The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. G.Y., Defendant. (2026)

The defense moves this court to find the People's certificate of compliance (COC) invalid and to dismiss the case pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30 (1) (b) and 170.30 (1) (e). Specifically, the defense argues that the People did not satisfy their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20 in that they failed to timely provide surveillance video, body-worn camera (BWC) footage, an NYPD I-card, CCRB materials, chain of custody records, activity logs, and an arrest photograph. In opposition, the People argue that the motion is procedurally barred, that some of these materials are not discoverable, and that regardless of any discovery defects, they exercised due diligence prior to filing their COC.

I. Procedural History

The defendant is charged with violating PL §§ 155.25 and 220.03 for allegedly stealing merchandise from a Sunglass Hut on October 24, 2025, and for allegedly possessing crack cocaine at the time of his arrest on November 2, 2025. On November 3, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint. The court adjourned the case to December 18, 2025, for conversion.

On November 10, 2025, the court advanced the case after receiving a CASES report that the defendant had not complied with his supervised release obligations and issued a bench warrant. On November 14, 2025, the defendant was rearrested, appeared in court, and the bench warrant was vacated. The court then adjourned the case to December 18, 2025, for conversion.

On December 18, 2025, the People filed supporting depositions, and the court deemed the complaint an information. The People had not complied with their discovery obligations and did not state ready for trial. The court adjourned to February 6, 2026, for trial.

On January 5, 2026, the People produced discovery to the defense then filed and served a COC and certificate of readiness (COR). The COC specified that the People had not provided several discoverable items — an arrest photograph, a voucher, two chain of custody reports, and four activity logs — that they had been "unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence."

On February 2, 2026, the defense emailed the People a list of potentially outstanding discoverable material.

On February 6, 2026, the People stated that they were ready for trial. The defense objected to the People's discovery compliance and informed the court that they would be filing a motion challenging the People's COC. The court set a motion schedule and adjourned for decision.

On February 9, 2026, the defense filed their motion. In the motion, the defense argues that the People's COC was invalid because they failed to timely produce the materials included in the conferral email, as well as the materials listed as not disclosed in the People's COC.

On March 4, 2026, the People filed an affirmation in opposition to the defense motion. The People argue first that the motion is procedurally barred because defense counsel's conferral efforts were insufficient under CPL § 245.50 (4) (c). On the merits, they argue that the I-card is duplicative, that the BWC footage does not exist, and that the CCRB records are not in their actual or constructive possession. The People concede that the remaining materials are discoverable, but they argue that they exercised due diligence.

On March 18, 2026, defense counsel filed a reply.

II. Validity of the People's COC

On a motion challenging a COC, this court will first determine whether the movant has complied with the procedural requirements of CPL § 245.50 (4) (see People v Minor, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50255[U] [Crim Ct, NY County 2026]). Next, the court will examine the alleged discovery violations individually (People v Lodgson-McCray, 88 Misc 3d 1212[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2026]). If the court finds that any discovery violations occurred, the court will then examine the violations in the context of "the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with the provisions of [Article 245]" and determine whether the People nevertheless "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith" in discharging their duties (CPL 245.50 [5], [6]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 [2023]).

1. Defense Compliance with CPL § 245.50 (4)

The People argue that defense counsel did not comply with the conferral requirement of CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), which is a statutory requirement for a COC motion. A motion challenging a COC must "be accompanied by an affirmation by the moving party that . . . such moving party timely conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the opposing party regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge, that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the opposing party or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). The People specifically argue that defense counsel's conferral efforts were not "timely" or conducted "in good faith," and that the conferral did not include all of "the specific and particularized matters" raised in the motion (id.). The court will address each of these objections in turn.

