The People of the State of New York, v. S. Young, Defendant. (2026)

This class A misdemeanor case began with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint on November 28, 2025. The last day of the C.P.L. § 30.30 statutory speedy trial period was 90 days later: February 26, 2026.

The People intended to declare ready on that day, beginning the filing process via the Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS) at some time before midnight. Having prepared their filing, the People pressed "send documents" in the waning moments of February 26, at 11:59p.m.

According to the People, however, the EDDS system did not fully process their submission for another twelve seconds, pushing official acknowledgement of their filing into 12:00a.m. on February 27. (The People's unsworn representations about the submission process are credited for the purpose of this decision.) People's Resp. at 9. As a result, the supporting deposition, certificate of compliance (COC), and off-calendar statement of readiness all bear EDDS headers of "2/27/2026 12:00 AM." The EDDS receipt mailed to the People upon submission says, "On 02/27/2026, the EDDS system received the documents listed below," with each document having a "received date" of February 27. People's Resp. at 16-17 (pdf pag.).

Through counsel, defendant S. Young  ¹ now moves to dismiss, contending that the People were not ready within the 90-day period established by C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). See Defense's Mot. at 5 (pdf pag.). The People oppose, arguing primarily that because they submitted their documents before midnight, they should receive the benefit of the February 26 filing date even though the EDDS system delayed completion of the transaction until 12:00a.m. on the 91st day, because they clearly attempted to file on time and "missed the mark by mere seconds." People's Resp. at 10.

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The People's response presupposes that a 12:00a.m. filing would in fact be too late. See People's Resp. at 9. The issue is somewhat more complicated, but as explained at greater length below, the People's initial instinct is ultimately correct.

General Construction Law § 19 provides the relevant definition of a "day" for § 30.30 purposes: "A calendar day includes the time from midnight to midnight." G.C.L. § 19; see also People v. Licius, 45 NY3d 109, 112 (2025) (clarifying that the § 19 definition controls). However, the General Construction Law does not define midnight, which "occurs twice on any given day, once at its beginning and again at its end." Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Villafana, 82 Misc 2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1975); accord People v. A.B., 87 Misc 3d 1239(A), 2025 NY Slip Op 51844(U), at *5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2025) (Shamahs, J.).

Relying on § 19, or on comparable language from similar statutes and rules—the definition now found in § 19 dates from at least the nineteenth century, see L. 1892, c. 677, § 27, reprinted in 1 The Revised Statutes of the State of New York 116 (Charles A. Collin ed., 9th ed. 1896), available at https://ia801706.us.archive.org/28/items/revisedstatutes01collgoog/revisedstatutes01collgoog.pdf—some decisions make reference to a day beginning at 12:01a.m., although not generally where that distinction would be meaningful. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 80 Misc 3d 932, 939-40 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2023) (concluding that a 12:01a.m. filing was untimely, but allowing that a filing "on or before 12:00a.m." might have been timely); In re Janklow, 589 N.W.2d 624, 626-27 (S.D. 1999) (construing similar language to conclude that a day begins at 12:01a.m.). If that were so, and the entirety of the 12:00a.m. minute belonged to the prior day, the People's 12:00a.m. filing would not be late at all.²

While there is no need to definitively resolve the question, to define the § 19 reference to "midnight" as including the entire post-midnight minute in the previous day is both counterintuitive and against common usage. Doing so also is in no way compelled by a plain reading of § 19 or by any other apparent source of binding authority.

Instead, an interpretation that hews much closer to common usage would deem a new day to begin "the instant after midnight of the preceding day," meaning the moment after the clock strikes 12:00a.m. State v. Soloman, 571 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. 1977) (emphasis added). Plenty of courts take this view. See, e.g., People v. Curran, No. CR-014577-25BX, Slip Op. at 4-5 & n.3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (Ortner, J.); Cerro Wire Inc. v. Southwire Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1336 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 2011) ("[T]he sixty seconds immediately following the stroke of midnight is the first minute of a day."); Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (observing that "the duration of a time period which grants or denies rights" expires at "the stroke of midnight"); Loughran v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 92 A. 55, 55 (N.J. 1914) (describing resignation as taking effect "at the stroke of midnight"). So will this one, at least for the purposes of this decision and in light of the People's position.

