ROCKET PROPERTIES LLC v. THE CITY OF TULSA (2024)

¶1 Defendant, City of Tulsa [City] appeals a jury verdict of $1,895,000.00 in this inverse condemnation case on the grounds Plaintiff, Rocket Properties, LLC [Rocket], failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and thus, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Further, Rocket counter-appeals the trial court's rulings of its award to Rocket of prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

¶2 Since 2003, Rocket has owned 4.5 acres of unplatted, undeveloped property located in a low-lying area at 9415 South Yale Avenue, in Tulsa, Oklahoma. A portion of Rocket's bowl-shaped property has been located within a Tulsa Regulatory Flood Plain (codified in Title 11A of Tulsa City Ordinances) since 1978 when areas of flood risk were identified, mapped and adopted by City's ordinances. The fact that Rocket's property is partly within the City's Regulatory Flood Plain does not preclude development of the property. The cost to develop property depends upon the location. Developing property in a flood plain that must be graded to build up the flat surface above the flood level might be more expensive than building on level property that is not in a flood plain.

¶3 In 2015, a prospective purchaser of the property informed Rocket the property was subject to City's regulatory flood plain. Upon receiving knowledge of the flood plain, Rocket undertook an investigation, with the assistance of a civil engineer, Mr. Tanner, to determine the nature and extent of the regulatory flood plain and its burden on the property.  ¹ Rocket's investigation resulted in it filing an application with City to obtain an Earth Change Permit, seeking to fill in the area of the regulatory flood plain in order to develop the property.

¶4 On December 14, 2015, Rocket submitted its Earth Change Permit Application to City's Development Services Department. Mr. Holmes, an engineer with City's Development Services Department, sent Rocket's engineering firm two Letters of Deficiency at various times during the application process seeking information which Rocket ultimately did not provide. After six months with no re-submission of the permit application, City closed Rocket's file.

¶5 On February 2, 2018, Rocket filed a lawsuit against City for inverse condemnation, alleging City had taken its property via a physical and a regulatory taking. City urged in its Answer, in its Answer to Amended Petition, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, in the Pretrial Order, during argument on Motions in Limine, during trial at the close of Rocket's case and again after City rested its case, that the case is premature as Rocket failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The trial court denied all of City's motions and prevented it from asserting the issue as an affirmative defense.

¶6 After a trial of the matter, the jury returned its verdict finding a “taking of the whole property” in favor of Rocket and against City and awarded compensation in the amount of $1,895,000.00. In its January 17, 2023, Journal Entry Upon Jury Verdict, the trial court ordered that Rocket be granted judgment against City for the sum of $1,895,000.00 plus pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney fees as may be determined upon Rocket's motion. Rocket filed Plaintiff's Motion to Assess Pre-Judgment Interest, Attorney Fees, and Costs. In its Final Supplemental Order and Journal Entry of Judgment, the trial court supplemented the principal amount of the Journal Entry Upon Jury Verdict to include: Prejudgment interest in the amount of $108,058.50; prevailing party costs of $19,109.58; and attorney fees of $1,011,084.04.

¶7 In Case No. 121092, City appealed the Journal Entry upon Jury Verdict, and in Case No. 121438, Rocket appealed the Final Supplemental Order and Journal Entry of Judgment. On July 14, 2023, the Supreme Court issued an order consolidating the two appeals under the surviving case no. 121092.  ²

I

¶8 The standard of review of City's exhaustion of administrative remedies defense is a legal issue subject to de novo review. Shackelford v. Oklahoma Dept. Of Corr. Ex rel State, 2008 OK CIV APP 37, ¶3, 182 P.3d 167. In inverse condemnation cases, whether there is a taking and the amount of damages are questions of fact for the jury. The jury's decision will be affirmed if it is supported by any competent evidence. Material Service Corp. v. Rogers County Bd. Of Com'rs,2012 OK CIV APP 17, ¶5, 273 P.3d 880.

¶9 City argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because Rocket failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. It has long been established in Oklahoma that exhaustion of statutory administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite for resort to the courts. Martin v. Harrah Independent School District, 1975 OK 154, ¶6, 543 P.2d 1370. The rule which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before one is entitled to relief for supposed or threatened injury is a well settled rule of judicial administration to aid in the orderly administration of justice and to prevent transfer to the courts of duties imposed by law on administrative agencies. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corporation, 327 U.S. 540, 543, 66 S.Ct. 712, 90 L.Ed. 839, 842 (1946).  ³

¶10 One of City's ordinances, Title 11A, sets forth the requirements and necessary permits to develop property, including property within a regulatory flood plain. Title 11A also sets forth the appeals processes, including requests for variances, filing an appeal with the Stormwater Drainage & Hazard Mitigation Advisory Board, filing an appeal with the City Council, or a direct appeal to the City's Engineer.

