OBI HOLDING COMPANY v. SCHULTZ BUTZBACH (2025)

OPINION

BACKGROUND

¶1 Shaneese Schultz-Butzbach (“Employee”) claimed that her knee was injured at work. She timely filed a CC-Form 3 and filed a Form 9 Request for Hearing seeking medical and indemnity benefits under the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act.  ¹ OBI Holding Company (“Employer”) denied her claim, claiming she did not suffer an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Upon an order by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Employee's knee was examined by Dr. Kevin Hargrove. Dr. Hargrove opined that Employee's knee pain was unrelated to the work injury she described but stemmed from a preexisting knee issue.

¶2 After six months passed, during which Employee was not seen by Dr. Hargrove and no further pleadings were filed or hearings held, Employer filed for dismissal of the case.  ² Employer moved to dismiss Employee's claim pursuant to 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4),  ³ arguing Employee failed to receive or seek benefits, including medical treatment, for a period of six months.

¶3 Relying on White v. 918 Construction, 2023 OK CIV APP 2, 524 P.3d 502, ALJ denied Employer's motion to dismiss holding Employee had satisfied subsection (a) of § 69(A)(4). Employer appealed ALJ's decision to the Commission asserting ALJ's Order was contrary to law and against the clear weight of the evidence. The Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”) affirmed ALJ's Order and Employer subsequently sought review by this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4 Title 85A O.S. § 78(C) prescribes the standard of review for any appeal arising out of the Commission. This Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the judgment of the Commission only if it was:

1. In violation of constitutional provisions;

2. In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission;

3. Made on unlawful procedure;

4. Affected by other error of law;

5. Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence;

6. Arbitrary and capricious;

7. Procured by fraud; or

8. Missing findings of facts on issues essential to the decision.

85A O.S. § 78(C). The issue presented is one of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which we review de novo. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Paredes, 2023 OK 42, ¶ 3, 528 P.3d 772, 774. De novo review involves a plenary, independent, and non-deferential examination of the issues presented. Benedetti v. Cimarex Energy Co., 2018 OK 21, ¶ 5, 415 P.3d 43, 45.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Employer disagrees with ALJ and Commission's interpretation of 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4). Title 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) provides:

If a claim for benefits has been timely filed under paragraph 1 4 of this subsection and the employee does not:

a. make a good-faith request for a hearing to resolve a dispute regarding the right to receive benefits, including medical treatment, under this title within six (6) months of the date the claim is filed, or

b. receive or seek benefits, including medical treatment, under this title for a period of six (6) months, then on motion by the employer, the claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.

ALJ and Commission determined that because Employee requested a hearing within six months of the date her claim was filed, in satisfaction of subsection (a), inquiry into whether she received or sought benefits in satisfaction of subsection (b) was not necessary. ALJ and Commission relied on White v. 918 Construction, 2023 OK CIV APP 2, 524 P.3d 502toreach the conclusion that Employee only needed to satisfy (a) to avoid dismissal.

¶6 Employer argues any reliance on White is flawed as applied to the facts of this case.  ⁵ Specifically, Employer posits § 69(A)(4) delineates two distinct time periods in which an employee must act to avoid dismissal of her claim--that satisfaction of subsection (a) does not bar dismissal indefinitely because subsection (b) must be continuously satisfied for ongoing periods of six months. Employer argues the purpose of § 69(A)(4) is to ensure a claim is actively pursued, and if a claim could indefinitely avoid dismissal by filing a request for hearing within six months from the date the claim is filed, the purpose behind § 69(A)(4) would be thwarted. In response, Employee contends ALJ and Commission correctly relied on White, arguing satisfaction of § 69(A)(4)(b) is not necessary once § 69(A)(4)(a) is satisfied.  ⁶ Employee additionally contends § 69(A)(4) is a special law violative of Article 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

¶7 We agree with Employer that reliance on White is misguided as COCA's analysis is inapplicable to the facts before us. White strictly focused on the immediate six month time period following the filing of the CC-Form 3 which is not at issue here.

