The People of the State of New York, v. A. Cazales, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant A. Cazales's  ¹ New York driver's license was suspended at arraignment on qualifying Bronx drunk driving charges under the prompt suspension law, V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7). Through counsel, he now seeks a hardship privilege that, if granted, would permit him to drive to and from work—from his home in the suburbs to the city's airport, for an evening shift as a federal airport employee—during the pendency of the prosecution. See V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e) ("The hardship privilege shall permit the operation of a vehicle . . . for travel to or from the licensee's employment.").

But there is a complication. The suburb in question is Marlborough, Massachusetts—and the city airport is Boston's Logan.

Because the proposed hardship privilege would fall entirely outside of New York state, the People oppose on threshold jurisdictional/procedural grounds as well as on the merits, contending (among other things) that the New York City Criminal Court lacks the power to grant a hardship privilege that does not begin in, end in, or pass through New York state.

After a bench discussion about the jurisdictional and procedural issues, a hearing primarily on the merits was held September 10. Because of the need for expediency in hardship determinations, the parties were then directed to submit expedited informal briefs on the threshold issues.

As explained below, and with the acknowledged caveat of the expedited nature of this proceeding, the relevant authority suggests that a hardship privilege can be granted in these circumstances and, with some significant reservations, that it should be allowed here. Granting a hardship privilege on a New York license is a permissible in-state exercise of jurisdiction. The privilege itself allows a New York licensee to drive to and from work, with nothing in the broader statutory scheme explicitly limiting that privilege to the borders of New York state. The proposed privilege, meanwhile, would not unlawfully commandeer another state's authority or infringe on interstate comity; in particular, it is up to Massachusetts whether to recognize the privilege, which is a separate issue Cazales will have to address in his new home state.

On the merits, the traditional hardship factors favor Cazales, but the very serious charges are a significant counterweight. Yet while the charges might be relevant to a court's exercise of its discretion, the People did not rely on them in opposing Cazales's application—and it would be unwise to assume their truth as the primary basis for a denying a privilege where, as here, the issue was not raised at the hearing and the defense has not been heard on it. Thus, the hardship privilege will be granted.

a. A New York court has jurisdiction to grant an out-of-state hardship privilege to a holder of a New York driver's license.

The discussion begins, as it must, with jurisdiction. See Henry v. N.J. Transit Corp., 39 NY3d 361, 367 (2023); Adams v. John, 227 AD3d 1395, 1396 (4th Dept. 2024); see also Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. v. Palmquist, 607 U.S. 421, 428 (2026) (observing that courts of limited jurisdiction must confirm their own jurisdiction). Jurisdiction turns on whether this court is "competen[t] to entertain [the] action." Lacks v. Lacks, 41 NY2d 71, 75 (1976).

The answer to that narrow question appears to be "yes." The core requirements for criminal court jurisdiction are satisfied, and the People's arguments against jurisdiction, while thoughtful, ultimately do not persuade.

Starting with the basics: this hardship proceeding is downstream of a New York City misdemeanor prosecution, which itself arises out of an alleged drunk driving incident in the Bronx. That kind of misdemeanor prosecution is comfortably within the fundamental jurisdiction of the New York City Criminal Court. See N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 31(1) (granting jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses in New York City); C.P.L. § 20.20(1)(a). Territorial jurisdiction is otherwise satisfied because "the alleged conduct" occurred within the state. People v. McLaughlin, 80 NY2d 466, 471 (1992).

Meanwhile, the authority to grant a hardship privilege is statutorily conferred by V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e). While most, if not all, "preconviction license suspension procedures" are effectively "civil administrative proceedings," Schmitt v. Skovira, 53 AD3d 918, 919-20 (3d Dept. 2008), lower criminal court judges can nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over them, as the statutory scheme indicates that they must. See V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b).²

Thus, this court generally has jurisdiction over this hardship privilege application. The only jurisdictional issue that remains is the proposed scope of the privilege—in other words, whether "permit[ting] the operation of a vehicle only for travel to or from the licensee's employment," V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e), falls within a New York court's jurisdiction when the proposed operation would occur entirely outside of the state.