¶11 City complains that when Rocket submitted its Earth Change Permit, Mr. Holmes, one of City's engineers, in a Letter of Deficiency, indicated Rocket's application was deficient because, among other things, Rocket did not include required calculations to show compensatory stormwater drainage storage for the property. Rocket resubmitted its application and corrected some of the deficiencies but did not include the required compensatory stormwater drainage storage calculations. Mr. Holmes sent another Letter of Deficiency advising Rocket to submit the calculations for compensatory stormwater storage, but Rocket did not do so. Again, after six months with no re-submission of the permit application, City closed Rocket's file. City submits because Rocket failed to complete the permitting process, it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and that it prematurely sued for inverse condemnation.

¶12 However, Rocket argues City's two Letters of Deficiency, in addition to requiring that it provide compensatory stormwater drainage storage calculations, also required it to provide and maintain an easement for the proposed flood plain. Rocket also explained that City required Rocket to construct, at significant financial expense and loss of useful acreage, a compensatory stormwater drainage and collection area somewhere on the property to replace the existing regulatory floodplain to manage any excess upstream stormwater runoff. Mr. Sutton, sole member of Rocket, testified the loss of acreage to create a stormwater storage pond would cost at least $600,000.00 and the cost to construct the storage pond easement would be at least $400,000.00. Mr. Holmes likewise testified that City required Rocket to provide both compensatory storage and an easement for City's benefit. He testified Rocket would need to do both of those things “both presently and forever in the future, at its own expense.” Thus, Rocket complains City exercised dominion and control over its property by mandating an easement and stormwater management improvements as conditions precedent for it to build on its property.

¶13 The Oklahoma and the United States Constitutions protect private property owners from a governmental taking of its property for public use and benefit. The Okla. Const. Art.II, § 24 provides, in part: “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation ․ When possession is taken of property condemned for any public use, the owner shall be entitled to the immediate receipt of the compensation awarded.” If the government does not institute condemnation proceedings, the property owner has a right to file an inverse condemnation proceeding to recover for the property taken. Page v. Oklahoma City, 1927 OK 440, ¶1, 263 P. 448. The essential elements of an inverse condemnation claim are (1) a taking of property for public use by a governmental entity that has the power of eminent domain, and (2) a failure to tender just compensation. Drabek v. City of Norman, 1966 OK 126, ¶4, 946 P.2d 658. A property owner is entitled to just compensation if the government's actions constitute such a “substantial interference” with the use of the property that a de facto taking occurs. Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137, ¶11, 617 P.2d 1347. A taking can occur when a governmental entity with the right to eminent domain overtly exercises dominion and control over private property, including when a governmental entity seeks an easement for the use of private property. Snow v. Town of Calumet, 2022 OK 63, ¶10, 512 P.3d 369.

Regulatory Taking

¶14 A regulatory taking may occur if the regulation itself (an overt act exercising dominion or control over the property) acts to destroy or impair the land's usefulness. Calhoun v. City of Durant, 1988 OK CIV APP 152, ¶13, 970 P.2d 608. Under Title 11A, City could only impose its regulatory flood plain concept on any given private property if there were at least 40 acres of contributory natural stormwater drainage to and through the property. That is, in order for City's regulatory flood plain on Rocket's property to be validly asserted under the express terms of City's ordinance, there must be a minimum of 40 acres of natural upstream contributory drainage as a condition precedent to supporting the imposition of a regulatory flood plain.

¶15 Rocket points out that after receiving City's letters of deficiency in its permitting process, it continued to communicate with City to seek resolution of the issues presented by City's regulatory flood plain. Mr. Tanner geographically plotted the property subject of the regulatory flood plain to determine if the regulatory flood plain actually was supported by at least 40 acres of contributory natural drainage, a condition precedent to the City ordinances permitting the assertion of a regulatory flood plain. Tanner determined that there was only 37 acres of natural contributory drainage to the property. Mr. Holmes also agreed with this. As a result, Rocket challenged, as part of the permit process, City's imposition of the regulatory flood plain on its property. Rocket complains that City continued to impose its regulatory flood plain on its property and its demands that Rocket grant a perpetual easement to City and create compensatory storage on the property as part of the permitting process.