Thus, because the People acknowledge that filing was complete some moments after midnight, see People's Resp. at 9, their submission is facially late. And while the law usually does not recognize fractions of a day, Schneider v. Rockefeller, 31 NY2d 420, 435 n.7 (1972), that rule bends when fractions are material, as is the case here. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 225 n.29 (1980); Marvin v. Marvin, 75 NY 240, 243 (1878); Bacalokonstantis v. Nichols, 141 AD2d 482, 484 (2d Dept. 1988).

In nevertheless arguing against dismissal, the People's contend that despite the facial lateness of their filing, they should not be penalized for the twelve seconds of lag between the time they pushed "send documents" on EDDS at 11:59p.m. and the subsequent acknowledgment of their submission at 12:00a.m. People's Resp. at 9-10. In the People's view, they should receive the benefit of the earlier filing time, which fell just before the deadline.

But the People do not cite any authority in support of this argument. And at least without more marshaled in its favor, the argument does not persuade.

For one, "filing" generally requires delivery of papers to the court, not just the act of sending them. See C.P.L.R. § 2102(a)-(c); Uniform Rules for Courts Exercising Criminal Jurisdiction 200.3-.4 (suggesting that the filing definition of the C.P.L.R. controls in criminal case); Conti v. Clyne, 120 AD3d 884, 885 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Practice Commentaries to C.P.L.R. § 2102 ("It should be emphasized that 'filing' occurs upon the actual delivery of the papers to the County Clerk and not upon mailing."); Miller v. Annucci, 37 NY3d 996, 998 (2021) ("Indeed, 'filing' has long been understood to occur only upon actual receipt by the appropriate court clerk[.]"); cf. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2006) (articulating the analogous federal rule). So to the extent that the People are arguing for a time-of-sending doctrine, that proposal strains against the usual rule.³

A narrower argument premised on EDDS transmission also is not convincing, at least without more, and would likely prove unworkable. The People do not suggest that the twelve-second lag is either a technical fault or an unreasonable processing duration. More to the point, the People cannot specify when delivery actually occurred in those twelve seconds, let alone argue with any confidence that the system's acknowledgment of their filing did not mark the moment that filing and delivery were truly complete. And, absent an audit of EDDS or an analysis of the People's outbound internet traffic at the time of submission—assuming, for these purposes, both that delivery is complete at the time the files are fully transmitted and that EDDS's processing does not itself constitute delivery—it is unclear how the People would specify the moment of delivery, either in this case or other cases.

The difficulty of pinpointing the exact moment of filing is why electronic filing systems (and courts interpreting their rules) often specify that filing is complete only when a receipt is generated. See, e.g., Franklin v. McHugh, 804 F.3d 627, 630-31(2d Cir. 2015). Sometimes they do so in ways that anticipate or address the precise situation at issue here. For instance, the Southern District of New York requires that electronic filing be "completed before midnight local time where the Court is located in order [for a document] to be considered timely filed that day." S.D.NY ECF Rule 3.3 (emphasis added); see also In re Sands, 328 B.R. 614, 615-19 (Bankr. N.D.NY 2005) (filing that was initiated before deadline but completed after deadline was untimely); Berman v. Cong. Towers Ltd. P'ship-Section I, 325 F. Supp. 2d 590, 592-94 (D. Md. 2004) (filing initiated just before midnight, but completed afterwards, was untimely when, among other things, the court's procedures manual cautioned users that the date of completion would control).

Those decisions do not govern here, of course, and would not compel the same conclusion if EDDS, New York court procedures, or other sources of authority specified a different rule. But the People do not point to any other relevant authority suggesting that a different rule applies, and EDDS does not otherwise appear to have a mechanism to give a party the benefit of an initiation time—that is, to record the time a transaction is initiated or the "send documents" button is pressed.

Accordingly, the People do not provide any reason, or workable broader rule, that would credit the earlier filing time. They cannot specify when the documents were actually delivered to the court, or offer any assurance that the documents were "filed" at a specific, articulable point between the pressing of the "send documents" button and EDDS's final acknowledgment. The path of least resistance favors the defense: absent any instruction to the contrary, the completion date controls.

