The People of the State of New York, v. Joe Lee, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Joe Lee moves for an order of the court dismissing the accusatory instrument in the interests of justice. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is hereby GRANTED.

Background

On November 7, 2025, Defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint charging him with Penal Law § 155.25 Petit Larceny (a class A misdemeanor) and Penal Law § 165.40 Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree (a class A misdemeanor). The complaint alleges as follows:

THE DEPONENT IS INFORMED BY JANNY WONG THAT, AT THE ABOVE TIME AND PLACE, THE INFORMANT OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT REMOVE A LIGHTBULB FROM THE HALLWAY OF THE ABOVE LOCATION.

THE DEPONENT IS INFORMED BY SANDY LEE THAT, THE INFORMANT IS THE CUSTODIAN OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROPERTY, AND THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE THE PERMISSION OR AUTHORITY TO TAKE, USE, POSSESS, OR EXERCISE DOMINION OR CONTROL OVER SAID PROPERTY.

Following Defendant's arraignment, the parties appeared in Part APAR6 on December 15, 2025, February 4, 2026, February 6, 2026, and March 18, 2026. Defendant filed the instant motion on March 9, 2026.

Discussion

CPL 170.40 grants a court with the discretion to dismiss a criminal matter should conviction or continued prosecution constitute or result in injustice. The court should grant such a motion when the defendant demonstrates by a preponderance of credible evidence that a compelling reason exists to warrant dismissal in the interest of justice (People v Rawl, 88 Misc 3d 1262[A], [Crim Ct 2026], citing People v Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501, 502 [2d Dept 1984]).

The statute requires the court to consider the following factors:

(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;

(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;

(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;

(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;

(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant;

(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense;

(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;

(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system;

(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; and

(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose.

In deciding such a motion, "a court must strike a 'sensitive balance between the individual and the State' interests to determine whether the ends of justice are served by dismissal of the [accusatory instrument]" (People v Jenkins, 11 NY3d 282, 287 [2008], quoting People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 208 [2d Dept 1973]). No one factor is determinative, and "when an action is dismissed in the interest of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40, the judge must consider, 'individually and collectively,' the specific factors listed and must state the reasons on the record" (People v Berrus, 1 NY3d 535, 536 [2003] [quoting CPL 170.40]).

This decision will address each factor in turn. However, the court first addresses the People's argument that Defendant's motion was untimely pursuant to CPL 255.20 because it was not filed within 45 days of Defendant's arraignment.

CPL 255.20(1) requires that "all pre-trial motions shall be served or filed within forty-five days after arraignment and before commencement of trial, or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant made prior to entry of judgment." CPL 255.20(3) states that, notwithstanding 255.20(1), "the court must entertain and decide on its merits, at anytime before the end of trial, any appropriate pre-trial motion based upon grounds of which the defendant could not, with due diligence, have been previously aware, or which, for other good cause, could not have been raised within the period specified[.]"

Defendant was arraigned on the complaint in this matter on November 7, 2025. Defendant filed the instant motion on March 9, 2026, which was a total of 119 days after Defendant's arraignment. Defendant argues that he could not have made the instant motion within 45 days of Defendant's arraignment because he did not receive any discovery from the People until February 3, 2026, which was 88 days after Defendant's arraignment (Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law ["MOL"] at 2—3). Specifically, Defendant states that he could not have properly addressed the following factors required by statute: (i) the seriousness of the offense; (ii) the extent of the harm caused; (iii) the evidence of guilt; and (iv) exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement (id. at 2).

This court agrees that Defendant needed this information, which the People were required to provide pursuant to CPL 245.20(1) within 35 days of Defendant's arraignment under CPL 245.10(1)(a)(ii). Such a timely production would have been before the 45-day deadline. The People produced four surveillance video clips that are purportedly from the scene of the alleged incident. The parties dispute the impact of these videos on this case. The People also disclosed "police reports, 911 documents, activity logs, [and] BWC footages" (People's MOL at 9).

This court finds that Defendant has shown good cause for the filing of the instant motion after the 45-day deadline imposed by CPL 255.20, as Defendant could not have known the extent of the seriousness of the offense, the harm caused, or the evidence against Defendant in this matter before receiving discovery. Further, Defendant could not fully assess whether serious misconduct of law enforcement occurred without production of the arrest documents and BWC footage. Thus, Defendant's motion is timely.

(a) Seriousness and circumstances of the offense

Defendant is charged with petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree. As previously noted, the extent of the complaint's allegations is that Defendant removed a lightbulb from the hallway of a certain address, which both parties confirm is a house in which Defendant resides on the first floor. While both petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property are serious offenses, this court does not find the removal of a single lightbulb to be especially severe.

(b) Extent of harm caused by the offense

Defendant argues that the alleged offense did not cause any harm whatsoever. The People's opposition states that "Defendant's actions had a direct, substantial, and serious impact on his ex-wife, daughter and the community" (People's Memorandum of Law ["MOL"] at 7). As noted below, Defendant's daughter, Sandy Lee, contends that the taking of the lightbulb was another example of ongoing harassment. However, there is no information to suggest that any of Defendant's actions impacted the community.