¶8 Whether Commission's order is contrary to 85(A) O.S. § 69(A)(4) requires statutory interpretation. “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and purpose as expressed by the statutory language.” Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 2018 OK 23, ¶ 17, 415 P.3d 521, 528. “It is presumed that the Legislature has expressed its intent in a statute's language and that it intended what it so expressed.” Id. “Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.” Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 882, 886. “Only where legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of a statute, as in cases of ambiguity, are rules of statutory interpretation employed.” Odom, ¶ 18, 415 P.3d at 528. The test for ambiguity in a statute is whether the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 2014 OK 95, ¶ 33, 341 P.3d 56, 64-65. Where a statute is ambiguous, or its meaning uncertain, it is to be given a reasonable construction, one that will avoid absurd consequences if this can be done without violating legislative intent. Odom, ¶ 18, 415 P.3d at 528.

I. Under 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4), Employee's failure to seek or request benefits for a period of six months triggered dismissal.

¶9 To ascertain legislative intent, we begin with the text. Section 69(A)(4) states:

If a claim for benefits has been timely filed under paragraph 1 of this subsection and the employee does not:

a. make a good-faith request for a hearing to resolve a dispute regarding the right to receive benefits, including medical treatment, under this title within six (6) months of the date the claim is filed, or

b. receive or seek benefits, including medical treatment, under this title for a period of six (6) months,

then on motion by the employer, the claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.

85(A) O.S. § 69(A)(4) (emphasis added). The text highlights two distinct time periods: (1) within six months of the date the claim is filed, and (2) for a period of six months. If subsection (a) is not satisfied within six months of the date the claim is filed, subsection (b) must be satisfied during the requisite six months to avoid dismissal. If subsection (a) is satisfied--or is inapplicable--subsection (b) requires that an employee must receive or seek benefits for a period of six months. In other words, subsection (b) remains operative after the initial six months outlined in subsection (a) have passed. The subsequent six months outlined in subsection (b) requires the employee to receive or seek benefits during any period of six months.

¶10 Looking at § 69 in its entirety, the statute requires employees to not only timely file their claims, but also to actively pursue their claims. See 85A O.S. § 69(A)(1)-(3).  ⁷ In Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Paredes, we analyzed 85A O.S. § 69, wherein we noted that “persons seeking benefits must file their claim for benefits within one to three years, depending on the type of underlying injury or illness.” 2023 OK 42, ¶ 16, 528 P.3d 772, 779. We further noted, after a claim is filed, it “must be pursued in a diligent manner” ․ because a filed claim will be dismissed if not actively pursued after 6 months.” Id. ¶ 12.

¶11 To read § 69(A)(4) to mean satisfaction of subsection (a) immunizes an employee from future dismissal would be contrary to the statute's clear purpose of preventing stale or inactive claims. Both subsections (a) and (b) are independent conditions--each with distinct timing--that serve the statute's purpose. For example, even if subsection (a) is satisfied--or does not apply because there is no dispute--the statute requires compliance with subsection (b) to avoid dismissal. Satisfaction of subsection (a) does not negate compliance with subsection (b); rather, once subsection (a) is met, the statute imposes an ongoing obligation under subsection (b). Our interpretation gives effect to both subsections: subsection (a) ensures a prompt request for a hearing to resolve an existing dispute regarding the right to receive benefits, while subsection (b) requires the employee's continued diligence. Under the plain language of the statute, failure to receive or seek benefits for a period of six months subjects a claim to dismissal.

¶12 Here, Employee requested a hearing within six months following the filing of her claim in satisfaction of subsection (a). But Employee did not receive or seek medical benefits for nine months following her last visit with Dr. Hargrove. Employee's failure to receive or seek medical benefits for a period of six months triggered Employer's right to move for dismissal. To find otherwise would undermine the manifest intent of § 69(A)(4): to encourage employees to actively pursue their claims.

