Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Joseph Grimmet, Defendant.
The defense moves for dismissal pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30 (1) (b) and 170.30 (1) (e). The primary issue before the court is whether the People should be charged with an unexcused failure to file their opposition to the defense omnibus motion until 21 days after their court-ordered deadline. Relying primarily on People v CC 1 (CR-002318-26NY, Crim Ct, NY County, Aug. 12, 2026), the defense argues that such delays must be charged under CPL § 30.30. The People oppose, arguing that their post-readiness delinquency did not result in any actual delay in the proceedings.
For the reasons that follow, the People are charged with 90 days of speedy trial time, and the motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED.
I. Relevant Facts
The defendant was arrested on March 31, 2026, and that same day the People filed a misdemeanor information charging him with violating VTL § 1192 (2-a) and related offenses. The defendant was arraigned the next day, and the case was adjourned to May 21, 2026, for trial.On May 21, 2026, the People were not ready for trial, and the case was adjourned to July 14, 2026, for trial. On June 29, 2026, the People filed a certificate of compliance (COC) and certificate of readiness (COR).
On July 14, 2026, the People were ready for trial. However, the defense requested an adjournment to review discovery, and the case was adjourned to August 12, 2026, for trial.
On August 12, 2026, the People were again ready for trial. The defense requested an adjournment to file an omnibus motion, and the court adjourned the case to October 6, 2026, for decision. On August 18, 2026, the court emailed the parties informing them that the defense motion would be due on August 26, 2026, and the People's opposition would be due on September 9, 2026.
The defense filed their omnibus motion on August 25, 2026. The People did not file their opposition on September 9, 2026, nor did they contact the court to request an extension. On September 30, 2026, the court emailed the People, inquiring whether they intended to file an opposition. That same day, the People filed their opposition. On October 5, 2026, the court emailed its decision to the parties.
On October 6, 2026, the defense filed the instant motion to dismiss, and the court set a motion schedule. The People's opposition was due on October 20, 2026. By October 21, 2026, the People had failed to file an opposition, and the court inquired whether the People still intended to respond. The People then requested an extension to the next day. On October 22, 2026, the People filed an opposition. The defense filed their reply on October 29, 2026, in accordance with the motion schedule.
II. CPL § 30.30
In this case, in which the defendant is charged with an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days of imprisonment and no felonies, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). On a motion to dismiss, the defense must initially allege that the People were not ready for trial within the applicable time limit. Until the People answer ready for trial, all delay must be charged to the People unless they meet their burden of proving that an exclusion applies under CPL § 30.30 (4). However, once the People validly answer ready for trial, the People may only be charged with delay that is "attributable to their inaction and directly implicates their ability to proceed to trial" (People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]), and the defense bears the burden of demonstrating that such delay exists (People v Daniels, 217 AD2d 448, 452 [1st Dept 1995]). With these principles in mind, the court makes the following findings.
First, the People are charged with 90 days from the commencement of the action on March 31, 2026, through the filing of the People's COR on June 29, 2026. The People have not identified any CPL § 30.30 (4) exclusions that apply to pre-readiness delay, nor would the record support applying such exclusions. The People incorrectly count the pre-readiness delay as 89 days because they assume that the criminal action commenced with the defendant's arraignment. In fact, the Criminal Procedure Law explicitly states that "[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court" (CPL 1.20 [17]). Thus, the one day from the filing of the accusatory instrument through the defendant's arraignment is charged to the People, along with the subsequent 89 days. The defense has not challenged the validity of the People's COR, and it is therefore uncontested that the speedy trial clock stopped on June 29, 2026.
Next, the defense argues that the People must be charged with the time between their motion deadlines and the dates on which they either filed their affirmations in opposition or requested an extension. CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) excludes "a reasonable period of delay resulting from . . . pre-trial motions," and adjournments for motion practice are typically also excludable pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (4) (b) because they are usually "granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel." However, when the People miss a filing deadline without requesting an extension or offering an explanation (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a], [g]), their lateness may be charged against them (People v Reid, 245 AD2d 44, 44 [1st Dept 1997]; People v Commack, 194 AD2d 619, 620 [2d Dept 1993]). CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) only excludes a "reasonable period of delay resulting from . . . pre-trial motions" (emphasis added), and an unexplained failure to meet a filing deadline is not reasonable (see People v Gonzalez, 266 AD2d 562, 563 [2d Dept 1999]; People ex rel. Nieves v Maginley-Liddie, 223 AD3d 859, 860 [2d Dept 2024]). Further, delay caused by an unexplained failure to meet a deadline has not "result[ed] from . . . pre-trial motions" (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]), but rather from the People's "dilatoriness" (Reid, 245 AD2d at 44).
