PEOPLE v. INFINITE (2026)

On February 18, 2026, the defendant was arraigned on an information charging one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law [PL] § 265.01[1]) in connection with the defendant's alleged possession of a switchblade knife. By motion papers filed on March 11, 2026, July 13, 2026, and July 24, 2026,¹ the defendant moves for a finding that the People's certificate of compliance and statements of readiness are invalid; dismissal of the information on statutory speedy trial grounds under CPL 30.30; and various other relief. On August 3, 2026, the People filed a response opposing the motions. On August 6, 2026, the defendant filed a reply.

For the reasons that follow, the defendant's motion to invalidate the COC is denied as procedurally barred. In any event, the defendant's motion to invalidate the COC is denied on the merits and the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 is denied. The court finds that 21 days are charged to the People. Further, the defendant's motion for a hearing on his discovery motions is denied. In addition, a Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered.

I. Applicable Law to Defendant's Speedy Trial and Discovery Compliance Challenges

Pursuant to CPL 30.30(1), the applicable speedy trial period is determined by the highest offense charged in the accusatory instrument. Here, the top count charged on the accusatory instrument is a misdemeanor punishable by a term of incarceration not to exceed 364 days (PL § 70.15[1]). Accordingly, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action, less any excludable time (CPL 30.30[1][b], [4]). The criminal action began when the accusatory instrument was filed against the defendant in criminal court (CPL 1.20[17] [a “criminal action is commenced by filing of the accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court․”]; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 355-356 [1980] [the point of commencement of an action for speedy trial purposes is the date on which the first accusatory instrument was filed]). The People attain trial readiness by declaring their actual readiness in open court or by filing a certificate of actual readiness with the court and serving a copy on defense counsel (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985]).

The defendant has the initial burden under CPL 30.30 to demonstrate by sworn allegations of fact that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time limit set forth in the statute (People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]). Upon such a showing, the People bear the burden of demonstrating their entitlement to statutory exclusions of time (People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 403 [2016]; People v Santana, 80 NY2d 92, 105 [1992]). In the post-readiness context, the burden is on the People to ensure that the record of a proceeding “is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering [a] CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged” with the delay (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 [1992]; People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 440 [1998]). The Court of Appeals has clarified that the legislature linked the speedy trial requirements set out in CPL 30.30 to the People's discovery obligations under CPL 245.20 (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 209-210 [2023]).

Under CPL 245.20(1), the People's initial disclosure obligations extend to 21 enumerated categories of discoverable material, along with a catch-all provision that further requires disclosure of “any other material or information relevant to the subject matter of the charges․ in the instant case or a defense thereto.” To satisfy this obligation, the People are required to “make a diligent, good faith effort” to ascertain what discoverable material exists and, where such material is not already in the prosecutor's possession, custody, or control, to take steps “to cause such material․to be made available for discovery” (CPL 245.20[2]). The People must also work to maintain a sufficient flow of information between their office and law enforcement so that discoverable materials come within their possession or control (CPL 245.55[1]). Notably, “all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the [People's] possession” (CPL 245.20[2]). And significantly, the statute establishes that “[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure” (CPL 245.20[7]).

Once the People have satisfied their initial discovery obligations under CPL 245.20(1), they must serve and file a COC pursuant to CPL 245.50. The COC must state that, “after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery,” the People have disclosed and made available all known material subject to discovery (CPL 245.50[1]). The COC must also identify the items disclosed, as well as any discoverable items of which the People are aware but which they were unable to obtain despite exercising due diligence (id.). Where, as here, the defendant is not in custody, the People must fulfill their initial discovery obligations as soon as practicable, but no later than 35 days after arraignment (CPL 245.10[1][a][ii]).

The filing of a valid COC is a prerequisite to the People being deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50[3]; People v Lobato, 66 Misc 3d 1230[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50322[U] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020]). If additional discoverable material comes to light after an initial COC has been filed, the People must serve and file a supplemental certificate of compliance (SCOC), noting the newly disclosed material and explaining the basis for the delayed disclosure, “so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the [COC]” (CPL 245.50[1], [1-a]). Absent a finding of special circumstances, the People cannot be deemed ready for trial for purposes of CPL 30.30 unless and until they have filed a valid COC (CPL 245.50[3]).