¶13 We hold 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) requires employees to actively pursue their claims by receiving or seeking benefits for a period of six months throughout the life of their claims. Employee's failure to receive or seek benefits for a period of six months triggered Employer's right to move for dismissal of the claim. The Commission's order affirming ALJ's denial of Employer's motion to dismiss was contrary to law. Accordingly, the Commission's order is vacated and Employer's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

II. Title 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is constitutionally firm.

¶14 Employee asserts that § 69(A)(4) is a special law violative of Article 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Employee contends § 69(A)(4) allows Employer unlimited time to prepare its case but permits Employee only six months to prepare her case after her case is filed. Employee asserts § 69(A)(4)’s “asymmetry” extinguishes her “property right.”  ⁸

¶15 When considering the constitutionality of a statute, courts are guided by well-established principles and a heavy burden is placed upon those challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Hill v. Am. Med. Response, 2018 OK 57, ¶ 8, 423 P.3d 1119, 1124. All presumptions are to be indulged in favor of a statute's constitutionality. Id. A legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld by this Court unless it is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution. Id.

A. Title 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is not a special law in violation of Article 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

¶16 A statute is considered a “special law” where part of an entire class of similarly affected persons is separated for different treatment. Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 OK 98, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 861, 868. This Court has previously held that,

The terms of art. 5, § 46 command that court procedure be symmetrical and apply equally across the board for an entire class of similarly situated persons or things. In a special laws attack under art. 5, § 46, the only issue to be resolved is whether a statute upon a subject enumerated in the constitutional provision targets for different treatment less than an entire class of similarly situated persons or things. The test is whether the provision fits into the structured regime of established procedure as part of a symmetrical whole. If an enactment injects asymmetry, the § 46 interdiction of special law has been offended.

Montgomery v. Potter, 2014 OK 118, ¶ 6, 341 P.3d 660, 661-62 (emphasis in original). Article 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits the enactment of special laws on 28 enumerated subjects.  ⁹ Legislation setting temporal restrictions for pursuing a claim is not one of those enumerated subjects, nor does Employee point to one in her brief. Further, even if § 69(A)(4) fell under one of the enumerated subjects, § 69(A)(4) does not “target[ ] for different treatment less than an entire class of similarly situated persons or things,” and therefore cannot be classified as a special law. Id.

¶17 Employee asserts § 69(A)(4) provides asymmetry between an employee and employer, such that an employer has unlimited time to prepare its case, but an employee only has six months once her claim is initiated. Employee's argument misses the mark--injured employees and employers are different classes and are not similarly affected persons treated differently. The question of whether a statute is a special law focuses on the treatment of one class of persons, not two different classes of persons. For example, this Court determined in Graham v. D & K Oilfield Services, Inc., 2017 OK 72, ¶ 25, 404 P.3d 863, 872 that the pertinent statute was a special law because it altered the benefits for hernias but not other types of injuries within the entire class of injured employees.

¶18 Here, the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act, including § 69(A)(4), applies to all injured employees after they have filed their claim. Section 69(A)(4) does not target injured employees for different treatment; rather, the Legislature enacted § 69(A)(4) to ensure all injured employees actively pursue their claims once initiated. Accordingly, we hold that 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is not a special law.  ¹⁰

B. Title 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is not a forfeiture provision and does not deprive Employee of due process.

¶19 Employee asserts application of 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is an unconstitutional attempt to “extinguish [a property right] without rational basis.  ¹¹ In other words, Employee argues § 69(A)(4) forfeits her right to a remedy in violation of Article 2, § 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Article 2, § 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides, “The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.” Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6. This provision embodies three distinct constitutional guarantees: (1) access to the courts; (2) right-to-a-remedy for every wrong and every injury to person, property, or reputation; and (3) prohibition on the sale or denial of justice. Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2017 OK 78, ¶ 5, 404 P.3d 44, 46.

