The People of the State of New York, v. S. Santiago, Defendant. (2026)

In the main branch of his omnibus motion, defendant S. Santiago  ¹ moves to dismiss this misdemeanor prosecution in the interest of justice. See C.P.L. §§ 170.30(1)(g), 170.40(1). Having allegedly interfered with the arrest of his daughter for a noise complaint by pulling her away from officers and assuming a "fighting stance" directed at police, Santiago was hit in the face by a police officer, taken to the ground (where he was punched at least one more time), and forcibly arrested, all in full view of a sizeable crowd of bystanders. Later, at the hospital, he was diagnosed with a brain bleed, which he attributes to the force—in his view, unnecessary, unjustified, and excessive—used during the arrest.

Santiago's core argument—that this prosecution is disproportionate to any harm he caused, in light of the harm he has suffered—is far from meritless. But the decision to proceed with a criminal prosecution is ordinarily entrusted to the discretion of the District Attorney. And, as explained below, this is not one of the rare and extraordinary cases that warrants judicial displacement of prosecutorial discretion.

The branch of Santiago's omnibus motion seeking dismissal in the interest of justice is therefore denied. A Huntley hearing is ordered.

I. Background

The Police Encounter and Arrest

As the parties agree on the basic facts, the narrative that follows is taken in part from the parties' submissions. It is supplemented by a review of the body-worn camera footage from the incident, which the People provided in response to a May 12 order.² Nothing set forth below, however, is intended as a factual finding that might carry preclusive effect in subsequent stages of this case, or in any other related criminal or civil litigation.

In the late evening of August 23, 2025, officers responded to multiple 311 noise complaints on Hunts Point Avenue. They arrived at around 10:57p.m., encountering S.H. on the sidewalk near a large speaker.

S.H., who apparently suffers from mental illness, was agitated and very verbally combative with officers, although she did eventually provide her ID. She asked to be just given a ticket (which was eventually written), but became more upset when an officer took her speaker, which she insisted had not been turned on.

The encounter eventually attracted bystanders, some of whom spoke to S.H. while physically separating her from the officers. This intervention did not calm her down.

When S.H. herself attempted to leave, the officers informed her that she was stopped, and kept her from going around them to leave the scene. And, after repeatedly warning S.H. to stand back, one of the officers pushed her backwards into a filming bystander as she approached too close.

Defendant Santiago, S.H.'s father, appeared on the scene at around 11:00p.m. as S.H. again attempted to leave. The brief encounter between Santiago and the officers is captured from several angles on the body-worn camera footage.

Santiago initially stood between the officers and S.H., much as bystanders had earlier, seemingly trying to separate her from the police. As he did so, officers began to arrest S.H., placing her in handcuffs. They also began to push back one of the aforementioned bystanders, as another crowd of onlookers approached from down the block.

The pivotal moment occurred a few seconds later. Santiago said, "That's my daughter, [expletive]," while appearing to exchange shoves with one of the officers. After additional heated words, he said, "I'll get it on with you, [expletive]," and squared up into what the accusatory instrument would later describe as a "fighting stance."

Seconds later, one of the officers rushed Santiago and hit him in the face—at least from some video angles, possibly an open-hand slap—as others took him down to the ground. Over the next few minutes, Santiago was handcuffed and arrested. Some of the camera angles depict at least one additional strike to Santiago's head while he was restrained, which prompted an audible reaction from the now-sizeable crowd of onlookers, many of whom were filming the encounter.

Santiago and S.H. were both taken to the precinct. Both the arrest and further attempts at on-scene crowd control are documented in the body-worn camera footage, portions of which depict additional intense moments between the now-in-custody Santiago and the arresting officers,³ although tensions appear to have diminished somewhat by the time Santiago and S.H. actually arrived inside the precinct.

