The People of the State of New York, v. C. Billings, Defendant. (2026)

Pending before the Court is the defense's  ¹ fully briefed  ² omnibus motion. The People also submitted a supplemental, informal letter brief addressing a facial sufficiency issue raised sua sponte by order of September 2, 2026. The motion is resolved as follows; as the parties are the primary audience, familiarity with the case is assumed.

It is hereby ORDERED that the branch of the defense motion that seeks invalidation of the People's certificate of compliance, and dismissal on C.P.L. § 30.30 grounds, is DENIED.

As the People observe in their response papers, see People's Resp. at 12-13, the defense submitted its motion 36 days after the May 26, 2026 certificate of compliance had been filed and served. In other words, the defense's motion was one day late. See C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c) (requiring that certificate of compliance challenges "shall be addressed by motion within thirty-five days of the service of the certificate"). Mandatory filing deadlines must generally be enforced if properly invoked, and the defense has not offered any argument about why this one should not be. See Miceli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726 (2004) ("[S]tatutory time frames . . . are not options[;] they are requirements, to be taken seriously by the parties."); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985) (explaining that filing deadlines are arbitrary "with respect to individuals who fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced"). Accordingly, the defense's challenge to the certificate of compliance is time-barred. Cf. People v. Seymour, 84 Misc 3d 23, 25 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2024) (treating predecessor statute, which required certificate of compliance challenges to be brought "as soon as practicable," as creating a procedural bar for late-filed motions).

(This branch of the motion would have otherwise been denied on the merits because the relevant C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a) factors favor the People. In particular, the People disclosed appropriate discovery within the statutory time limit and fixed most of the problems otherwise identified within the implied conferral window.)

It is further ORDERED that count one of the accusatory instrument, which charges fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon under P.L. § 265.01(1), is DISMISSED as facially insufficient on the Court's own motion. According to the accusatory instrument, the defendant was observed with a stun gun in her jacket pocket. Accusatory Instrument at 2. Yet nothing is alleged about the operability of the stun gun. In their supplemental letter brief, the People concede that they were required to plead facts alleging operability, and the weight of authority is in accord with that position.³ Since they did not, count one is dismissed.

It is further ORDERED that the branch seeking a Wade/Crews hearing is DENIED. At arraignment, the defense conceded that the parties were known, see People's Resp. at 28, undermining any claim now that the identification was the product of suggestion. Meanwhile, United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), held that an in-court identification was not suppressible as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. See id. at 472-73. That decision mentioned how certain "photographic and lineup identifications" were suppressible, but that particular issue had been "conceded" and was not at issue before the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 472; see also Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (No. 78-777), 1979 WL 213894, at *1-2 (limiting question presented to "the reliable in-court identification testimony by the victim of a crime"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (No. 78-777), 1978 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 66, at *2 (same). As no in-court identification issue is apparent here—and again, as Crews held that suppression of the in-court identification was not warranted—there is no basis for a so-called Crews hearing.

To the extent that the defense seeks instead to challenge the identification as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, that application is GRANTED out of an abundance of caution. The People assert that the defendant was arrested on an I-Card, but the circumstances of the creation of the I-Card, and the way it led to the arrest, might as well be tested at a hearing.

Any Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are reserved for the trial court. Any request for relief not specifically mentioned is DENIED.

Dated: September 3, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for electronic publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information.

2.   The defense did not file a reply.

3.    See People v. Burgess, --- NY3d ---, 2026 NY Slip Op. 02438, at *1 (Apr. 23, 2026) (concluding that facts addressing firearm operability were required for a C.P.L. § 265.01(1) firearm charge); People v. Rivera, 54 Misc 3d 129(A), 2016 NY Slip Op. 51825(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2016) (concluding that operability was made out for a stun-gun charge in a misdemeanor information, although without a clear holding that this was actually required); see also People v. Johnson, 66 Misc 3d 662, 664-65 (City Ct., Rome 2019) (Amoroso, J.) (dismissing a weapons count as facially insufficient because of a failure to allege operability of a stun gun); People v. Dang, 172 Misc 2d 274, 277 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 1997) (Posner, J.) ("[W]hen a defendant is charged with possession of an electronic stun gun, whether pursuant to the Penal Law or the Administrative Code, a jurisdictionally valid information must contain factual allegations that the stun gun was operable.").

David L. Goodwin, J.