A defense challenge to the validity of a COC must be by motion within 35 days of service of the certificate, unless an extension has been granted by the court (CPL 245.50[4][c]). Further, the challenge must be accompanied by an affirmation that, after the COC was filed, the defense timely conferred with the People in good faith or made good faith efforts to timely confer about the specific basis for the challenge, that efforts to obtain missing discovery or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached (CPL 245.50[4][c]).

The People have “the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries before filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure” (Bay at 213). In assessing the People's due diligence to meet their disclosure obligations, the court shall look at the totality of the People's efforts to comply with Article 245, rather than assess their efforts item by item (CPL 245.50[5]). The court's finding shall be based upon consideration of all relevant factors, and no one factor shall be determinative (CPL 245.50[5][b]). The relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. the efforts made by the People to comply with the statutory requirements;

2. the volume of the discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding;

3. the complexity of the case;

4. whether the People knew that the belatedly disclosed or missing material existed;

5. the explanation for any discovery lapse;

6. the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery;

7. whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied;

8. whether the omission was corrected;

9. whether the People self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention;

10. whether the People's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

CPL 245.50[5][a]). Importantly, the mere fact that an item of discovery is disclosed after a COC is filed does not necessarily invalidate that COC (Bay at 212). Rather, a COC may be found valid where it is “filed in 'good faith and reasonable under the circumstances' despite the belated discovery” (People v Gaskin, 214 AD3d 1353, 1355 [4th Dept 2023]; see People v Lee, 249 AD3d 555, 556 [1st Dept 2026]; People v Haggan, 248 AD3d 660, 660-61 [1st Dept 2026]; CPL 245.50[1]). “[T]he key question in determining if a proper COC has been filed is whether the prosecution has 'exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery.' Although the statute nowhere defines 'due diligence,' it is a familiar and flexible standard that requires the People 'to make reasonable efforts' to comply with statutory directives” (Bay at 211[citations omitted]). Whether the People made reasonable efforts “is fundamentally case-specific” and “will turn on the circumstances presented” (id. at 212). “[T]he statute does not require or anticipate a 'perfect prosecutor'” (id.).

Notably, subsequent disclosures and a supplemental COC cannot cure the prosecution's failure to exercise due diligence before filing its initial COC. If due diligence cannot be established, the COC “should be deemed improper [and] the readiness statement stricken as illusory” (Bay at 213).

II. Certificate of Compliance

A. Chronology of Discovery and Motion Practice

The defendant contends that the People failed to disclose certain discovery materials and that these omissions demonstrate a lack of diligence, thereby rendering the COC invalid. He seeks a hearing to orally argue his discovery-related motions. In response, the People contend that the court should deny the defendant's motion, without a hearing, as both procedurally barred and meritless. Further, the People contend that the COC was valid at the time it was filed because all discovery materials were shared with the defendant by that time.

On April 10, 2026, the People served discovery along with an automatic discovery form (ADF), a COC, and a certificate of readiness (COR) on the defendant by mail. On that same day, the People filed the ADF, COC, COR, and a discovery list with the court. Thereafter, at the court appearance on May 13, 2026, the People served an additional hard copy of their discovery materials and readiness documents on the defendant. On both July 13, 2026 and July 24, 2026, the defendant filed motion papers, wherein he sought various relief, including invalidation of the COC and statements of readiness.

