The People of the State of New York, v. Dajanae Wesley. (2026)

The People allege that at about 8:00 a.m. on February 22, 2026, the complainant was walking to a delicatessen when defendant, a woman with whom the complainant allegedly had a prior intimate relationship, "grabbed and rubbed" the complainant's penis over his clothing without his permission. A bystander recorded the incident with their cellphone. The complainant called 911, and responding police officers completed a domestic incident report ("DIR"). The complainant identified defendant from a still photo taken from the bystander's video, and the police issued an I-card for defendant's arrest. Two days later, on February 24, 2026, defendant surrendered to a detective with the Bronx Special Victims Squad, who conducted a recorded interrogation of the defendant.

On February 25, 2026, the People charged defendant with Forcible Touching (Penal Law § 130.52(1)), Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 130.55), and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26(1)). Because defendant was charged with no offense higher than misdemeanor grade, at least one of which carried a potential jail sentence exceeding three months, the People were required to announce their trial readiness within 90 days of the action's commencement—i.e., by May 26, 2026. See CPL 30.30(1)(b). The People filed a certificate of compliance ("COC") and statement of readiness on May 20, 2026. Defendant now moves to dismiss the action, arguing that the People's COC was invalid and their statement of readiness was illusory. The court assumen CPL 245.20(2) requires the People to make "a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the ees the parties' familiarity with the facts and arguments in the motion. As explained below, the motion is GRANTED.

CPL 245.20(1) lists 21 categories of material that the People "shall disclose to the defendant," if those materials are in the possession of the prosecution or "persons under the prosecution's direction or control," which includes the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"). See CPL 245.20(2). If materials that fall into any of those categories are not in the People's possession so defined, thxistence" of those materials and to "cause such material or information to be made available for discovery." Once the People have made good faith efforts to disclose the materials required under CPL 245.20(1), they must file a COC certifying "that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." CPL 245.50(1). The People must file a valid COC before declaring ready. See CPL 245.50(3). A COC is valid if the People made "reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives." People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 (2023) (cleaned up); see CPL 245.50(6). This is a "fundamentally case-specific" inquiry that turns on a variety of factors, including a list of factors set out in the discovery statute. Bay, 41 NY3d at 212; see CPL 245.50(5)(a).

Here, a confluence of factors persuades the court that the People's COC was not valid.¹ First, the People failed to disclose body-worn camera ("BWC") footage from the officers who responded to the scene on February 22, 2026. These materials are discoverable under CPL 245.20(1)(e) and CPL 245.20(1)(g). There is reason to believe that they exist, since other documents in the People's discovery production indicate that officers activated their BWC when they responded. And the BWC footage would be significant evidence in the case, since it would provide a jury with a visual and audio recording of the complainant shortly after the alleged incident occurred. Here, although the People identified the omission of this material before filing their COC and undertook significant efforts to uncover it before certifying their discovery compliance, there is no indication that the People communicated with the responding officers directly about the missing BWC footage. This is significant, as doing so may have uncovered whether the responding officers misidentified their BWC footage when uploading it to the appropriate NYPD software. Instead, the People's only efforts to locate these materials appear to have been requests made to the investigating detective, and there is no obvious reason to believe that that person would have had any profitable information about the location of the missing BWC footage.

Second, the People did not disclose prior DIRs involving the complainant, including DIRs documenting incidents between the complainant and defendant that occurred shortly before and after the charged incident. The People do not dispute that DIRs between the parties are discoverable; and contrary to the People's contention, the seven additional prior DIRs involving the complainant and other individuals are also discoverable in the context of this case, at a minimum pursuant to CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iii) and CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv). These materials could be significant, for example to substantiate the defense theory that the complainant was familiar with the domestic-violence criminal justice system and in this case was attempting to weaponize that system against defendant. Yet the record reflects no pre-COC efforts by the People to uncover and disclose the DIRs, including the DIRs between the parties that the People concede are discoverable in this case. Instead, the record indicates that the People only disclosed those materials after counsel demanded them in conferral. There is no explanation for this belated disclosure.

Third, the People failed to adequately investigate the existence of contact information for the eyewitness bystander who recorded the incident. This information is not discoverable under CPL 245.20(1)(c), inasmuch as the People assert that it is not in their actual or constructive possession. The nondisclosure of this information thus cannot form a basis to invalidate the People's COC. See People v. Haggan, 248 AD3d 660, 660 (1st Dep't 2026). But this information would plainly be discoverable if it were in the People's possession, so the People were required to make "a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence" of this information and make it available to the defense.² The record here reflects no such diligent effort by prosecutors before they filed their COC. And the only post-COC attempt to obtain this information documented in the record—when prosecutors asked the complainant to provide it—cannot credibly be characterized as "diligent." The People have designated the video as potential trial evidence, so it is reasonable to infer that there is some forensically sound chain of custody that terminates in the device used to create the video—i.e., the bystander's cellphone. Yet the record reflects no attempt by the People to pursue that lead to identify the bystander. Given the obvious import of the bystander's eyewitness testimony, the People's decision essentially to cede this part of their investigation to the complainant himself is not consistent with reasonable diligence.

Fourth, the People failed to adequately investigate the existence of text message communications between the complainant and defendant. Such communications could fall within several of the CPL 245.20(1) categories, and some of those text messages were in the People's possession as attachments to discoverable DIRs. Even as to communications not within the People's possession, the People were required to make diligent, good faith efforts to discover their existence before certifying their discovery compliance. See CPL 245.20(2). But again, the record here reflects no such diligent efforts, either before or after the People filed their COC. A prosecutor exercising reasonable diligence would have anticipated the existence of these communications; indeed, prosecutors in this case were aware that such communications might exist, because they referred to that possibility in other documents that were disclosed during discovery. And these materials were potentially significant evidence in the case: they would have contained statements between the parties that may have provided context for the nature of their relationship. The People's failure to take any steps to locate them was not diligent or reasonable.

Taking these circumstances together, the court cannot agree that the People made reasonable, diligent efforts to comply with their discovery obligations. Considering the statutory factors as a whole, including the nature of the case, the nature and volume of the material omitted or not investigated, the nature and volume of material provided, and the People's other discovery compliance efforts, as well as the prejudice to defendant resulting from the People's omissions, the court concludes that the People failed to exercise due diligence and make reasonable efforts to ascertain the existence of and disclose discoverable material. The COC is therefore invalid, and the action must be dismissed.

Given this disposition, it is unnecessary to address defendant's remaining contentions, including his argument that the People failed to disclose materials related to sealed criminal cases prosecuted by the Bronx District Attorney against the complainant. Likewise, the People's motions for protective orders are denied as academic. The foregoing constitutes the order of the court.

Dated: September 16, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Philip V. Tisne

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant does not make any argument that the People's COC in this case is invalid because the wording of the People's certification diverges slightly from certification required by CPL 245.50(1).

2.   The People's statutory exemption from having to "ascertain the existence of witnesses not known to the police or another law enforcement agency," CPL 245.20(2), does not affect their obligation to diligently search for the bystander's contact information, since the existence of that eyewitness was known to law enforcement during their investigation of this case.

Philip V. Tisne, J.