Sometime later, Santiago asked to be taken to the hospital, and apparently was diagnosed with a brain injury. His medical records (which have not been provided, but are referenced by the parties) also indicate that he was intoxicated to some degree during the incident. Defense's Aff. ¶¶ 11, 23(d); see also People's Resp. at 11 (pdf pag.). Civilian recordings of the encounter were reported on local news channels. Defense's Aff. ¶ 18.

The Charges and Procedural History

Both S.H. and Santiago were charged with second-degree obstructing governmental administration (P.L. § 195.05(1)), resisting arrest (P.L. § 205.30), and other offenses in connection with this incident. Santiago was accused of interfering with S.H.'s arrest by advancing towards the arresting officers and pulling S.H. away, before assuming his "fighting stance" and telling officers he would "get it on with you." People's Resp., Ex. 1 at 1-2. Santiago then resisted his own arrest by flailing his arms and pushing officers away, while otherwise refusing to comply with lawful orders to place his hands behind his back. Id. at 2.

Santiago was not arraigned until August 26. The People's recommendation at arraignment was a plea to the obstructing count with a conditional discharge and three days of community service, which (through counsel) Santiago rejected "now and . . . forever." People's Resp., Ex. 2 at 2-3.

Defense counsel instead asked for the case to be dismissed, describing the video of the incident as exonerating Santiago by depicting "three [later four] officers on top of my client, beating him down and attacking him about the head . . . without him doing anything other than walk up and prevent the arrest of his daughter." Id. at 4. Explaining that Santiago had been "chained to his bed in a MICU unit" while awaiting arraignment, counsel expressed surprise that the People were nevertheless moving forward with the case despite having reviewed the video. Id. at 7-9.

The court declined to dismiss the case, and the People later became ready and discovery-compliant on November 19. This motion schedule was set on January 15, 2026, although it was subsequently amended.

S.H.'s own case was resolved at arraignment with a plea to the noncriminal offense of disorderly conduct (P.L. § 240.20).

II. Dismissal Arguments  ⁴

In the relevant branch of his counseled motion, Santiago contends that the case should be dismissed in the interest of justice. Addressing the factors set forth in C.P.L. § 170.40(1), Santiago argues that the minor charges he faces—which, he asserts, are undermined by the exculpatory body-worn camera footage—pale in comparison to the harm inflicted on both him and the community through the "brutality" of his arrest, which was contrary to NYPD directives for de-escalation in the context of encounters with emotionally disturbed persons. Defense's Aff. ¶¶ 21-23; see also Defense's Mem. of Law at 1-4 (addressing ways in which the charges are undermined by the video footage). A conviction in this matter would "compound his distress and it is contrary to the interests of justice," especially in light of the lack of discipline meted out to the officers involved. Id. ¶ 23(j). Santiago concedes that his criminal history is "substantial," id. ¶ 23(d), but argues that the totality of circumstances still weigh in favor of dismissal.

The People oppose dismissal. Among other things, they view the same body-worn camera footage as strong evidence of Santiago's guilt. They point also to his extensive criminal history. Regarding the pretrial publicity, they assert that prosecutorial decision-making cannot rise and fall on pretrial publicity. They respond to Santiago's accusations of escalation by the police by pointing to his own escalation upon arriving at the scene. People's Resp. at 10-13 (pdf pag.). On the extent of the force used by the police, however, the People demur, deferring to the outcome of (apparently ongoing) IAB investigations. Id. at 12 (pdf pag.).

Santiago did not reply. Neither party requested a hearing on the motion, or argued that a hearing would be required due to a dispute of material fact in the motion papers.

III. Legal Standard

Prosecutors generally are afforded broad discretion to enforce the criminal laws of the state. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing this "special province" of the Executive and delegates). As the Court of Appeals has recognized, the "bedrock" concept of the separation of powers grants the District Attorney "the broad authority and discretion" to "conduct all phases of criminal prosecution." Soares v. Carter, 25 NY3d 1011, 1013 (2015). Thus, "almost invariably[,] it is the prosecutor who decides whether a case is to be pressed or dropped and what the nature of the specific offense or offenses to be lodged against a defendant is to be." People v. Zimmer, 51 NY2d 390, 394 (1980).