B. Timeliness and Good Faith Consultation

The 35-day time frame for the defendant to file a motion challenging the validity of the COC began to run from service of the COC on April 10, 2026 (see CPL 245.50[4][c]). Thus, the filing of the first motion challenging the validity of the COC 94 days later on July 13, 2026 was untimely. Moreover, even when measured from service of the materials at the May 13, 2026 court appearance, 61 days elapsed before the filing of the motion, and, thus, the defendant's challenge was still untimely. Further, the defendant failed to establish that he made any efforts to timely confer with the People about his challenge to the validity of the COC. As such, the court finds that the defendant failed to meet the requirement that, prior to filing his motion papers, he make good faith efforts to confer with the People about the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for his challenge (see id.). Accordingly, the defendant's motion challenging the People's discovery compliance is denied as procedurally barred pursuant to CPL 245.50(4)(c). Nevertheless, as discussed below, the court considers the merits of the defendant's motion and declines to invalidate the COC.

C. Discovery Purported to be Outstanding

The defendant asserts that the People's COC is invalid because they do not possess the knife at issue in this case nor have they disclosed certain disciplinary records for the arresting officer.

1. Knife

The defendant contends that the police department returned the knife to him on the day of his arrest after determining that it was not actually a switchblade knife and, instead, was legal to possess. As the knife is not in the People's possession, he argues that the People cannot validly certify compliance with their discovery obligations nor state ready for trial. In response, the People assert that the knife is actually a switchblade knife, as shown by the arresting officer's use of it on body worn camera footage, and that its release to the defendant was the result of an administrative error. The People state that they disclosed the arrest voucher for the knife but cannot disclose to the defendant the knife that was previously returned to him.

Pursuant to CPL 245.20(1)(m), the People are required to provide the defendant with “[a] list of all tangible objects obtained from, or allegedly possessed by, the defendant․in connection with the criminal action or proceeding.” The People's ADF lists the switchblade knife as physical evidence in this case and indicates that the knife was recovered from the defendant's person (see People's ADF at ¶ 5[a]). Further, it is undisputed that the People disclosed the voucher for the knife. CPL 245.20 does not require the People to possess the knife nor does it require the People to disclose the knife to the defendant. In any event, the defendant admits that the knife was returned to him on the day of his arrest. Accordingly, the court finds that the People sufficiently met their discovery obligations regarding the knife.

2. Law Enforcement Disclosure Materials

The defendant asserts that the arresting officer fabricated a false police report as the basis for the instant case and that the People have failed to turn over the officer's disciplinary records in connection with filing this report. As such, the defendant argues that the People's COC is invalid. The People, however, state that the defendant's claim of a fabricated police report is baseless and contradicted by the body worn camera footage showing the officer's use of the knife as a switchblade. Further, the People assert that they have turned over all law enforcement disclosure materials related to their one testifying police officer.

In order to meet their automatic discovery obligations, the People are required to disclose all evidence and information related to the subject matter of the case that tends to “impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness” (CPL 245.20[1][k][iv]). The People, as part of their obligations under CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), are required to disclose disciplinary records that tend to impeach their testifying police officer witnesses (see People v Fuentes, 45 NY3d 325 [2025]; Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d 447 [1st Dept 2021]; People v Rodriguez, 77 Misc 3d 23 [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]). Here, the People assert that they have disclosed all disciplinary records for their testifying police officer and that this case is not based upon a false police report. Beyond his bare allegations, the defendant provides no indication that any disciplinary records remain outstanding. Accordingly, the court finds that the People satisfied their disclosure obligations under CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv).

D. Validity of the Certificate of Compliance

At the time the People filed the COC, they had disclosed a large number of files to the defense, as shown by their ADF and list of disclosures, including NYPD arrest paperwork, body-worn camera footage and metadata, photos, and law enforcement disciplinary records. Having examined the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations and viewing those efforts holistically in light of the relevant factors set forth in CPL 245.50(5), the court finds that the People exercised due diligence, made reasonable inquiries, and acted in good faith before filing the COC (see Bay at 211-212). Further, the defendant has not established a basis to conclude that the People failed to meet their automatic discovery obligations. For these reasons, the defendant's motion to invalidate the COC is denied and his motion for a discovery hearing is denied.

