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The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. C. PULIQUIZHPI, Defendant.
Defendant C. Puliquizhpi 1 again challenges the People's discovery compliance and moves to dismiss this case on speedy trial grounds, contending that late-disclosed discovery—additional body-worn camera footage of a subsequent search his car, as well as five photographs of the interior—calls into question whether the People's original efforts at discovery compliance reflected the requisite due diligence. The People oppose, arguing in part that relitigation of the validity of the certificate of compliance (COC) and any supplemental certificates of compliance (SCOCs) is barred.
As explained below, because the new disclosures do not fatally undermine the People's prior COC and SCOCs, the motion will be DENIED on the merits.
I. Background
The Charges
The background of this case has already been addressed in two prior decisions. See People v. Puliquizhpi, 88 Misc 3d 1254(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50536(U) (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co.) [Puliquizhpi I], reargument denied, 89 Misc 3d 1214(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50942(U) (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2026) [Puliquizhpi II]. The reader's familiarity with them is assumed.
In brief, this is a drunk driving case with a twist. The Intoxilyzer machine used to conduct the chemical breath test was taken out of service due to diagnostic failure about a month after the June 19, 2025 breath test.
After his arrest, Puliquizhpi was arraigned June 20, the day the misdemeanor accusatory instrument appears to have been filed. The People declared ready on September 3.
Initial Discovery Challenges and Decisions
Puliquizhpi's initial October 2025 challenge to the People's discovery compliance was premised mainly on the alleged withholding of materials associated with the Intoxilyzer's diagnostic failure. In denying that challenge and validating the People's original COC, this Court concluded:
The record establishes outreach and efforts that were reasonable and tailored to produce discoverable material. . . . [T]he People provided extensive discovery pertaining to the pending charges and engaged in reasonable efforts to ascertain and make available that discovery. Their responses to defense inquiries were timely and thorough, and the Intoxilyzer materials that were belatedly disclosed were provided within the extended conferral window.
Puliquizhpi I, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50536(U), at *4-5. The Court also observed that because Puliquizhpi focused on the Intoxilyzer issue, he had not "directly address[ed] the People's record of outreach, or otherwise argue[d] that the People's efforts outside of the narrow issue of the Intoxilyzer's failure represented a lack of due diligence." Id. at *4.
Puliquizhpi moved for reargument and renewal in April 2026, contending (on reargument) that the initial decision had overlooked his broader challenges to the People's overall record of outreach. The Court disagreed, as the papers cited in support generally referred to the Intoxilyzer issue, not the People's other discovery efforts. See Puliquizhpi II, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50942(U), at *1-2. He had thus not shown "that anything was overlooked." Id. at *2.
The original decision was from March 2026; the reargument decision was from May. The pretrial motions posture spanned, from October 2025 through May 2026, spanned around seven months.
New Discovery, Including Body-Worn Camera Footage, on the Eve of the Suppression Hearing
The case was then scheduled for a July suppression hearing. This new motion arises from new discovery material uncovered and disclosed during the People's preparation for the suppression hearing.
First, in a late June meeting with the officer, the People were provided with five new photographs. Defense's Aff. ¶ 17; People's Aff. ¶ 75.2 Those photographs, which apparently showed "evidence such as beer bottles and a 6 pack of beer," Defense's Mot. at 12, were then disclosed to the defense.
The pattern repeated in July, shortly before the hearing. Another meeting with the arresting officer produced yet more new discovery: additional body-worn camera footage of the officer's search—possibly a second search—of Puliquizhpi's car. Defense's Aff. ¶ 18; People's Aff. ¶ 76; see also Defense's Mot. at 12 (explaining that the officer "conducted a subsequent search of Mr. Puliquizhpi's vehicle which was recorded on BWC").
The Suppression Hearing
During the July 14 suppression hearing, the People utilized some of the late-disclosed photographs at the hearing, but not the body-worn camera video. See Defense's Aff. ¶¶ 19—21. The judge presiding reserved decision, set a new motion schedule, and granted the defense a good-cause extension so that any new discovery challenge would encompass both the June and July disclosures and the accompanying SCOCs. See Defense's Aff. ¶ 26.
The Current Motion
Puliquizhpi filed his new motion on August 14, 2026. It is now fully briefed and ripe for decision. Because it implicated the prior decisions about the People's discovery compliance, the judge who presided over the suppression hearing and set the schedule transferred the motion to the undersigned for decision.
II. The Parties' Arguments
In the new motion, Puliquizhpi challenges the validity of both the original COC and all subsequent SCOCs, as the belated disclosure of the photographs and body-worn camera footage undermines the People's prior claims of discovery compliance. Defense's Mot. at 1, 12.