But prosecutorial discretion is not unchecked. Among other veto points both small and large—the grand jury in felony cases, for instance—is a court's power to dismiss an accusatory instrument in the interest of justice when circumstances warrant (a "Clayton" motion).⁵ See C.P.L. § 170.40(1); see also C.P.L. § 210.40(1) (setting out the equivalent mechanism in felony cases); Fam. Ct. Act § 315.2(1) (roughly equivalent mechanism in Family Court cases).

This dismissal power may be exercised when "such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice." C.P.L. § 170.40(1). Courts contemplating a dismissal in the interest of justice must consider, individually and collectively, the following factors:

(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; (c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; (d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; (e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant; (f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense; (g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community; (h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system; (i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; (j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose.

Id. § 170.40(1)(a)-(j); see People v. Berrus, 1 NY3d 535, 536 (2003).

However, the power to dismiss in the interest of justice is an "extraordinary" move that should be exercised "sparingly." People v. Curley, 212 AD3d 444, 445 (1st Dept. 2023); People v. Monroe, 65 Misc 3d 128(A), 2019 NY Slip Op. 51528(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2019). That is because it amounts to a court "substitut[ing] its discretion for that of the District Attorney, the State officer normally charged with the responsibility of determining when and in what manner to prosecute a suspected offender"—an encroachment, in other words, on the Executive's domain. People v. Colonramos, 49 Misc 3d 135(A), 2015 NY Slip Op. 51482(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2015).

Thus, relief is reserved for "rare and unusual cases which cr[y] out for justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And both the Appellate Division and Appellate Term have not hesitated to reverse interest-of-justice dismissals falling short of these standards.⁶

IV. Discussion

While the circumstances of this case may be troubling, and the problems identified by the defense may have some merit, this is not the kind of rare and unusual case that warrants substituting a court's discretion for the District Attorney's. So, as explained below, the relevant branch of Santiago's motion will be denied.

Many of the statutory factors, all of which have been considered, do not need extended discussion. The misdemeanor charges Santiago faces are not particularly serious, although the body-worn camera footage reflects a rapid escalation upon his arrival that could have ended with more dire consequences. Santiago has a criminal history consisting of both New York and out-of-state felony convictions, although most are quite old; his most-recent New York misdemeanor conviction dates from 2021. Another misdemeanor, accompanied by a conditional discharge with programming, would not alter his record much, although both his resistance to that added conviction and the District Attorney's independent rationale for insisting on it are understandable. Cf. People v. McGraw, 158 AD2d 719, 719 (2d Dept. 1990) (relying on, among other things, "the defendant's two prior felony convictions" as a factor weighing against an interest-of-justice dismissal).⁷

Santiago points to the community unrest caused by his arrest. The People counter with the need to disincentivize those who might interfere with police conduct. Santiago's position is stronger here, but the People's response is not unreasonable. Relatedly, a dismissal also would be audience-dependent regarding faith in the criminal justice system.

The two most relevant factors are also those where it is most important to tread carefully.

Santiago argues that the body-worn camera footage is exculpatory, showing that he did not, in fact, obstruct governmental administration. It is true that the summons was written before Santiago arrived on the scene, but it also appears that the police decided to escalate the encounter to a formal arrest right around the same time that he arrived.⁸

Otherwise, obstructing governmental administration under P.L. § 195.05(1) is a broad charge, extending even to "inappropriate and disruptive conduct at the scene of the performance of an official function." People v. Romeo, 9 AD3d 744, 745 (3d Dept. 2004); see also id. (concluding that charge was made out by defendant's "repeatedly ignor[ing] orders that he remove himself from the situation"). The camera footage may undermine proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or provide a justification defense to the secondary charge of resisting arrest, but those are issues for the jury, who would be the ultimate factfinder. Indeed, as the Appellate Term for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts has recognized, even a legitimate defense "is not so compelling a factor as to warrant a court to circumvent the prosecutorial discretion of the People" because it "in no way lessens the quantum of proof available to the People" and instead "simply raises an issue to be presented to the trier of fact." People v. McConnell, 11 Misc 3d 57, 61-62 (App. Term, 9th & 10 Jud. Dists. 2006).

