The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Angel Collazo, Defendant. (2026)

The defense moves to dismiss the charges of VTL § 600 (2) (a) and PL § 120.20 as facially insufficient (CPL 100.40 [1], 170.30). To be facially sufficient, an information must "set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense," and it must "set forth nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015] [internal quotations and citations omitted]; see also CPL 100.40 [1]). An information that "fail[s] to allege a complete element of the charged offense is jurisdictionally defective," and any such defective charge is subject to dismissal (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]).

The information in this case alleges that, after a police officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop of a car the defendant was operating, the defendant "accelerate[d], dr[ove] at a high speed, swerve[d] between traffic lanes, and d[rove] through three red lights," ultimately "collid[ing] with another moving vehicle" while driving through the third red light. The defendant then allegedly "exit[ed] his vehicle and fle[d] on foot."

As to the charge of VTL § 600 (2) (a), the allegations are insufficient to establish that the defendant "kn[ew] or ha[d] cause to know that personal injury ha[d] been caused to another person" (VTL 600 [2] [a]). The statute requires "that the victim actually sustain . . . [an] injury" (People v Levy, 157 Misc 2d 941, 945 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1993] [emphasis in original]). Here, the information does not contain any allegation that another person suffered an injury. The People seem to agree that VTL § 600 (2) (a) requires an actual injury, not merely the possibility of an injury (see People's opp., p. 5). Nevertheless, they argue that the court can infer that an injury occurred from the fact that the defendant "was driving at a high rate of speed when he hit a moving vehicle" (id. at 4). Without more, those allegations do not support an inference that an injury occurred. While it is certainly possible that an injury could occur any time two moving vehicles collide, there is no basis on which the court could conclude here that an injury did in fact occur. For the same reasons, the allegations are insufficient to support an inference that the defendant knew or had reason to know that personal injury was caused (People v Lewis, 162 AD2d 760, 764 [3d Dept 1990]). The motion to dismiss the charge of VTL § 600 (2) (a) is therefore GRANTED.

However, the allegations are sufficient to establish that the defendant's conduct created a "substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person" (PL 120.20). The information alleges that the defendant was attempting to evade the police, that he was driving at a high rate of speed, that he swerved between lanes, and that he drove through three red lights. These allegations are sufficient to support the mens rea of recklessness. The allegation that the defendant drove through a red light while another vehicle was in the intersection, causing a collision, is sufficient to establish that the defendant's actions created a "substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person" (PL 120.20). The risk of serious physical injury satisfies the statute even if no actual injury resulted. The motion to dismiss the charge of PL § 120.20 is therefore DENIED.

The defense's remaining motions are decided as follows. The motion to suppress is GRANTED to the extent that a Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered. The motion for a bill of particulars is DENIED as the demanded information permissible in a bill of particulars has already been provided. The motions to preclude identification and prior bad acts evidence are referred to the trial court.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: October 19, 2026

New York, NY

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Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.

Ilona B. Coleman, J.