¶16 Here, there is competent evidence of substantial interference with Rocket's use and enjoyment of the property. It is undisputed that City imposed the regulatory flood plain on Rocket's property and that it demanded Rocket grant it a perpetual easement to City and create compensatory storage on the property as a condition precedent to Rocket's ability to develop its property pursuant to the permitting process. It is also undisputed the loss of acreage to create a stormwater storage pond would cost at least $600,000.00 and the cost to construct the storage pond easement would be at least $400,000.00. The perpetual easement alone will restrict Rocket's property for an unlimited duration of time. A taking can occur when a government entity with the right to eminent domain overtly exercises dominion and control over private property, including when a government entity seeks an easement for the use of private property. Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137, ¶12, 617 P.2d 1347. There is competent evidence City's permitting process asserted dominion and control of the property resulting in an actual taking of the property. Material Service Corp. V. Rogers County Bd. of Com'rs, 273 P.3d 880, ¶5, 2012 OK CIV APP 17.

Physical Taking

¶17 A physical taking may occur if a physical invasion of property by City is severe enough to “effectively destroy or impair the land's usefulness.” Calhoun v. City of Durant, 1988 OK CIV APP 152, ¶12, 970 P.2d 608. At trial, there was testimony [Mr. Holmes] and trial exhibits indicating Rocket's property is the epicenter of City's stormwater collection. There was evidence City allowed construction of permanent stormwater drains and underground piping systems to collect upstream stormwater runoff from newly developed upstream properties and diverted the excess stormwater volume and velocity directly onto Rocket's property. At the time of trial, evidence demonstrated Rocket's property was surrounded by City-approved and constructed stormwater management collection and diversion devices from the north, east, and west of Rocket's property.  ⁴

¶18 Rocket urges that, in effect, City took advantage of its designation of the regulatory flood plain on Rocket's property and used it as a stormwater collection and storage area for the benefit of improvement and development of the upstream properties. Rocket states that, in perpetuity, its property is to be used by and is, in fact, being used by City as a stormwater drainage and storage facility, and that in order to develop its property, it would have to grant an easement and construct a collection pond to City at great expense to it.

¶19 City points out that Rocket's expert, Mr. Tanner, did not provide calculations that it directed excess volume and velocity of stormwater across Rocket's property. However, both he and Mr. Holmes testified City increased the volume and velocity of water onto Rocket's property.

¶20 Rocket's property is in a regulatory flood plain, and there is competent evidence City used and is using the property as a stormwater collection and storage area and has increased the volume and velocity of stormwater across Rocket's property such that the increased volume and velocity of water into Rocket's property constituted substantial interference with its use and enjoyment of the property. Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137, ¶11, 617 P.2d 1347. There is competent evidence of a physical taking of Rocket's property. Material Service Corp. v. Rogers County Bd. of Com'rs, 273 P.3d 880, ¶5, 2012 OK CIV APP 17.

¶21 The trial court properly granted judgment in favor of Rocket and against City in the amount of $1,895,000.00 upon the jury's finding of a “whole taking of Rocket's property.”

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

¶22 City argues the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because Rocket had not exhausted its administrative remedies regarding the permitting process. It complains Rocket must complete City's permitting process, and then administratively appeal an unfavorable decision before Rocket is able to file its lawsuit.

¶23 The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused where there is a showing the administrative remedies would be futile or inadequate to give the relief required; however, a strong showing is required. Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137, at ¶17. Rocket complains the administrative remedies would be futile and inadequate. Even if an administrative remedy were available to provide Rocket with relief from City's imposition of the regulatory flood plain in its property, (for example its removal), Rocket's property was permanently burdened with over 40 acres of excess upstream stormwater collection and diversion onto the property--a burden which is both financially and developmentally detrimental to the use of the property--in perpetuity.  ⁵ Moreover, City did not identify any adequate administrative remedy which could have been available to Rocket under the specific facts and circumstances of the case. There was a taking of Rocket's property which substantially impaired its use and enjoyment of the property. There can be no administrative remedy to compensate Rocket for such governmental taking. Id. at ¶19. The trial court was correct in its continued denial of City's exhaustion of administrative remedies defense.