The People's main argument against jurisdiction focuses on this extraterritorial nature of the requested hardship privilege. As they emphasize, see People's Resp. at 2-4, a state generally cannot "regulate and control activates wholly beyond its boundaries." Watson v. Emps. Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70 (1954); see, e.g., Matter of Mary, 75 Misc 3d 643, 645, 647-48 (Sup. Ct., Clinton Co. 2022) (concluding that there was no jurisdiction to modify an identity document issued by another state). The People contend that granting the requested privilege would violate this no-extraterritorial-regulation rule, defying "the long-established jurisdictional bounds of state law" by "compel[ling] a foreign jurisdiction to" comply with this Court's order. People's Resp. at 2, 4.

While the People's argument might have purchase if this case involved a purported modification of an out-of-state license to drive—that is, a direct modification of a privilege granted by another state—it is less persuasive when the object of the hardship application is a New York license. Modification of a New York license is not a prohibited extraterritorial exercise of this court's jurisdiction, but is instead an in-state exercise of court power with effects outside of the state's borders.

Greatly simplified, a driver's license granted by one state generally confers the privilege to drive in another, as recognized by the laws of other states. For instance, V.T.L. § 250(2) grants out-of-state license holders the privilege to drive in New York with certain narrow limitations. Section 10 of Chapter 90 of the Massachusetts General Laws does the same for Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 10. And through both state law and interstate agreements such as the Driver License Compact, states often (but not always) give reciprocal effect to modifications to driving privileges—suspensions, revocations, and the like—from other jurisdictions.³

Under this framework, the home-state license is the source of driving authority. The interstate privilege is derivative.

Because Cazales's New York license is an entity of this state, modifying it to permit a hardship privilege is within this court's jurisdiction. As multiple sources of authority confirm, a New York court can affect out-of-state interests through appropriate exercises of in-state jurisdiction. See Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Com., 21 NY3d 55, 64 (2013) (observing that a turnover order involving out-of-state property is appropriate if a court has personal jurisdiction over a party); Johnson v. Johnson, 68 AD3d 1685, 1686 (4th Dept. 2009) ("[A] court with personal jurisdiction over the parties has equity jurisdiction over their rights with respect to foreign realty[.]" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP Int'l Fin. Co., B.V., 41 AD3d 25, 31 (1st Dept. 2007) ("Clearly, it would violate the sovereignty of another state if a New York sheriff tried to attach property in another state. However, a turnover order merely directs a defendant, over whom the New York court has jurisdiction, to bring its own property into New York.").

Nothing in the statutory language itself would suggest otherwise, especially considering the interstate context discussed above. Travel "to or from the licensee's employment," or to "necessary medical treatment," or to "college or university" does not self-evidently restrict the privilege to in-state employment, medical treatment, or school. V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e).

That in-state modification can have permissible out-of-state effects becomes clearer from a big-picture perspective. Cazales's driving privileges in Massachusetts are suspended because his New York license is suspended. Yet if this case is dismissed, his New York license will eventually be restored, because the prosecution will no longer be pending—an act that could also restore his Massachusetts driving privileges.⁴ If lifting the suspension on Cazales's license could restore his Massachusetts privileges in their entirety without any suggestion of impermissible commandeering, it would be strange if a limited modification to his license—a partial restoration of driving privileges—could not have the same out-of-state effect.

Nor would it seem to matter that the hardship privilege at issue here falls entirely outside of New York state rather than just partially, because the in-state license remains the jurisdictional hook. If the People were correct about the inability of a New York court to authorize a hardship privilege on the roadways of another state, any interstate hardship privilege would appear to be prohibited, even if one end of the proposed journey was in New York state. Yet as Cazales points out, New York courts have granted hardship privileges for New York licensees whose workplaces are in neighboring states. See, e.g., People v. Aharon, 58 Misc 3d 1223(A), 2018 NY Slip Op. 50231(U), at *2-3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2018). That exercise of partial interstate power strongly suggests that state borders do not define the limits of the hardship privilege for New York license holders.