¶20 In Gibby, employee was injured at work and was provided temporary total disability and medical benefits. Id. ¶ 2, 404 P.3d at 46. Employee subsequently sought permanent partial disability, but his employer asserted that section 57 of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act prohibited employee from receiving any further workers’ compensation benefits because he had missed two or more scheduled medical appointments without a valid excuse or notice to his employer. Id. After balancing the rights of employers and employees, we determined section 57 forfeited all workers’ compensation benefits when an injured employee missed two or more medical appointments. Id. ¶ 10, 404 P.3d at 47. We struck section 57 as unconstitutional because “the forfeiture provision tip[ped] the delicate balance achieved in the Grand Bargain too far in favor of employers and therefore it fail[ed] to provide an adequate substitute remedy to injured workers as required by the constitutional mandate of Article II, section 6.” Id. ¶ 13.

¶21 Here, Employee is not unconstitutionally deprived of her remedy. Rather, § 69(A)(4) requires Employee to actively pursue her claim by receiving or seeking benefits for a period of six months. In fact, all § 69(A)(4) requires of Employee is that she receive or seek benefits for a period of six months to keep her claim alive. The requirement that Employee receive or seek benefits for a period of six months is not a penalty placed upon her, but rather encourages her to diligently pursue her claim and provides notice to Employer that the claim is ongoing. Unlike the statute in Gibby, § 69(A)(4) does not tip “the delicate balance achieved in the Grand Bargain too far in favor of employers ․” because Employee had ample opportunity to pursue her claim in satisfaction of subsection (b). Gibby, ¶ 13, 404 P.3d at 47.

¶22 Lastly, the statute's requirement that Employee receive or seek benefits for a period of six months does not deprive Employee of due process of law. Article 2, § 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7. Although the Legislature may “alter private contractual rights of employers and employees when it properly exercises its police power in creating a particular workers’ compensation law,” the Legislature may not deprive such rights, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Paredes, 2023 OK 42, ¶ 16, 528 P.3d 772, 774. When the police power of the Oklahoma Legislature is challenged, a court must examine whether legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and if the challenged legislation reasonably advances that interest. Hill v. Am. Med. Response, 2018 OK 57, ¶ 50, 423 P.3d 1119.

¶23 The requirement that an employee receive or seek benefits for a period of six months bears a rational relationship to the State's legitimate interest of efficient resolution of workers’ compensation claims. The requirement reasonably advances the State's interest by ensuring that employees diligently pursue their claims. Accordingly, we agree with Employer that § 69(A)(4)’s requirement reasonably advances the State's interest of efficient resolution of workers’ compensations claims.

CONCLUSION

¶24 Employer filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4)(b) after Employee did not receive or seek benefits for a period longer than six months. We hold 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) requires employees to actively pursue their claims by receiving or seeking benefits for a period of six months throughout the life of their claims. Employee's failure to receive or seek benefits for a period of six months triggered Employer's right to move for dismissal of the claim. The Commission's holding affirming ALJ's denial of Employer's motion to dismiss was contrary to law. Accordingly, the Commission's order is vacated and Employer's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

¶25 Furthermore, Employee's arguments that § 69(A)(4) is unconstitutional fail. The statute does not violate Article 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution because it does not treat injured employees differently. The statute is also not a forfeiture provision, as it does not take away Employee's right to pursue her claim. Additionally, the statute does not violate due process, since it reasonably advances the State's interest of efficient resolution of workers’ compensations claims. Accordingly, we hold 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is constitutionally firm.

MATTER PREVIOUSLY RETAINED FOR DISPOSITION; ORDER OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION VACATED; MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Title 85A O.S. §§ 1-126.

2.   It is undisputed that Employee's last doctor visit within the Workers’ Compensation system was March 15, 2023. According to the record, Employee allegedly sought private medical treatment, during which she did not file any pleadings before the Commission.

3.   See infra ¶ 5.

4.   Paragraph 1 of 85A O.S. § 69(A) provides:“A claim for benefits under this act, other than an occupational disease, shall be barred unless it is filed with the Workers’ Compensation Commission within one (1) year from the date of the injury or, if the employee has received benefits under this title for the injury, six (6) months from the date of the last issuance of such benefits. For purposes of this section, the date of the injury shall be defined as the date an injury is caused by an accident as set forth in paragraph 9 of Section 2 of this title.”