II

¶24 In its Final Supplemental Order and Journal Entry of Judgment, among other things, the trial court awarded Rocket prejudgment interest in the amount of $108,058.50 calculated pursuant to the pre-judgment interest rates [12 O.S. § 727.1(I)] set out in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's Notice of Interest on Judgments for the period January 1, 2016 (the date of the condemnation taking) through January 17, 2023 (the date of the filing of the Entry upon Jury Verdict).  ⁶ It also awarded Rocket post-judgment interest from January 18, 2023, until paid at the statutory rate of 9.5%, pursuant to 12 O.S. § 727.1(I).  ⁷

¶25 Rocket counter-appeals this post-judgment ruling regarding the calculation of prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest. The issues present by this counter-appeal are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo. Lierly v. Tidewater Petroleum Corp., 2006 OK 47, ¶16, 139 P.3d 897.

Pre-judgment Interest

¶26 Prejudgment interest can be collected on a judgment only if statutorily authorized. See Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70, ¶8, 690 P.2d 1048. In this case, Rocket argues Carter v. City of Oklahoma City, 1993 OK 134, 862 P.2d 77, an inverse condemnation case, specifically determines that the applicable statute governing prejudgment interest in an inverse condemnation action is 15 O.S. § 266 which provides:

The legal rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) in the absence of any contract as to the rate of interest, and by contract parties may agree to any rate as may be authorized by law, now in effect or hereinafter enacted.

¶27 In Carter, the landowner argued that 12 O.S. § 727 (the predecessor to the current 12 O.S. 2022 § 727.1) was the proper statute upon which to calculate pre-judgment interest.  ⁸ The Supreme Court rejected the landowner's argument and affirmed the trial court, finding the proper statute to be applied to that inverse condemnation case was 15 O.S. 2022 § 266. The Supreme Court held, “We conclude that the award of 6% interest from the date of taking to the date of judgment was proper.” In so holding, the Court reasoned:

In State v. Berry, [1972 OK 41, 495 P.2d 401], we held that landowners were not entitled to 10% interest from the date of taking, and that absent any contract, 6% interest was the proper amount to be applied for prejudgment interest. Interest on a judgment against an individual ․ is paid only by the judgment debtor while interest against a governmental unit must be borne by all taxpayers of the governmental unit. Lower interest attaches to prejudgment against the state to further the legitimate purpose of preserving the public fisc.

¶28 On the other hand, City argues that 12 O.S. 2022 § 727.1 controls the rate of prejudgment interest for judgments, including this inverse condemnation action. It states that pursuant to § 727.1, the rate of pre-judgment interest shall be the rate in effect for judgments rendered during each calendar year, as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Section 727.1(F) provides:

If a verdict of the type described by subsection E of this section is rendered against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, the judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed pursuant to subsection I of this section from the date the suit was commenced to the earlier of the date the verdict is accepted by the trial court as expressly stated in the judgment or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk. The interest rate for computation of prejudgment interest shall begin with the rate prescribed by subsection I of this section which is in effect for the calendar year in which the suit resulting in the judgment is commenced. This rate shall be in effect until the end of the calendar year in which the suit resulting in judgment was filed or until the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, whichever first occurs. Beginning on January 1 of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the date judgment is rendered whichever first occurs, and for each succeeding calendar year thereafter, the prejudgment interest rate shall be the rate in effect for judgmennts rendered during each calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. After the computation of prejudgment interest has been completed, the amount shall be added to the amount of the judgment rendered pursuant to the trial of the action, and the total amount of the resulting judgment shall become the amount upon which postjudgment interest is computed pursuant to subsection B of this section. No award of prejudgment interest against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, including the amount of the judgment awarded pursuant to trial of the action, shall exceed the total amount of liability of the governmental entity pursuant to The Governmental Tort Claims Act.

¶29 Sections 727.1(E) and (F) both apply to tort actions. In Rocket Properties v. LaFortune, 2022 OK 5, ¶6, 502 P.3d 1112, the Supreme Court held that condemnation proceedings do not involve a tort, “[a]nd this has been the law ever since, without exception.” It noted that a cause of action grounded on inverse condemnation is not governed by the Governmental Tort Claims Act.

¶30 Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding pre-judgment interest pursuant to 12 O.S. 2022 § 727.1(I) for the period January 1, 2016 (the date of the condemnation taking) through January 17, 2023 (the date of the filing of the Entry upon Jury Verdict). Pre-judgment interest in an inverse condemnation action was established by State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Berry, 1972 OK 41, 495 P.2d 401and Carter v. City of Oklahoma City, 1993 OK 134, 862 P.2d 77 pursuant to 15 O.S. 2022 § 266 at a rate of 6%.