The People point to Vanderminden v. Tarantino, 60 AD3d 55 (3d Dept. 2009), to emphasize the limited scope of the hardship privilege, but Vanderminden held only (as relevant here) that suspension of an out-of-state license holder's New York driving privileges was permissible despite the prompt suspension law's statutory text referencing only the suspension of a "license." See id. at 58. As a decision about modifications to non-resident operator privileges, Vanderminden says very little about the scope of a New York court's power over New York licenses.⁵

Finally, there is a lurking issue of redressability, as Massachusetts may not recognize a hardship privilege granted in this state. Assuming without deciding that redressability is a jurisdictional prerequisite, see People v. Johnson, --- NY3d ---, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06528, at *2 (2025) (explaining that federal and New York standing requirements are distinct), cert. denied, No. 25-6940, 2026 WL 1780086 (June 22, 2026), Cazales has alleged an injury sufficient for a derivative action like this one, even if true redressability—whether his problem will actually be solved by the privilege—is somewhat uncertain. Cf. Jules v. Andre Balazs Props., 608 U.S. 200, 209 (2026) (concluding that a federal court had jurisdiction to decide a controversy arising in a case over which it already had jurisdiction, even if it would have lacked jurisdiction to decide a freestanding version of the controversy).

For these reasons, a New York court has jurisdiction to grant a hardship privilege that allows a holder of a New York driver's license to drive "to or from the licensee's employment," V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e), even if the journey takes place entirely outside of New York state. The New York license is the source of the person's authority to drive, and a modification of what that license allows is within this court's jurisdiction.

b. The People do not persuasively show why a New York court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction to decide this hardship application on the merits.

While the court has jurisdiction, the People's arguments raise the related question of whether that jurisdiction should be exercised, as Massachusetts is the authority better positioned to decide whether Cazales should be able to drive on the roads of that state. However, courts should generally exercise the jurisdiction they possess. See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (addressing the federal rule); Raymond v. Davis' Est., 248 NY 67, 72 (1928) (concluding that the Surrogate should have exercised all jurisdiction granted by statute). And as explained below, neither formal nor informal abstention is warranted here, in part because might be no other forum in which Cazales can seek relief.

Beginning with the issue of forum: the parties seem to agree that Massachusetts hardship privileges and reinstatement hearings are for Massachusetts licensees and in-state suspensions only. See Mass. Dep't of Transportation, Apply for a Hardship Driver's License, https://www.mass.gov/how-to/apply-for-a-hardship-drivers-license (last visited Sept. 14, 2026); Mass. Dep't of Transportation, Out of State Suspension, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/types-of-massachusetts-registry-of-motor-vehicles-rmv-suspension-hearings (last visited Sept. 14, 2026); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(4)(g) (addressing review of in-state suspensions). In other words, Cazales might not be able to seek relief via a Massachusetts agency or court. And since his New York license is suspended, he also might not be able to solve the problem by exchanging his current license for a Massachusetts license at this time.

Of course, as the People observe, this is a problem Cazales created for himself. Despite living in Massachusetts, he did not obtain a Massachusetts license upon becoming a resident, in contravention of that state's law. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 10 (permitting the reliance on out-of-state licenses only by "nonresident[s]" of Massachusetts). The People thus argue that the hardship privilege is moot because Cazales is violating Massachusetts law and cannot be restored to even partial good standing in that state.

While the People's point is well-taken, it also seems like an issue for Massachusetts, not here. Certain New York laws pertaining to updating information on driver's licenses have "no extraterritorial effect for non-New York license holders." Meza v. Proud Transit Inc., 55 AD3d 332, 333 (1st Dept. 2008). By extension, whatever Cazales's noncompliance with a Massachusetts statute might mean for his Massachusetts driving privileges, it probably does not affect the validity of the New York license before the court.⁶ And while his noncompliance raises the question of unclean hands, which might otherwise be a bar to the pseudo-equitable relief of a hardship privilege, see Wen Mei Lu v. Wen Ying Gamba, 244 AD3d 1488, 1495 (3d Dept. 2025), there is nothing to suggest that Cazales's noncompliance was intended to engineer this outcome. To the contrary, his possible failure to comply with Massachusetts law made his situation more complex, not less.