5.   Although we are not bound by the decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals, Arulkumar v. Arulkumar, 2022 OK 90, ¶ 21, n.10, 521 P.3d 131, we address White because it is the seminal case relied upon by Commission, ALJ, and both parties. In White, the employee filed a CC Form-3, alleging he suffered a work-related injury while working for his employer. White, ¶ 2, 524 P.3d 502. Seven months later, employer moved to dismiss pursuant to 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) for employee's failure to request a hearing or seek or receive benefits within six months of filing his Form 3. Id. The Court of Civil Appeals (“COCA”) interpreted § 69(A)(4) to mean if an employee satisfies either subsection (a) or subsection (b) of § 69(A)(4) during the six months after the filing of a claim, his claim will not be dismissed. More specifically, COCA stated:[Title 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4)] contains a clear legislative edict that a workers’ compensation claim will not be subjected to dismissal with prejudice if, during the six (6) months following the filing of a claim, the employee satisfies either subsection (a) or subsection (b) of § 69(A)(4).Id., ¶ 4, 524 P.3d at 504. In line with its interpretation, COCA determined that although employee did not satisfy subsection (a), employee “sought benefits” by actively participating in good faith discovery in satisfaction of subsection (b) and reversed the Commission's dismissal. Id. ¶ 8, 524 P.3d at 505.

6.   It is undisputed that Employee satisfied § 69(A)(4)(a).

7.   Title 69 O.S. § 69(A)(1)-(3) provides:A. Time for Filing.1. A claim for benefits under this act, other than an occupational disease, shall be barred unless it is filed with the Workers’ Compensation Commission within one (1) year from the date of the injury or, if the employee has received benefits under this title for the injury, six (6) months from the date of the last issuance of such benefits. For purposes of this section, the date of the injury shall be defined as the date an injury is caused by an accident as set forth in paragraph 9 of Section 2 of this title.2. a. A claim for compensation for disability on account of injury which is either an occupational disease or occupational infection shall be barred unless filed with the Commission within two (2) years from the date of the last injurious exposure to the hazards of the disease or infection.b. A claim for compensation for disability on account of silicosis or asbestosis shall be filed with the Commission within one (1) year after the time of disablement, and the disablement shall occur within three (3) years from the date of the last injurious exposure to the hazard of silicosis or asbestosis.c. A claim for compensation for disability on account of a disease condition caused by exposure to X-rays, radioactive substances, or ionizing radiation only shall be filed with the Commission within two (2) years from the date the condition is made known to an employee following examination and diagnosis by a medical doctor.3. A claim for compensation on account of death shall be barred unless filed with the Commission within two (2) years of the date of such a death.

8.   Employee's Response Brief, at 1.

9.   The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:The creation, extension, or impairing of liens;Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts;Changing the names of persons or places;Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining of roads, highways, streets, or alleys;Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other state;Vacating roads, town plats, streets, or alleys;Relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned by the State;Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children;Locating or changing county seats;Incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing their charters;For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting;Granting divorces;Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts;Changing the law of descent or succession;Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals, or providing or changing the methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcement of judgments or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate;Regulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices of the peace, or constables;Regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes;Fixing the rate of interest;Affecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability;Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid into the treasury;Exempting property from taxation;Declaring any named person of age;Extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from due performance of his official duties, or his securities from liability;Giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds;Summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries;For limitation of civil or criminal actions;For incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements;Providing for change of venue in civil and criminal cases.Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46.

10.   Employee does not present argument that 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4) is a special law in violation of Article 5, § 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution, and therefore will not be addressed.

11.   Employee's Response Brief, at 1.

ROWE, C.J.:

Rowe, C.J., Kuehn, V.C.J., Edmondson, Gurich, Darby, Kane and Jett, JJ., concur. Combs, J., dissents. Winchester, J., not participating.