Post-Judgment Interest

¶31 Rocket complains that the trial court erred in awarding it post-judgment interest from January 18, 2023, until paid, at the statutory rate of 9.5%, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2022 § 727.1(I). City insists that post-judgment interest accumulation and City's liability to pay that interest cannot exceed the tort limits found at § 727.1(B). Section 727.1(B) provides:

Judgments, including costs and attorney fees authorized by statute or otherwise and allowed by the court, against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts or which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, shall bear interest during the term of judgment at a rate prescribed pursuant to this section from the date of rendition. No judgment against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, inclusive of postjudgment interest, shall exceed the total amount of liability of the governmental entity pursuant to the Governmental Tort Claims Act.

However, as stated in Rocket Properties v. LaFortune, a cause of action grounded in inverse condemnation is not governed by the Governmental Tort Claims Act [GTCA]. The GTCA does not affect the judgment itself in this case; therefore, City is not limited by the GTCA in its payment of post-judgment interest.

¶32 Rocket insists the issue regarding post-judgment interest is the amount of post-judgment interest to accrue and to be paid on the judgment. Section 727.1(C) provides:

The postjudgment interest authorized by subsection A or subsection B of this section shall accrue from the earlier of the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk, and shall initially accrue at the rate in effect for the calendar year during which the judgment is rendered until the end of the calendar year in which the judgment was rendered, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs. Beginning on January 1 of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs, the judgment, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued, shall bear interest at the rate in effect for judgments rendered during that calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. For each succeeding calendar year, or part of a calendar year, during which a judgment remains unpaid, the judgment, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued, shall bear interest at the rate in effect for judgments rendered during that calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. A separate computation using the interest rate in effect for judgments as provided by subsection I of this section shall be made for each calendar year, or part of a calendar year, during which the judgment remains unpaid in order to determine the total amount of interest for which the judgment debtor is liable. The postjudgment interest rate for each calendar year or part of a calendar year a judgment remains unpaid shall be multiplied by the original amount of the judgment, including any prejudgment interest, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued. Interest shall accrue on a judgment in the manner prescribed by this subsection until the judgment is satisfied or released.

The post-judgment interest for any given year as may be certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts determines the post-judgment interest rates annually and the amount of interest accrued and to be paid to satisfy the judgment.

¶33 Rocket urges that in the present case, the 2023 post-judgment interest rate of 9.5% applies to the judgment for 2023; the 2024 post-judgment interest rate of 10.5% is then assessed against the judgment in 2024; thereafter, when the Administrative Director of the Courts determines the post-judgment interest rate for 2025, that interest rate will apply to the judgment in 2025. Rocket further urges that until the judgment is paid in full, post-judgment interest rates accruing for 2023, 2024, and potentially 2025, will accrue. We agree. The trial court erred in awarding Rocket post-judgment interest at the rate of 9.5%.

¶34 The jury verdict is AFFIRMED. The trial court's denial of City's exhaustion of administrative remedies defense is AFFIRMED.

¶35 The judgment awarding pre-judgment interest in the amount of $108,058.50 is REVERSED AND REMANDED with instructions for the trial court to calculate pre-judgment interest at 6% pursuant to 15 O.S. 2022 § 266 from the date of taking (January 2016) through the date of entry of the judgment.

¶36 The judgment awarding post-judgment interest from January 18, 2023 until paid at the statutory rate of 9.5% pursuant to § 727.1(I) is REVERSED AND REMANDED with instructions for the trial court to calculate the applicable annual interest rate under § 727.1 from the date of entry of the judgment to the date the judgment is paid in full.

