The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Elianny Batista, Defendant. (2026)

On March 23, 2026, at approximately 12:40 AM, in front of 158 Nagle Avenue, New York, New York, Police Officer Emily Taveras of the New York City Police Department (NYPD)'s 34th Precinct observed defendant, Elianny Batista, to have an odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath, screaming, crying, stumbling, and attempting to run into traffic. Officer Taveras concluded that defendant was intoxicated. Officer Taveras also observed a small child under the age of seventeen, fewer than four feet tall and appearing approximately four years old, wearing a long-sleeve shirt, sweatpants, and Crocs while shivering in the rain.

For these acts, defendant was arrested and charged with one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Penal Law [PL] 260.10[1]) in New York County Criminal Court.

On March 23, 2026, an accusatory instrument was filed, and defendant was arraigned in New York County Criminal Court before the Honorable Terence McCormick the following day. At defendant's March 24, 2026 arraignment, 18-B counsel, Mr. Robert Blau, represented defendant. The case was adjourned to April 30, 2026, in Part D, for trial.

On April 22, 2026, defendant retained the Center for Family Representation, Ms. Morgan Shaffer, Esq. appearing, to represent defendant.

On April 29, 2026, the People shared numerous items of discovery with Mr. Blau via electronic sharing.

On April 30, 2026, defendant appeared at calendar call with her attorney, Ms. Shaffer, who filed a Notice of Appearance with the court and the People. The People were not ready for trial, and the case was adjourned to June 25, 2026, for trial.

On June 22, 2026, the People shared remaining discovery with Mr. Blau and filed a Certificate of Compliance (COC), Statement of Readiness (SOR), and Automatic Discovery Form (ADF) with Mr. Blau and the court.

At the June 25, 2026 calendar call, the People maintained their readiness for trial, noting that they had previously filed and served a COC and SOR. Defense counsel noted that she had not received discovery, a COC, and/or SOR and the People shared discovery, a COC, and a SOR with Ms. Shaffer the same day. Defense counsel requested the instant motion schedule, which was subsequently granted.

Now, in papers dated July 10, 2025, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for an Order dismissing the criminal action on the ground that she has been denied a speedy trial. Specifically, defendant contends that because People's SOR had been served on Mr. Blau, rather than Ms. Shaffer, that the June 22, 2026 SOR was ineffective to stop the speedy trial clock and the clock did not stop until June 25, 2026, the 94th day, when Ms. Shaffer was served. Defendant argues that, consequently, the People are attributable with more than the 90 chargeable days allowable to them, and that the case must be dismissed pursuant to speedy trial.

The People oppose in papers dated June 27, 2026, arguing that the June 22, 2026 SOR sufficiently stopped the speedy trial clock, despite incorrect service on the wrong attorney, because the People's actions were made in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances. The People argue that they were unaware of the change in representation because the prosecutor did not have actual knowledge of Ms. Shaffer's appearance.

In reply papers dated July 31, 2026, defendant argues that the People did not act reasonably as counsel appeared in court on April 30, 2026, spoke on the record, and handed a Notice of Appearance to the court and to the People, giving the People ample notice of counsel's representation. Defendant attaches the calendar minutes, dated April 30, 2026 in support of her original motion (Defendant's Exhibit A annexed).

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within "ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action" where a defendant is charged with "a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months " See CPL § 30.30(1)(b). Here, the criminal action commenced, on a misdemeanor with a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, on March 23, 2026, when the accusatory instrument was filed, so speedy trial began to run the following day with an allowable ninety-days. People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987) (excluding day of reckoning from speedy trial computations). As the parties are in agreement that the June 25, 2026 SOR was made after the expiration of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30, the only issue this Court must decide is the validity of service as to the June 22, 2026 SOR. After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

To prevail on a motion to dismiss under CPL § 30.30 (1)(a), a defendant must present sworn allegations of fact establishing an unexcused delay that exceeds the statutory limit. People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 (1992); People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 357 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant must claim that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed period to meet their initial burden. People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 (2011); People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 41 (2016); People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant has asserted that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of a criminal action without a valid declaration of readiness from the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay. People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