First, defense counsel's conferral efforts were timely. CPL § 245.50 does not define timeliness or provide a specific deadline, so timeliness must be evaluated in light of the statute as a whole and the legislature's intent. The primary purpose of the conferral requirement is to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of scarce judicial resources, which suggests that a conferral is timely if it occurs before judicial intervention is required. However, in practical terms, conferral must generally be completed before the motion is filed (see CPL 245.50 [4] [c]), so defense counsel should begin their conferral efforts with sufficient time to complete the process before their motion deadline. Of course, this is a flexible standard: discovery conferrals can take five minutes or five weeks, and the motion deadline is subject to judicial modification (see CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [i]). On the facts of this case, one week was more than enough time for the parties to confer.¹

Second, the People have not established that defense counsel's conferral efforts were in bad faith. Good faith is a "state of mind" that includes "honesty in belief or purpose," "faithfulness to one's duty or obligation," and "absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage" (Black's Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024]). The critical question is whether the circumstances demonstrate that counsel acted with a "proper motive" (Polotti v Flemming, 277 F2d 864, 868 [2d Cir. 1960]). Because the point of the conferral requirement is to avoid unnecessary litigation by "resolv[ing] the issues" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]), defense counsel should forthrightly explain their positions regarding discovery violations to allow the People the opportunity to respond and, where possible, cure any defects. As long as that standard is met, this court will not attempt to divine defense counsel's subjective motivations, which is a difficult task even with a much more robust factual record than is available here. Here, defense counsel's conferral efforts met that standard.

The fact that the defense did not request accommodations short of dismissal does not mean that their conferral efforts were in bad faith. This court will not typically second-guess an attorney's affirmation that "no accommodation could be reached" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). While the statute requires a conferral, it does not require that the defense specifically seek accommodations from the People (see id.; see also People v Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270[A], *2 [Crim Ct, NY County 2025] ["[W]here the defense believes that they are entitled to dismissal and the prosecution offers only explanations for any discovery lapses and belated disclosure, the parties need not confer any more than what is needed to clarify the points of disagreement."]). It is not improper for defense counsel to confer with the expectation that the issues will not be resolved and the intention to subsequently file a motion to invalidate the COC. Under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney has a duty to "use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause" (Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.1 Comment [1]). The rules state that lawyers "should . . . take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor" and must "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and in advocacy upon the client's behalf" (id., rule 1.3 Comment [1]). Even a miniscule chance of dismissal may be more valuable than whatever sanction the People might be willing to accept as an "accommodation," and defense counsel — who knows the case, their adversary, and their client — is best positioned to make that strategic decision. Thus, defense counsel's affirmation that "an accommodation could not be reached" is sufficient, even if the parties never discussed any potential accommodations (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). Nothing in the statute requires the parties to engage in negotiations they know will be fruitless (see id.), and the court cannot force the parties to reach a resolution that is not mutually acceptable (see Citibank, N.A. v Barclay, 124 AD3d 174, 176—77 [1st Dept 2014]).

In support of their claim that defense counsel did not confer in good faith, the People stress the fact that defense counsel's conferral email fell on the 90th day after arraignment, which they argue suggests "manipulation of the speedy trial clock" (People's affirmation, 15). This is unconvincing. Even if it were true, it is not clear that it would reflect bad faith. As discussed above, using procedural rules to secure a dismissal for a client is not improper; it is an ethical imperative under the NY Rules of Professional Conduct. Regardless, there is no reason to conclude that defense counsel intentionally delayed their conferral to secure a speedy trial dismissal in this case. The only evidence the People have proffered is the timing of the email, but that proves nothing. In this case, the four weeks between the People's COC and defense counsel's conferral email were a reasonable amount of time in which to conduct a thorough discovery review.

Finally, while it is true that defense counsel did not confer with the People regarding every "specific and particularized matter[ ] forming the basis for" the COC challenge (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]), barring the motion would not be an appropriate remedy on the facts of this case. In the past, when the defense failed to raise some of their discovery objections in conferral, the court did not preclude the entire motion but instead deemed the un-conferred objections waived (see, e.g., People v Harris, 87 Misc 3d 1212[A], *5 [Crim Ct, NY County 2025]). However, in the case of undisputedly discoverable materials listed as outstanding in the People's COC, waiver is not an appropriate sanction for a failure to confer. The conferral requirement is intended to resolve discovery disputes without litigation, including by giving the People an opportunity to cure the violation. Here, though, there was no dispute regarding these materials: the parties have always agreed that they are discoverable and constructively within the People's possession. Further, the People had actual knowledge that the materials were outstanding, and they should have maintained their efforts to obtain the materials after filing their COC. In these circumstances, this court determines that the appropriate remedy is to assume that, had the People been reminded that the materials were outstanding, they would have promptly and diligently produced them.

