18.

91.   R. & R., In re Lowery, No. 2023PR00060, at *1 (Ill. Att'y Reg. Discip. Comm'n Dec. 12, 2024).

92.   Id. at *3.

93.   Id. at *4.

94.   Id. at *5.

95.   Id.

96.   Id. at *2.

97.   Contra Tr. at 127:21--22.

98.   R. & R., In re Lowery, No. 2023PR00060, at *8.

99.   Id. at *14.

100.   Id. at *27.

101.   R. & R., In re Lowery, No. 2023PR00060, at *30 (Ill. Att'y Reg. Discip. Comm'n Oct. 3, 2025).

102.   State ex rel. OBA v. Bolton, 1995 OK 98, ¶ 14, 904 P.2d 597, 603.

103.   Compl't’s Verified Compl. and Appl. for an Order of Emerg. Interim Suspension at **6--7.

104.   Compl't’s Br.-in-chief at *16.

105.   Compl't’s Verified Compl. and Appl. for an Order of Emerg. Interim Suspension at *10.

106.   Id. at *12.

107.   Compl't’s Verified Compl. and Appl. for an Order of Emerg. Interim Suspension at **13--14.

108.   Report of the Trial Panel at *10.

109.   Compl't’s Br.-in-chief at *27.

110.   Id.

111.   Id.

112.   State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, 2012 OK 29, 275 P.3d 133.

113.   Report of the Trial Panel at *13.

114.   In re Reinstatement of Conrady, 2017 OK 29, 394 P.3d 219.

115.   Compl't’s Notice of Intent to Use Prior Discipline as Enhancement at *1; see also State ex rel. OBA v. Mothershed, 2003 OK 34, ¶ 0, 66 P.3d 420, 421 (“Since Respondent was previously disciplined, this enhances any discipline arising out of the instant matter ․”).

116.   Ex. A to Notice of Discip. Action in Other Jurisdictions at *1, SCBD No. 7940 (Okla. July 28, 2025).

117.   Order, State ex rel. OBA v. Conrady, SCBD No. 7940 (Okla. Aug. 1, 2025).

118.   Compl't’s Br. in Supp. of Recomm. of Discipline, SCBD No. 7940 (Okla. Sept. 22, 2025).

119.   Id. at *4.

120.   Id.

121.   See State ex rel. OBA v. Hyde, 2017 OK 59, ¶¶ 17--18, 397 P.3d 1286, 1290 (imposing discipline under Rule 7 pursuant to five-year suspension from practice in the bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Oklahoma).

122.   Ex. A to Notice of Discip. Action in Other Jurisdictions at *1, SCBD No. 7940 (Okla. July 28, 2025).

123.   State ex rel. OBA v. Rymer, 2008 OK 50, ¶ 4, 187 P.3d 725, 726.

124.   Clark, 2023 OK 27, ¶ 10, 527 P.3d at 712.

125.   Knight, 2014 OK 71, ¶ 14, 330 P.3d at 1221 (“[I]t is within this Court's discretion to visit the same discipline as that imposed in the other jurisdiction or one of greater or lesser severity.”).

126.   E.g., State ex rel. OBA v. Mortenson, 2023 OK 32, ¶ 0, 527 P.3d 724, 728.

127.   Kruger, 2018 OK 53, ¶ 27, 421 P.3d at 314.

JETT, J:

ALL JUSTICES CONCUR