STATE SECRETO v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO (1997)

 Moyer, C.J.  Claimant seeks to compel an award of permanent total disability compensation (“PTD”).   The commission seeks to uphold its order denying PTD.

 The appropriate standard guiding our review is whether there is “some evidence” in the record to support the commission's decision.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.   If so, then the commission will not be deemed to have abused its discretion, and  the granting of a writ of mandamus to correct an abuse of discretion is not warranted.

All examining physicians agreed that appellant suffered from chronic back discomfort.   Dr. Spencer diagnosed appellant as suffering from sciatic neuritis.   Dr. Sidow attributed appellant's pain to arthritis and sciatica.   Dr. Hutchison ascribed the pain to low back degenerative change which preexisted his 1985 injury and was secondary to the normal aging process.

None of these medical ailments had been adjudicated to be an allowed condition for workers' compensation purposes.   Thus, assuming arguendo that appellant is unable to engage in sustained remunerative employment, there is “some evidence” that the cause of the inability is not related to the condition allowed at the time his application was heard.

 Permanent total disability compensation may not be awarded where a claimant's inability to work is not causally related to his allowed claim.   State ex rel. Hartung v. Columbus (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 257, 560 N.E.2d 196.   A claimant whose allowed conditions prevent sustained remunerative employment should not be penalized in a permanent total disability determination simply because he or she is unfortunate enough to have other health problems.  State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 452, 457-458, 619 N.E.2d 1018, 1022.   However, in light of the Hutchison and Sidow medical reports, the commission acted within its discretion in finding that appellant's injury of “sprain lumbar, pain left leg” was not a cause of his alleged inability to work.   Appellant's claim was not recognized for degenerative change, arthritis, or sciatica.   Nor had appellant's additional claim for “anxiety disorder” been ruled upon at the time of rehearing.

 The court of appeals correctly concluded that it is within the commission's discretion to refuse to consider additional conditions which are allowed after a permanent total disability hearing has been held.   Cf. State ex rel. Cordray v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 99, 101, 561 N.E.2d 917, 919.

As did the court of appeals, we note that appellant is not precluded from filing another permanent total disability application based on the additional allowed condition of anxiety disorder.

We do not find that the commission's decision denying permanent total disability constituted an abuse of discretion.   We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying appellant a writ of mandamus.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

 PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. DOUGLAS, J., dissents. RESNICK and FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., JJ., dissent and would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.