CARL PARSON v. DON FARLEY CDF INC FAR PRO LLC SANDY FARLEY CHRISTOPHER DON FARLEY MELINDA KAY FARLEY CHARMAGNE PEREZ CIMARRON PROPERTIES INC JOHN DOES KELLYVILLE HISTORICAL MUSEUM INC CHASE FARLEY (2025)

¶1 Defendant/Appellant, Cimarron Properties, Inc. (“Cimarron”) appeals an Order on Plaintiff's Garnishment. Plaintiff/Appellee, Carl Parson, issued a garnishment to Cimarron in an attempt to satisfy judgments owed to him and to the estate of Hubert Leon Farley. Cimarron objected to the garnishment and a hearing was subsequently held approximately three years later at which time the trial court ordered Cimarron to comply and make monthly payments to Mr. Parson pursuant to the terms of a promissory note. After a review of the law, the record, and the Parties’ briefs, we find that the Order of the trial court should be REVERSED. It was error for the trial court to enter a continuing general garnishment and it was error for the trial court to find that Cimarron should have been on notice that there was a fraudulent assignment of the promissory note.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The instant action was commenced by Mr. Parson on January 24, 2020, asserting various claims against Defendants. Cimarron was not initially named in the suit. Mr. Parson alleged that he was entitled to collect two money judgments from the Defendants in two counties in Oklahoma (Rogers County and Sequoyah County). Mr. Parson's various claims allegedly justified the collection action, including a claim to pierce the corporate veil, reverse piercing the corporate veil, fraudulent transfer, fraudulent concealing of assets, and civil conspiracy among the Defendants. Mr. Parson alleged that he obtained a total of four judgments ¹ against Defendant Don Farley, and Defendant CDF, Inc. Mr. Parson alleged that Defendants had not paid any portion of the four judgments and that Defendant, Don Farley, had attempted to conceal personal assets by transferring the assets to CDF, Inc., and other family members. CDF, Inc. allegedly was controlled by Mr. Farley. Mr. Farley's son, Christopher Farley, and his son's wife, Melinda Farley, also allegedly had ownership interests in CDF, Inc. Mr. Parson alleged that Defendant, Don Farley, transferred millions of dollars of assets to his son and his son's wife. Mr. Farley's son and his son's wife allegedly had created a new entity, Far-Pro, LLC, in order to hold and conceal assets previously owned by CDF, Inc. after a money judgment was entered against CDF, Inc. in favor of Mr. Parson. Mr. Parson claimed that all transfers of property constituted fraudulent transfers and that Mr. Farley engaged in a conspiracy to shield assets from the judgments that were owed.

¶3 Mr. Parson filed an Amended Complaint on November 25, 2020, adding Cimarron as a Defendant. Mr. Parson alleged that CDF, Inc. owned and operated Cimarron Mobile Home Park in Mannford, Oklahoma. He additionally alleged that, while litigation was pending in Sequoyah County, Mr. Farley caused CDF, Inc., to transfer and convey real property and/or ownership of the Cimarron Mobile Home Park to close family members of Mr. Farley's and/or another entity, Cimarron Properties, Inc. (“Cimarron”). Mr. Parson alleged that, despite the transfer of assets from CDF, Inc. to Cimarron, Mr. Farley still controlled the Cimarron Mobile Home Park. In response, Cimarron denied Mr. Parson's allegations and raised claims of its own against Mr. Parson.

¶4 While the instant litigation was pending, Mr. Parson filed a Garnishment Affidavit ² on May 27, 2021, the disposition of which led to this appeal. Mr. Parson alleged that he had three judgments against CDF, Inc., and that the judgments, at that time, totaled $255,739.04. The Garnishment Affidavit also included the following:

That I believe that Cimarron Properties, Inc. is indebted to or has property, including money owed to CDF, Inc. or payments to CDF, Inc. and Far-Pro, LLC in its possession or under its control, which is not by law exempt from seizure or sale upon execution, belonging to the Judgment Debtor or Defendant, CDF, Inc.

