STATE EX REL OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GIES (2025)

Facts and Procedural History

¶1 On the evening of March 7, 2024, Cassity B. Gies and her husband traveled from Oklahoma City to Tulsa for a concert, leaving their four-year-old child with a relative. The couple had planned to collect their child afterward and return home that night. During the evening, both consumed alcohol, and tensions escalated. At one point, her husband allegedly raised his arm in a threatening manner, causing Gies to feel physically intimidated. After retrieving their child, the couple stopped at a restaurant for food, leaving the child unattended in the vehicle. While inside, Gies's husband allegedly threatened physical violence, prompting Gies to leave with the child while he remained inside the establishment.

¶2 Shortly thereafter, Gies struck a curb while traveling to a hotel, flattening both driver's side tires and disabling the vehicle. Officer Justin Wolzen of the Tulsa Police Department arrived on the scene and detected the odor of alcohol in the car and on Gies. He also noted she had slurred speech and was unsteady on her feet. Although Gies cooperated with field sobriety tests, she refused to submit to a breath test. Gies did not inform law enforcement of the escalating domestic situation. She was arrested and subsequently charged in Tulsa County Case No. CF-2024-1044 with one felony count of child endangerment under 21 O.S.2021, § 852.1, and one misdemeanor count of driving under the influence pursuant to 47 O.S.2021, § 11-902(A)(2).

¶3 On October 7, 2024, Gies entered a no contest plea to both charges and received a three-year deferred sentence with supervised probation. As part of her probation conditions, she was prohibited from entering bars, liquor stores, or any establishment restricted to patrons over the age of 21.

¶4 On October 25, 2024, the Oklahoma Bar Association submitted a certified copy of the Order of Deferred Sentence filed in the underlying criminal case. Pursuant to Rule 7.2 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings,  ¹ a formal disciplinary case was opened. On February 10, 2025, we issued an order directing Gies to show cause why she should not be immediately suspended from the practice of law pending resolution of the disciplinary action. After reviewing her response, we found good cause under Rule 7.3 to decline interim suspension. The matter was then referred to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal for a hearing to determine the appropriate level of discipline, if any.

¶5 On January 5, 2025, Gies and a friend visited two bars in Oklahoma City, where she consumed a significant amount of alcohol.  ² Gies later testified that she had little memory of what occurred after they left the first drinking establishment. The pair went to a second location and, upon leaving, arranged transportation through a ride service. During the ride, a dispute reportedly arose over the driver's chosen route, leading one of the women to call 911. The driver pulled into a business parking lot, where Oklahoma City police officers responded. Although Gies claimed to have no recollection of the incident, body camera footage showed her visibly intoxicated and acting belligerently toward officers. Both women were arrested for public intoxication. Gies continued to display signs of severe intoxication after being transported to the Oklahoma County Jail. During booking, she identified herself as an attorney and made disparaging comments to detention staff. Her arrest was reported on websites that publish public booking records and identified her as a member of the OBA. The incident also attracted attention on social media, where users highlighted both the arrest and her professional status.

¶6 After conducting a hearing, the PRT issued its report on May 30, 2025. It concluded that Gies's nolo contendere pleas to the criminal charges in CF-2024-1044, combined with her subsequent arrest for public intoxication while on probation, violated Rule 8.4 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct ³ and RGDP Rule 1.3. The panel recommended a public censure, along with maintaining sobriety, participation in Lawyers Helping Lawyers, and ongoing therapy through the remainder of her deferred sentence.

Standard of Review

¶7 This Court retains the sole authority to determine whether misconduct has occurred and, if so, to impose appropriate discipline, pursuant to our exclusive original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Woodward, 2022 OK 72, ¶ 10, 522 P.3d 515, 518. Factual and legal determinations of the PRT are not binding on us, and any recommendations are merely advisory. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Drummond, 2017 OK 24, ¶ 17, 393 P.3d 207, 214. Our role in attorney disciplinary proceedings is not to exact punishment, but to evaluate the lawyer's continued fitness to practice law and to ensure protection of the public and the integrity of Oklahoma's legal profession. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Willis, 2022 OK 15, ¶ 8, 504 P.3d 1141, 1146.

