The People of the State of New York, v. J. Ayala, Defendant. (2026)

Pending are the defense's counseled motion to dismiss and separate omnibus motion, both fully briefed.¹ The motions are resolved as follows. Because the parties are the primary audience, familiarity with the case and its procedural history is assumed.

It is hereby ORDERED that the motion seeking to invalidate the certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness, and dismiss the accusatory instrument on C.P.L. § 30.30 grounds, is DENIED.² It is further ORDERED that the branch of the omnibus motion seeking suppression hearings is GRANTED pertaining to the lawfulness of seizure (so-called Mapp/Dunaway) and the propriety of the identification procedure (so-called Wade/Dunaway), with a caveat regarding the latter; the parties may wish to address, either before the judge presiding when this decision is handed down or the hearing judge, whether a new 15-day notice period was triggered by the filing of and arraignment on the superseding accusatory instrument. Any issues pertaining to preclusion or to alleged prior bad acts are REFERRED to the hearing or trial courts. Any application for relief not specifically mentioned is DENIED.

I. Background

Regarding the validity of the COC, this case commenced on February 28, 2026, and the People filed their COC and declared ready 87 days later on May 26. The People's disclosures included activity logs/body-worn camera footage for seven officers, extensive impeachment material for the testifying officers, photographs, chain-of-custody and complaint reports, a Brady letter, and an aided report. See Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. A at 7-8 (pdf pag.).

The People acknowledged in their COC, however, that 911 recordings had not yet been obtained, due to delays associated with a high volume of outstanding requests. The People's own request had been made in mid-March. See Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. A at 2.

Apparently receiving the recordings only a few days later, the People belatedly, but on their own initiative, provided the 911 materials on June 3, which was day 94. The People also provided a video recording from the arresting officer's phone, which they had not previously obtained despite four pre-readiness (but, presumably, not targeted) attempts at outreach. Finally, the People acknowledged that a recording from inside of the incident location had been destroyed because the store's surveillance system retained video for only 30 days. See Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. B at 2-3.

After asking for and receiving consent for additional time to review the relevant discovery materials, the defense (via prior defense counsel) emailed the People on July 9 to confer about missing items. The top entry was the "discovery in the case against" the cross-complainant, which had not yet been provided. Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. C at 2.

At a discovery conference later in the day on July 9, the People confirmed that they would be sharing the cross-complainant's discovery with the defense. July 9, 2026 2d Call Tr. at 13. The People eventually did so on July 15, candidly conceding that the prior omission was an error: the assigned Assistant District Attorney mistakenly thought the cross-complainant's material was not discoverable. See Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. E at 2.

II. Dismissal Arguments

The dismissal motion now before the Court (via the current defense counsel) is premised mainly on the late disclosure of the abovementioned materials and the nondisclosure (since remediated in part) of a case summary, notes from an alleged proffer session, unredacted entity reports, and ZOLPA. See Defense's Dismissal Mot. at 5-6.³

The People concede that the discovery was belatedly provided, but argue that they exercised diligence overall, having exercised reasonable efforts to assemble their discovery package.⁴ Regarding the officer's video recording, the People learned of the footage only shortly before the § 30.30 deadline was to expire, and were unable to obtain it before the deadline; regarding the 911 materials, the queue could not receive multiple requests, so the People were unable to meaningfully expedite the process, which completed shortly after the deadline expired. See People's Resp. at 9-10. Regarding the cross-complainant's materials, the People again candidly concede their error, but point out that it was corrected swiftly when brought to their attention. See id. at 10-11. Certain other materials, such as the proffer notes, either do not exist, see id. at 11, or have since been (substantially) provided, see id. at 12.

III. Dismissal Discussion

On this record, the People have met their burden of demonstrating reasonable efforts to comply with their statutory discovery obligations, as assessed under all relevant C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a) factors. See People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211-13 (2023). The People provided extensive discovery within the statutory timeframe, and the initial omissions were swiftly corrected without defense prompting only a few days beyond the deadline. While the backlogged-911-queue explanation is not entirely satisfying—the People asked for the 911 materials in March, yet did not receive them until after the § 30.30 period expired, and that kind of extensive turnaround time would imperil many misdemeanor prosecutions—the defense's rejoinder, while well taken, see Defense's Reply at 4, does not quite tip the scales here.