III. CPL 30.30(1): Speedy Trial

February 18, 2026 — April 10, 2026

On February 18, 2026, the defendant was arraigned on an information charging him with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (PL § 265.01[1]). He was released on his own recognizance, and the case was adjourned to April 10, 2026 for trial and for the People to file a COC. On March 11, 2026, the defendant filed motion papers seeking various relief. This filing tolled the speedy trial clock (see CPL 30.30[4][a]; People v LaClair, 79 Misc 3d 8, 12 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023] [“CPL 30.30(4) exclusions are still available in the pre-readiness context”], citing Matter of People ex rel LaBrew v Vance, 192 AD3d 645 [1st Dept 2021]). “New York courts have consistently held that, when computing a period of days, the first day is excluded but the last day is included” (People v DiMeglio, 294 AD2d 239 [1st Dept 2002]; People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 [1987]). Accordingly, the People are charged with the 21 days from February 18, 2026 until the filing of the defendant's motion on March 11, 2026.

21 DAYS CHARGED TOTAL = 21

April 10, 2026 — May 13, 2026

At the court appearance on April 10, 2026, the People were not ready for trial, as they had not yet filed a COC. Thus, the case was adjourned to May 13, 2026 for trial and for the People to file a COC. Later on April 10, 2026, the People filed a COC and COR. As previously discussed, the COC is valid, and the court finds that the COR is effective. Therefore, this entire adjournment period is excludable. This period is also excludable because the defendant's motion remained pending during this time (see CPL 30.30[4][a]).

0 DAYS CHARGED TOTAL = 21

May 13, 2026 — July 13, 2026

On May 13, 2026, the People stated ready for trial. However, the matter was adjourned to July 13, 2026 for trial. The court finds that the People's statement of readiness and the continued pendency of the defendant's motion tolled the speedy trial clock for the entirety of this adjournment period (see CPL 30.30[4][a]).

0 DAYS CHARGED TOTAL = 21

July 13, 2026 — September 14, 2026

On July 13, 2026, the People stated ready for trial. At that time, the defendant filed a second set of motion papers seeking various relief. Accordingly, the court set a motion schedule and adjourned the case to September 14, 2026 for decision. Thereafter, on July 24, 2026, the defendant filed a third set of motion papers seeking various relief. The court finds that the People's statement of readiness effectively tolled the speedy trial clock. In addition, because this adjournment period was occasioned by motion practice, it is excludable (CPL 30.30[4][a]).

0 DAYS CHARGED TOTAL = 21

Thus, the court finds that there are 21chargeable days to date.

Since less 90 days are charged, the defendant's motion to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL 30.30 is denied (see CPL 30.30[1][b]).

IV. Omnibus Motions

A. Motion to Suppress Statement Evidence

The People provided notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a) of a statement made by the defendant to law enforcement personnel that they intend to use in their direct case (see CPL 710.30[1][a]). The defendant moves to suppress this statement.

Given the legal significance of any ruling on the admissibility of the defendant's statements, the court may, in its discretion, hold a Huntley/Dunaway hearing as a matter of prudence (see People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]; CPL 60.45). Such a hearing will allow the court to examine, among other issues:

1. the circumstances and timing of the defendant's arrest,

2. whether he was properly advised of his Miranda rights before questioning,

3. whether any waiver of those rights was knowing and voluntary, and

4. whether the statements made after Miranda warnings are admissible.

Holding a combined Huntley/Dunaway hearing will help develop the record and ensure an appropriate determination. Accordingly, under the circumstances presented, the defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered.

B. Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and Dismiss the Charged Offense and Request for a Mapp/Dunaway Hearing

The defendant moves to suppress physical evidence, specifically the alleged switchblade knife, and to dismiss the sole charge against him (see CPL 710.20[1]). In the alternative, the defendant requests a Mapp/Dunaway hearing (see Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200).²

Pursuant to CPL 710.60(1),

A motion to suppress evidence made before trial must be in writing and upon reasonable notice to the people and with opportunity to be heard. The motion papers must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact, whether of the defendant or of another person or persons, supporting such grounds. Such allegations may be based upon personal knowledge of the deponent or upon information and belief, provided that in the latter event the sources of such information and the grounds of such belief are stated.