However, if the People's late filing does not delay the resolution of the motion beyond the originally scheduled decision date, the People's lateness "cannot be said to have caused any delay whatsoever in the progress of the case" and therefore does not result in chargeable time (People v Nivol, 225 AD3d 630, 631 [2d Dept 2024] [quoting People v Beasley, 69 AD3d 741, 743 [2d Dept 2010]], lv denied, 41 NY3d 1020 [2024]; see also People v Guthrie, 250 AD3d 754, 757 [2d Dept 2026], lv denied, 46 NY3d 927 [2026]; People v Austin, 115 AD3d 1063, 1064 [3d Dept 2014]). In the absence of a contrary holding from the Court of Appeals or the Appellate Division, First Department, the holdings of Nivol, Guthrie, and Austin are binding on this court. The First Department does not appear to have addressed this issue directly, but its holdings are consistent with this approach. In People v Bonilla, for example, the court specifically charged the People with "the 28-day delay in resolving the motion" (94 AD3d 633, 634 [1st Dept 2012] [emphasis added]). Similarly, in People v Reid, the Court noted that the People's "abject dilatoriness . . . delayed resolution of the motion for many months" (245 AD2d at 44).
The defense has not identified any binding precedent contrary to Nivol, Guthrie, and Austin, nor is this court aware of any. In support of their position, the defense relies primarily on People v CC (Crim Ct, NY County, CR-002318-26NY, Aug 12, 2026). The court in CC, however, did not directly address this issue, because the People's late filing in that case did delay the motion's resolution (see id. at 2). To the extent the language in CC seems to state an absolute rule that lateness must be charged regardless of the surrounding circumstances, it is dicta from a court of coordinate jurisdiction that is unsupported by appellate precedent. The defense also relies on People v Gonzalez, but in that case, too, the People's late filing delayed the resolution of the motion (see 266 AD2d at 562). None of the other cases cited by the defense, or by the court in CC, explicitly address whether the People should be charged even where no delay results from their late filing, and to the extent the facts can be gleaned from the opinions, the resolution of the motion seems to have been delayed in each case. This court therefore considers itself to be bound by the explicit holdings of Nivol, Guthrie, and Austin.
In this case, the uncontested facts demonstrate conclusively that the People's lateness did not cause any delay in resolving the motion. On August 12, 2026, the case was on for trial, and the People answered ready for trial. As the defense concedes, the court adjourned the case for motion practice with a decision date of October 6, 2026, at defense counsel's request. Despite the People's late filing, the court issued its decision before the scheduled decision date. Because the People's lateness did not affect the decision date, which was set at the defense's request (see CPL 30.30 [4] [b]), it has not "led to any delay in the proceedings or impeded the trial's commencement" (Austin, 115 AD3d at 1064). While this court does not condone the People's unprofessional conduct, this court has observed before that CPL § 30.30 is not an open-ended mechanism for imposing sanctions (People v Torres, 88 Misc 3d 1254[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2026]). Rather, its purpose is to determine the extent to which the People are responsible for delay. Here, the People's late filing has not caused any delay, and the time therefore cannot be charged to them (Nivol, 225 AD3d at 631; Austin, 115 AD3d at 1064).
The court therefore finds that the People are charged with a total of 90 days. The People have not exceeded their 90-day limit (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]), and the defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.
Dated: October 30, 2026
New York, NY
_________________________________
Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.
FOOTNOTES
1. This decision is unpublished, and the underlying case is sealed.
Ilona B. Coleman, J.
Thank you for your feedback!
As the largest network of trusted legal brands, we help firms build authority across the platforms consumers and AI systems rely on most. Our network helps attorneys strengthen visibility, credibility, and preference where legal decisions begin.
Docket No: CR-009463-26NY
Decided: October 30, 2026
Court: Criminal Court, City of New York.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Make It a Preferred Google Search Source
Add to GoogleGet help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)