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The People of the State of New York v. Raiyman Mohan, Defendant.
Defendant Raiyman Mohan, charged with Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (PL § 215.50[3]) ("Count One") and Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree (PL § 170.20) ("Count Two") moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that it is facially insufficient. The Defendant also moves for hearings, and for discovery-related relief. The People oppose the Defendant's motions. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. The remaining motions are therefore moot.
I. Factual Allegations
The misdemeanor information alleges that on February 21, 2025, at approximately 12:30 a.m., at the intersection of Broadway and West 40th Street, NYPD Officer Ronald Pierre observed the Defendant operating a motor vehicle. Specifically, Officer Pierre observed that the vehicle engine was running, and that the Defendant was behind the wheel. Officer Pierre also observed a "forged Georgia temporary license plate" affixed to the vehicle. Officer Pierre concluded that the plate was forged based upon "his training and experience as a police officer," as well as the following factors:
(i) the temporary plate had different font than a genuine plate; (ii) the temporary plate was printed on thinner paper than a genuine temporary plate; (iii) the temporary plate had a printed seal versus a sticker seal on a genuine [plate] and (iv) the temporary plate was on paper of a bigger dimension than a genuine temporary plate.
Officer Pierre "observed R.M. and A.Z.1 inside of the defendant's vehicle seated next to the defendant." The information alleges that an Order of Protection, issued in Bronx Supreme Court on June 6, 2024, and in effect until June 5, 2031, directs the Defendant "to stay away from R.M. and A.Z.," and that the Defendant was present in court when the Order of Protection was issued.
II. Legal Standards
An information must contain factual allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information, and non-hearsay factual allegations establishing, if true, that the defendant committed every element of the offense charged. (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]-[c]) This latter requirement, the "prima facie case requirement," is " 'not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial,' nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015], quoting People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 [2009]). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).
III. Analysis
a. Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree
The Defendant argues that the information contains conclusory allegations regarding the identity of the individuals in the car with the Defendant. Specifically, the defense asserts that the information contains no facts supporting Officer Pierre's conclusion that the people in the Defendant's car were R.M. and A.Z., or that the people in the car "were the same people protected by the underlying order of protection." The People respond that "any issue regarding . . . identification" of these individuals "would go to admissibility and weight," rather than facial sufficiency. The Court disagrees.
The factual portion of an accusatory instrument must allege "facts of an evidentiary character" supporting each element of the charged offense (CPL 100.15 [3]). Facts of an evidentiary character are "nonconclusory descriptions of what the deponent personally observed, heard or experienced" (People v Concepcion, 36 Misc 3d 551, 553 [Crim Ct, NY County 2012]). Conclusory statements unsupported by facts showing the basis for the conclusion do not satisfy this requirement (see People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986] [accusatory instrument alleging that defendant sold marihuana facially insufficient where no "evidentiary facts showing the basis for the conclusion that the substance sold was actually marihuana"]; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 104 [2010] [accusatory instrument alleging that defendant possessed a gravity knife facially insufficient where no allegations indicating how officer "formed the belief that the object . . . was a gravity knife").
"This logic" has been "extended beyond contraband" (People v Wilson, 58 Misc 3d 535, 541—42 [Crim Ct, Bronx Cty 2017]). "When a crime involves a child, for instance, a deponent cannot simply state that the person is a child, without providing some factual basis for that determination" (id.).
So too, does this rationale apply to allegations of criminal contempt. Courts have specifically held that a police officer "cannot say that the person he observed with the defendant was the protected party" in an order of protection "without further explanation," because "such an allegation is conclusory" (id.) "Rather, the deponent must set forth some factual basis to support his conclusion that this is the protected party" (id.; see People v Simmons, 62 Misc 3d 1205(A) [Crim Ct, Kings Cty 2018] [accusatory instrument failed to "establish how the officer knew the location that the defendant was allegedly at, was, in fact, the residence of the person the defendant was directed to stay away from"]. "Thus, where the fact at issue is a conclusion that derives solely from another fact or facts that have not been alleged, that fact is a 'conclusory allegation'—whether it be the claim that a substance is marijuana, or the claim that a knife is a prohibited gravity knife," or "a claim that an individual is the party protected by an order of protection"2 (People v Pandiello, 54 Misc 3d 496, 500 [Crim Ct, NY Cty 2016]).