Two other issues bear mentioning.

First, the People argue that there was no prejudice from the late filing because all discovery had been provided, and thus that dismissal is not warranted. See People's Resp. at 9. Although Young frames his motion in part as a challenge to the validity of the COC, see Defense's Mot. at 6 (pdf pag.), the primary issue here is not the validity of the COC, but the timeliness of the People's declaration of readiness. Prejudice arising from COC or discovery defects is not relevant when the People do not declare ready on time. See People v. Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 934 (1979) (per curiam).

Second, and perhaps more saliently, this is not an exceptional circumstance that would justify excluding the final day of otherwise-chargeable time under C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(g). Cf. Grskovic v. Holmes, 111 AD3d 234, 243 (2d Dept. 2013) (concluding that, in a civil case, a court cannot excuse a "clearly untimely filing" via C.P.L.R. § 2001). EDDS did not glitch or crash, thereby preventing the People from timely filing. There were not unforeseen technical difficulties. Compare with People v. Ramirez, 75 Misc 3d 931, 935-36, 170 N.Y.S.3d 832, 836 (N.Y.C Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2022) (Holderness, J.) (suggesting that "an EDDS malfunction would qualify as an exceptional circumstance" where "there was no intentional inaction on the part of the prosecution" (emphasis added)). And as mentioned above, a twelve-second lag in transmitting multiple files is also far from egregious or unexpected.

A party takes a risk by filing on the final day of a deadline, and a greater risk still if the party does so as the pivotal moment approaches. "Computers can crash, and a court's e-filing software can have bugs," but a document filed late is still late, and "[a] prudent litigant or lawyer must allow time for difficulties on the filer's end." Justice v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 682 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2012). The People did not otherwise seek an extension of time or make any relevant application before this motion schedule was set. So, under these circumstances, there is no basis to exclude any time, under § 30.30(4)(g) or for any other reason. Cf. S.E.C. v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to disturb finding of untimely filing that resulted from technical electronic filing problems).

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The People's declaration of readiness took effect just after the § 30.30 deadline expired. "Filing deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced." United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985). Accordingly, because the People did not become ready in time, dismissal is required. People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 (2024).

It is therefore ORDERED that Young's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the accusatory instrument is DISMISSED. Unless the People make an application to stay sealing, the matter will also be SEALED as of the calendar appearance following or coinciding with this decision and order being issued. The separate omnibus motion is DENIED as academic.

Dated: May 29, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information.

2.   Some venues have gotten ahead of this potential ambiguity by specifying that filings are due by 11:59p.m. on the relevant date. See, e.g., 5th Cir. R. 25.2.4; 9th Cir. R. 22-5(d)(2); D. Colo. Civ. R. 77.1; Commercial Division Part 48 R. 5(A).

3.   The People might be on firmer ground if only an off-calendar statement of readiness were at issue, as the leading Court of Appeals decisions address off-calendar readiness statements "sent by the prosecutor" to the appropriate court clerk to stop the clock. People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 403 (2016) (emphasis added); see People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 (1985); see also People v. Licius, 45 NY3d 109, 113 (2025) (addressing the valid "submi[ssion]" of a statement of readiness by EDDS). While these decisions are generally read to impose a filing requirement—see, e.g., People v. Cox, 161 AD3d 1100, 1100 (2d Dept. 2018); People v. Brooks, 88 Misc 3d 327, 329 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2025)—there may be a nonfrivolous argument in favor of a transmission rule in certain contexts.Here, though, the supporting deposition and COC were transmitted alongside the statement of readiness—and both of those documents must be filed, not just sent, for the People to validly declare ready. See C.P.L. §§ 100.20 (requiring the filing of a supporting deposition); 245.50(3) (requiring a COC to be "filed" as a prerequisite to readiness); see also Brown, 28 NY3d at 403-04 (emphasizing that the People must actually be ready at the time they declare ready). Any argument based on a different rule for off-calendar statements of readiness would thus be unavailing in these particular circumstances.

David L. Goodwin, J.