The second primary batch of material, as well as the belatedly disclosed August third batch from after the motion schedule was set, consisted in large part of the cross-complainant's materials. That did require defense prompting, and should not have; there appears to be no dispute that materials pertaining to the prosecution of a cross-complainant are generally discoverable as relating to both the defendant's case and the charges. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 87 Misc 3d 1203(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 51446(U), at *4-5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., NY Co. 2025) (addressing discoverability of complainant's arrest material); People v. Dunmeyer, 81 Misc 3d 1213(A), 2023 NY Slip Op. 51334(U), at *1-3 (Sup. Ct., NY Co. 2023) (invaliding COC when, among other things, the People did not provide any discovery pertaining to the prosecution of the cross-complainant). The People concede that they were simply mistaken, but that concession is not a shield from potential consequences.

On this particular record, however, the People's mistake does not require invalidation of the COC for three primary reasons.

First, the mistake (and concomitant delay in disclosure) must be evaluated holistically against "the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with" their discovery obligations. C.P.L. § 245.50(5); see People v. Lee, 249 AD3d 555, 555 (1st Dept.), leave denied, 46 NY3d 928 (2026). The People did more right here than wrong by a decent margin; the materials associated with the cross-complainant, while not insignificant, are overshadowed by the material appropriately disclosed in the defendant's own case.

Second, the total delay emphasized by the defense—50 days after the COC was filed, see Defense's Reply at 5—is the wrong benchmark, because it overlooks the extended timeline that the defense itself requested. As mentioned above, the defense specifically sought and obtained an extension of time to review the discovery  ⁵ before sending initial objections 44 days after the COC was filed. That extended deadline was itself possible only with the People's consent, because the defense request was made more than 35 days after the COC had been filed and served. See C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c)(i) (requiring good cause extension requests to be made before the deadline expires); see also July 9, 2026 2d Call Tr. at 3-5 (addressing situation during discovery conference). The People had the option of shutting the COC challenge down before it began, but decided instead to waive their procedural objections to the belated request for an extension by consenting to an extended timeline.

Thus, the 50-day "delay" was in in large part due to the defense's extension request. Had the defense objected within the original 35-day conferral timeline, the People probably would have responded earlier.

Third and finally, the People's quick correction of the error is a significant point in their favor. "[W]hether the omission was corrected" is one of the central C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a) factors, and "a number of the due diligence are satisfied" when outstanding discovery is disclosed and mistakes are corrected during conferral. People v. Whitney, 88 Misc 3d 905, 909 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025). The People swiftly fixed most aspects of their (significant) error upon being alerted to it, during what was functionally an extended conferral window. Whether considered only as reflecting on their pre-readiness diligence, or given the independent post-readiness significance that § 245.50(5)(a) appears to permit, this quick correction weighs heavily in the People's favor.

One final dismissal point bears mention. The defense argues, both in its initial motion and reply, that the People did not abide by their oft-ignored obligation under C.P.L. § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) to provide initial discovery within 35 days of arraignment in "out" cases like this one. See, e.g., Defense's Dismissal Mot. at 17; Defense's Reply at 2; see also S.M. v. City of New York, --- AD3d ---, 2026 NY Slip Op. 03248, at *8 (1st Dept. 2026) ("[I]f the accused is at liberty after arraignment, the prosecution has 35 days to comply" with initial discovery obligations, absent certain exceptions). The general consensus is that noncompliance with § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) is but one factor in the People's overall due diligence or lack thereof, rather than being a freestanding deficiency. See, e.g., People v. Stamm, 85 Misc 3d 136(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50497(U), at *3 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2025).

