The People of the State of New York, v. L. Reyes, Defendant. (2026)

Pending is the defense's fully briefed, counseled omnibus motion.¹ It is resolved as follows. Because the parties are the primary audience, familiarity with the case and its procedural history is assumed.

It is hereby ORDERED that the branch of the motion seeking to invalidate the certificate of compliance (COC) and dismiss the accusatory instrument on C.P.L. § 30.30 grounds is GRANTED, the statement of readiness is STRUCK as illusory, and (as the C.P.L. § 30.30 time has otherwise elapsed) the accusatory instrument is DISMISSED AND SEALED, subject to any application the People may make to defer sealing at the time this decision is handed down. The remaining branches of the motion are DENIED as academic, although (for the sake of completeness) a facial sufficiency issue raised sua sponte, which was the subject of supplemental briefing, is addressed below as well.

The defendant was charged with third-degree assault, menacing, and other counts based on an alleged January 8 dispute with the complaining witness. See Accusatory Instrument at 1. The defendant was not arrested until March 17, however, when he was detained on an I-Card. Defense's Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6-8.²

On March 31, the People (via a trial preparation assistant) emailed an NYPD discovery liaison, as well as both arresting officers, Officer Marin and Officer Walker, to seek certain itemized missing discovery. Listed as missing were aided reports, arrest reports, chain of custody reports, property vouchers, patrol/roll call logs, the WINQ, and DD5s/ECMS files. See People's Resp., Ex. A at 34-35 (Bates pages). No mention was made of activity logs or body-worn camera footage. See id.

A month and a half later, on June 12, the assigned prosecutor sent a follow-up email to several NYPD liaison contacts, highlighting the urgency of the outreach: "we have only a few days to spare before dismissal." Id. at 36. This time, the prosecutor identified as missing the activity logs for Officers Walker, Marin, and Rosado, as well as the body-worn camera footage for the same three officers. Id.

The People filed their COC and declared ready on June 16, which was 90 days after the March 18 filing of the accusatory instrument. At the time they declared ready, the People had shared, among other things, body-worn camera footage from Officer Marin; 911 materials; two surveillance videos from the scene; and impeachment material for both Officer Marin and Officer Walker. See Defense's Mot., Ex. A at 6-7 (pdf pag.).

No activity logs were mentioned in the discovery receipt. Instead, the activity logs for Officers Marin, Walker, Geronimo, and Rosado were identified in the COC as missing. The People's record in the COC was "Email to precinct 6/12 and 06/15, called precinct twice on 06/15." Id. at 2.

The defense initiated outreach to the People ten days later, on June 26. The defense identified numerous outstanding items from the actual underlying incident date, including "[a]ctivity logs from officer response at TPO," an aided report, and "[b]ody-worn camera footage from the TPO." Defense's Mot., Ex. B at 3-4 (pdf pag.). Regarding the TPO footage, defense counsel observed that the shared BWC checklist "state[d] that there was no footage," but asked if the People had "inquired as to why this would be" or "confirmed that this is true." Id. at 4 (pdf pag.).

The record reflects several additional emails between the People and their discovery contacts at the NYPD around this time. As relevant here, on June 29, the People (via the assigned) again emailed the discovery liaisons, passing along the defense's comment on the missing body-worn camera footage, including the defense's "have you inquired as to why this would be" remark. See People's Resp., Ex. A. at 41 (Bates page).

In a series of emails to the defense from June 29, the People shared medical records from the complaining witness, but the other issues were not resolved. Defense counsel thus followed up on July 6 to inquire about any new updates. The People explained the next day that the discovery liaison was being repeatedly pulled from the precinct and had not been able to get the material yet. See id. at 2-3. The People called the liaison's personal cell phone on July 7, and were told that the liaison would send the outstanding discovery the next day, provided he was not again pulled from the precinct. See People's Resp. Aff. at 6.

The liaison eventually sent some of the missing discovery about two and a half weeks later on July 24, providing activity logs for several officers and making available the body-worn camera footage from the incident date. See People's Resp., Ex. A at 45-46 (Bates pages). The People shared the initial batch with the defense on July 27, and were able to provide the body-worn camera footage to the defense on July 29, two days after this motion was filed. See People's Resp. Aff. at 6-7.

In the pending motion, the defense chiefly argues that the sheer amount of missing discovery—including all body-worn camera footage from the incident date, activity logs and DD5s, and all records relevant to the medical treatment of the complainant  ³ —alongside the minimal record of pre-readiness outreach of only a few contacts shortly before the timeline was to expire together show that the People did not exercise due diligence in complying with their statutory discovery obligations. The People concede that some of the discovery was not provided in time, but otherwise respond that their efforts reflect appropriate diligence.