Analysis

Gies's actions amounted to professional misconduct under the ORCP and RGDP.

¶8 Rule 7 establishes a summary process for initiating disciplinary action when an attorney “has been convicted or has tendered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to a deferred sentence plea agreement in any jurisdiction of a crime which demonstrates such lawyer's unfitness to practice law.” RGDP Rule 7.1. The process is triggered by submission of certified copies of the conviction or deferred judgment to the Chief Justice. RGDP Rule 7.2. In proceedings brought under Rule 7, a deferred sentence constitutes conclusive evidence that the attorney committed the underlying criminal conduct. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Dunivan, 2018 OK 101, ¶ 15, 432 P.3d 1056. As in all attorney disciplinary proceedings, our review of a Rule 7 matter is conducted de novo. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Hart, 2014 OK 96, ¶ 6, 339 P.3d 895, 898. In such cases, we are tasked with resolving two fundamental questions: (1) whether the attorney's conviction or deferred sentence reflects a lack of fitness to practice law, and if so, (2) what level of discipline is warranted in light of the full record. Id. ¶ 8, 339 P.3d at 898.

¶9 A criminal conviction or deferred sentence, standing alone, does not establish a violation of the ethical rules; rather, it is the nature and circumstances of the underlying offense that determine whether the attorney's conduct fails to meet professional standards. Willis, ¶ 23, 504 P.3d at 1151; see also State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Cooley, 2013 OK 42, ¶ 12, 304 P.3d 453, 456 (explaining that every criminal conviction does not facially demonstrate the lawyer's unfitness to practice law); to State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Aston, 2003 OK 101, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 676, 678 (recognizing fitness practice law under Rule 8.4(b) “encompasses more than an absence of detriment to specific clients”). Our threshold inquiry under Rule 7 is whether the specific criminal conduct at issue reflects adversely on the attorney's “honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer,” and if so, what disciplinary sanction is appropriate. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Conrady, 2012 OK 29, ¶¶ 7, 11, 275 P.3d 133, 136-37; Willis, ¶¶ 23, 26, 504 P.3d at 1151-52. In considering whether an attorney's acts or omissions carry ethical consequences, we look to ORPC Rule 8.4, which outlines the conduct that may subject a lawyer to disciplinary measures.  ⁴ Under Rule 8.4(b), we consider it professional misconduct when a lawyer enters a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal act which casts doubt on their honesty, integrity, or overall suitability to practice law. Conrady, ¶ 7, 275 P.3d at 136. “Entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendre to a felony charge has routinely been viewed by this Court as satisfactory evidence of professional misconduct.” Id. ¶ 8, 275 P.3d at 136.

¶10 We have previously held that even a single, isolated instance of criminal conduct--absent any harm to a client--may still violate Rule 8.4(b) when it places the physical safety of others at risk. For example, in State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Bethea, 2024 OK 33, ¶¶ 23-24, 549 P.3d 1230, 1238--39, the Court found a Rule 8.4(b) violation based on a single misdemeanor DUI that resulted in injuries to multiple people, emphasizing that such conduct reflects adversely on the attorney's fitness to practice law. Perhaps the disciplinary case most factually analogous to the present matter was considered by this Court in State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Shahan, 2017 OK 10, 390 P.3d 254. Mr. Shahan entered no contest/guilty pleas in two separate cases arising just months apart--one for misdemeanor public intoxication, and the other for misdemeanor driving under the influence and leaving the scene of a collision involving property damage.  ⁵ Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 390 P.3d at 255. Although the convictions did not affect any clients, we nevertheless found a Rule 8.4(b) violation due to the adverse impact of Shahan's criminal transgressions on the legal profession. Id. ¶ 27, 390 P.3d at 259. See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Salters, 146 Ohio St.3d 1, 50 N.E.3d 546, 546-47 (2016) (finding attorney's guilty pleas to felony trespassing, and misdemeanor charges of driving while intoxicated and child endangerment established violations of Rule 8.4).