Overall, defense counsel's conferral affirmation satisfies the requirements of CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), and the People have not demonstrated that defense counsel's conferral efforts were untimely, in bad faith, or otherwise deficient. The court will therefore consider the merits.

2. The People's Compliance with CPL § 245.20

The defense argues that the People failed to satisfy their discovery obligations in that they failed to produce surveillance video, additional BWC footage, the I-card, CCRB materials, chain of custody records, activity logs, and an arrest photograph. The People concede that the surveillance video, chain of custody forms, activity logs, and arrest photograph are discoverable. However, they argue that the BWC footage, the I-card, and the CCRB materials are not discoverable.

The People credibly argue that the allegedly outstanding BWC footage does not exist, and the defense has not provided any reason to conclude otherwise. The BWC footage is therefore not discoverable.

Next, the People argue that the I-card is not discoverable because it is duplicative, but this argument improperly conflates the due diligence factors with discoverability in the first instance. The I-card is discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (e) even if it is duplicative of other material and thus not a significant factor for assessing the People's diligence under CPL § 245.50 (5) (a). However, where arresting officers rely on an I-card to provide probable cause, the I-card itself may play an important role at a suppression hearing and cannot be considered duplicative (see, e.g., People v Palacios, — NY3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, *1 [2026]).

The CCRB materials are not in the People's actual or constructive possession and therefore are not part of the People's initial discovery obligation (People v Haggan, 253 NYS3d 154 [1st Dept 2026]). Even if the defense is correct that this holding is contrary to the statute and renders the People's obligations under CPL § 245.20 (2) empty, Haggan is binding on this court.

3. The People's Diligence and Reasonableness

The court will consider the People's discovery violations in context of their overall diligence. Even where the People have not satisfied all of their discovery obligations, their COC will not be invalidated where they have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material" (CPL 245.50 [6]; see also Bay, 41 NY3d at 211). In determining whether the People acted with due diligence, the court must consider:

[T]he efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with [their discovery obligations]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

(CPL 245.50 [5] [a]; see also Bay, 41 NY3d at 212).

This is not a particularly complex case, and by the People's admission, the discovery is not voluminous. The People began collecting discovery soon after the case commenced. They obtained BWC footage one day after the defendant's arraignment, and they obtained a laboratory report for a test of an alleged controlled substance a week later. However, the record regarding the People's efforts to obtain discovery is somewhat sparse. For example, it is unclear when the People requested, obtained, or reviewed police records, including DD5s, activity logs, vouchers, chain of custody forms, and arrest reports. Confusingly, the People state that they contacted three members of the NYPD between November 5 and December 30, 2025, to inquire whether there was any outstanding discovery, and that no outstanding discovery was identified (People's affirmation, 6). Yet on December 30, 2025, the People state that they had compiled a list of several outstanding NYPD documents (id.), and there is no indication that the People discussed these outstanding materials with the NYPD.

The People's subsequent efforts to obtain these missing materials were insufficient. After referring the matter to the Litigation Support Unit (LSU) of the District Attorney's Office, the People filed their COC without obtaining the missing discovery — and, in fact, without even waiting for a substantive response.² This is unacceptable. (See Lodgson-McCray, 88 Misc 3d 1212[A], *4 ["The People cannot say that they have made 'reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain' discoverable material when the material is in their constructive possession and they have not, at minimum, (1) allowed sufficient time for their normal discovery procedures to bring that material into their actual possession, and (2) determined why the normal procedures were not producing results."]). The People filed their COC the same day they submitted their referral to the LSU, and they appear to have stopped trying to obtain the missing documents immediately thereafter. Indeed, it appears that the LSU provided some of the documents to the assigned prosecutor the same day or the next morning, yet the assigned prosecutor did not produce those documents to the defense.

