The People of the State of New York v. Wnguang Lan, Defendant (2026)

Defendant moves for leave to reargue the Court's prior decision denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30. Defendant contends that the Court overlooked his argument that the People filed their opposition to the underlying motion one day after the court-imposed deadline and that this additional day must be charged to the People for speedy-trial purposes.

To prevail on a motion to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221(d), the movant must demonstrate that the Court overlooked or misapprehended matters of fact or law in determining the prior motion. After reviewing the court file, the underlying pleadings, the Court's prior decision, and the relevant law, defendant's leave to reargue is GRANTED. Upon reargument, the Court adheres to its prior determination and defendant's motion to dismiss remains DENIED.

The parties are presumed familiar with the underlying facts and procedural history. The Court addresses only the issue that was not expressly resolved in its prior written decision: whether the People must be charged with one additional day because their opposition, due July 1, 2026, was electronically filed through EDDS at 12:06 a.m. on July 2, 2026.

THE PEOPLE'S LATE OPPOSITION

Defense counsel argues that because the People filed their opposition one day after the court-imposed deadline, that day is automatically chargeable to the People. According to defense counsel, the additional day would put the People's speedy-trial calculation at 91 days—one day beyond the statutory limit—thereby requiring dismissal. The Court disagrees.

In People v. Nivol, 225 AD3d 630, 631 (2d Dept 2024), the People submitted their response to the defendant's omnibus motion twelve days after the court-imposed deadline Nevertheless, the Second Department held that the twelve-day period was excludable because, notwithstanding the late response, the trial court had rendered its decision in accordance with the motion schedule it had previously set The Court held that under those circumstances the late response "cannot be said to have caused any delay whatsoever in the progress of the case," quoting People v. Beasley, 69 AD3d 741, 743 (2d Dept 2010).

Recently, the Second Department applied the same principle in People v. Guthrie, 250 AD3d 754, 757 (2d Dept 2026). In Guthrie the Court determined that the People's two-week delay in responding to the defendant's motion caused the determination of that motion to be rendered nine days later than the original adjournment schedule. Thereafter, the People were charged with the additional nine days—only the period that impeded the Court's determination.

These recent Second Department cases confirm that in deciding whether to charge the People with any additional time past a court-imposed deadline, the relevant inquiry is not simply whether the People's response was late, but to what extent, if any, such lateness actually impacted the Court's determination of the motion.

The Court has also considered the Second Department's rulings in People ex rel. Nieves v. Molina, 207 AD3d 797 (2d Dept 2022), and People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann, 197 AD3d 787 (2d Dept 2021). In those cases, the Second Department charged the People with the entirety of the time between the court-imposed deadline, and the date on which People filed their response. However, Nivol and Guthrie, both decided after Nieves and Ferro, make clear that a late filing does not invariably render the entire period of lateness chargeable to the People where such tardiness caused no corresponding delay in the court's determination of the motion.

Here, although the People's opposition was technically filed one day past the court-imposed deadline of July 1, 2026—having been filed at 12:06 a.m. on July 2, 2026—in determining whether any additional time should be charged to the People, the Court must consider whether this six-minute delay caused any delay in the Court's determination of the motion in accordance with the original motion schedule. It is apodictic that the six-minute delay did not impede the Court's ability to consider or determine defendant's motion, and the subsequent record confirms this.

The Court's written decision is dated July 22, 2026. At the August 4th court appearance, the New York Bench entry reflected that a decision had already been written and was under review. The decision was approved and emailed to counsel on August 6, 2026, twelve days before the next scheduled court appearance on August 18, 2026. Thereafter, on August 18, 2026, the matter was adjourned for hearings and trial. Thus, as in Nivol, nothing about the six-minute delay in the filing of the People's opposition prevented the Court from drafting, reviewing, or issuing its decision in a timely manner, or otherwise delayed the progress of the case.

Accordingly, the Court declines to charge the People with an additional speedy-trial day based upon the July 2, 2026, filing of their opposition.

CONCLUSION

Defense counsel's motion for leave to reargue is GRANTED to the extent that the Court now expressly addresses the argument concerning the People's late-filed opposition. However, upon reargument, the Court adheres to its prior determination.

Defendant's motion to dismiss remains DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

Dated: October 9, 2026

ENTER:

Hon. Jevet T. Johnson

Judge, Criminal Court

Jevet T. Johnson, J.