Nor does the specific context of this case suggest an interstate comity issue that might weigh against exercising jurisdiction. A court generally should not meddle with the procedures or regulations of another state. See Watson, 348 U.S. at 70. But as discussed above, the law of interstate driving is premised on reciprocal recognition of out-of-state licenses and, with certain exceptions, out-of-state suspensions and revocations—some via interstate compact, and others through individual state laws. While each state makes rules for driving on its roadways, those rules are at least partially subordinated to the laws, rules, and judicial/administrative orders of other jurisdictions. It would thus not appear to offend Massachusetts's sovereignty, or otherwise undermine interstate comity, for a New York court to carve out a limited hardship privilege to the suspension of a New York state license in a New York state criminal case, even if that privilege reached only Massachusetts roadways.

Finally, abstention would raise constitutional concerns where there is no other route to relief. A driver's license, once issued, is a property interest that may not be suspended without due process. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 & n.7 (1979). And in concluding that the prompt suspension law (under which Cazales's license was suspended) comported with due process, the New York Court of Appeals specifically cited the availability of hardship relief as a factor, albeit without specifying how much weight that factor would bear. See Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 NY2d 426, 431-34 (1996); see also People v. Reick, 33 Misc 3d 774, 775 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., NY Co. 2011) (recognizing Pringle's acknowledgment of the hardship privilege as "an important element of the prompt suspension law"). Eliminating the hardship privilege for New York license holders who live and work out of state might call the constitutionality of those suspensions into doubt.

In sum, the various factors weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction, not abstaining.

c. While the underlying allegations are serious and troubling, courts generally have not relied on allegations or charges as a reason to deny hardship privileges; moreover, even if assuming the truth of the charges would not undermine the presumption of innocence, the People have not focused on these specific allegations as a reason to deny relief.

That brings the discussion, at long last, to the merits. A hardship privilege is a discretionary form of relief, available only if a license suspension "will result in extreme hardship," which is statutorily defined to mean (among other things) the "inability to obtain alternative means of travel to or from the licensee's employment." V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e). Although there appears to be no binding appellate authority on what constitutes extreme hardship, trial courts in this state (and in this County) generally consider the following factors:

1. the presence or absence of licensed persons present in the licensee's household; 2. the ability of other licensed household members to provide transportation for the licensee; 3. the occupation and health condition of the licensee; 4. the proximity of the licensee's place of employment, health care provider or school to his or her household; 5. the presence or absence of any public transportation or taxi service to or from the licensee's household to the place of employment, health care provider or school; 6. a consideration of the licensee's ability to afford public transportation or taxi service as an alternative means of transportation; 7. the presence or absence of co-workers, friends or family members who may assist in the licensee's transportation; and, 8. any other factor that the court deems appropriate to the determination.

People v. Bridgman, 163 Misc 2d 818, 820 (City Ct., Canandaigua 1995); see also People v. Ford, 85 Misc 3d 1270(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50675(U), at *4 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (relying primarily on those factors); People v. Cruz, 80 Misc 3d 671, 675-76 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2023) (same).

Those hardship factors, all of which have been considered even if not mentioned, ultimately favor Cazales, although not overwhelmingly so. He lives about 30 miles from the airport in a region without extensive public transit options. The evidence at the hearing established that while he is a short walk away from at least one bus stop, and that the bus could take him to a train station, neither the bus nor train runs during at least one of the legs of Cazales's journey to and from the airport. And even assuming that all connections—bus, train, Silver Line—ran without a hitch, the public transit journey to Logan would be over two hours, whereas the drive would be approximately 45 minutes.⁷ This crosses the line from "longer" travel time to potentially "prohibitive" given the sheer amount of late-night uncertainty. Cruz, 80 Misc 3d at 674.

Meanwhile, Cazales testified that he does not have any family members that live nearby. And although (as the People skillfully brought out at the hearing) he was not sure about his coworkers' willingness or ability to drive him, that factor alone does not itself undermine his request for the privilege in these particular circumstances and in light of his atypical work hours. Compare with Ford, 2025 NY Slip Op. 50675(U), at *4 (concluding that the privilege was not warranted when, among other things, public transit was widely available and "several relatives" who could drive the defendant lived nearby).