Citationizer© Summary of Documents Citing This Document

Cite Name Level None Found. Citationizer: Table of Authority Cite Name Level Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases Cite Name Level 2008 OK CIV APP 37, 182 P.3d SHACKELFORD v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF Discussed 167, CORRECTIONS 2012 OK CIV APP 17, 273 P.3d MATERIAL SERVICE CORPORATION v. ROGERS COUNTY Discussed at Length 880, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 1998 OK CIV APP 152, 970 P.2d Calhoun v. City of Durant Discussed 608, 69 OBJ 3914, Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases Cite Name Level 1989 OK 70, 775 P.2d 1347, 60 April v. City of Broken Arrow Discussed OBJ 1133, 1993 OK 134, 862 P.2d 77, 64 OBJ Carter v. City of Oklahoma City Discussed at Length 3283, 1966 OK 126, 416 P.2d 884, JOHNSON v. SMITH Cited 1972 OK 41, 495 P.2d 401, STATE EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS v. BERRY Discussed at Length 2006 OK 47, 139 P.3d 897, LIERLY v. TIDEWATER PETROLEUM CORPORATION Discussed 1996 OK 126, 946 P.2d 658, 67 Drabek v. City of Norman Cited OBJ 3630, 1975 OK 154, 543 P.2d 1370, MARTIN v. HARRAH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT Discussed 1980 OK 137, 617 P.2d 1347, Mattoon v. City of Norman Discussed at Length Cite Name Level 2022 OK 5, 502 P.3d 1112, ROCKET PROPERTIES v. LaFORTUNE Discussed 2022 OK 63, 512 P.3d 369, SNOW v. TOWN OF CALUMET Discussed 1927 OK 440, 263 P. 448, 129 PAGE v. OKLAHOMA CITY Discussed Okla. 28, 1984 OK 70, 690 P.2d 1048, Sisney v. Smalley Discussed Title 12. Civil Procedure Cite Name Level 12 O.S. 727, Postjudgment Interest on Judgments Rendered Between January 1, 2000 Cited and January 1, 2005 - Prejudgment Interest on Actions Filed Between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2005 12 O.S. 727.1, Postjudgment Interest on Judgments Rendered After January 1, 2005 - Discussed at Length Title 15. Contracts Prejudgment Interest on Actions Filed After January 1, 2010 Cite Name Level 15 O.S. 266, Legal and Contract Rates of Interest Discussed at Length

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FOOTNOTES

1.   A flood plain is defined as any land area susceptible of being inundated by water from any source. (City of Tulsa Revised Ordinances, Title 11-A section 301(35)). A Regulatory Flood is the flood having a one percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. A Regulatory Flood Plain is the area subject to the regulatory flood based on the full development of the watershed (an area of land that drains or “sheds” water into a specific waterbody) and where the contributing drainage area is forty (40) acres or more as designated by the City.

2.   On January 23, 2024, the Supreme Court issued an order regarding Rocket's (appellee/counter-appellant's) motion to strike the appendix attached to City's (appellant's) brief in chief. It ordered that the motion to strike be deferred to the decisional stage of the appeal. On August 5, 2024, the Court of Civil Appeals denied Rocket's motion to strike appendix.

3.   McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) set forth several reasons for the rule exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to the courts: agency decisions frequently require expertise or are discretionary in nature. The agency should be given the first opportunity to either exercise discretion or apply expertise. It is generally more efficient to permit the administrative process to move forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages (the same reasons are the foundation of judicial rules which restrict interlocutory appeals). Additionally, if a complaining party is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. And notions of administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors. Finally, it is possible that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.

4.   City's diversion devices to manage stormwater from newly developed upstream properties was evidence of overt action similar to the facts in Mattoon. By contrast, in the case of April v. City of Broken Arrow, 1989 OK 70, 775 P.2d 1347, the City of Broken Arrow neither diverted water or granted permits for upstream facilities. The flood risk was caused only by the natural phenomenon of heavy rainfall. April, at ¶23.

5.   City argues that if Rocket wanted to administratively appeal the designation of the regulatory flood plain, it could have filed a TCLOMR (Tulsa Conditional Letter of Map Revision). However, Mr. Tanner testified that while map revision since has been adopted by City, City did not have an effective way to manage changes in its regulatory environment during the period of 2012, to 2015 to 2017.

6.   Section 727.1 specifies the applicable interest rate for each calender year. See “Notice Re: Interest on Judgements” for years 2016 to 2023.

7.   Section 727.1(I) provides:For purposes of computing postjudgment interest as authorized by this section, interest shall be the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year and as certified to the Administrative Director of the Courts by the State Treasurer on the first regular business day following publication in January of each year, plus two percent (2%). For purposes of computing prejudgment interest as authorized by this section, interest shall be determined using a rate equal to the average United States Treasury Bill rate of the preceding calendar year as certified to the Administrative Director of the Courts by the State Treasurer on the first regular business day in January of each year.

8.   Section 727(B) provided that interest on all court judgments against municipalities not exceed 10% from the date of rendition. This 10% interest limitation is omitted from section 727.1.

B.J. GOREE, JUDGE:

MITCHELL, P.J., and DOWNING, J., concur.