The People of the State of New York, v. Miranda Acosta. (2026)

Defendant moves to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds the accusatory instrument charging her with Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law 120.00(1)) and other offenses, arguing that the People's statement of readiness was invalid because they served it on the wrong defense attorney. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the People acted reasonably despite the error in service, and that their statement of readiness is therefore valid. Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

On April 9, 2026, defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint. A private lawyer authorized to represent indigent criminal defendants pursuant to County Law article 18-B stood as counsel for defendant at her arraignment, even though she was already represented by The Legal Aid Society on a prior matter. The record does not reflect whether the private 18B attorney was formally appointed to represent defendant or was reimbursed for the arraignment; his notice of appearance stated: "LAS CASE ARRAIGNMENT ONLY." He also stated on the record that he was "standing in for the attorney of record Mr. Gurwitch." Mr. Laurence Gurwitch is a staff attorney employed by The Legal Aid Society, who represented defendant in connection with another matter.¹

At the next court date on April 13, 2026, defendant appeared with LAS attorney Gurwitch, and the People stated that they were not ready for trial. The court's file lists "Gurwitch" as the defense lawyer who stood on the case, but the file does not contain any new notice of appearance for him or for The Legal Aid Society. There is also no notation in the case file indicating that attorney Gurwitch sought to be assigned to the case or sought to have the private 18B attorney relieved.

The case was adjourned to July 13, and the People filed an off-calendar statement of readiness with the court on July 8, 2026. Their affirmation of service stated that, on July 8, 2026, they served the statement of readiness on the private 18B attorney who handled defendant's arraignment. At the next court appearance on July 13, 2026, the People announced that they had filed an off-calendar statement of readiness, and LAS attorney Gurwitch, who was again standing on the case, stated that neither he nor The Legal Aid Society had been served with the statement of readiness. Counsel argued that the People's statement of readiness was invalid because it was not properly served on the defense and requested a motion schedule on the instant CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss. That motion is now before the court, and it raises essentially one question: whether the People's statement of readiness was invalid because the People served it on the wrong attorney.²

The general principles governing this type of claim are fairly settled. A statement of readiness must be made on the record, meaning either orally "in open court, transcribed by a stenographer, or recorded by the clerk," or through "a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk, to be placed in the original record." People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 (1985); see People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 405-06 (2016) (off-calendar statement of readiness is presumptively valid). If defense counsel is not present when the People make a statement of readiness, the People must "promptly notify" the defense of their readiness. Kendzia, 64 NY2d at 337 n.; see People v. Bonilla, 94 AD3d 633, 634 (1st Dept 2012). Such a statement is "deemed effective at the time of filing, so long as defense counsel is promptly notified." People v. Anderson, 252 AD2d 399, 400 (1st Dep't 1998).

Claims involving an alleged failure to provide prompt notice generally take one of two forms: either that notice was not promptly given because the People delayed serving notice altogether, see, e.g., People v. Collins, 186 Misc 2d 818, 821 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Richmond County 2000); or that notice was not promptly given because the People's notice failed to reach defense counsel as the result of some error, such as that the People sent it to the wrong address, see, e.g., People v. Cenat, 176 Misc 2d 39, 45 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings County 1997), or (as here) that they sent it to the wrong attorney, see, e.g., People v. Stewart, 21 Misc 3d 1109(A), at *1 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., NY County 2008). The relevant appellate decisions have not outwardly considered whether these types of claims implicate the validity of the People's statement of readiness itself, or whether a remedy should instead come through some other framework.³ Instead, the appellate decisions appear to direct lower courts to consider whether the People acted reasonably despite the alleged service defect. See People v. Osorio, 39 AD3d 400, 401 (1st Dep't 2007); People v. Vaughn, 36 AD3d 434, 436 (1st Dep't 2007); People v. Nina, 291 AD2d 294, 295 (1st Dep't 2002); see also People v. Telemaque, 43 Misc 3d 138(A), at *2 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2014).