In particular, the People must not have had a "substantive conversation with" the arresting officer prior to the summer of 2026, because any conversation would have revealed the omitted discovery. Id. at 16.
By extension, the People could not have been ready for trial at the time they originally declared ready. First, they used two of the photographs at the hearing, which they did not possess at the time they declared ready. Id. at 17. Second, they could not have been ready because they had not yet discussed the case with the arresting officer; their statement of readiness was instead just a prediction of future readiness, which is not permissible. Id.
Regarding prejudice to the defense, Puliquizhpi contends that the belated discovery was not duplicative or insignificant. There "had been no prior information or photographs taken of the 6 pack of beer and there was no information, report of any discovery that mentioned a subsequent search was conducted of the vehicle." Id. at 16.
In response, the People point out that the validity of the original COC and SCOC was already litigated. Relying on C.P.L. § 245.50(1-a), which says that the filing of a SCOC does not undermine the original COC, the People assert that Puliquizhpi cannot "relitigate the validity of the original COC as though the previous ruling had never occurred." People's Resp. Mem. at 2. Thus, the scope of the current motion should be limited to possible discovery sanctions only, without invalidation of the COC/SCOCs and dismissal as options. People's Resp. Mem. at 2-4.
On the merits, the People emphasize that they were in touch with the arresting officer near the commencement of the case, following up repeatedly throughout the initial readiness period. See People's Resp. Mem. at 3-4. As they did in the original round of motion practice, the People attach a June 23, 2025 email to the arresting officer from the assigned Assistant District Attorney, sent just three days after arraignment. In the email, the Assistant District Attorney asked for "All BWC" and, in a catch-all request for "all other evidence," specifically mentioned "photos and videos taken on scene." People's Resp., Ex. 1 at 1; see also People's Original Motion Resp., Ex. 1 at 1. The Assistant also texted the officer that same day to specifically ask for, among other things, body-worn camera footage for the purposes of preparing a statement notice. See id. at 9 (pdf pag.).
The People also argue that there has been no prejudice from the delayed disclosures. One of the "new" photographs had in fact already been shared, and the one missing video is outweighed by the over 50 videos properly and timely disclosed. See People's Resp. Mem. at 6-7.
In reply, Puliquizhpi emphasizes that Article 245 permits challenges to earlier COCs whose validity may have been undermined by subsequent discovery disclosures. Defense's Reply at 1-2. The People have otherwise not explained why it took them over a year to reach out to the arresting officer or learn about the photographs. Defense's Reply at 2-3. And their admission that they did not reach out to the officer at the time of their original COC shows that their statement of readiness was illusory, as "they weren't actually prepared and 'ready' when they filed their SOR." Id.
III. Legal Standard
A COC is valid if it is the product of due diligence and good faith (although the latter has not been meaningfully challenged here). "Due diligence," in this context, means that the COC (or SCOC) must be the product of reasonable inquiries and efforts to find and disclose all relevant initial discovery. See C.P.L. § 245.50(1); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211-12 (2023). Under the August 2025 revisions to Article 245, the People's diligence must be assessed holistically and under the totality of the circumstances—an inquiry guided by the nonexhaustive set of factors set out in § 245.50(5)(a). See C.P.L. § 245.50(5), (5)(b).
The People bear the burden of demonstrating their diligence. Bay, 41 NY3d at 213. If they do not do so, the relevant COC or SCOC is deemed improper, associated statements of readiness are struck as illusory, and (if the speedy trial § 30.30 time has run) the accusatory instrument is dismissed. Id.
IV. Discussion
As explained below, the People's threshold argument about a procedural bar does not persuade, at least as presented.3 Article 245 specifically contemplates COC-challenge motions based on belated disclosures, and a court has inherent authority to reconsider its prior decisions (accounting for reliance interests). Puliquizhpi's challenge nevertheless fails on the merits.
The structure of article 245 does not support the People's argument that a COC's validity cannot be revisited, even if additional discovery is belatedly provided. Section 245.50(4)(c)(ii), for instance, explicitly contemplates "challenge[s to] the validity of the certificate" premised on "the belated disclosure of discoverable material," and says nothing about whether those challenges must be initial challenges or, as here, renewed challenges.
The People's reliance to the contrary on C.P.L. § 245.50(1-a) seems misplaced. The People quote § 245.50(1-a) for the principle that the filing of a SCOC "shall not impact the validity of the original certificate of compliance if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence." But the sentence before that one says, "[a]ny supplemental certificate of compliance shall detail the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance." C.P.L. § 245.50(1-a) (emphasis added). In other words, § 245.50(1-a) itself anticipates that new discovery disclosures might permit challenges to the original COC.