Cimarron responded to the Garnishment Affidavit, on June 11, 2021, asserting that it was not indebted to CDF, Inc., that it did not have possession or control of any property, etc., belonging to CDF, Inc., and that “Plaintiff Carl Parson's Garnishment Affidavit states on its face that it has three judgments against Defendant, CDF, Inc., not Far-Pro, LLC.“ Cimarron requested a hearing pursuant to 12 O.S. § 1177 ³ to address its objection to the Garnishment. On June 25, 2021, fourteen days after Cimarron filed its Answer and Objection to the Garnishment Affidavit, Mr. Parson filed a Reply to Defendant Garnishee Cimarron Objection. Mr. Parson alleged that Cimarron was previously named Toliver, Enterprises, Inc., that Cimarron assumed all obligations of Toliver, that Cimarron was indebted to CDF, Inc. in the amount of $750,000.00 to be paid at the rate of $6,083.41 per month, that Cimarron failed to explain why the liability is owed by Cimarron to Far-Pro, LLC., instead of CDF, Inc., and that “Cimarron has conspired with Don Farley, CDF, Inc., Far-Pro, LLC to illegally convey and transfer property to hinder the collection by Carl Parson.” Mr. Parson additionally alleged that the trial court entered default judgments against CDF, Inc. and Far-Pro, LLC in the present collection action and that “Don Farley states that Far-Pro, LLC was acting as a ‘trustee’ of CDF, Inc. which demonstrates that either CDF, Inc. and/or Far-Pro, LLC are the recipients of the $6083.41 monthly payment from Cimarron Properties, Inc. per the $750,000.00 Promissory Note.”

¶5 A hearing was conducted on April 5, 2023, that was unrelated to the garnishment proceeding. At that time, the trial court took up several motions, including “Plaintiff's Motion to Avoid Fraudulent Conveyance of CDF, Inc. $750,000.00 Promissory Note filed May 20, 2022.” An Order was subsequently entered on May 19, 2023, journalizing the decisions following the hearing on April 5, 2023, including that “Plaintiff's Motion to Avoid Fraudulent Conveyance of CDF, Inc. [to Far-Pro, LLC of] $750,000.00 Promissory Note filed May 20, 2022 is Granted. The Court concurs with Judge Condren's Decision and Order file [sic] May 5, 2022, and finds the transfer is [sic] Vacated.” Cimarron's counsel appeared at and participated in the April 5, 2023 hearing.

¶6 On September 22, 2023, more than two years after the Garnishment Affidavit had been filed, Cimarron filed a “Motion to Stay or Hold in Abeyance the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff Parson's Garnishment on the Cimarron Purchase Agreement.” Cimarron alleged that Mr. Parson sought garnishment of a payment from Cimarron to Far-Pro, LLC and that the payments from Cimarron to Far-Pro, LLC were pursuant to a real estate and property purchase agreement. Cimarron claimed that half of the payment was owed to a bank and that if Mr. Parson retained the entire payment, the bank would foreclose on the property purchased by Cimarron. Cimarron claimed that although Mr. Parson did not have a judgment against Far-Pro, LLC when the garnishment was filed, the trial court recently invalidated the assignment from CDF, Inc. to Far-Pro, LLC, of the rights to the payment. Consequently, Cimarron now owed CDF, Inc. rather than Far-Pro, LLC for the payments. Cimarron requested a stay pending resolution of other issues involved in the collection action. Mr. Parson objected to the Motion to Stay and claimed that Cimarron failed to pay him “the money garnished from May 27, 2021 to the present date, or computed as $170,335.20 for the previous 28 months․”

¶7 A hearing was held on April 2, 2024, on both Cimarron's objection to the Garnishment and on “Motion to Stay or Hold in Abeyance the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff Parson's Garnishment on the Cimarron Purchase Agreement”. On June 12, 2024, the trial court entered an Order on Plaintiff's Garnishment.  ⁴ The trial court determined that Mr. Parson's garnishment was a valid and enforceable garnishment, Cimarron's objection was overruled, the garnishment was a general garnishment under 12 O.S. § 1173.3,  ⁵ Cimarron was put on notice prior to the service of the garnishment that an amended petition alleged Far-Pro, LLC and CDF were involved in fraudulent transfers, and that Cimarron was ordered to make monthly payments to Carl Parson from the date of the order forward with reservation of Mr. Parson's right to seek back payments. It is from that Order that Cimarron has timely commenced this interlocutory appeal.  ⁶

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Garnishment proceedings are equitable in nature and there should be no unwarranted vexation or expense to be inflicted upon the garnishee. Discover Bank v. Cox, 2009 OK CIV APP 23, ¶ 8, 281 P.3d 248, 249. The judgment of the court shall be just to all of the parties and properly protect their respective interests. Horwitz v. Doubenskaia, 2011 OK CIV APP 115, ¶ 6, 264 P.3d 744, 746. “On review, ‘there is a presumption in favor of the trial court's finding and the judgment will be affirmed unless the findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Also See, Discovery Bank v. Barnes, 2012 OK CIV APP 89, ¶ 15. 294 P.3d 453, 457-458.