At all times until the People announce that they are ready for trial, the People are chargeable with the time that elapses unless they can show that the specific delay is not chargeable to them pursuant to an exception enumerated in the statute. CPL §§ 30.30(1), (4); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-26 (1st Dept 2022). Moreover, under the newly enacted discovery laws defined in CPL Article 245, the People's valid compliance with their discovery obligations is now a prerequisite to asserting trial readiness. See CPL §§ 245.50(3); 30.30(5). Once the People have met this statutory predicate by filing a valid COC, an accompanying statement of readiness is "presumed truthful and accurate and that a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory" People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). Thus, "[i]n the absence of proof that [a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position ..., the People [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998).

A valid statement of readiness requires "either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court, transcribed by a stenographer, or recorded by the clerk or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk, to be placed in the original record." People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 (1985). When the People file an off-calendar statement of readiness, they must also promptly notify the defense (Kendzia, 64 NY2d at 337; People v Anderson, 252 AD2d 399, 400 [1st Dept 1998]). While what constitutes prompt notification may vary (e.g., People v Collins, 186 Misc 2d 818, 821 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 2000] [five day delay not prompt]; People v. Bloodworth, 173 AD3d 1838, 1840 [4th Dep't 2019] [17 days not prompt]), if the People do not promptly notify the defense, the statement of readiness is not effective until the defense receives actual notice of their statement. People v Bonilla, 94 AD3d 633, 634 [2d Dept 2012]); People v Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270(A) (Crim Ct NY Co 2025) (Coleman, J) (statement of readiness filed on attorney who appeared on actual counsel's behalf when actual counsel filed notice of appearance and made appearances not reasonable and 13 day delay not prompt notification).

There are, however, exceptions. Service of a statement of readiness incorrectly served to the wrong attorney or address will not always implicate the prompt/actual notification rule. In such an instance, the statement of readiness is still effective despite incorrect service on a defense attorney if the People' actions were made in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances. See People v McClure, 80 Misc 3d 238, 241 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2023) (citing Kendzia, supra) ("[i]t is the filing of the statement, not service, that is critical, and all that is required is 'prompt' notice to defense counsel"). For example, in cases such as People v Vaughn, 36 AD3d 434 (1st Dept 2007) and People v Nina, 291 AD2d 294 (1st Dept 2002), it was reasonable for the People to have mailed their statements of readiness to defense counsel's former address based on their limited knowledge and the circumstances apparent to them. Whereas, in stark contrast, in People v Telemaque, 43 Misc 3d 138(A) (App Term, 2d Dept 2014), the prosecution's statement of readiness was ineffective because it was unreasonable for the People to have served their statement of readiness on defendant's former counsel, a LAS attorney, when private counsel filed a notice of appearance and made court appearances. Similarly, in People v Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270(A) (Crim Ct NY Co 2025) (Coleman, J), it was unreasonable for the People to have served a statement of readiness on a substitute counsel standing for counsel when defendant's counsel had filed a notice of appearance and made court appearances. Id. In that case, the court held that the thirteen days between service on the incorrect attorney and service on the correct one was not prompt notification. Id.

Here, contrary to the People's assertions, their actions are more akin to the People in Telemaque and Calvin Y. than Vaughn and Nina. As defendant aptly points out, Ms. Shaffer filed a Notice of Appearance with the court and People and made court appearances. The People were, thus, amply placed on notice and should have served the correct attorney. That the assigned prosecutor did not have actual knowledge of counsel's representation is irrelevant in this analysis. Institutional attorneys are responsible for routing documents that are served on their office to the individual attorneys assigned to a case. People v Aucanzhala, 2024 NY Slip Op 51737(U) (Crim Ct, Queens Co 2024). Thus, the People's actions were unreasonable, and the initial SOR did not stop the speedy trial clock. Consequently, the three-day delay from the People's June 22, 2026 SOR to service on counsel on June 25, 2026 was not prompt notification. Therefore, the People are attributable with 94 days, in excess of their allowances.

For these reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. The information is accordingly dismissed.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.

Dated: August 19, 2026

New York, New York

ELIZABETH Y. SHAMAHS, J.C.C.

Elizabeth Y. Shamahs, J.