On this record, the defense has the better position. The People have not satisfied their burden of showing reasonable efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, as assessed under all relevant statutory factors. See People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 210-13 (2023); C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a). Accordingly, their COC was not valid, the statement of readiness must be struck as illusory, and (as the § 30.30 time had run otherwise) the accusatory instrument must be dismissed. Bay, 41 NY3d at 213.

The biggest omission was the discovery related to the TPO, as well as the activity logs and material within the People's possession that was relevant to medical treatment. The body-worn camera footage from the TPO is the most crucial omission—and the record reflects that it was not specifically requested before the People declared ready. Indeed, the March email identified specific missing documents, but not the body-worn camera footage or activity logs. People's Resp., Ex. A at 34-35 (Bates pages). And as that email appears to be the entirety of the pre-mid-June outreach, the discovery liaison would have had no reason to think that the body-worn camera footage was missing prior to the near-the-end-of-the-§ 30.30-period correspondence in June.

The People also do not provide a clear explanation for why they did not think that material from the TPO existed. During conferral, the defense referenced a body-worn camera checklist that apparently indicated no footage existed. See Defense's Mot., Ex. B at 3-4 (pdf pag.). But the People do not claim they were misled, or that they relied on documentation showing no police response to TPO, so the omission remains unexplained. See Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9-10 (2025) (per curiam) (discussing party presentation principle); Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 519 (2009) (same).

Instead, the People emphasize that they timely tendered surveillance video showing the underlying incident in its entirety, thereby minimizing the prejudice the omission caused, as well as footage from the interview with the defendant where he allegedly makes inculpatory statements. See People's Resp. at 17-18. The defense's reply does not directly contend with the surveillance footage, or address its quality, but claims that the body-worn camera footage shows elements—interviews with the complaining witness, for instance—that were otherwise unavailable. See Defense's Reply at 5-6 (pdf pag.). These dueling positions suggest, at the very least, that the belated body-worn camera video was not duplicative or insignificant within the meaning of C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a).

Finally, as the defense points out, nearly all of the relevant outreach described by the People to specifically obtain the body-worn camera video is post-readiness. See Defense's Reply at 5 (pdf pag.). And while post-readiness efforts may have independent legal significance after the August 2025 revisions to Article 245, the efforts here still fell short. The People were not able to obtain or disclose any of the relevant footage before the 35-day implied conferral period expired, despite being on alert that the footage was missing with 25 days still remaining in the conferral period. Cf. People v. Whitney, 88 Misc 3d 905, 909 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (observing that "a number of the due diligence are satisfied" when outstanding discovery is disclosed during the 35-day implied conferral window).

To be clear, this belated disclosure appears to be in part due to factors beyond the People's actual control, such as the many New York City events of late June and early July that called the liaison away from his desk. But C.P.L. § 245.20(2) specifically says that items within police possession are also constructively possessed by the People. If the People are truly reliant on a single officer as a source of discovery, then that officer's protracted absence or lack of response can lead to dismissal—not a value judgment, nor an attribution of fault, but instead just statutory consequence. And while efforts by the People could potentially make up for that shortcoming, there is no indication that such efforts were taken here, despite the importance of the discovery that was still outstanding.

In sum, a holistic assessment of the record and statutory factors—all of which have been considered, even if not addressed above—reveals that the People have not met their burden of showing reasonable efforts to comply with their statutory obligations pre-readiness, or (to the extent such efforts have independent legal significance) that their post-readiness efforts made up for their pre-readiness shortcomings. Their COC must therefore be deemed invalid, the statement of readiness struck as illusory, and the instrument dismissed on § 30.30 grounds. Bay, 41 NY3d at 213.⁴

Dismissal notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the third-degree assault charge is facially insufficient, although the issue is academic in this context. The accusatory instrument charged the defendant with third-degree assault under a criminal negligence theory, which requires a person to cause "physical injury" by means of "a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument" with the requisite mental state of "criminal negligence." P.L. § 120.00(3). However, the only allegations in the instrument pertaining to the "assault" are:

[T]hat at the above time and place, informant and the defendant engaged in a verbal dispute, at which point informant observed defendant to have on his person, in his hand one (1) knife. . . . [A]s a result of the defendant's aforementioned conduct, informant sustained a laceration to his right middle finger, that required seven (7) stiches to close.

Accusatory Instrument at 1 ("informed by" language omitted).

