People of the State of New York, v. Raheem Logue, Defendant. (2026)

To suppress evidence or to warrant a suppression hearing, a defendant must make sufficient sworn factual allegations to support the suppression grounds. This defendant, in trying to suppress identification procedures and a Mirandized statement as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, provided conclusory statements to support his suppression grounds. Because the defendant alleged legal conclusions and not factual allegations in service of his request to suppress evidence, he is not entitled to a hearing on whether the identification procedures and his statements were the fruits of an unlawful arrest.

Background  ¹

In a misdemeanor complaint, the People alleged that the defendant, a dean at a school in the Bronx, forcibly touched one of his students who was inside of his office. The student promptly told three school staff members about the incident, but none of the staff members alerted the police. The next day, the complainant told her parents about the incident, and the parents reported the incident to the police. As a result, the police went to the school and spoke with the defendant, who admitted that the student had been in his office but denied touching her. The police went to the complainant's home and took her to the school, where she identified the defendant as the perpetrator in a "show-up" identification procedure. One-and-a-half hours later, a New York City Police Department (NYPD) detective conducted a single-photo identification procedure with the complainant; again, the complainant positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Later that same day, the defendant provided a Mirandized statement to the detective.

In his counseled omnibus motion made after he received discovery, the defendant sought to suppress his Mirandized statement and the two identification procedures. He claimed that he involuntarily made the statements to the police, the police-arranged identification procedures were unduly suggestive, and that the statement and identification procedures were the fruits of an unlawful arrest. In challenging probable cause, the defendant claimed that, when he was arrested, he "was not participating in any unlawful or suspicious activity, nor did he possess any contraband."² He then contested "the reliability and sufficiency of any information provided to the police regarding the alleged offense prior to his arrest."³ He specifically contested "both the reliability and basis of knowledge of the complaining witness, and any other individual who may have supplied information to the police implicating the defendant prior to his arrest."⁴ Finally, the defendant claimed, "at the time of his arrest, the police had not established the reliability and basis of knowledge of the complaining witness, nor had the police conducted any investigation to corroborate information provided by the complaining witness."⁵

The People agreed to a hearing on whether the defendant's statement to the police was voluntary but opposed a hearing on whether the identification procedures were unduly suggestive, or whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. As to the identification procedures, the People argued, without sworn factual allegations, that the complainant and defendant were so well known to each other as to make any identification procedure impervious to undue suggestion. As for probable cause, the People in their factual affirmation put forth a detailed chronology from the alleged incident to the defendant's arrest.

Analysis

A defendant may seek to suppress unduly suggestive, police-arranged identification procedures.⁶ Moving to suppress an unduly suggestive identification procedure does not require factual allegations to support the suppression grounds.⁷ The court may summarily deny the request when the prosecution clearly establishes that the identification procedure is exempt from the notice requirement under CPL 710.30.

Here, the defendant alleges that the show-up and single-photo procedures are unduly suggestive. The People oppose suppression and a hearing because the parties are so well-known to each other because the complainant was a student in the school where the defendant is the dean.⁸

The court grants a hearing on whether the identification procedures were police-arranged and unduly suggestive because the People failed to state the factual allegation in their affirmation and because the People never explained how many prior contacts the parties had with each other or for how long either party had been in the school. As for the former reason, the People first alleged that the parties were well-known to each other in their legal memorandum and not in their affirmation. Any newly alleged facts in a legal memorandum are unsworn, contravening CPL 710.60 (3) (b)'s plain requirement that sworn facts must support the alleged ground. Thus, the People failed to provide a sworn allegation to support their asserted legal ground that the parties were well-known to each other.⁹ And the People failed to specify the quantity or quality of any prior contacts between the parties. Thus, a hearing is required.

An identification procedure can be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest only when the procedure follows the arrest, not before.¹⁰ Here, the People explained that the police went to the school and spoke with the defendant. Then, the police transported the complainant to the school to do the show-up procedure; the defendant was not under arrest. Clearly, the show-up identification procedure cannot be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The single-photograph procedure, however, followed the arrest; thus, the second procedure conceivably is a suppressible fruit.¹¹

To warrant a hearing on whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, a defendant must offer factual allegations that suggest that the police lacked sufficient information to make out probable cause. Here, the court denies defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of an unlawful arrest (the single-photo identification and the Mirandized statement) or, alternatively, a Dunaway hearing because the defendant failed to raise a factual dispute as to the probable cause for the defendant's arrest. When evaluating the sufficiency of the defendant's allegations, the court should evaluate "(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant's access to information."¹² As for the face of the motions, a defendant cannot proffer legal conclusions. Instead, the defendant must raise a factual dispute that requires a hearing to resolve. CPL 710.60 (3) lets the court summarily deny a suppression motion when the defendant fails to allege adequate sworn factual allegations.¹³ Either the defendant or other persons must provide those sworn allegations of fact.¹⁴ Presumably, the other people who may provide sworn factual allegations are people with first-hand knowledge of the alleged crimes.¹⁵ And the People's evidence may be the source of "another person or persons" with first-hand knowledge upon which the defendant may rely to get a suppression hearing.¹⁶ By contrast, a defendant cannot rely on guesswork, speculation, generalizations, and vague allegations to raise a factual issue on whether there was probable cause to support the defendant's arrest.¹⁷