When seeking suppression of evidence on probable cause grounds, a defendant must present specific facts rather than merely asserting legal conclusions (see People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584 [2006] [“[t]here is no legal basis for suppression and, hence, no need for a hearing, unless the accused alleges facts that, if true, demonstrate standing to challenge the search or seizure.”]; People v Martinez, 187 AD2d 310, 310—11 [1st Dept 1992] [“[s]ummary denial of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress physical evidence was proper. Defendant's motion papers consisted solely of legal conclusions and conclusory allegations, which cannot provide the requisite basis for a Mapp hearing”]). Exceptions to this rule apply only where the defendant does not have access to or awareness of the facts necessary to support suppression (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 [1993]). The court may summarily deny the motion where the motion papers do not provide adequate sworn allegations of fact (CPL 710.60[3]).

In this case, the defendant contends that the return of the knife to him on the day of his arrest demonstrates that the knife was not a switchblade and was instead a knife he was legally authorized to possess. Thus, he argues that there was not probable cause for his arrest and, in turn, the charged offense should be dismissed. The People acknowledge that the knife was returned to the defendant but assert it is a switchblade and the return was in error. The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. However, in light of the factual dispute about the knife recovered from the defendant, the defendant's motion to suppress is granted to the extent that a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is ordered.

C. Motion for Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes and Dismissal or Reduction of Indictment

The defendant moves for inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the indictment. However, in this case, the defendant is solely charged with an A misdemeanor, and evidence was never presented to a grand jury. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied.

D. Motion for a Bill of Particulars

The defendant's request for a bill of particulars is denied (see CPL 200.95). “The sole function of a bill of particulars is to define more specifically the crime or crimes charged in the [accusatory instrument], or, in other words, to provide clarification of certain matters set forth in the pleading. A bill of particulars serves to clarify the pleading; it is not a discovery device” (People v Davis, 41 NY2d 678, 679-680 [1977] [internal citations omitted]; see CPL 100.45[4]). Here, the court finds that the People's Automatic Disclosure Form “advises [the] defendant of the alleged date, time, location and general nature of the misconduct with which he was charged and, thus, is sufficient to satisfy the People's obligation of informing defendant of the theory of the prosecution's case” (People v Thompson, 27 AD3d 888, 890 [3d Dept 2006]).

E.  Motion to Compel

The defendant moves for an order directing the People to produce evidence, including the alleged switchblade knife. The defendant's motion is denied. As previously discussed, the knife was already given to the defendant. In addition, the defendant has not given the court a reason to conclude that the People are not complying with or will not comply with their statutory obligations. However, the People are reminded of their preservation and disclosure obligations under Article 245 of the Criminal Procedure Law, including their obligations pursuant to Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), and its progeny.

F. Request for Court Orders and Minutes

The defendant seeks copies of court orders and minutes from this case. Requests for court orders should be directed to the Part C Clerk's Office, and requests for minutes should be directed to the Court Reporter's Office. Both offices are located at 100 Centre Street.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the court appearance on July 13, 2026, the defendant filed motion papers, and the court set a motion schedule. He thereafter filed additional motion papers on July 24, 2026. The court file also includes motion papers filed by the defendant on March 11, 2026, and there is no indication therein that a decision was issued in connection with this filing. A review of all three filings shows duplicative requests for certain relief. This decision addresses all three filings.

2.   The defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence and dismiss the case, or, alternatively, for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is his only request for omnibus relief that is untimely under CPL 255.20. Pursuant to this section, the motion should have been made within 45 days of the People's disclosures related to CPL 245.20(1)(m). However, upon consideration of the defendant's pro se status and the circumstances of this case, the court, in its discretion, entertains the motion in the interest of justice (see CPL 255.20[3]). The court notes that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers'” (Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106 [1976]; see Erickson v Pardus, 551 US 89, 94 [2007]).

Shirin Zarabi, J.