(c) Evidence of guilt

As stated above, Defendant lived in the building from where he allegedly took the lightbulb. Defendant cannot be convicted of petit larceny if the lightbulb belonged to him (People v Nappo, 94 NY2d 564, 567 [2000]) or if Defendant is an owner in common with another owner (People v Norman, 5 Misc 3d 1016[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51392[U], at *5 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2004], aff'd, 40 AD3d 1130 [2d Dept 2007]). Likewise, the charge of Penal Law § 165.40 requires the lightbulb to have been stolen. Here, Defendant's rights to the property (and likewise the lightbulb) are currently the subject of litigation in Sandy Lee v Joe Keung Lee, Index No. 512164/2023, currently pending in Kings County Supreme Court before Justice Aaron Maslow. In that action, Sandy Lee seeks the ejectment of the Defendant from the property for alleged violation of their license agreement, which allows Defendant to occupy the first floor of the property. Ms. Lee alleges that her mother and Defendant previously co-owned the property but transferred title to her in 2015 (Complaint at ¶ 6). Defendant alleges that this transfer was only because he had divorced Ms. Lee's mother and was marrying another woman (Answer at ¶¶ 49—50). Defendant further alleges that he always retained the ability to transfer the title back to himself (id. at ¶ 50).

Defendant's and Ms. Lee's rights with respect to the property remain unresolved. Those rights will not be resolved until trial or when the parties settle the civil matter. Ms. Lee filed a Note of Issue in the Supreme Court action on January 8, 2026, which states the case is ready for trial. However, this court has been advised that the Final Conference Part administratively closed the matter on February 25, 2026. It is not clear why the matter was closed, though possibly due to the nonappearance of the parties. That said, the matter is still considered "active," and the parties need only move to restore the case pursuant to CPLR 3404 within 1 year (Brannigan v Bd. of Educ. of Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 307 AD2d 945, 946 [2d Dept 2003]).

Thus, the adjudication of the parties' rights within this property is currently in procedural limbo. Such a delay risks violating Defendant's right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal of this criminal action in the interests of justice.

(d) History, character and condition of the defendant

Defendant is sixty-nine years old. He has no criminal history or prior contacts with the criminal justice system. The defense indicated that Defendant suffers from high blood pressure, and that he has few assets and little means to move out of the home shared with his ex-wife and daughter (Defendant's Motion, ¶ 27).

The People argue that Defendant "has a history of harassing and stalking the complainant (his daughter) and her mother, Defendant's ex-wife (People's MOL at 5), and attached voice messages from Defendant to his ex-wife (People's Exhibit G). The People also represent that the complainant's mother previously obtained a temporary order of protection against Defendant in family court in 2023 (id. at 6; People's Exhibit F) and needs an order of protection subject to lawful incidental contact in response to the instant action. The People have attached a statement purportedly from Defendant's daughter as Exhibit B to the People's opposition. The court notes that this document is not signed and does not have any clear indication that it was written by Defendant's daughter. Notwithstanding, it details that the complainant has had a tumultuous relationship with her father, largely driven by Defendant's unwillingness to support the complainant.

This court does not deny what may be a tumultuous relationship between Defendant and his daughter and ex-wife. However, the above information does not entirely fit within the confines of this action, which concerns only a stolen lightbulb. There are no allegations of harassment here. While the People's argument largely seeks to establish that Defendant is of poor character, this alone is not sufficient to tip the scale against dismissal in the interests of justice in this matter.

(e) Exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement

Each side accuses the other of misconduct in some form. In short, this court finds no misconduct by either side. This court encourages both sides to not accuse each other of wrongdoing unless the circumstances actually warrant it. Unsubstantiated or speculative accusations serve only to diminish the accuser in the eyes of the court and increase animosity among your fellow attorneys.

(f) Purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence

It is not clear to this court what sentence would be appropriate for the alleged theft of a lightbulb. If, in fact, this is merely another act in an ongoing harassment by Defendant, as his daughter contends, then perhaps the best course for this family is to live apart. This, of course, is the subject of the civil proceeding between them. The People have offered Defendant an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal if Defendant completes two counseling sessions with this court's Community Health and Wellness team and agrees to an order of protection subject to lawful incidental contact (People's MOL at 10). The People's argument with regard to this factor largely focuses on their perceived misconduct of defense counsel, which is irrelevant to the analysis.

(g) Impact of dismissal on safety or welfare of the community

As noted, Defendant has not had any prior contact with the law enforcement and the alleged offenses occurred within the confines of Defendant's own residence. Further, the alleged offenses are non-violent. There is no indication that Defendant poses any danger to the safety or welfare of the community.

(h) Impact of a dismissal upon confidence of public in the criminal justice system

There is no reason to believe that the public's confidence in the criminal justice system will be eroded by the dismissal of the charges in this matter. This case concerns the alleged taking of a lightbulb from a hallway of a building in which Defendant resides. It is more likely, in this court's view, that the public's confidence would be eroded by the continued adjudication of such an offense, especially when there is uncertainty as to whom the lightbulb belongs.

(i) Attitude of complainant with respect to the motion

Based on the People's opposition to the instant motion, it appears that the complaint and her mother are fully in support of continued prosecution of the instant matter (People's MOL at 14).

(j) Other relevant facts indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose

This court finds no additional information relevant to this analysis.

Conclusion

The above analysis warrants dismissal of the instant matter in the interests of justice. The low-level nature of the non-violent alleged offense combined with lack of essential facts, pending civil litigation, and Defendant's non-criminal background do not demonstrate that there is significant benefit (to the public at large or otherwise) to Defendant's potential conviction.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument in the interests of justice is granted. The matter is dismissed and sealed.

Dated: June 29, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

SO ORDERED:

Hon. Devin R. Robinson

Judge, Criminal Court of the City of

New York, Kings County

Devin R. Robinson, J.