To support his motion, the defendant proffered only legal conclusions and not factual allegations. Legal conclusions are statements that apply legal standards to facts. Factual allegations, by contrast, explain the who, what, where, when, and how, or a description. To start, the statement that the defendant "was not participating in any unlawful or suspicious activity, nor did he possess any contraband" is a legal conclusion because the statement does not explain what the defendant was doing; instead, the statement only denies that the defendant acted unlawfully, his actions were not suspicious, and that he did not have "contraband." Then, the defendant challenged the complainant's or any other witness's reliability and basis of knowledge: "Mr. Logue specifically contests both the reliability and basis of knowledge of the complaining witness, and any other individual who may have supplied information to the police implicating the defendant prior to his arrest ."¹⁸ Challenging the reliability and basis of knowledge of complainants and of witnesses is a legal conclusion because it invokes the Aguilar/Spinelli test.¹⁹ A factual allegation may have been: "The surveillance video of the incident, which the police viewed upon arriving at the school, showed that the defendant never touched the complainant." Finally, the defendant claimed that "the police had not established the reliability and basis of knowledge of the complaining witness, nor had the police conducted any investigation to corroborate information provided by the complaining witness."²⁰ Again, attacking the complaining witness's reliability and basis of knowledge is a legal conclusion. And the police need not corroborate a complainant's version of the events to have sufficient information to establish probable cause: "Probable cause is established absent materially impeaching circumstances, where the victim of an offense communicates to the arresting officer information affording a credible ground for believing the offense was committed and identifies the accused as the perpetrator."²¹ Upon the complainant telling the police about the alleged forcible touching and identifying the defendant as the perpetrator, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant.

As for the context of the defendant's motion, the court must compare the defendant's motion allegations with the People's allegations in their opposition papers, accusatory instrument, notices, and any disclosure forms. "When defendant is able to specifically deny this information but fails to do so, it may be deemed a concession, which may render a hearing unnecessary."²² After the People filed their opposition papers, the defendant did not file a reply (although the court scheduled one). Thus, the court deems that the defendant conceded the People's factual allegations regarding probable cause.²³

As to the third Mendoza factor, a court, when determining the sufficiency of a defendant's factual allegations, must consider what information was available to the defendant before he filed his motion. The more information that is available to the defendant, the more specificity the defendant must supply.²⁴ In other words, when the prosecution withholds from the defendant the predicate for the stop, a defendant's vague denial that he committed the alleged crime is sufficient to warrant a suppression hearing.²⁵ Here however, the People provided the defense ample discovery material, including the audio recording of the 911 call, a radio run, an ICAD, 14 DD5s, a Department of Education evidence request, a DAS entity report for the complainant, the arrest report, the District Attorney's case summary, three surveillance videos from the school, and 19 clips of body-worn camera from the NYPD. The defendant failed to address any of the discovery material.

The defendant's vague, legal conclusions are insufficient to raise a factual dispute warranting a suppression hearing about probable cause. The ample discovery provided to the defendant gave details of the defendant's arrest that he had to specifically deny.²⁶ He did not. And his vague, boilerplate challenge to the reliability and basis of knowledge of the complainant is clearly insufficient.²⁷ For those reasons, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the tainted fruits of an unlawful arrest or, alternatively, a Dunaway hearing.

Summary

In summary, the court GRANTS a hearing on whether the defendant's statements to law enforcement were voluntary — a so-called Huntley hearing; the court GRANTS a hearing on whether the police-arranged show-up and single-photo identification procedures were unduly suggestive — a so-called Wade hearing;²⁸ the court DENIES a hearing on whether the defendant's statements and the two identification procedures were the fruits of an unlawful arrest — a so-called Dunaway hearing.

As for the defendant's other requested relief, the court DENIES with leave to renew before the trial judge a voluntariness hearing, preclusion, and pre-trial motions in limine (so-called Sandoval/Molineux hearings). The court DENIES all other relief requested by the defendant.

DATED: October 1, 2026

BRONX, NEW YORK

Hon. Harold E. Bahr, III, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To render the decision, the court read the defendant's omnibus motion, the People's opposition, and the People's certificate of compliance.

2.   Omnibus ¶ 6.

3.   Omnibus ¶ 7.

4.    Ibid.

5.   Omnibus ¶ 8.

6.   CPL 710.20 (6); see People v McPherson, 56 NY2d 696, 697 (1982) (concluding that "the challenged station house identification of defendant was not the product of a suggestive identification procedure").