¶11 The facts here are no less serious. Gies pleaded nolo contendere to the felony charge of child endangerment and the misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence. Although these criminal offenses neither involve client representation nor arise directly from the practice of law, the felony charge of child endangerment reflects negatively on Gies's fitness as an attorney. Both charges together clearly constitute violations of ORPC Rule 8.4 and RGDP Rule 1.3.  ⁶ Such a conclusion is consistent with our prior decisions and those of other jurisdictions. Additionally, Gies's subsequent arrest for public intoxication and the accompanying behavior brought discredit to our profession and constitutes a violation of RGDP Rule 1.3.  ⁷

Gies's professional misconduct warrants issuing a six-month suspension.

¶12 Considering the totality of the evidence presented at the PRT hearing, our next inquiry concerns the appropriate level of discipline. While precedent offers useful guidance in calibrating attorney discipline, the ultimate determination necessarily turns on the unique facts and circumstances of each case. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Townsend, 2012 OK 44, ¶¶ 31--32, 277 P.3d 1269, 1279--80. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not punishment, but rather the protection of the public and the preservation of confidence in both the judiciary and the legal profession. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Albert, 2007 OK 31, ¶ 11, 163 P.3d 527, 532--33. In addition, consideration must be given to the deterrent effect of the sanction upon the respondent attorney. Conrady, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d at 139. In determining the appropriate measure of professional accountability, we examine the attorney's complete record of practice alongside this Court's precedent addressing comparable misconduct. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Kinsey, 2009 OK 31, ¶ 16, 212 P.3d 1186, 1192. We likewise consider any aggravating or mitigating factors that may aid in identifying the proper corrective action. Id.

¶13 To determine the appropriate level of discipline, careful consideration of the mitigating evidence presented to the PRT is warranted. First, Gies has undertaken meaningful steps to confront the personal and emotional difficulties that contributed to her misconduct. She has participated in therapy with a licensed counselor and voluntarily attended an intensive, week-long residential workshop in Scottsdale, Arizona. Second, according to Gies's credible testimony, she was subjected to a pattern of physical, verbal, and emotional abuse throughout her recent marriage. She further testified that verbal abuse and threatening behavior occurred on the night of her DUI and child endangerment arrest and were a substantial contributing factor in her decision to drive while intoxicated.  ⁸ The marriage was terminated by a decree of dissolution entered on March 4, 2025. By finalizing her divorce, Gies removed herself from the volatile relationship and has since reached a more stable and constructive mental and emotional state. Third, Gies expressed genuine remorse for the conduct underlying her first arrest and conveyed sincere regret for her belligerence during the public intoxication incident. Fourth, there is no evidence Gies's actions caused harm to clients, financial or otherwise, and she has no prior disciplinary record. Finally, Gies was candid and cooperative with the OBA throughout the proceedings, reflecting her acceptance of responsibility and commitment to ensuring such behavior is not repeated. These factors, taken together, weigh in favor of mitigation.

¶14 In considering the appropriate discipline for Attorney Gies, the Court is guided by prior cases involving alcohol-related misconduct. For example, in State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Bethea, ¶ 2, 549 P.3d at 1232, the respondent attorney pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor count of driving under the influence and received a three-year deferred sentence.  ⁹ After the OBA initiated a Rule 7 case by filing a notice of the order deferring judgment, we issued an order immediately suspending Bethea pending resolution of his disciplinary proceeding. Id. ¶ 3, 549 P.3d at 1232-33. Bethea was suspended on an interim basis for nearly a year until we issued an opinion finding Bethea should receive a one-year suspension with credit for the time already served. Bethea proactively sought help from Lawyers Helping Lawyers and a professional counselor following his arrest. Id. ¶¶ 10 -11. He also took accountability and expressed genuine remorse for his conduct and the harm it caused. Id. Notably, as here, no client matters were adversely affected by his misconduct. Id.

