The People of the State of New York, v. Latoya Footman, Defendant. (2026)

Procedural History

Defendant Latoya Footman ("Defendant Footman") is charged by information with violating Agriculture and Markets Law ("AML") §§ 353 — Overdriving, torturing and injuring animals; failure to provide proper sustenance, a class A misdemeanor; and 356 — Failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal, an unclassified misdemeanor.

By Notice of Omnibus Motion dated April 20, 2026, Defendant Footman moved, inter alia, to preclude at trial evidence of her prior bad acts and suppress all evidence related to her arrest. In the alternative, Defendant sought pre-trial hearings, to wit, Ingle/Dunaway/Rossi/Mapp/Payton and Huntley/Dunaway. By Order dated May 20, 2026, Hon. Juliette-Noor Haji granted Defendant's motion to the extent that Huntley, Mapp, Dunaway, and Payton hearings be conducted; all other hearings were denied. Sandoval/Ventimiglia matters were reserved for resolution by the trial judge.

Suppression hearings commenced on July 21, 2026 and concluded on July 23. Based on the testimony and evidence presented, the parties' oral arguments, and relevant legal authority, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

The People called Police Officer ("PO") Casey Patari and presented as evidence the officer's body-worn camera ("BWC") footage (People's Exhibits 1A, 1B, and 1C). Defendant Footman neither testified nor called witnesses but presented by stipulation PO Ariel Balbi's BWC footage (Defendant's Exhibit A).

Testimony of PO Casey Patari

PO Casey Patari has been employed by the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") for nine and-a-half years. Prior to his current assignment in the Detective Bureau, he was a member of the 40th Precinct Quality of Life Team, where his primary duties included "responding to 311 complaints" (tr I  ¹ at 10). He has made approximately one hundred forty arrests and responded to complaints concerning animals. PO Patari owns two dogs and has observed both "well-fed dogs [and] dogs that appear to be underfed" (tr I at 11).

On December 1, 2025, at approximately 3:00PM, PO Patari and his partner, PO Balbi, responded to a 311 complaint alleging "animal abuse noise" at 660 Saint Ann's Avenue, Apartment 2B, in Bronx County. PO Patari was aware of previous 311 calls regarding the same location. Upon arrival, the officers spoke to the building superintendent and a neighboring tenant. The superintendent informed PO Patari that the residents of Apartment 2B had not been home in "[a]pproximately four days" and that the fire department had responded to reports of a "gas leak that was caused by the dogs . . . in that apartment" (tr I at 20, 13). Both the superintendent and neighboring tenant expressed concerns that the dogs would escape the apartment. PO Patari also became concerned that the dogs might escape, considering a FedEx notice on the apartment door, which suggested no one was home to receive a package. He was unable to recall the date on that notice.

PO Patari heard dogs barking while in the lobby. As the officers approached Apartment 2B, the barking intensified, and PO Patari smelled "a pungent odor of feces and urine . . . coming from that floor" (tr I at 13). When he touched the doorknob, it "fell off [and the door] was swaying and it was, like open" (tr I at 14).

Once the apartment door was opened, several "semi-aggressive" dogs greeted PO Patari. He therefore retrieved a department shield, which enabled him to "barricade [himself] from them and . . . see inside the apartment and its conditions" (tr I at 14). PO Patari observed "fecal matter on the floor and urine stains that appeared to have been there for a long time, absorbent pads in the corner — they were heavily soiled — several pots on the floor, most were empty" (id.) PO Patari further testified that he "did not observe any food on the floor in the pots" (tr I at 15). One of the pots, however, contained "an amount of water" (id.). PO Patari added that he did not believe the dogs were being "fed appropriately" because he "could see their spine[s]" (tr I at 15).Upon reviewing People's Exhibit 1A, PO Patari testified that he and his partner had planned to contact the NYPD Emergency Service Unit ("ESU") for the dogs to be transported to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("ASPCA") Hospital. PO Patari further testified that he heard additional dogs barking from the back of the apartment and therefore sought access to the fire escape to get an "official count of how many dogs needed assistance . . . and their condition . . . but [he] was unable to do so" (tr I at 21).

PO Patari reviewed People's Exhibit 1B and reiterated his observations of the apartment and dogs therein, adding that the first dogs removed from the apartment "were skinny [and] seemed to be agitated and aggressive" with fur that "appeared dirty" (tr I at 22, 23). While investigating, PO Patari became concerned that the dogs would "d[ie] in the apartment" and concluded that it was an "emergency to remove these animals for their safety and for the [other tenants'] safety" (tr I at 20, 23).

PO Patari and his partner returned to the precinct after ESU removed the dogs from Apartment 2B. Defendant Footman later arrived at the precinct, where PO Patari participated in her arrest.