To amplify the prejudice of the delayed disclosure, the defense emphasizes that the video surveillance from the store was destroyed because the People did not disclose the officer's off-line recording within the 35-day deadline, which kept the defense from learning about it until too late. See Defense's Reply at 2 ("Had that video been disclosed earlier, defense counsel would have sought additional video surveillance before it was erased."). But while it is possible that an earlier disclosure would have allowed the defense to obtain the original video, the People's SCOC reflects that the store's policy was to retain video for only 30 days. See Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. B at 3. Thus, the People could have complied with their § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) obligations by disclosing initial discovery within 35 days of arraignment, yet still have been beyond the 30-day retention window as measured from the incident. In other words, the destruction of the video does not inherently flow from the People's noncompliance with § 245.10(1)(a)(ii).

In sum, for the reasons set forth above, the People have met their burden of showing due diligence as assessed under all relevant factors. The delayed disclosure past the § 245.10(1)(a)(ii) period does weigh against the People, but not so heavily to favor dismissal. The defense's motion to invalidate the COC, strike the statement of readiness, and dismiss the accusatory instrument on § 30.30 grounds is therefore denied.

IV. Hearings

Regarding hearings, the defense seeks a Wade/Dunaway hearing on identification "only if proper identification notice was served on the Court and defense counsel." Defense's Omnibus Mot. at 1. The defense explains that § 710.30(1)(b) identification notice was served May 20, facially beyond the 15-day statutory time limit. The defense also concedes, however, that the notice could conceivably have been served on the defense before that time. Thus, suppression is sought only if the notice was properly served within the statutory time limit, and otherwise preclusion is requested. See id. at 6-7, 11. The People do not appear to have responded to this issue.

The relevant notice does indeed appear to have been filed beyond the statutory § 710.30(2) period as measured from the original arraignment. The general rule seems to be, however, that the People receive a new 15-day window upon arraignment on a new accusatory instrument, at least so long as that instrument was not filed as a pretext to evade the expired time limit. See People v. Lacast, 59 Misc 3d 131(A), 2018 NY Slip Op. 50466(U), at *4-5 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2018); People v. Littlejohn, 184 AD2d 790, 791 (2d Dept. 1992). Here, the People consistently represent that they filed a superseding instrument off-calendar on May 14. See People's Omnibus Resp. at 4. And at least one trial court has suggested that service of statement or identification notice before arraignment on a new instrument still satisfies the statutory requirement that notice be served within 15 days after arraignment. See People v. Korang, 160 Misc 2d 604, 605 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1994). The People's notice could conceivably be timely if these rules applied.

However, there is a certain lack of clarity about whether this doctrine applies in a pure "conversion" context, meaning when a complaint is deemed converted to an information upon curing hearsay, or when the only thing that has changed about a superseding instrument is the identity of the deponent. See People v. Etkin, 50 Misc 3d 1216(A), 2016 NY Slip Op. 50115(U), at *5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2016) (collecting cases about pretextual instruments, including one where the only thing that changed was the identity of the deponent). The primary difference in instruments here seems to be the identity of the deponent.

Because this issue is not as well-developed in the papers as one would like, the parties may wish to revisit it on the day this decision is handed down or on the day of the hearings. As of right now, Wade/Dunaway hearings will be ordered alongside Mapp/Dunaway hearings.

Dated: October 15, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information.

2.   The motion was filed within the extended good-cause period, to which the People had previously consented.

3.   The defense argues that the period before the July 9 setting of the motion schedule is entirely chargeable to the People. See Defense's Dismissal Mot. at 6. But the period between June 30 and July 9 would likely be excludable due to the extended conferral/good-cause timeline. See C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c)(i). Because the original COC was valid, there is no need to resolve this issue.

4.   The record of the People's diligence is unsworn. Because it largely matches what is set out elsewhere in the record and was not met with an objection, it will be credited for the purposes of this decision.

5.   The record suggests that this was due to a change in the assigned attorney. See Defense's Dismissal Mot., Ex. C at 1-2.

David L. Goodwin, J.