In sum, the traditional factors weigh in favor of granting the privilege. Without one, Cazales would not be able to reliably get to work. He could, and likely would, lose his job and possibly his home. And he also might not be able to support his children, as he mentioned at the hearing.

One non-traditional factor, however, weighs strongly against the privilege: the underlying allegations. This is not a case where a person was pulled over for a minor traffic infraction or for erratic driving. Instead, Cazales allegedly swerved across the double yellow line and struck another car "head-on," injuring its driver. Accusatory Instrument at 2. The other person was not seriously harmed, but she or others easily could have been. Cazales also blew a .24, precisely three times the legal limit, leading to a charge of aggravated driving while intoxicated per se under V.T.L. § 1192(2-a)(a).

These allegations are extraordinarily serious. However, whether the underlying allegations can be used at all in deciding the hardship privilege appears to be an open question.

For one, they do not appear relevant to the extreme hardship itself. That is, even if they could conceivably fall under the catchall category of "any other factor that the court deems appropriate to the [hardship] determination[,]" Bridgman, 163 Misc 2d at 820, they do not relate to a person's ability to get to or from work, or to alternative modes of travel, or to other considerations pertaining to whether a suspension would cause a hardship.

Moreover, very few publicly available decisions rely on the underlying allegations in deciding whether an extreme hardship was established. Decisions often will mention the charges and allegations before engaging in an assessment of the traditional factors, without explicitly incorporating the allegations in the analysis. See, e.g., People v. Tavarez, 79 Misc 3d 1235(A), 2023 NY Slip Op. 50813(U), at *1-2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2023).

Instead, the charges are probably relevant only to a court's ultimate exercise of discretion, rather than to whether an extreme hardship has been established. The statutory text indicates that a court "may" (not "must" or "shall") grant the privilege upon a finding of extreme hardship, suggesting that the discretionary determination is separate from the assessment of hardship. V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e). And at least one court has exercised its discretion in precisely that fashion, denying a hardship privilege because the "underlying allegations" overwhelmed "any hardship factor"—although that court also acknowledged that the prior case law "d[id] not address" whether a court may "consider such things as defendant's driving record, other pending charges, or as here, the allegations of the particular charges." People v. Derosa, 83 Misc 3d 1246(A), 2024 NY Slip Op. 50928(U), at *1 (Town Ct., Perinton 2024).

It may therefore be permissible to deny a hardship privilege based solely on the severity of the allegations. But at least three considerations counsel against doing so here.

First, there is some (small) statutory evidence that the charges should either not be considered or have little relevance. Unlike the prompt suspension provision itself, which specifically requires consideration of the facial sufficiency of the allegations and authorizes a presuspension hearing to test them, the hardship subsection does not mention the allegations at all. Compare V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b), with V.T.L. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e). That contrast raises the implication that the charges have either limited relevance or no place at all in a discretionary hardship determination.⁸

Second, a person applying for a hardship privilege is still cloaked with the pretrial presumption of innocence. See People v. Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439, 443-44 (2024); People v. D'Angelo, 34 AD2d 745, 745 (1st Dept. 1970), aff'd, 29 NY2d 599 (1971). Assuming the truth of the allegations is in tension with that presumption—and absent any binding case law on this precise issue, marshalling the charges against a defendant implicates unmapped constitutional terrain.

Third, and perhaps most saliently, neither the People nor the undersigned raised the allegations at the hardship hearing, which instead focused on the traditional factors. So to the extent that the allegations may be used to deny the hardship privilege in an appropriate case, Cazales was not given any notice of that possibility at the hearing.

Thus, while the allegations are enough to give one pause—more than pause, frankly—both the lack of clear precedent and the People's general reliance on other factors suggest that this is not the case in which to break new ground.

*

**

Granting a hardship privilege is, in this context, a modification of a suspended New York license to permit a licensee to drive to and from work. A New York state court has the power to make that modification on a New York license. The reciprocal framework of licensing discussed above may mean that a hardship modification refracts across state lines when "to and from work" occurs entirely out of New York state, but there is no guarantee that it will. That is an issue for later, not for now.