Conclusions of Law

Warrantless Entry

"It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable (Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403 [2006] [internal quotations omitted]). Exceptions exist because " 'the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness'--, not the warrant requirement" (People v Molnar, 98 NY2d 328, 331 [2002], quoting United States v Knights, 534 112, 118 [2001]; see Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US 740 [1984]). One such exception is the emergency doctrine, for which the Court of Appeals has promulgated elements:

(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched (People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-78 [1976]).

Additionally, the Mitchell court held, the first element requires that "the police have valid reasons for the belief that an emergency exists, a belief which must be grounded in empirical facts rather than subjective feelings" (id. at 178). Animals may be classified as property under the emergency doctrine (see People v Rogers, 184 Misc 2d 419, 420 [2d Dept 2000] ["Since the protection of property is encompassed in the doctrine, this court finds no reason not to include therein the protection of animals which constitute property (3 NY Jur 2d, Animals, § 3). While there is currently no authority in this State specifically including the protection of animals within the emergency exception, the facts of the instant matter patently invite such inclusion."] [parenthetical in original]).

In People v Rogers, after receiving complaints about a "closed pet shop with dead animals observable from the front window," an ASPCA officer witnessed same and heard a dog barking from inside the store (Rodgers, supra at 421). Considering both the dead animals in plain view and the barking dog, the officer believed it was "highly probable that there were living creatures inside the store which required emergency medical attention" (id.). The Second Department agreed, upholding the warrantless search and seizure.

People v Rogers is distinguishable from the instant matter. While PO Patari testified that he heard barking, he did not have plain view of the dogs inside the apartment to determine whether they were injured or dead. Additionally, PO Patari smelled urine and feces, but absent an odor of decay or rot, or some other indication that at least one of the dogs was dead, the circumstances here are not on par with People v Rogers (e.g., People v Mitchell, supra at 179 ["In some cases, there are obvious signs which connect the place to be searched with the emergency, for example, screams or the odor of a decaying corpse."] [internal citations omitted]).

The People failed to elicit testimony showing that PO Patari's concerns were "grounded in empirical facts rather than subjective feelings" (People v Mitchell, supra at 178). According to testimony, PO Patari concluded that the dogs must be removed to prevent them from escaping the apartment. Based upon the facts before the Court, however, that concern was unfounded. Despite testimony that the doorknob fell off when PO Patari grabbed it and the front door was swaying, Defendant's door was closed completely when the officers approached (Exh A — 13:38:22  ² ). In fact, the building superintendent needed to push the door twice for it to open (Exh A — 13:38:23). Moreover, the Court finds it unlikely that firefighters would have left the dogs behind if they could escape the apartment or cause further property damage, or more importantly, if any were deceased.

PO Patari also testified to his fear that the dogs might die in the apartment. But as noted above, the officer did not have plain view of Defendant's apartment before the door was opened and therefore could not factually conclude that the dogs' lives were in jeopardy. Furthermore, the dogs he observed and at Defendant's rear window did not appear to be at risk of death. There were no visible wounds, and the dogs did not whimper or behave despondently. Instead, as PO Patari approached, the dogs responded excitably, barking and sniffing through the window guards while he took photos (Exh A — 13:51:31).

The facts and circumstances available to the officers on December 1 presented ample support for a search warrant application. While speaking with Defendant at the precinct, an unidentified officer states, "there's [sic] been multiple times that officers have had to come over for animal abuse" (Exh 1C — 19:26:47). Additionally, PO Patari testified that he was aware of 311 calls regarding Defendant's apartment made before December 1. The Court therefore takes judicial notice of the "311 Calls Analysis — Chronic Location Report" in Defendant's case file. It details eight 311 calls spanning October 20 to October 30, 2025—all concerning alleged animal abuse at 660 Saint Ann's Avenue. The final call, made on December 1, refers to several dogs left in an abandoned apartment. Considering PO Patari's testimony that he 1) heard excessive barking and smelled the "pungent odor of feces and urine" coming from Defendant's apartment; 2) was informed that Defendant had not been home in four days and that FDNY had responded to the apartment for a gas leak caused by the dogs; 3) observed a FedEx notice on Defendant's door; and 4) knew of prior 311 calls regarding animals, People had sufficient facts to apply for a search warrant. This Court acknowledges its "detach[ment] from the tension and drama of the moment" (People v Mitchell, supra at 177) and fully appreciates the unsettling nature of the evidence presented here. But upon "balancing the exigencies of the situation against the rights of the accused," we find that the search of Defendant's home was unreasonable, as the record before the Court fails to show that there was "an immediate need for [police] assistance for the protection of life or property" (id.). Consequently, all evidence obtained from the illegal search and seizure must be suppressed at trial.

Probable Cause to Arrest

The People bear the initial burden of showing that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. An officer has probable cause to arrest a person for committing an offense when "[it] appear[s] to be at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator, for conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice" (People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]; see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the police acted illegally (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 [1971]). An arrest not supported by probable cause is unlawful and therefore invalid (People v Baker, 20 NY3d 354 [2013]).