A count of a misdemeanor information is facially sufficient if the facts (accepted as true) and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts establish reasonable cause and every element of a prima facie case. See People v. Wheeler, 34 NY3d 1134, 1135 (2020); People v. Aponte, 45 Misc 3d 29, 30 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2014). Here, though, the allegations say only that the defendant engaged in an verbal argument with the complaining witness while holding a knife and, as a result of that conduct, the complaining witness was injured. The accusatory instrument does not reveal how the complaining witness was injured, or what the defendant did or did not do that caused the injury, let alone that the defendant acted with criminal negligence by "fail[ing] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" of injury under those circumstances. P.L. § 15.05(4); see also People v. Conway, 6 NY3d 869, 871-72 (2006) (addressing criminal negligence in the specific context of third-degree assault under subsection 3).

Thus, as currently drafted, the allegations do not provide sufficient notice of the conduct allegedly constituting the offense. They are therefore facially insufficient. See Wheeler, 34 NY3d at 1135; cf. People v. Fitzgerald, 45 NY2d 574, 580 (1978) (explaining that even in the context of an indictment, "a person accused of . . . acting with 'criminal negligence' is entitled to know specifically what conduct on his part involved a 'substantial and unjustifiable risk' . . . and 'a gross deviation' from the standard of reasonable care").

The People respond by referencing in part facts outside of the instrument, see People's Supp. Resp. at 1-2, but those do not matter. Facial sufficiency review is limited to the four corners of the instrument and to certain supporting materials. See People v. Morel, ___ NY3d ___, 2026 NY Slip Op. 00822, at *2 (2026).

Otherwise, the thrust of the People's argument is that since the parties were arguing, the defendant was holding a knife, and the complaining witness was injured, "it is a reasonable conclusion . . . that the victim'[s] injury was caused by the defendant's knife." People's Supp. Resp. at 2. But the elision of what the defendant actually did, or how the injury occurred, brings what should otherwise be a permissible reasonable inference right to the brink of "impermissible speculation to fill in the gaps." People v. Mejicanos, 40 Misc 3d 23, 26 (App. Term, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud. Dists. 2013).

Even accepting that the injury was caused by the defendant's knife—that the very fact of causation is not impermissible speculation—the total absence of "how" is still a problem for criminal negligence. There is nothing—"no statement that defendant might have made, or any other surrounding circumstance—that might illustrate that this act occurred along with a culpable mental state." People v. Gonzalez, 49 Misc 3d 1216(A), 2015 NY Slip Op. 51731(U), at *2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., NY Co. 2015). And there is also nothing that would inherently demonstrate the "blameworthy conduct" that is the cornerstone of criminal negligence charges. People v. Smith, 62 Misc 3d 12, 14 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2018).

Thus, were the People not beyond their speedy trial time, the third-degree assault count would be dismissed as facially insufficient. Since they are, however, the issue is ultimately academic.

Dated: October 15, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information.

2.   The People do not dispute this chronology.

3.   As discussed at the discovery conference, see Defense's Mot., Ex. C at 6-7, three of the four Appellate Division Departments have held that materials not in the People's direct or constructive possession are not relevant to the validity of a COC. See People v. Haggan, 248 AD3d 660, 660 (1st Dept. 2026); People v. Branton, 238 AD3d 1429, 1431 (3d Dept. 2025); People v. Radford, 237 AD3d 1511, 1512 (4th Dept. 2025); People v. Walker, 232 AD3d 1214, 1217 (4th Dept. 2024); see also People v. Solomon, 88 Misc 3d 11, 12-13 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2025) (concluding that the "validity of the COC did not depend upon" the People turning over material not in their direct or constructive possession). The defense argues, however, that these decisions did not clearly resolve whether the People's efforts under C.P.L. § 245.20(2) remain relevant, even if the ultimate results of those efforts are of no moment. See Defense's Mot. at 15; see also People v. Dunn, 88 Misc 3d 1230(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50281(U), at *2-3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2026) (addressing similar argument). Since the validity of a COC is based on whether the People have made diligent and good-faith efforts "to obtain and provide the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20," Haggan, 248 AD3d at 660 (quoting C.P.L. § 245.50(1)), efforts under subdivision two to obtain materials not falling under subdivision one probably are not relevant either. Regardless, there is no need to definitively resolve the issue now, as the outcome would be the same under either construction of the People's obligations.

4.   The People argue that dismissal is no longer the default remedy under the revised Article 245 for an invalid COC, pointing to the Governor's press release on the August 2025 statutory revisions and to authority from other jurisdictions. See People's Resp. at 2-7. That argument is rejected for substantially the same reasons set forth in People v. Guevarez, 88 Misc 3d 1207(A), 2026 NY Slip Op. 50045(U), at *11-12 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2026), and need not be addressed further.

David L. Goodwin, J.