So for the reasons, and despite the reservations, set forth above, the hardship privilege is granted. Cazales is permitted to drive to and from work. The granting of the hardship privilege in no way imposes an obligation on Massachusetts to recognize the reciprocal effect of the modification, which is an issue beyond the scope of this decision. The judge presiding in the Part on the day this decision is handed down is authorized to complete and execute the relevant paperwork on behalf of the undersigned.

Dated: September 15, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information. It has also been edited and revised. This revised version will replace the original in the court file; since nothing substantive has changed, the decision date remains the same.

2.   Throughout much of the state, initial arraignments and related proceedings are conducted by Town, Village, and City courts, which possess statutory civil and criminal jurisdiction. See Uniform Just. Ct. Act. §§ 201(1), 2001(1); Uniform City Ct. Act. §§ 201, 2001(1); C.P.L. § 20.50(2). The New York City Criminal Court, by contrast, lacks a clear statutory grant of civil jurisdiction, although its judges are magistrates empowered with certain related authority and responsibilities. See N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 30. The parties have not challenged this court's jurisdiction over ancillary civil proceedings arising out of a criminal case, so the issue is noted simply for the sake of completeness.

3.    See Rivera v. Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 564 P.3d 1040, 1044-45 (Alaska 2025) (discussing the general framework of the Compact); see also V.T.L. § 516 (enacting the Compact in New York); Packard v. Hinden, No. CIV A 05-11906-DPW, 2007 WL 2746799, at *5-6 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2007) (addressing Massachusetts's treatment of out-of-state violations; "if another state suspends or revokes an individual's license, the [Massachusetts] Registry [of Motor Vehicles] is required to revoke the license without a prior hearing"); Driver License Compact, https://compacts.csg.org/compact/driver-license-compact/ (showing both New York and Massachusetts as members) (last visited Sept. 14, 2026); Nonresident Violator Compact, https://compacts.csg.org/compact/nonresident-violator-compact/ (showing both New York and Massachusetts as members) (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

4.   The People's argument about Cazales's failure to obtain a Massachusetts license under that state's law will be addressed below, as it is unique to his circumstances rather than relating to the general exercise of jurisdiction. The People do not dispute that a person such as a student could conceivably work, live, and go to school in Massachusetts without necessarily establishing residency (and, thus, triggering the requirement to obtain a new license) under that state's laws. See Commonwealth v. Chown, 948 N.E.2d 394, 400-01 (Mass. 2011); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 3. The jurisdictional question of whether a hardship privilege can be granted for out-of-state driving is therefore distinct from whether one should be granted in Cazales's unique circumstances.

5.   A New York court might not be able to grant an out-of-state hardship privilege to the holder of an out-of-state license, because the court would be modifying derivative New York driving privileges that extend solely to "the public highways of this state," meaning New York. V.T.L. § 250.20(2) (emphasis added). But see People v. Reick, 33 Misc 3d 774, 776 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., NY Co. 2011) (granting a partially out-of-state hardship privilege to a person licensed in another state). Since this case is about a New York license, there is no need to reach the issue.

6.   The parties do not rely on any New York statute or regulation having a similar effect for persons who move out-of-state.

7.   Although the parties did not raise the option at the hearing, a bus called the Logan Express Framingham runs to a location about 20 miles away from Cazales's home. See Logan Express Framingham, https://www.massport.com/logan-airport/getting-to-logan/logan-express/Framingham (last visited Sept. 14, 2026). While this has better hours for Cazales than the pure bus/train route, and also has its last trip from Logan at 1:15a.m.—after his shift ends—it would require either a bus connection to the suburban terminal or for him to drive 20 miles. The parties may wish to discuss whether this option is preferable to a full hardship privilege.

8.   The counterargument would be that a defendant already had the opportunity to contest the charges at suspension, so referencing them again in the hardship subsection would be unnecessary. But to assume that silence at suspension functions as an admission at the hardship stage would raise procedural and constitutional concerns, regardless of the quasi-civil nature of these proceedings. Besides, as everything from the reliability of the chemical test on down will likely be litigated, there are good reasons to refrain from assuming the truth of the allegations absent explicit statutory authority to do so.

David L. Goodwin, J.