Here, Defendant met her burden of proving that the police acted illegally. While responding to a 311 call alleging animal abuse, NYPD officers entered Defendant's apartment without a warrant and removed several dogs that they determined had not been "fed appropriately" (tr I at 15). Defendant was arrested later that day after going to the 40th Precinct and claiming ownership of the dogs. Despite Defendant's voluntary actions, the Court holds that her arrest was not supported by probable cause since it was based upon observations and evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure.

Defendant Footman's Alleged Statement

When a person suspected of a crime is taken into custody or significantly deprived of freedom, the constitution requires the police to administer Miranda warnings if he or she is to be interrogated (see Miranda v Arizona, 348 US 436 [1966]). The standard for determining whether an individual is in custody is an objective one — whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position, innocent of any crime, would have believed that he or she was free to go (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969]; People v Hall, 125 AD2d 698 [2d Dept 1986]). Subjective beliefs of either the defendant or the police officer are not controlling (People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234 [1986]; People v Contini, 283 AD2d 323 [1st Dept 2001]). Factors considered to determine custody include, but are not limited to: (1) the amount of time the defendant spent with police; (2) whether the defendant's freedom of action was significantly restricted; (3) the location of the questioning and the atmosphere under which it was conducted; (4) the level of cooperation exhibited by the defendant; (5) whether the defendant was apprised of his constitutional rights; and (6) whether the questioning was investigatory or accusatory in nature. Statements made during any custodial interrogation must be preceded by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights (see People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285, 288-89 [1984]; Miranda v Arizona, supra at 444).

On the other hand, spontaneous statements, which are voluntary and blurted out without any "inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed," may be admissible even if made while in custody (People v Maerling, 46 NY2d 289, 302-03 [1978]). In evaluating the nature of a defendant's statement, courts determine whether the statement was in response to any word or actions on the part of the police (see Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980], cert denied 456 US 930 [1982]; People v Maerling, 46 NY2d 289, supra).

Defendant's alleged statement is as follows:

Statement Made To: PO PATARI, CASEY

Date and Time: 12/01/2025 19:29

Location: INSIDE THE 40TH PRECINCT

Type: Oral

Substance of Statements: I'M THE PERSON. DID YOU GUYS HAVE A WARRANT WHEN YOU CAME TO MY APARTMENT? THEY HAD WATER, THEY HAD FOOD. I FED THEM BEFORE I LEFT. WHO GOT MY DOGS?

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds Defendant Footman was not in police custody or significantly deprived of freedom at the time of her alleged statement. First, Defendant's freedom of action was not restricted. According to testimony, Defendant arrived at the 40th Precinct to speak with PO Patari and his partner. When the officers approached Defendant, she was seated in a vestibule, uncuffed and not accompanied by officers (Exh 1C — 19:25:20). Second, the level of cooperation exhibited by Defendant indicates that she was not in custody. Defendant exhibited hostility toward the officers and constantly interrupted as the unidentified officer spoke. At one point, PO Balbi asked Defendant, "can you stay quiet so he can [explain to you]" (Exh 1C — 19:26:39). Defendant immediately stood up, approximately three feet in front of PO Balbi and exclaimed, "don't yell at me, don't yell at me . . . but don't yell at me" (Exh 1C — 19:26:40). Finally, the questioning was investigatory, not accusatory. PO Balbi initially asked Defendant an unintelligible question; she replied, "yep, I'm the one that . . . the house that you broke into, that you went into. Did y'all have a warrant?" (Exh 1C — 19:25:20). PO Balbi then requested identification, and explained, in sum and substance, that he wanted to confirm she was a resident of Apartment 2B. Defendant interjected, "I'm the person. I'm the person 'cause I got you on my video camera, you and your partner on my video camera. I saw y'all come in my apartment with no warrant. Did y'all have a warrant? Did y'all have a warrant?" (Exh 1C — 19:25:32). In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that a reasonable person in Defendant's position would have believed she was free to leave, negating the requirement for a Miranda warning.

Defendant's alleged statement was spontaneous. As the unidentified officer explained, in essence, that a 311 call about her dogs triggered the investigation, Defendant abruptly responded, "where's the abuse? They had water. They had food. I fed them before I left. I fed them all of that" (Exh 1C — 19:26:53). Although Defendant's alleged statement was non-custodial and spontaneous, it must be suppressed since her arrest was not supported by probable cause.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that officers entered Defendant's apartment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, police did not have probable cause for her arrest, and all evidence obtained must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: September 18, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. MICHELE DAVILA, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Since the hearing occurred on July 21 and July 23, "tr I" and "tr II" are used to denote the transcript of each day's proceedings, respectively.

2.   All timestamps referenced herein are internal.

Michele Davila, J.