On the other hand, the People's explanation as to the surveillance footage is reasonable. The footage was contained in a subfolder within the NYPD ECMS file, and when People attempted to upload the ECMS file to their discovery portal, the contents of that subfolder were not successfully uploaded. The People intended to produce the surveillance footage, and they believed in good faith that they had.

The People responded promptly to defense counsel's conferral email. While the People did not self-report any errors, they acted diligently upon receiving notice from the defense. For the materials that they listed as outstanding in their COC, the People should have continued to try to obtain and disclose the materials, but they did not. However, as discussed in section II.1, supra, the court assumes that the People would have rectified the errors promptly and diligently if the defense had raised them in their conferral email.

While the defense has not identified any prejudice from the delayed disclosure, prejudice is only one factor in the court's analysis, and the absence of prejudice is not determinative (CPL 245.50 [5] [b]). Further, contrary to the People's argument, the undisclosed materials were not insignificant or merely duplicative. The I-card seems to have provided the arresting officer with the basis for making an arrest and is thus important for evaluating the legality of the defendant's arrest. Even if the information from the I-card is contained in other documents, knowing what information the arresting officer had at the time of arrest could be important at a Dunaway hearing. Further, the arrest photograph and vouchered hat could be relevant to a potential defense of misidentification, and the voucher and chain of custody forms for the controlled substance allegedly recovered from the defendant are important for evaluating the strength of that charge.

On balance, and considering all of the factors set forth in CPL § 245.50 (5) (a), the court finds that the People have not met their burden of demonstrating that they "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed pursuant to [CPL § 245.20]" prior to filing their January 5, 2026 COC (CPL 245.50 [6]). The defendant's motion to deem the People's COC invalid is therefore GRANTED.

III. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to CPL § 30.30

In this case, in which the defendant is charged with an A misdemeanor and no felonies, the People must be ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). The court makes the following findings:

The People are charged with 7 days from the defendant's arraignment on November 3, 2025, through the issuance of a bench warrant on November 10, 2025.

The parties agree that the period from November 10 through November 14, 2025, during which the bench warrant was active, is excludable pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (4) (c).

The People are charged with 34 days for the period from November 14, 2025, through December 18, 2025 (see People v Francisco G., 87 Misc 3d 1203[A], *3 [Crim Ct, NY County, 2025]). The People are charged with all prereadiness delay unless they "satisfy their burden of proving their entitlement to an exclusion" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 213 [1992]), and they have not done so here. The People do not cite any exclusion from CPL § 30.30 (4) but instead rely on People v Muhanimac, which held on the facts before it that the People "must be given a reasonable time to call their witnesses and arrange for the recommencement of the case after a defendant is involuntarily returned" on a bench warrant (181 AD2d 464, 465-466 [1st Dept 1992]). However, this court has previously observed that "Muhanimac applies in the prereadiness context only if the People can demonstrate that the defendant's absence hindered the People's ability to become ready for trial even after the defendant's return" (Francisco G., 87 Misc 3d 1203[A], *3). Here, the People have not alleged that the defendant's four-day absence affected their ability to file a COR beyond those four days. The fact that the People's witnesses were not physically present in the building when the defendant's warrant was executed is irrelevant to their ability to announce their readiness for trial (People v Dushain, 247 AD2d 234, 236 [1st Dept 1998]).

The People are charged with 50 days from December 18, 2025, through February 6, 2026. The People's January 5, 2026 COC was invalid, and therefore their COR of the same date was illusory (Bay, 41 NY3d at 204). The People are charged a total of 91 days. This exceeds the People's 90-day limit, and the defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: May 28, 2026

New York, NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The People cite People v Whitney for the proposition that "initial attempts at conferral within a week of the 35-day deadline are generally not [timely]" (88 Misc 3d 905, 910 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025]). This Court views the issue differently in light of both the statutory text and the practical realities of criminal defense practice. Before meaningful conferral can occur, attorneys must organize, review, and assess discovery, while also maintaining substantial caseloads and often-daily court obligations. Under those circumstances, four weeks to complete a thorough discovery review is not unreasonable as a general rule.

2.   Though the email exchange regarding the outstanding discoverable materials was not included in the People's affirmation in opposition, the People subsequently submitted them to the court for review.

Ilona B. Coleman, J.