¶15 As noted previously, in State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Shahan, the respondent attorney pled guilty to driving under the influence, and no contest to leaving the scene of a non-injury accident resulting in property damage. Shahan, ¶ 2, 390 P.3d at 255, On the same day, Shahan pleaded guilty to a charge of public intoxication he had received just three months earlier.  ¹⁰ The OBA initiated a Rule 7 proceeding, and this Court imposed an interim suspension while the disciplinary case was pending. At the PRT hearing, Shahan presented evidence that he had taken substantial steps to prevent future alcohol-related incidents, including attending AA meetings, participating in the Lawyers Helping Lawyers group, and volunteering in community projects focused on alcohol abuse. Before these alcohol-related arrests and convictions, Shahan had no prior disciplinary history. In our final opinion, we lifted Shahan's interim suspension and imposed a public censure for his violation of professional ethics standards. Id. ¶ 28, 390 P.3d at 259. See also State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Hunt, 2017 OK 28, ¶¶ 2, 10, 394 P.3d 216, 217, 219 (attorney pled guilty to felony DUI after plea in a separate case for misdemeanor DUI, and after being suspended on interim basis, we lifted the suspension and imposed public reprimand); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. McMillen, 2017 OK 26, ¶¶ 2-3, 10, 393 P.3d 219, 220-21, 222 (attorney's guilty pleas pursuant to plea agreements to two incidents related to driving under the influence (DUI), combined with steps to seek treatment and counseling, warranted a public censure).

Conclusion

¶16 In Bethea, Shahan, Hunt and McMillen, the attorneys were each placed on an interim suspension during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. However, Gies has not been suspended in this case. Taken together, Gies's no-contest pleas to felony child endangerment and misdemeanor DUI, along with her subsequent arrest for public intoxication, raise serious concerns. These criminal incidents also reflect poorly on the integrity of the legal profession. Yet, the discipline imposed should reflect her substantial efforts at rehabilitation, her genuine remorse, and an absence of harm to clients. In line with our prior decisions, and given the unique circumstances in this case, we conclude that a six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction. Gies shall be suspended immediately and shall cease practicing law in any capacity. Gies's six-month suspension period shall commence once she has withdrawn from all pending matters and filed an affidavit as required in RGDP Rule 9.1.

¶17 Respondent Gies is further ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings in the amount of $3,027.28, as set forth in OBA's Application to Assess Costs. This sum shall be paid within one-year of the date this opinion becomes final.

RESPONDENT SUSPENDED SIX MONTHS AND COSTS IMPOSED

FOOTNOTES

1.   5 O.S.2021, ch. 1, app. 1-A.

2.   As noted above, under the terms and conditions of Gies's court ordered probation, she was prohibited from being in any “bars, liquor stores, or any area of an establishment that is designated for persons over the age of twenty-one (21) due to the sale and/or consumption of alcohol.” OBA Hearing Exhibits, Ex. 2, p. 009.

3.   5 O.S.2021, ch. 1, app. 3-A.

4.   5 O.S.2011, ch. 1, app. 3-A. Rule 8.4 provides:It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

5.   In Shahan, the accident occurred when the attorney crashed into a public utility pole, with no collision involving another vehicle and no resulting injury to third parties. Id. Mr. Shahan pleaded guilty to the public intoxication and DUI charges, but no contest to the charge of leaving the scene of a collision involving property damage. Id.

6.   Rule 1.3 reads as follows:The commission by any lawyer of any act contrary to prescribed standards of conduct, whether in the course of his professional capacity, or otherwise, which act would reasonably be found to bring discredit upon the legal profession, shall be grounds for disciplinary action, whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, or a crime at all. Conviction in a criminal proceeding is not a condition precedent to the imposition of discipline.

7.   At the time of the PRT hearing, the public intoxication charge remained pending and unresolved.

8.   Although Gies did not disclose the mistreatment to arresting officers, she explained that her silence stemmed from fear that police would place her minor son in state custody rather than in the care of his father.

9.   Bethea was originally charged with two felonies: (1) leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, and (2) driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.

10.   Notably, prior to his arrest for public intoxication, Shahan made a reprehensible remark to a female bartender at the establishment. Id. ¶ 6, 390 P.3d at 256.

GURICH, J.

CONCUR: C.J., ROWE, V.C.J., KUEHN, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, DARBY, JETT, JJ. CONCUR IN PART, DISSENT IN PART: KANE, J.