Here, the information states that Officer Pierre "observed R.M. and A.N. inside of the defendant's vehicle seated next to the defendant." The information does not, however, establish how Officer Pierre determined these individuals' identities. Nor does the information indicate how Officer Pierre concluded that these individuals were the same individuals who were named in the underlying order of protection. The People suggest that Officer Pierre "would have gathered" the names and birth dates of the occupants of the car during the vehicle stop. It is by no means clear that this is, in fact, what occurred. And in any event, courts have specifically rejected the argument that "pedigree information should be treated differently than other facts" (id.) when determining facial sufficiency. Accordingly, Count One of the information is dismissed as facially insufficient.
b. Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree
The Defendant argues that the information fails to allege facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that he knew that the license plate was forged. Under the circumstances presented here, the Court agrees.
A person commits Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree when, "with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another," he "possesses a forged instrument" (PL § 170.20). While "possession on one's person permits the inference that a person knows" what he possesses, "when the difference between a forged instrument and a genuine instrument is not readily apparent to a layperson, guilty knowledge may not be inferred unless the People allege additional facts such as the circumstances surrounding the defendant's possession" (People v Bankston, 61 Misc 3d 669 [Crim Ct, NY Cty 2018]). Where an officer concludes, based upon certain characteristics of a license plate, that the license plate is forged, the accusatory instrument must thus also allege "details surrounding the circumstances of the defendant's possession" of the vehicle "to establish the requisite element that defendant had 'knowledge' " that the "license plate was forged" (id.).
Such details include allegations that the defendant is "an owner or ha[s] a possessory interest over the vehicle" (id.; see People v Doudoulgou, 67 Misc 3d 134[A] [Sup Ct, App Term, 1st Dept 2020] ["[D]efendant's knowledge of the forgery and intent to defraud could be inferred from his actions and the surrounding circumstances, including his ownership and operation of a vehicle"; People v Pena, 83 Misc 3d 128[A] [knowledge that NYPD parking permit was forged could "be inferred from [defendant's] actions and the surrounding circumstances, including that he was the registered owner of the vehicle with the forged permit; the conspicuous evidence of the forgery; and the allegation that the forged permit was placed in the front driver's side window, making it visible to defendant every time he utilized the vehicle"). Mere operation of the vehicle is insufficient (Bankston, 61 Misc 3d at 674 ["The absence of facts necessary to establish that the defendant was anything more than the operator of the motor vehicle makes it unfeasible for this court to reasonably infer that the defendant knew that the license plate affixed to the vehicle was forged"]). Indeed, the cases cited by the People involve allegations that the defendant owned the vehicle 3 (see Doudoulgou, 67 Misc 3d 134[A]; People v Calderon, 70 Misc 3d 130[A] [Sup Ct, App Term, 1st Dept 2020]).
Here, the information alleges that the temporary license plate possessed certain characteristics which, based on Officer Pierre's training and experience, led him to believe that the license plate was forged. The information does not, however, include factual allegations from which the Defendant's knowledge of the forgery could be inferred. The information does not allege that the Defendant admitted he owned the vehicle, or that Officer Pierre determined, based on Department of Motor Vehicle documents, that the Defendant had a possessory interest in the vehicle. Without such factual allegations, the accusatory information is facially insufficient.
The Defendant's motion to dismiss the information is granted. Sealing is stayed for 30 days.
This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: July 28, 2026
New York, New York
Kacie A. Lally, J.C.C.
FOOTNOTES
1. The misdemeanor information contains the full names of these individuals. To protect their privacy, the Court refers to them by their initials (see People v Pandiello, 54 Misc 3d 496, 497 fn1 [Crim Ct, NY Cty 2016]).
2. The People seek to distinguish Pandiello by asserting that, in that case, the accusatory instrument referenced the complainant "exclusively by initials" (People's Opp 3). To the contrary, however, the Pandiello Court chose to reference the complainant by initials in its written decision to protect the complainant's privacy (see id., fn1 "To protect [J.M.'s] privacy, in case it is true that the person named in the misdemeanor complaint is the same person named in the orders of protection, the court will not name her"), a practice that this Court follows in the instant decision.
3. The People also cite People v West (58 Misc 3d 157[A] [Sup Ct, App Term, 1st Dept 2018], which does not allege ownership of the vehicle. In that case, however, the defendant waived prosecution by information, and thus "the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint."
Kacie A. Lally, J.
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Docket No: Docket No. CR-005662-26NY
Decided: July 28, 2026
Court: Criminal Court, City of New York.
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