Santiago also points to the officers' allegedly excessive response,⁹ as well as the injuries he sustained in the aftermath. The relevant statutory factor looks to "exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant." C.P.L. § 170.40(1)(e) (emphasis added), and few appellate decisions address the distinction between "regular" misconduct and "exceptionally serious" misconduct. Compare People v. Eubanks, 114 Misc 2d 1097, 1098-99 (App. Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dists. 1982) (improper post-commencement communication between Attorney General's office and a represented defendant was not exceptionally serious misconduct), with In re Steven C., 93 AD3d 91, 96 (2d Dept. 2012) (execution of a defective affidavit, which was primary support for the initiation of proceedings, "constituted exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the presentment of the petition").

Here, it is enough to say that the footage can reasonably be interpreted to depict a disproportionate response to Santiago's conduct. At the same time, the supposedly escalatory behavior by the police seems not quite as one-sided as Santiago suggests, as the build-up during the encounter with S.H. was gradual. Moreover, Santiago did square up and assume a real fighting stance upon confronting the police. That in no way means he deserved to be struck, taken to the ground, and forcibly arrested after having been on the scene for a matter of seconds. But it does complicate an assessment of culpability.

These circumstances suggest an incident that falls short of exceptionally serious misconduct. The moments following the arrest do not depict extensive injuries; the additional force used while Santiago was on the ground does not, at least based on what has been provided, depict the kind of encounter that, standing alone, that might compel a dismissal in these circumstances. Again, that is not a finding that any of this was warranted or appropriate. It merely means that there is not enough, on this record, to warrant displacement of prosecutorial discretion.

Relatedly, whether the force used to effectuate Santiago's arrest was legally excessive—see Matusak v. Daminski, 165 F.4th 702, 713 (2d Cir. 2026); Koeiman v. City of New York, 36 AD3d 451, 453 (1st Dept. 2007)—need not be definitively resolved now. Santiago has made clear his desire to bring that claim (and possibly others) in a civil proceeding, which will provide both sides with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues—well beyond a mere in-chambers review of footage from the incident. Whether his brain injury resulted from his arrest, or had some preexisting cause, is also beyond the ken of this kind of review.

To be clear once again, none of this should be taken to minimize what happened to Santiago. His pain is real, his injuries are real, and the secondhand trauma to the community is also real. Misconduct that is not "exceptionally serious" would still be misconduct; unnecessary force used to effectuate an arrest for an alleged crime of this sort is still unnecessary. But the record as it currently stands does not meet the high bar required for this Court to step in and terminate a case against the District Attorney's wishes.

***

The District Attorney is "the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated." United States v. B. G. G., 53 F.4th 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Absent constitutional infirmity, egregious misconduct, or rejection at one of the veto points provided by the Criminal Procedure Law, it is usually the People's prerogative to commence a case and carry it forward to disposition, even if another participant in the system, such as the court, thinks it weak, or not worth pursuing, or brought for the wrong reasons. A court should not undermine prosecutorial discretion by unilaterally terminating cases absent extraordinary circumstances. And, as set forth above, this case, while troubling, falls short of that exacting standard.

It is therefore ordered that the branch of Santiago's motion that seeks dismissal in the interest of justice is denied. A Huntley hearing is ordered. Any Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Any request for relief not mentioned above is denied.

Dated: June 12, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for publication has been redacted to remove certain identifying information.

2.   The Court reviewed the body-worn camera footage from all officers present. None of the footage filmed by bystanders, available in news reports of the incident, has been referenced. Nor have the IAB materials (also provided by the People) been reviewed in connection with this decision.