7.   CPL 710.60 (3) (b); see People v Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 222 (1995) (outlining the procedural history of CPL 710.60 [3] [b]).

8.    See People v Tas, 51 NY2d 915 (1980).

9.   The People compounded their error by failing to attach an affidavit from the complainant that she knew the defendant's identity (CPL 710.60 [1] ["The motion papers must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact, whether of the defendant or of another person ").

10.    See e.g., People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 437 (1991) (the "State Constitution requires that statements obtained from an accused following a Payton violation must be suppressed unless the taint resulting from the violation has been attenuated"); People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 (1984) (holding that the identification procedure should be suppressed because it flowed from the illegal arrest).

11.   Neither party's papers mentioned when the police arrested the defendant. Thus, the court emailed the parties for clarification. The People explained that the police arrested the defendant after the show-up. The detective conducted the single-photo procedure almost two hours after the defendant's arrest. While the defense counsel countered that the police surrounded the defendant during the show-up, defense counsel never provided the court with his client's affidavit, alleging that, at the time of the show-up, he did not feel free to leave the area.

12.    People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993).

13.    People v Ibarguen, 37 NY3d 1107, 1108 (2021).

14.   CPL 710.60 (1).

15.    See e.g. United States v Shelby, 121 F3d 1118 (7th Cir 1997) (discussing discrepancies between the defendant's affidavit supporting his suppression motion and defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing). While the Court of Appeals has not reached that conclusion, it was apparent from the oral arguments in People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584 (2006) that the Court struggled with the issue of whether defense counsel alone could assert factual allegations or whether the defendant had to be the source of such allegations: JUDGE ROSENBLATT: So he didn't say they searched me. Isn't this, the lawyer speaking? MS. BOYD: Yes, it's an affirmation by the lawyer --JUDGE ROSENBLATT: All right, so, can we distinguish between, for constitutional purpose and the Fifth Amendment, should we distinguish between what the -- what Judge Uveller in the appellate division seem to be demanding of a defendant which is I think that the heart of this as opposed to what the lawyer can say, if what Judge Uveller wanted is that the defendant, out of his own mouth, give a recitation so as to pin that defendant down so as not to be able to come in the court later in life. If that's what she wants, and if that what -- what's the appellate division sustained, that's one thing. On the other hand, if the lawyer can say all these things, that's a very different thing. In here in this affidavit, the search was not attested to by, admitted by the defendant, all this is coming from the lawyer. MS. BOYD: Right. JUDGE ROSENBLATT: Now do you read -- You read the appellate division is saying that nothing will do short of allegations from the defendant's own mouth that he was searched then that his -- his body was invaded, that's how I read Judge Uveller -- that's how I read the ruling, and I'll read to you right here and see whether the constitution is implicated, she said, denied absent personal allegations by the defendant acknowledging, then he go to the appellate division and they appear to be saying, very much the same thing. That the defendant himself must say it, although, the defendant, necessarily had direct knowledge, he didn't allege, no -- anything. So, --

16.    People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 588 (2006), citing People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99 (1996).

17.    People v Rodriguez, 34 AD3d 320 (1st Dept 2006), lv denied 8 NY3d 884 (2007).

18.   Omnibus, at 5 ¶ 7.

19.    Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 (1964); Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 (1969).

20.   Omnibus, at 5, ¶ 8.

21.    People v Gonzalez, 138 AD2d 622, 623 (1st Dept 1988) (internal citations omitted), lv. denied 71 NY2d 1027 (1988).

22.    People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 428 (1993) (citations omitted).

23.    Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v Baiden, 36 NY2d 539, 544 (1975).

24.    See People v France, 50 AD3d 266 (1st Dept 2008) (upholding trial court's summary denial of suppression motion because the People provided ample information about the predicate for the stop).

25.    People v Bryant, 8 NY3d 530 (2007).

26.    People v Long, 8 NY3d 1014 (2007); see also People v Brinkley, 174 AD3d 1159 (3d Dept 2019) (upholding trial court's summary denial of defendant's Mapp/Dunaway hearing in light of the discovery provided to the defendant months before he filed his suppression motion).

27.    See People v Burch, 59 AD3d 266 (1st Dept 2009) (affirming the summary denial of a Dunaway hearing because the defendant knew the arrest was based on the victim's complaint).

28.   As an aside, the court agrees with the Hon. John Brunetti that courts should dispense with labeling suppression hearings by case names (see Retirement of the Term "Wade Hearing": A First Step Toward Phasing Out the Practice of Using Case Name Hearings in Suppression Litigation, 69 New York State Bar Journal 24 [1997]). Case names mean different things to different jurists. Thus, suppression motion decisions would be much clearer if the decisions specify the particular evidence that is sought to be suppressed and under what theory.

Harold E. Bahr, III, J.