Applying that framework here, the court concludes that the People acted reasonably despite serving the wrong attorney, mainly for three reasons. First, the People attempted to serve their statement of readiness immediately after they filed it. This is not a case, then, where the People's inaction prevented defense counsel from receiving notice of the People's readiness status. Second, the People served their statement of readiness on the only counsel who had filed a notice of appearance with the court. Any successor attorney was "required to file a written notice of appearance on or before the time of the attorney's first appearance in court or not later than 10 days after appointment or retainer, whichever is sooner." 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5. Given this requirement, the People could reasonably rely on the information in the official court file to identify counsel of record for the receipt of service. Third, defense counsel Gurwitch received actual notice of the People's readiness in court three business days (five calendar days) after the People submitted their off-calendar written notice. Had service been proper, then, it is entirely possible that counsel Gurwitch would have received actual notice of the statement of readiness in open court well before the mailed copy would have arrived in his office. Defendant does not articulate any way in which the delay in receiving notice of the statement of readiness, if there was any, prejudiced the defense, impeded their ability to prepare for trial or defend the charges, or otherwise delayed the action. Under the circumstances, the court concludes that the People promptly notify defendant of their off-calendar statement of readiness as required.

Neither the disclaimer on the private 18B attorney's notice of appearance, nor counsel Gurwitch's appearance in court four days after defendant's arraignment, warrants a different conclusion. As to the former, the mere fact that the private 18B attorney indicated that this was a "Legal Aid case" does not render the People's service upon him unreasonable. Of course, a private attorney lacks authority to direct The Legal Aid Society to accept a representation, and a prior representation was no guarantee that The Legal Aid Society would be free to represent defendant in the present matter. So, the People were not bound to conclude that this was a Legal Aid case, simply because, at arraignment, a private 18B attorney said it was. And if this had been a Legal Aid case in which defendant was represented at arraignment by a non-Legal Aid attorney, that circumstance would be all the more reason to expect some formal documentation transferring the representation to The Legal Aid Society. The fact that the file contained no such indication, and that no notice of appearance had been filed, gave added reason to rely on the sole notice of appearance that was filed in the case.

The People's reliance on the notice of appearance was also not unreasonable, despite attorney Gurwitch's appearance in court on April 13, 2026. Nothing in the court file suggests that, during that court appearance, attorney Gurwitch did anything to indicate that representation had transferred to The Legal Aid Society: he did not ask to have The Legal Aid Society appointed as counsel, or seek to have the private 18B attorney relieved, or provide written notice of his role as counsel for defendant. Because there is no record that any of those things happened, defendant's argument is that the People acted unreasonably because they failed to recognize, without prompting, that a new attorney unaffiliated with prior counsel was making a new appearance in the case and failed to adjust their records. But even if attorney Gurwitch's court appearance would reasonably have raised flags about who was the appropriate attorney for service, the People were not required to investigate defendant's representation; the obligation was squarely on defense counsel to make a record about the change in representation. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5; see also Telemaque, 43 Misc 3d 138(A), at *2 (citing successor counsel's written notice of appearance in holding that service on prior counsel was unreasonable). Having failed to do so, the defense cannot now claim that it was the People who acted unreasonably.

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the People provided prompt notice of their off-calendar statement of readiness, which was therefore valid when filed. Defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED. This constitutes the order of the court.

Dated: October 20, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Philip V. Tisne

FOOTNOTES

1.   The institutional indigent criminal defenders in this county—the Bronx Defenders and The Legal Aid Society—are required to assign at least one attorney from their organization to staff each arraignment shift. The record contains no indication of whether a Legal Aid attorney was present in the arraignment part when defendant was arraigned on this case, or any explanation for why a Legal Aid attorney could not represent defendant at her arraignment instead of a private 18B attorney.

2.   Defendant's brief summarily references two other claims about allegedly improper service—namely, that the People's statement of readiness was invalid because the People failed to serve a "converted information" on the defense, and because they failed to serve a certificate of compliance ("COC") on the correct attorney. These conclusory claims are abandoned, however, because counsel's brief does not cite any authority or develop any argument to support either of them. See, e.g., People v. DiTommaso, 127 AD3d 11, 21 (1st Dep't 2015); see also CPL 245.50(3) (stating only that a COC must be filed with the court before the People may declare ready).

3.   The validity of a statement of readiness should not turn on service; instead, service-error claims should be analyzed under the framework for post-readiness delay. See generally People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 (2024). That framework is more appropriate, both because service errors do not obviously affect whether the People are in fact ready for trial, and because service-error claims raise concerns about delay and prejudice that are better addressed though the post-readiness chargeability analysis. What is more, the existing approach—which appears retrospectively to hinge the validity of a statement of readiness on the reasonableness of service—unnecessarily introduces uncertainty into an area of the law particularly unsuited to uncertainty. See People v. Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678 (1993) (noting that the purpose of requiring an on-the-record declaration of readiness is to provide "objective" criteria by which to measure the People's trial readiness). No appellate court has adopted that approach to service-error claims, however, and the court is bound to follow existing precedent.

Philip V. Tisne, J.