That this is a successive challenge would not appear to require a different result. A criminal court has inherent authority to reexamine its own prior prejudgment decisions. See People v. Lawson, 43 NY3d 939, 942 (2024); see also People v. Allen, --- AD3d ---, 2026 NY Slip Op. 04880, at *3 (2d Dept. 2026) (in the context of a quasi-civil SORA appeal, discussing how all courts retain discretion to revisit their prior intermediate decisions). Motions, meanwhile, are generally evaluated based on their substance, not the labels affixed by the parties. See Taliento v. Taliento, 246 AD3d 1129, 1130 (2d Dept. 2026); see also Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 439 (3d Cir. 2021) (addressing similar federal rule). Thus, even though Puliquizhpi filed this as a "new" motion, and not explicitly as a motion for renewal, both framings can be considered.
In sum, the People's threshold procedural objection does not persuade.4
However, Puliquizhpi's motion falls short on the merits. As recognized in the previous decisions, the People provided extensive and thorough discovery within the statutory period; their COC reflects disclosure of a wide array of material, arguably above and beyond what one would expect in a case like this one. Thus, his challenge will be denied.
These belated disclosures do not call into question the reasonableness of the People's initial efforts to make available all relevant discovery, for several reasons. First, and following from the above, the late-disclosed material is dwarfed by "the volume of discovery" provided in time. C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a). Second, the People's (apparently uncontested) suggestion that one of the five photographs had been disclosed, and the defense's reference to the search as being a "subsequent" search of the car, suggests there is at least some duplication to material already possessed. More to the point, this is a drunk-driving case, and while the belatedly disclosed material appears to pertain to suppressible evidence, it does not necessarily implicate the core elements of the charges.
But even with the above set aside, discovery compliance is ultimately a case-specific inquiry about whether the People have made reasonable efforts and inquiries to fulfill their statutory discovery obligations. Bay, 41 NY3d at 211-12. A belated disclosure, even if important, will not necessarily undermine the validity of a COC if the People meet their (related) burden of building a record that shows reasonable and diligent efforts to assembly a timely and comprehensive discovery package. Cf. People v. Zeigler, 88 Misc 3d 131(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50232(U), at *2 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2026); see also People v. Martinez-Perez, 87 Misc 3d 130(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 51648(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2025) (addressing the proper development of the record).
The People have more than met that burden here. The record reflects outreach to the arresting officer within days of the arraignment on this case, both by email and by text message.5 The People specifically requested body-worn camera footage and any other relevant evidence. The arresting officer, and others at the NYPD, provided extensive impeachment material, body-worn camera footage, IDTU paperwork, 911 calls, and other discovery documents. And the record further reveals that the People timely followed up regarding certain perceived omissions or glitches in the discovery that had been provided.
This omission also was not "obvious" from the broader record, which means that it is difficult to fault the People for not becoming aware of it sooner. Bay, 41 NY3d at 212. Puliquizhpi does not contend otherwise; to the contrary, he asserts that there had been "no information" in what was provided previously "that mentioned a subsequent search was conducted of the vehicle." Defense's Mot. at 16. Since the omission was not evident or obvious, it does not, in this context, undermine the People's claim of diligent efforts.
Finally, the People swiftly corrected the omissions. They provided each batch of new discovery within a few days of receipt and filed SCOCs to appropriately alert the defense.
In sum, an assessment of the circumstances and C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a) factors (all of which have been considered, even if not mentioned) leads to the same conclusion as before: "the People provided extensive discovery pertaining to the pending charges and engaged in reasonable efforts to ascertain and make available that discovery," while remaining responsive to defense inquiries and swiftly providing any new discovery and information that they obtained. Puliquizhpi I, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50536(U), at *5. Put another way, the belated disclosures do not undermine the conclusion that "the People acted in good faith and exercised due diligence prior to filing the" relevant COC and SCOCs. People v. Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1007 (3d Dept. 2024). On this record, the arresting officer's mistake does not undermine the reasonableness of the People's inquiries and efforts.
Puliquizhpi's additional arguments to the contrary do not persuade.
As an initial matter, his challenges to the People's fundamental readiness for trial may be barred by C.P.L. § 30.30(5)(a), which says that discovery noncompliance undermines a statement of readiness only if the COC is also invalid. Thus, to the extent that Puliquizhpi argues that the People's true readiness hinged on material that was not disclosed until recently, § 30.30(5)(a) might forestall those arguments, as the COCs were not deemed invalid.