¶9 Cimarron also presents an issue of statutory interpretation, i.e., whether a general garnishment can be continuing in nature. Issues involving statutory interpretation are issues of law subject to de novo review. Dobson Telephone Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Corporation Comm., 2017 OK CIV APP 16, ¶ 5, 392 P.3d 295, 298-299. A de novo review involves a plenary, independent, and non-deferential review of the legal rulings made by the trial court. Id.

¶10 This appeal involves an issue of procedural due process. Procedural due process issues are reviewed de novo. In the Matter of the Turkey Creek Conservancy District, 2008 OK 8, ¶ 3, 177 P.3d 558, 559.

ANALYSIS

¶11 Cimarron's Br.-in-chief includes seven propositions of error.  ⁷ Cimarron argues that: (1) the trial court committed error when it did not set a trial on its objection to the garnishment; (2) the trial court committed error when it found that the general garnishment was continuing in nature; (3) laches and other equitable defenses prevent the execution of the garnishment as a result of the approximately three year delay in hearing the matter; (4) the trial court committed error when it determined that Cimarron should have been on notice that the assignment of the Promissory Note from CDF, Inc. to Far-Pro, LLC, was fraudulent prior to the time that the trial court set aside the assignment; (5) the trial court committed error when it did not grant an exemption for garnishment payments on the basis of a mortgage payment; (6) the trial court committed error when it failed to dismiss the garnishment even though it was not properly joined in an amended petition under 12 O.S. § 2015 as a separate cause of action; and (7) the trial court committed error when it failed to dismiss the garnishment action because it was not for an amount certain. We disagree with Cimarron on the first, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh propositions. We agree, however, with Cimarron's arguments set forth in the second and fourth propositions. We hold that a general garnishment under 12 O.S. § 1173.3, is not continuing in nature and that Cimarron should not have been on notice that the assignment of the Promissory Note from CDF, Inc. to Far-Pro, LLC, was fraudulent before the trial court vacated the assignment. Consequently, the Order on Plaintiff's Garnishment is REVERSED. Each proposition is addressed in turn.

Alleged Failure to Set a Trial on the Objection to the Garnishment.

¶12 Cimarron claims that the trial court committed error when it failed to set a trial as a civil action after the trial court apparently accepted the Reply that was filed by Mr. Parson to be sufficient notice pursuant to 12 O.S. § 1177. Cimarron also asserts that the Reply filed by Mr. Parson provided insufficient notice. Under § 1177, allegations made in response to a Garnishment Affidavit are conclusive of the facts stated with reference to a garnishee's liability unless the creditor provides “a notice in writing that the judgment creditor elects to take issue with the garnishee's answer.” See 12 O.S. § 1177; note 3 supra. Mr. Parson filed a Reply to Cimarron's Answer and the substance of Mr. Parson's “Reply” took issue with Cimarron's claim that it was not indebted to CDF, Inc. and that is all that is required under § 1177. See Horwitz v. Doubenskaia, 2011 OK CIV APP 115, ¶ 12, 264 P.3d 744, 748. Next, we find that the trial court did not commit error by not setting a “trial” as envisioned by Cimarron. The trial court held multiple hearings and considered all arguments as to why Cimarron objected to the garnishment. We find that additional proceedings were not required by § 1177.

Whether a General Garnishment is Continuing in Nature.

¶13 Cimarron argues that the trial court committed error when it found that the general garnishment was continuing in nature. Cimarron recites the law regarding statutory construction and claims that since the general garnishment statute, § 1173.3, is silent on whether it is continuing or non-continuing, and because the Legislature subsequently enacted a specific continuing earnings garnishment statute on wages, that new statute (i.e., § 1173.4, the continuing earnings garnishment statute) would have been unnecessary if the general garnishment statute was continuing in nature. In response, Mr. Parson argues that garnishment proceedings under § 1173.3 are equitable in nature, that § 1173.3(F) provides a lien on assets of the debtor, that § 1182 ⁸ grants the trial court the power to weigh the facts and circumstances and to adjudge the debtor's transfer of any property, and § 1185 ⁹ provides that the garnishee shall be liable for all debts due or to become due. Cimarron counters that the statement regarding all debts due or to become due in § 1185 applies to all garnishment proceedings, which would include continuing garnishment proceedings, and the statement regarding amounts to become due has no application to general garnishments. We agree with Cimarron and hold that general garnishments under § 1173.3 are not continuing in nature.