3.   There is no need to go into chapter and verse, as an arrestee need not cover himself in glory or adopt a measured tone, especially in these circumstances. It is simply worth noting that the encounters depicted between 23:03:11 and 23:07:10 found on, among others, Wtmk_PO_CASILLAALMANZAR_[first name omitted]_2025-08-23_2257.mp4, have been reviewed and are acknowledged. At the same time, the fraught interactions between the police and bystanders depicted at the later stages of the on-scene body-worn camera footage—see, e.g., Wtmk_PO_CARO_[first name omitted]_2025-08-23_2303_B25643345_B25643345 at 23:05:40—are also acknowledged.

4.   Santiago concedes that the accusatory instrument is facially sufficient, although elsewhere is somewhat equivocal on that point. See Defense's Aff. ¶¶ 5-7; see also People's Resp. at 6-10 (pdf pag.) (interpreting the defense as raising a facial sufficiency challenge). An independent review reveals no evident infirmity within the four corners of the instrument. See People v. Morel, --- NY3d ---, 2026 NY Slip Op. 00822, at *2-3 (NY Feb. 17, 2026). So to the extent Santiago intended to challenge the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, that challenge is denied.

5.    See People v. Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 (2d Dept. 1973); see also May v. Shinn, 37 F.4th 552, 555-56 (9th Cir. 2022) (Block, J., concurring in the denial of the motion to recall the mandate) (addressing the history and impact of Clayton from the perspective of the person who litigated the case).

6.    See, e.g., Colonramos, 2015 NY Slip Op. 51482(U), at *1; People v. Richman, 44 Misc 3d 34, 36-37 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2014) (concluding that the statutory factors "d[id] not justify the [trial] court's circumvention of the broad discretion granted to the People to determine what offenses to charge and how to prosecute them"); People v. Keith R., 95 AD3d 65, 67-69 (1st Dept. 2012) (observing that the District Attorney's charging "prerogative should not be lightly abrogated by a court's exercise of its interest of justice power"; while "the conservation of increasingly scarce judicial resources is a commendable goal, it is insufficient alone to warrant supplanting the prosecutor's discretion to decide how to proceed with a case"); People v. Betances, 193 Misc 2d 445, 446 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2002) (concluding that circumstances did not warrant "the extraordinary remedy of dismissal in the interest of justice"); People v. Kaufman, 77 AD2d 924, 926 (2d Dept. 1980) (reversing when the trial court "overrode the discretion not only of the District Attorney but of the two Judges to whom the prosecutor's recommendation would have been submitted, if made").

7.   Santiago does not appear to argue that a disposition unfavorable to him on one or more counts would bar a civil suit against the officers, so that issue has not been considered. But cf. Jackson v. Suffolk Cnty. Homicide Bureau, 135 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that a claim of excessive force might not be Heck-barred by an underlying criminal conviction if not relevant to the validity of that conviction).

8.   As a record has not been made of the grounds relied on by the police for the arrest, there is no need at this time to definitively determine whether a warrantless arrest for the noise complaint would have been lawful. But see C.P.L. § 140.10(1)(a)-(b) (permitting warrantless arrests for all offenses committed in an officer's presence, and crimes committed both in the officer's presence and otherwise); P.L. § 10.00(4) (defining a misdemeanor as an offense for which a sentence in excess of fifteen days may be imposed); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-108(j)(1) (authorizing a maximum jail sentence of thirty days for a violation of the noise code).

9.   The parties assume that the issue of excessive force during an arrest would fall under C.P.L. § 170.40(1)(e). However, the "misconduct" referenced in that subsection may refer to misconduct that affected the prosecution, which is how the cases referenced above the margin appear to treat it. Regardless, even if unrelated-to-the-prosecution excessive force were not relevant under subsection (e), it would be relevant under subsection (j) at the very least.

David L. Goodwin, J.