In any event, the People's use of some of the relevant discovery at the hearing does not mean the People would have been unable to proceed via different means. Their case might have been stronger with the new discovery, but their ability to proceed is what matters. Cf. People v. Wright, 50 AD3d 429, 430 (1st Dept. 2008) ("[T]he People could have tried this case on the basis of eyewitness testimony alone, and the wisdom of doing so is irrelevant for speedy trial purposes.").
His contention that the People could not have been ready without meeting one-on-one with the arresting officer overstates what is required for a valid initial declaration of readiness. The People become ready for trial under § 30.30 when they "have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried." People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 404 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Initial readiness does not require the ability to begin trial immediately, as "neither statute nor case law requires that the People . . . produce their witnesses instantaneously in order for a statement of readiness to be valid," and the People are not otherwise "required to contact their witnesses on each and every adjourned date." People v. Dushain, 247 AD2d 234, 236 (1st Dept. 1998); see also People v. Chalupa, 66 Misc 3d 139(A), 2020 NY Slip Op. 50096(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2020) (same); People v. Dauphin, 112 AD3d 471, 471 (1st Dept. 2013) ("Actual readiness does not require that the People be able to call their first witness to the stand at the very moment they represent that they are ready[.]"). And, as a practical matter, trial does not start in this court without ample advance notice to the parties accompanied by a designated trial date in the trial part.
For similar reasons, the period of time that elapsed before the People's initial interview does not undermine their readiness. The People were in touch with the arresting officer via email and text, with nothing to suggest that there was anything inadequate about this mode of contact.
More to the point, the reason the People's initial interview came so late was that this case was in a pretrial motions posture for a long while, resulting in hearings being scheduled more than a year after the case's commencement. There is nothing wrong with that lengthy period, of course. It just means there was no reason for the People to prep their main witness for pretrial suppression hearings until there were actually pretrial suppression hearings on the calendar.
Thus, Puliquizhpi's additional arguments do not undermine the validity of the COC or call into question the People's initial declaration of readiness, to the extent that such a challenge would not be barred by C.P.L. § 30.30(5)(a). And since there is no contention that the People become unready at any time since the initial declaration of readiness, his challenge to the COC and to the People's readiness, and his associated dismissal request pursuant to § 30.30, does not succeed.
Puliquizhpi asks in the alternative for discovery sanctions under C.P.L. § 245.80(1)(a). Those may yet be appropriate, but there is not quite enough context in the current set of motion papers to shed light on an appropriate or proportionate remedy or sanction, in part because the actual prejudice to the defense is somewhat unclear. The suppression decision may also render the issue moot in part. Accordingly, a decision on sanctions should be reserved for the trial court, and the parties should prepare pretrial applications accordingly.
***
For the above reasons, Puliquizhpi's motion is DENIED. The parties should anticipate presenting arguments about discovery sanctions to whichever judge conducts the trial in this matter.
Dated: November 4, 2026
Bronx, NY
David L. Goodwin
Judge of the Criminal Court
FOOTNOTES
1. The version of this decision submitted for publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information.
2. The People say in their memorandum that one of the five had already been provided. See People's Resp. at 4.
3. The current motion was filed within the extended good-cause deadline, and the People raise no untimeliness defense. However, the post-August-2025 version of Article 245, unlike its predecessor, appears to impose no actual deadline on COC-challenge motions premised on belated discovery. Compare C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c) (2024) (requiring COC challenges to be brought "as soon as practicable"), with C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c), (c)(ii) (2026) (requiring challenges to be brought within 35 days, except when "based upon . . . the belated disclosure of discoverable material"). The Legislature may have intended that such motions be brought within 35 days of the most-recent SCOC, but the statute does not clearly establish that rule. So since Puliquizhpi's actual challenge is to the original COC and perhaps its successor, extending the timeline via a good-cause application may not have been necessary.
4. The People do not address whether newly discovered evidence may be used to relitigate an earlier discovery dispute when, as here, the evidence has nothing to do with the narrower, earlier discovery dispute—and, in effect, re-rolls the dice on all relevant factors instead of only the narrower factors litigated earlier. Since the motion fails on the merits, that issue can await another case.
5. The exhibits in this case appear to reflect the full telephone numbers of the relevant parties. The parties should consider redacting that information (as well as email addresses) if this matter ever ends up in an e-filing court.
David L. Goodwin, J.
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Docket No: Docket No. CR-016901-25BX
Decided: November 04, 2026
Court: Criminal Court, City of New York.
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