¶14 It is our duty to give meaning and effect to the words chosen by the Legislature, unless to do so would result in an absurdity. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72¶ 15, 833 P.2d 1218, 1228 (“[t]o ascertain legislative intent we look to the language of the pertinent statute. Statutory words are to be given their ordinary sense except when a contrary intention plainly appears”); Hill v. Board of Education, District I-009, Jones, Oklahoma, 1997 OK 111, ¶ 5, 944 P.3d 930, 931 (“[t]he fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the Legislature's intention and purpose as expressed in a statute”). Generally, when determining the meaning of a statute, the plain language of the statute is conclusive absent an ambiguity. In the Matter of the Estate of Foresee, 2020 OK 88, ¶ 14, 475 P.3d 862, 867. Moreover, it is well established that garnishment proceedings are governed by equitable principles. See Discover Bank v. Cox, 2009 OK CIV APP 23, ¶ 8, 281 P.3d 248, 249.

¶15 We find that § 1173.3 is not ambiguous. The language of § 1173.4, which addresses continuing garnishments, includes language that specifically applies to multiple events, i.e., multiple paychecks, rather than a single event. Title 12 O.S. § 1173.3(F) specifically states that a “garnishment summons and affidavit served on the garnishee under this section are a lien on the defendant's property due at the time of service of the summons to the extent that the property is not exempt from garnishment.” Id. (emphasis added). On the other hand, § 1173.4 states that any “judgment creditor may obtain a continuing lien on earnings.” Id. (emphasis added). We find that the Legislative intent is clear from the plain language of § 1173.3, and that general garnishments are not continuing in nature. It was, therefore, error for the trial court to order Cimarron to make monthly payments based upon Mr. Parson's general garnishment.  ¹⁰

Equitable Defenses.

¶16 Cimarron asserts that the equitable defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, and/or waiver should preclude any recovery for Mr. Parson because of the approximately three year delay from the time that the Garnishment Affidavit was filed until the hearing was held on Cimarron's objection to the garnishment. We disagree.

¶17 Laches is an equitable defense to stale claims when there has been an unreasonable delay in prosecuting the claim and, as a result of that delay, the party asserting laches has been materially prejudiced. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Bailey, 2023 OK 34, ¶ 13, 530 P.3d 24, 33-34; Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 8, 66 P.3d 364, 369. In light of our holding that a general garnishment only involves property in the possession of the garnishee at the time that the garnishment is filed, the maximum amount for which Cimarron could be liable under the garnishment is one monthly payment under the promissory note. Even though there was a significant delay, Cimarron was not materially prejudiced by the delay and, therefore, laches does not apply.

¶18 The elements of equitable estoppel are “(1) a false representation or concealment of facts, (2) made with actual or constructive knowledge of the facts, (3) to a person without knowledge of, or the means of knowing, those facts, (4) with the intent that it be acted upon, and (5) the person to whom it was made acted in reliance upon it to his detriment.” Burdick v. Independent School Dist. No. 52 of Oklahoma County, 1985 OK 49, ¶ 13, 702 P.2d 48, 55. Here, there was no false representation or concealment of facts made by Mr. Parson and Cimarron did not rely upon any representations made by Mr. Parson to its detriment. We find that equitable estoppel does not apply.

¶19 The third and final equitable defense raised by Cimarron is waiver. We find that waiver does not apply to the facts of this case because a waiver requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right and there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Parson intentionally relinquished his right to garnish funds held by Cimarron. See Martin v. Brock, 2001 OK CIV APP 145, n. 1, 55 P.3d 1095, 1098. It was not error for the trial court to deny Cimarron relief on the basis of equitable defenses.

Notice that Assignment of Promissory Note was Fraudulent.

¶20 At the time that Mr. Parson filed his Garnishment Affidavit, Cimarron was making promissory note payments to Far-Pro, LLC due to an assignment of rights from CDF, Inc. to Far-Pro, LLC. However, the trial court did not vacate the assignment as fraudulent until May 19, 2023, approximately two years after the Garnishment Affidavit had been filed. The trial court, nevertheless, held that Cimarron should have been on notice of the fraudulent transfer based on allegations in pleadings that were made by Mr. Parson. Cimarron claims that was error and we agree. Judgments in garnishment proceedings are required to be just to all of the parties and properly protect their interests. 12 O.S. § 1182. In addition, there should be no unwarranted vexation or expense to be inflicted upon the garnishee. Discover Bank v. Cox, 2009 OK CIV APP 23, ¶ 8. In our view, a garnishee should not be required to speculate as to whether a transfer or assignment is fraudulent based solely upon the existence of allegations which have not been considered or adjudicated by the trial court. We find that the trial court committed error, under the limited facts on record in this case, when it found that Cimarron should have been on notice that the transfer was fraudulent at the time that the Garnishment Affidavit was filed.

Exemption From Garnishment on the Basis of A Mortgage Payment.

¶21 Relying upon Discover Bank v. Cox, 2009 OK CIV APP 23, Cimarron asserts that an exemption should have been granted on the garnishment payment because approximately half of the payment it makes to Far-Pro, LLC services a mortgage held by a bank that encumbers the property that Cimarron purchased. See Stalcup v. Easterly, 1960 OK 39, ¶ 9, 351 P.2d 735, 738 (where the Court noted that, following an assignment of a mortgage note, ‘ “the relationship between the grantee and grantor is that of principal and surety, the grantee becoming the principal obligor of the mortgage debt and the grantor his surety.’ ” (internal citations omitted). Here, however, there is no evidence that Cimarron is indebted to or required to make mortgage payments to any bank. Consequently, this matter is distinguishable from Discover Bank v. Cox, supra., because, in that matter, the garnishee specifically assumed responsibility for mortgage payments. We find that the trial court did not commit error when it did not grant an exemption based on mortgage payments.

Whether Garnishment Action Was Properly Joined.

¶22 Cimarron takes issue with the manner in which the garnishment action was filed and claims that it should be independent of the underlying cause of action. Cimarron claims that Mr. Parson did not sufficiently plead the garnishment cause of action in his Amended Petition. Cimarron concludes that “[t]here must be some limit or requirement for fair notice to join an entirely new garnishment cause of action with other claims in an existing, non-related lawsuit. Otherwise, parties could serve garnishments in cases while avoiding due process requirements, as well as Oklahoma Pleading Code requirements.” Mr. Parson argues that a garnishment is a remedy rather than a claim so the argument that the “claim” should have been asserted in the Amended Petition lacks merit. We disagree with Cimarron and find that the trial court did not commit reversible error.

¶23 Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, notice “calculated to provide knowledge of the exercise of adjudicative power and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Pierce v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 2014 OK 37, ¶ 23, 327 P.3d 530, 536-537. Whether a party has been provided with an appropriate level of process is determined on a case-by-case basis because the due process clause does not require any particular procedure. In the Matter of A.M. & R.W., 2000 OK 82, ¶ ¶ 7-9, 13 P.3d 484, 487. “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Before a party's due process rights are violated, it must be shown that the action or error was arbitrary, oppressive and shocking to the conscience of the court.” Flandermeyer v. Bonner, 2006 OK 87, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d 195, 198-199. The Garnishment Affidavit filed by Mr. Parson names a single garnishee: i.e., Cimarron. Cimarron filed an Objection to the garnishment and demanded a hearing. Cimarron did not raise the issue of improper joinder at that time. A Garnishment Affidavit is treated as a Petition. See 12 O.S. § 1177. Cimarron also does not claim it lacked notice or that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the garnishment issue. District Courts in Oklahoma “have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.” Oklahoma Constitution, Article 7 § 7(a). We find that it was not necessary for Mr. Parson to file a separate cause of action to address the garnishment issue. Even if there was error, the error was harmless and does not justify reversal because the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and Cimarron was provided with meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard, which satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. See 12 O.S. § 78.  ¹¹

Whether the Garnishment Should Have Been Dismissed Because it Was Not For An Amount Certain.

¶24 Cimarron claims in its final proposition that the garnishment should have been dismissed because the Garnishment Affidavit did not provide a certain amount of debt since it stated that the judgments totaling $255,739.04 were subject to modification and amendment of additional judgments and that the Affidavit did not provide the rate and date the interest begins to accrue as required by § 1172. At most, Cimarron would have been liable under the garnishment to make a single payment in the amount of one installment under the promissory note, which would not satisfy the $255,739.04 debt. We find that the Garnishment Affidavit was sufficient. Moreover, even if there was an error, it is harmless error that did not affect Cimarron's substantial rights. See 12 O.S. § 78.

CONCLUSION

¶25 It was error for the trial court to consider the general garnishment to be a continuing obligation for Cimarron and it was error for the trial court to find that Cimarron should have been on notice of the fraudulent transfer at the time that the Garnishment Affidavit was filed. Consequently, the June 12, 2024, Order on Plaintiff's Garnishment is REVERSED.

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FOOTNOTES

1.   The judgments include the following: A judgment for defamation and invasion of privacy in the amount of $700,000.00, a judgment for money damages in the amount of $50,710.00, a judgment in the amount of $171,866.58, and a judgment in the amount of $33,142.46.

2.   Cimarron Properties, Inc. was named as the Garnishee.

3.   Title 12 O.S. § 1177 provides, in part, that: “The answer of the garnishee shall in all cases be conclusive of the truth of the facts therein stated, with reference to the garnishee's liability to the defendant unless the judgment creditor shall within twenty (20) days from the receipt of the garnishee's answer․serve upon the garnishee or the garnishee's attorney of record․a notice in writing that the judgment creditor elects to take issue with the garnishee's answer; in which case, the issue shall stand for trial as a civil action in which the affidavit on the part of the judgment creditor shall be deemed the petition and the garnishee's answer the answer thereto.“ Id. (emphasis added).

4.   While the Order entered on June 12, 2024, does not mention the “Motion to Stay or Hold in Abeyance the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff Parson's Garnishment on the Cimarron Purchase Agreement”, a court minute is in the appellate record from the hearing of April 2, 2024, that indicates that said motion was argued that day.

5.   Title 12 O.S. § 1173.3 provides, in part, the following: “A. A general garnishment shall be commenced by filing the affidavit provided for by Section 1172 of this title․ E. Within ten (10) days after service of the garnishment, the garnishee shall file its answer with the court clerk and pay or deliver to the judgment creditor's attorney or to the judgment creditor if there is no attorney the indebtedness or property belonging to or owed to the defendant, together with a copy of the answer․ F. The garnishment summons and affidavit served on the garnishee under this section are a lien on the defendant's property due at the time of service of the summons to the extent the property is not exempt from garnishment.” Id. (emphasis added).

6.   During the pendency of this appeal Mr. Parson filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Supreme Court denied that Motion on October 14, 2024, and held that the Order of the trial court was appealable by right pursuant to 12 O.S. 2021, §§ 993(A)(3) and (5). The Order also noted 12 O.S. 2021, § 952(b)(2) and 12 O.S. Supp. 2023 § 1173.3(F). In addition, there was a related appeal involving some of the same parties that addressed an attorney fee issue. That appeal was styled Carl Parson, as Personal Administrator of the Estate of Hubert Leon Farley, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. CDF, Inc., Defendant, and Don Farley, Defendant/Appellant, Appellate Case #118,346.

7.   In addition to the propositions of error, Cimarron has included a “Response to Appellee/Plaintiff Parson's State of the Case” in the Br.-in-chief. Because we find that all arguments were previously addressed by the issues raised in the propositions of error, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the Response to the State of the Case. Additionally, Exhibit “C” to the Petition in Error includes seven issues to be raised on appeal. All issues are addressed by the propositions of error.

8.   Title 12 O.S. § 1182 states, in part, that: “The court shall render such judgment in all [garnishment] cases as shall be just to all of the parties and shall properly protect their respective interests, and may adjudge the recovery of any indebtedness, the conveyance, transfer, or delivery to the sheriff, or any officer appointed by the judgment, of any property disclosed or found to be liable to be applied to the judgment creditor's demand, or by the judgment pass the title thereto; and may therein, or by its order when proper, direct the manner of making sale and of disposing of the proceeds thereof, or of any money or other things paid over or delivered to the clerk or officer.”

9.   Title 12 O.S. § 1185 states, in part, that: “From the time of the service of the summons upon the garnishee he shall stand liable to the plaintiff to the amount of the property, moneys, credits and effects in his possession or under his control, belonging to the defendant or in which he shall be interested, to the extent of his right or interest therein, and of all debts due or to become due to the defendant, except such as may be by law exempt from execution.”

10.   It should be noted that this Opinion is limited to the scope and enforceability of the general garnishment filed by Mr. Parson and does not preclude Mr. Parson from seeking other prejudgment remedies or additional garnishments in order to secure satisfaction of the judgments.

11.   Title 12 O.S. § 78 states: “The court, in every stage of action, must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.”

THOMAS E. PRINCE, JUDGE:

GOREE, P.J., and SWINTON, J., concur.